ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

**OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 016-17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duty-On (X) Off ()</th>
<th>Uniform-Yes (X) No ()</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rampart</td>
<td>3/6/17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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**Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>10 years, 8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer D</td>
<td>11 years, 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer E</td>
<td>4 years, 5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer F</td>
<td>4 years, 9 months</td>
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**Reason for Police Contact**

Officers responded to a radio call of an intoxicated woman with a gun at a residence. Upon the officers’ arrival, they learned the female was suicidal and had barricaded herself within her residence and was armed with a shotgun. After approximately two hours, the woman exited her residence, pointed a rifle in the officers’ direction, and an officer-involved shooting (OIS) occurred.

**Subject**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deceased ()</th>
<th>Wounded (X)</th>
<th>Non-Hit ()</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject: Female, 45 years old.</td>
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**Board of Police Commissioners’ Review**

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division investigation (including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board recommendations; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police; and the report and recommendations of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

Because state law prohibits divulging the identity of police officers in public reports, for ease of reference, the masculine pronouns (he, his, and him) will be used in this report to refer to male or female employees.
The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on January 23, 2018.

**Incident Summary**

Witness A was with the Subject and Witness B while she was visiting from out of state. The Subject and Witness B had been divorced since 2014; however, they lived together in the same residence due to financial circumstances.

According to Witness A, the Subject started drinking alcohol at the age of 13. The Subject was admitted into a mental health facility in her late teens when she attempted to commit suicide by cutting her wrists. She had been admitted to detoxification and rehabilitation centers in the past for alcoholism.

The Subject was under a doctor’s care for several medical and mental health conditions and was taking medications for them. According to Witness A, the Subject had been on an alcohol binge for a month, which worsened her mental state. The Subject was known to be frequently angry and depressed. Witnesses A and B denied the Subject was physically violent or used drugs.

On the date of this incident, the Subject had agreed to go to the addiction center at a hospital. According to Witness A, the Subject had not slept well and had been drinking alcohol throughout the night. The Subject continued drinking vodka throughout the day, which made her very angry. At one point during the day, the Subject told Witness A that she was going to shoot herself, which concerned Witness A, because she knew that the Subject had a shotgun in her bedroom closet. The Subject became enraged when she called the addiction center and they told her that they could not take her that day. The Subject pulled all the food out of the refrigerator and threw it onto the floor.

**Note:** According to Witness B, the Subject purchased a rifle several years ago for protection when they lived in their prior residence. Witness A referred to the rifle as a shotgun.

A Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) emergency operator received a call from Witness A who stated the Subject had a gun and had threatened to shoot herself. The operator advised Witness A to wait outside of the residence. According to Witness B, she stayed on the patio until the police arrived. The LAFD operator called the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Communications Division (CD) and advised them of Witness A’s call.

CD broadcast, “Meet the fire department on […], combative patient, […], possibly in possession of a gun inside her room […].” CD broadcast, “Rampart unit available to meet with the fire department[.]”
The radio call was assigned to Officers A and B. Officer B drove the officers’ marked black and white police vehicle, equipped with a Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS). The officers acknowledged the call and responded to the location.

Sergeant A immediately advised CD to assign him the call.

An LAFD Rescue Ambulance (RA), along with other LAFD personnel, arrived at scene. Witness A met with the LAFD personnel and advised them that the Subject was intoxicated and she had a gun inside the residence. The LAFD personnel stood by and waited for the police to arrive on scene.

Approximately five minutes later, Officers C and D arrived at scene. The officers were in a marked black and white police vehicle equipped with a DICVS. They heard the broadcast to meet the LAFD personnel and advised CD that they were en route.

Officers A and B also arrived at the location and advised CD that they were at the scene. Officer B parked the officers’ police vehicle a few houses north of the Subject’s residence and they exited their vehicle. Officer A unlocked the rifle rack, retrieved his rifle, loaded a round into the chamber, and then carried the rifle in a sling across the front of his body.

Officer B approached LAFD personnel and Witness A, while Officer A positioned himself on the sidewalk facing toward the Subject’s residence, to keep a visual on the location. LAFD personnel advised Officer B that the Subject was inside the location, possibly armed with a shotgun. According to Witness A, the Subject was intoxicated inside her residence, had threatened to shoot herself, and had a shotgun inside her bedroom closet. Witness A was not aware if the shotgun was loaded.

At this time, Witness B exited the front yard of the residence and walked toward the officers. Officer A observed Witness B and verified with Officer B that Witness B was not the Subject.

Sergeant A, along with Officers C and D, arrived on scene. Sergeant A assumed the responsibility as incident commander (IC). Sergeant A advised the officers that three days prior, he had responded to a radio call and had contact with the Subject. According to Sergeant A, the Subject had called the police due to a dispute with Witness A. The Subject was intoxicated and wanted Witness A out of her residence. Witness A voluntarily left the Subject’s residence and stayed in a hotel for the night.

The officers established containment around the Subject’s residence and developed a plan to convince the Subject to exit her residence. Officer A walked toward the Subject’s residence and positioned himself on the corner of the property. Within a few minutes, Officer B joined Officer A at his location and unholstered his pistol.
Officer D called the Subject on her cellphone and she answered. The Subject told Officer D that she was upset, it was her birthday, and that she wanted Witnesses A and B out of the residence. Officer D stated he wanted to talk to her inside her residence, at which time she became irate and began to yell. Officer D asked the Subject if she had a gun, and she acknowledged that there was one in the residence. The Subject then hung up the phone. Officer D called the Subject again; she answered and said she did not want Witnesses A and B inside the residence and hung up the phone. Sergeant A attempted several times on his cellphone to call the Subject, but she did not answer. Sergeant A tried texting the Subject, and she did not reply. Sergeant A attempted calling the Subject via Witness B’s cellphone, and again she did not respond.

Sergeant A notified Lieutenant A and advised him that he possibly had a Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) callout. However, Sergeant A advised Lieutenant A to hold off calling SWAT, while he attempted to make contact with the Subject.

Meanwhile, Officer D requested three additional units and established a Command Post (CP). In the meantime, Officer B holstered his pistol and responded to the CP from his location, while Officer A remained in his position. Officer C, armed with a beanbag shotgun, positioned himself on the side of the Subject's residence. Officer B drove his police vehicle and joined Officer C. Before Officer B responded to Officer C’s location, he obtained Officer C’s rifle from the trunk of her vehicle, loaded it, and then placed the rifle in the rack between the front seats of his vehicle.

For the next 45 minutes, Sergeant A attempted several times to call and text the Subject. The Subject would answer her cellphone and immediately hang up. In the meantime, Officer A observed the Subject inside the residence through a front window, pick up a black folder and then walk away from the window. Officer A broadcast his observations on his police radio.

Officers E and F were in a marked black and white police vehicle equipped with a DICVS. For this incident, Officer E was assigned the role of using lethal force, and Officer F was assigned less-lethal force. The officers arrived at the location and advised CD.

Officers E and F responded to the CP and met with Sergeant A. Sergeant A told them to position a police vehicle close to the Subject’s residence so that they could utilize the public address (PA) system. Officer F drove Officer D’s police vehicle toward the Subject’s residence and positioned the vehicle in the middle of the street, facing the Subject’s residence. Officers E and F unholstered their pistols and took a position with Officer A. Officer E believed that they were too close to the Subject’s residence and advised that they should redeploy.

Officer A moved to the rear of a parked white van in front of the Subject’s residence. This position gave Officer A a better visual of the southwest corner of the Subject’s residence. Officers E and F moved to the west side, adjacent to the Subject’s residence. Officer E positioned himself along the front passenger side of a black vehicle parked along the curb, and holstered his pistol as Officer F deployed to the rear
of the vehicle.

In the interim, additional officers responded to the location and arrived within a few minutes of each other and advised CD that they were at the scene.

Officers G and H waited on the side of the street as Officer I evacuated the residents residing on the west side of the street. Officers J, K, L, and M deployed to the side of the Subject’s residence, along with Officers B and C.

Air Support Division (ASD) Officers N and O heard the radio call and responded over the location. Once overhead, Officer O verified a perimeter was established around the Subject’s residence.

Officer D utilized the PA system in his vehicle and directed the Subject to exit her residence and to surrender. The Subject did not respond. Officer D utilized the PA system for approximately an hour and a half, in addition to the Air Unit utilizing its PA system, with no response from the Subject.

Throughout the incident, the officers observed the Subject moving within her residence, yelling and pacing back and forth. According to Officer D, the Subject appeared to be upset based on her body language and communicated the Subject’s actions to the CP. At one point, the Subject exited her residence and retrieved a package from the front area of her residence. Officer D observed the Subject exit her residence and communicated with her via the PA system; the Subject ignored Officer D and re-entered her residence.

Officer O observed Officer A’s position behind the van and redeployed him to the side south of the Subject’s residence. Officer A positioned himself along the passenger side of a vehicle parked on the curb. Officer A placed the rifle on the hood of the vehicle.

Sergeant A called Lieutenant A and gave him an update of the situation. Sergeant A determined that SWAT needed to be notified since the Subject was armed, barricaded in her residence, and refusing to surrender. Sergeant A then notified SWAT. Officer O advised the units at the scene that the Air Unit needed to respond to another call and left the location.

Officer F deployed his beanbag shotgun, observed the Subject exit her residence, and then positioned himself to the rear of the vehicle. According to Officer E, based on the fact that the Subject was possibly armed with a shotgun, he asked Officer I to retrieve his rifle from his vehicle. Officer I retrieved Officer E’s rifle, handed Officer E his rifle and an extra magazine, and advised Officer E he had inserted a magazine into the rifle.

According to Officer F, believing the situation could escalate to where deadly force would be justified, he slung his beanbag over his shoulder, unholstered his pistol, and assumed a cover position. Officer E then repositioned himself to the right front passenger side of the vehicle. Officer F redeployed the beanbag and repositioned himself to the rear of the black vehicle.
At this time, Officer D reversed his police vehicle, away from the Subject’s residence and stopped two houses up from the Subject’s residence. Officer I unholstered his pistol and took a position on the passenger side of Officer D’s vehicle.

Lieutenant A arrived at scene and assumed the responsibility of IC.

Sergeant A notified SWAT of the incident. Sergeant A attempted to notify the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) and advise them of the incident, however, his notification was interrupted by a phone call from SWAT Lieutenant B. Sergeant A notified Lieutenant B of the incident. Lieutenant B contacted the MEU and was advised that the Subject was a prohibited possessor of firearms as a result of an incident that occurred in 2014. Lieutenant B advised Sergeant A of the Subject’s prior history and advised that he was going to send a Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) to the location.

Lieutenant B arrived at scene and was briefed by Sergeant A. Lieutenant B also spoke with Witnesses A and B to gather information on the Subject’s background. SWAT personnel also responded to the scene. According to Sergeant B, as the officers were formulating a plan on how to approach the incident from a CNT perspective, he heard yelling and heard via the radio that the Subject was exiting and also heard a mention of a rifle.

Ten minutes later, the Subject exited the front door of her residence and walked toward the front gate. Officers A, D, E, and F observed the Subject in the front yard and simultaneously provided commands to put her hands up. The Subject opened her front gate and exited onto the sidewalk, armed with a rifle. According to Officer E, he yelled out “Gun, gun, gun” as the Subject turned and started to raise the rifle in his direction. Officer E fired two to three rounds from his rifle toward the Subject as Officer F fired four rounds from his beanbag shotgun.

The Subject, who appeared unaffected by the gunfire, started to walk while armed with the rifle. According to Officer A, as the Subject turned, she swung the rifle in his direction, and he fired one round from his rifle. According to Officer E, as the Subject walked toward Officer A, he believed he fired two to three additional rounds from his rifle. According to Officer D, the Subject exited her front gate and held the rifle on her right side at a low-ready with the butt of the rifle under her right armpit. As the Subject raised the rifle toward Officers A, E, and F’s location, Officer D fired one round from his pistol toward the Subject. The Subject continued to raise the rifle toward the officers, and Officer D fired an additional round from his pistol toward the Subject. The Subject subsequently collapsed onto the sidewalk and dropped the rifle. Officers began to yell that the rifle was at the Subject’s feet, which were pointing north.
Following is an account of each of the officers’ actions during the OIS:

Officer A was deployed to the passenger side of a vehicle when he observed the Subject exit the front gate armed with a rifle. According to Officer A, the Subject was holding the rifle at a low-ready position with her right hand on the stock near her shoulder. Officer A heard three to five gunshots and did not know if the Subject or the officers had shot. The Subject turned the rifle toward Officer A’s direction. Officer A fired one round from his rifle from a standing right-shoulder shooting position from a distance of approximately 58 feet toward the Subject.

Note: Officer A’s actions are captured on his BWV but the movements of the Subject are not seen due the fact that Officer A’s position was behind a vehicle.

According to Officer A’s BWV, the OIS took six seconds.

Officer D was sitting on the driver’s side of his police vehicle when he observed the Subject exit her residence and walk toward the front gate. Officer D commanded the Subject to put her hands up several times via the PA system. The Subject ignored the commands and opened the gate. According to Officer D, he immediately recognized the barrel of a rifle pointed in a downward position and exited his vehicle as he unholstered his pistol. Officer D took a step away from his driver’s door as the Subject raised her rifle toward Officers A, E, and F’s locations. Officer D fired one round from his pistol, and the Subject did not go down. The Subject still had the rifle in her hands and continued to raise it toward the officers. Officer D fired an additional round from his pistol, and the Subject collapsed. Officer D’s two rounds were fired from a standing two-handed shooting position in a southwest direction from a distance of approximately 90 feet.

Officer E was deployed to the passenger side of the vehicle when he observed the Subject exit her residence and walk toward the front gate. The Subject opened the gate with her left hand and exited onto the sidewalk. Officer E observed the Subject armed with a rifle holding it with her right hand down along her right side. The Subject then gripped the front of the rifle with her left hand and began to raise it. The Subject then turned toward Officer E as she continued to raise the rifle. Officer E then fired two to three rounds from his rifle in her direction. Officer E believed the Subject was not affected by the gunfire as she began to walk north but then turned south toward Officer A’s position.

Concerned for the safety of Officer A if he lost sight of the Subject behind a van parked in front of her residence, he fired an additional two to three rounds from his rifle. The Subject then dropped the rifle and fell to the ground.

Officer E fired a total of six rounds from a standing right-shoulder shooting position, from an approximate distance of 60 feet in a southerly direction.

Note: The investigation determined that Officer E fired six total rounds.
from his rifle. Upon review of Officer E’s BWV, investigators were unable to determine how many rounds in each volley he fired from his rifle.

Officer F was deployed to the rear of a vehicle when he observed the Subject open the gate with her right hand and exit onto the sidewalk. According to Officer F, the Subject held the butt of the rifle against her left shoulder and the barrel pointed to her right side. The Subject grabbed the barrel with her right hand and raised the rifle. Officer F fired four rounds from the beanbag shotgun and simultaneously heard gunshots. According to Officer F, the Subject appeared unaffected by the gunshots as she was still standing armed with the rifle. Officer F transitioned to his pistol after his beanbag shotgun was empty. The Subject subsequently collapsed to the ground. Officer F holstered his pistol however he did not fire his pistol during the incident. Officer E’s four beanbag shotgun rounds were fired from a standing shooting position from an approximate distance of 66 feet, in a southerly direction.

Note: According to Officer F, he did not have an opportunity to give a warning prior to deploying the beanbag shotgun because he believed the threat of serious bodily injury was imminent; therefore, the warning was not feasible.

Upon review of the BWV, the rounds fired from the beanbag shotgun, pistol, and rifles appeared to be simultaneous. Investigators were unable to determine the sequence among fire of the officers. However, the BWV captured the officers communicating with each other that the Subject was down on the sidewalk and moving after the OIS.

Sergeant B, along with Officers P, Q, and R, while standing at the CP, heard a beanbag shotgun being deployed and then a series of gunshots. The SWAT officers formulated a plan to approach the Subject and take her into custody. The plan was for Officer P to cover and control the Subject, while Officer Q provided cover on the Subject’s residence as Sergeant B supervised. In order to approach the Subject safely, the officers needed some cover. The decision was made to utilize Officer D’s vehicle as cover as they approached the Subject. Sergeant B advised Lieutenant B, the other officers, and the CP of the plan.

Sergeant B, along with Officers P, Q, R, and G, approached the Subject. According to Sergeant B, his concern was the proximity of the rifle to the Subject. Sergeant B grabbed the Subject’s rifle and removed the magazine. He found that no cartridge came out, and no rounds were in the magazine. Sergeant B then placed the rifle and magazine in a planter located in front of the Subject’s residence. Officer G then handcuffed the Subject.

Officers A and I approached the Subject’s location on the sidewalk. Officer I unholstered his pistol and, along with Officer A, assisted Officers P and Q in conducting a protective sweep of the Subject’s residence. The residence was cleared, and no other persons were located inside. Officer I holstered his pistol after the residence was cleared.
An RA was requested, and the paramedics responded from the CP to the Subject’s location. Officer G removed the handcuffs from the Subject upon the request of the paramedics who rendered medical treatment. The RA subsequently transported the Subject to a hospital.

Sergeant A obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officers A, E, and D, separately.

**Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners’ Findings**

The BOPC reviews each Categorical Use of Force incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all other pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: Tactics of the involved officer(s); Drawing/Exhibiting of a weapon by any involved officer(s); and the Use of Force by any involved officer(s). All incidents are evaluated to identify areas where involved officers can benefit from a tactical debriefing to improve their response to future tactical situations. This is an effort to ensure that all officers benefit from the critical analysis that is applied to each incident as it is reviewed by various levels within the Department and by the BOPC. Based on the BOPC’s review of the instant case, the BOPC made the following findings.

**A. Tactics**

The BOPC found Sergeant A, and Officers A, E, D, and F’s tactics to warrant a Tactical Debrief.

**B. Drawing/Exhibiting**

The BOPC found Sergeant A, and Officers A, E, D, and F’s drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be in policy.

**C. Less-Lethal Use of Force**

The BOPC found Officer F’s less-lethal use of force to be in policy.

**D. Lethal Use of Force**

The BOPC found Officers A, E, and D’s lethal use of force to be in policy.

**Basis for Findings**

- **Detention**

  The involved officers responded to a radio call to meet with the Fire Department for a combative, intoxicated female, who was possibly armed with a gun. As the incident unfolded, the officers confirmed the female had a weapon inside the residence and that she was prohibited to possess a firearm. As they were
attempting to resolve the situation, the Subject exited her residence armed with a rifle, resulting in an OIS. The officers’ actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

A. Tactics

• Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, the Subject was inside her residence, possibly armed with firearm, and refusing to exit. The officers attempted to de-escalate the situation by establishing lines of communication with the Subject in an effort gain the Subject’s compliance, utilizing time to reduce the intensity of the incident, and establishing containment rather than attempting to enter.

After approximately two hours, while awaiting the assistance of the additional resources, the Subject exited the residence armed with a rifle and began to raise it toward the officers. Faced with an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death, the officers utilized lethal force to stop the deadly threat.

• During the review of this incident, the following debriefing points were noted:

1. Utilization of Cover

Officer D moved from the cover of his vehicle’s ballistic door panels when he observed the Subject exit her front gate, armed with a rifle.

The utilization of cover enables officers to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer’s tactical options.

In this case, when Officer D indicated that he left the cover of his ballistic door in order for him to maintain sight of the Subject, he was aware of additional cover to his left and felt that deploying to a secondary position of cover would provide him with additional time to react, formulate a plan, and wait for additional resources.

The BOPC determined that in this circumstance, Officer D’s actions were not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training.

2. Crossfire/Situational Awareness

Officers I and H covered the Subject with their service pistols as they approached Officer D from behind, creating a possible crossfire situation.
Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. The ability to utilize situational awareness and adjust to a tactical situation ensures minimal exposure to all involved officers.

In this case, Officers I and H recognized there was potential crossfire with Officer D, adjusted their positioning, and continued to work as a team throughout the incident given the dynamics of the situation.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that Officers I and H's actions were not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training.

3. Agitated Delirium

The investigation revealed that during this incident, the Subject's behavior was consistent with a person suffering from a state of Agitated Delirium. In an effort to improve future tactical performance, the BOPC recommended that these officers should review the relevant tactics directive on Agitated Delirium.

4. Ballistic Helmets

The investigation revealed that not all Rampart Area personnel wore their ballistic helmets as they held containment positions in and around the residence. All involved personnel are reminded to don their ballistic helmets while involved in a tactical situation involving an armed suspect, whenever feasible.

5. Patrol Rifle Deployment

The investigation revealed that Officer E had Officer I retrieve his police rifle from his vehicle, rather than retrieving it himself. Although, Officer I was patrol rifle certified, it is recommended that an officer retrieves his own weapon whenever tactically feasible.

6. Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands

The investigation revealed that several officers gave simultaneous commands to the Subject during the incident. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance.

7. Beanbag Shotgun Effectiveness Distances

The investigation revealed that Officer F fired his beanbag shotgun from an approximate distance of 66 feet. Officer F is reminded that the designated range for the bean bag shotgun is five to 45 feet.
8. Use of Force Warning

The investigation revealed Officer F did not provide a Use of Force Warning prior to deploying his less-lethal force option. Officer F is reminded that a Use of Force Warning shall be given whenever feasible.

9. Public Safety Statement

The investigation revealed that Sergeant A asked questions about the OIS in a group setting prior to obtaining a PSS from the involved officers. Sergeant A is reminded of the importance of obtaining a compelled, independent PSS after an OIS.

- The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made and a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

In conclusion, BOPC found Sergeant A, and Officers A, E, D, and F’s tactics to warrant a Tactical Debrief.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

- According to Officer A, based on the nature of the radio call, he deployed his rifle.

According to Officer D, he observed the Subject exit the yard armed with a rifle. He then exited the vehicle and drew his service pistol.

According to Officer E, based on the information that the Subject was possibly armed with a shotgun, he deployed his Patrol Rifle. According to Officer E, as the incident unfolded, he decided to deploy his Patrol Rifle due to the Subject being armed with a shotgun.

According to Officer F, when Officer E loaded his Patrol Rifle, he experienced a malfunction. So, he slung his beanbag shotgun and drew his service pistol to provide cover as Officer E cleared the malfunction.

According to Sergeant A, he drew his service pistol when he moved up to check on the involved officers and confirm there was only one suspect at the location.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined an officer with similar training and experience as Sergeant A, and Officers A, D, E, and F while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Sergeant A and Officers A, D, E, and F’s drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be in policy.

C. Less-Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer F** – (four rounds, Beanbag Shotgun)

  According to Officer F, he observed the Subject exit the yard armed with a rifle. He could hear his partner yelling that she had a gun and fired four beanbag shotgun rounds at the Subject.

  Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer F, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe the application of a less-lethal force option to stop the Subject’s actions was objectively reasonable.

  In conclusion, the BOPC found Officer F’s less-lethal use of force to be in policy.

D. Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer A** – (rifle, one round)

  According to Officer A, the Subject then started to turn toward him and swing the gun in his direction. In fear for his life, he fired one round at the Subject from his Patrol Rifle.

  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers A, D, and E, would reasonably believe that the Subject’s actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

- **Officer D** – (pistol, two rounds)

  **First Sequence of Fire**

  According to Officer D, the Subject was looking at Officers A, E, and F as she raised her rifle. In fear that the Subject was going to shoot at them, he fired one round from his service pistol at the Subject.

  **Second Sequence of Fire**

  According to Officer D, he assessed, observed the Subject was unaffected, and that
she was continuing to raise the rifle. He then fired a second round at the Subject.

• Officer E – (rifle, six rounds)

First Sequence of Fire

According to Officer E, he gave the Subject commands to drop the gun, but she didn’t comply. In fear for his safety, and the safety of his partner, he fired two to three rounds from his Patrol Rifle at the Subject.

Second Sequence of Fire

According to Officer E, he lowered his rifle, assessed and observed that the Subject still had the rifle in her hand. Fearing if the Subject continued moving behind a van parked on the street she would have a direct shot at Officer A, he fired two to three additional rounds at the Subject.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Officers A, D, and E’s lethal use of force to be in policy.