


INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

February 14, 2 3.2	2018
TO:	The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners
FROM:	Chief of Police
SUBJECT:	OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 018-17
Honorable Me	mbers:
The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 018-17. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on January 22, 2018. In this case, the recommended findings were not unanimous with a minority opinion rendered regarding the Lethal Use of Force finding for Officer Serial No.	
Note:	
I have carefully weighed each opinion, considered the case in its entirety and have adopted the recommendations of the majority opinion. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.	
SUMMARY	
On March 7, 2017, at approximately 2217 hours, Officers Serial No. Serial No. and Southeast Area, Gang Enforcement Detail (GED), were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white hybrid police vehicle.	
Compton Aver	he officers, they were driving westbound on Imperial Highway approaching nue when they heard a crime broadcast of a <i>carjacking</i> with a possible kidnap he vehicle, described as a <i>white Ram truck 1500</i> .
They then observed a truck matching the description driving eastbound on Imperial Highway towards their location. They conducted a U-turn and positioned their police vehicle behind the possible suspect's vehicle.	

According to the officers, they heard a license plate number given during the crime broadcast, but requested that Communications Division (CD) re-broadcast the license plate number to verify that they were in fact following the correct vehicle. After verifying that they were following the possible suspect, they advised CD that they were following the suspect and requested a *back-up*, *air unit*, and a *supervisor*.







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ANALYSI

Detention

While on patrol, the officers observed a vehicle matching the description of a carjacking and possible kidnap suspect's vehicle. The officers verified that it was the suspect's vehicle and

attempted to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to Tactical Debriefs is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."


Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).


The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation


Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.





During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:



Does the surrounding area provide a clear background/foreground? Officers must be aware of where the bullet will go and where it may stop. Officers should not fire under conditions that would subject bystanders to death or possible injury, except in Imminent Defense of Life or to prevent serious bodily injury (Standardized Roll Call Training Program, Deployment Period No. 8/2007).

Officer exited police vehicle and ran in front of officers at the time of the OIS.

In this case, Officer actions endangered own life as well as prevented Officer from taking immediate action to stop a deadly threat.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Utilization of Cover


Cover is defined as any object that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to seek cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding areas can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop certain rounds (gun, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department Basic Firearms Manual, January 2014).

Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXV, Issue 9 May 2003).

Officer left the cover of ballistic door while confronting a suspect armed with a knife.


The utilization of cover enables officers to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer's tactical options.

In this case, Officer was concerned the suspect would drive vehicle toward them and did not want to get caught between door and vehicle. Additionally, believed




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Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made and a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.



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
Note: In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional personnel that either drew or exhibited firearms during the incident. This Drawing/Exhibiting was appropriate and requires no specific findings or action in regard to these officers.

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat
 of death or serious bodily injury; or,
- Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,
- Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).

556.10).
Officer ————————————————————————————————————
According to Officer observed Castro lunging toward the victim as was exiting the vehicle. Fearing that Castro would kill fired four rounds at Castro to stop his actions.
Officer recalled,
When he then he then lunged towards the victim as she was exiting the vehicle and at that point I fired four rounds because I was in fear that if we didn't stop his actions he would possibly kill the victim so I was in fear for life. He then exits the vehicle, runs northbound, and I think I just remember after I had finished shooting my fourth round I heard approximately one more shot fired.
Officer ————————————————————————————————————
According to Officer observed Castro stab multiple times and proceed to chase with the knife. Believing that Castro was attempting to kill fired two rounds at Castro to stop his actions.



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CHARLIE BECK Chief of Police

vehicle in park and I exit the vehicle. And I see him stabbing her and it looks like going to lose vital organs, it's going to cause a lot of damage and in defense of life I shot at the suspect. And I I wish I could tell you exactly how many rounds. I know it was more than five but I don't know how many and I fired until he dropped.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers (rounds 1-7), would reasonably believe that Castro's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.
Therefore, I find Officers , and , and 's (rounds 1-7), Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer with, when firing his eighth round, would not reasonably believe that Castro's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.
Therefore, I find Officer 's eighth round of Lethal Force to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval.
Audio/Video Recordings
Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/Body Worn Video (BWV) – Sergeant along with Officers and so and so so show and so show a so show a so show a solution of the OIS. Additionally, the OIS was captured by the DICVS from Shop numbers and southeast Patrol Division personnel were not equipped with BWV at the time of this incident.
Outside Video – Video obtained from a surveillance camera located at captured the OIS.
Respectfully,