

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

February 14, 2018
3.2

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID NO. 018-17

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 018-17. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on January 22, 2018. In this case, the recommended findings were not unanimous with a minority opinion rendered regarding the Lethal Use of Force finding for Officer [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED]

Note: [REDACTED]

I have carefully weighed each opinion, considered the case in its entirety and have adopted the recommendations of the majority opinion. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY

On March 7, 2017, at approximately 2217 hours, Officers [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Southeast Area, Gang Enforcement Detail (GED), were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white hybrid police vehicle.

According to the officers, they were driving westbound on Imperial Highway approaching Compton Avenue when they heard a crime broadcast of a *carjacking* with a possible kidnap victim inside the vehicle, described as a *white Ram truck 1500*.

They then observed a truck matching the description driving eastbound on Imperial Highway towards their location. They conducted a U-turn and positioned their police vehicle behind the possible suspect's vehicle.

[REDACTED]

According to the officers, they heard a license plate number given during the crime broadcast, but requested that Communications Division (CD) re-broadcast the license plate number to verify that they were in fact following the correct vehicle. After verifying that they were following the possible suspect, they advised CD that they were following the suspect and requested a *back-up, air unit, and a supervisor.*

Additional personnel responded to the back-up request, including Sergeant [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Southeast Area GED, and Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Southeast Patrol Division.

According to the Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], upon the arrival of additional resources, they activated their forward facing red light and attempted to conduct a traffic stop of the suspect's vehicle. The driver failed to yield, and Officer [REDACTED] advised CD that they were in pursuit.

According to Sergeant [REDACTED] responded and declared [REDACTED] the Incident Commander (IC) of the pursuit upon [REDACTED] arrival. As the pursuit progressed, it left the City of Los Angeles and entered into the Los Angeles County Sheriff's jurisdiction. Due to the officers being unfamiliar with the area, and the possibility of needing a perimeter, [REDACTED] authorized four units in the pursuit.

Additionally, due to the slow speed of the pursuit, varying between *20 to 40 miles an hour*, [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] cellular telephone to call Sergeant [REDACTED], Serial No. [REDACTED] Watch Commander, Southeast Patrol Division, to discuss the possibility of utilizing the Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT).

According to Sergeant [REDACTED] after discussing it with Sergeant [REDACTED] requested a PIT certified unit and authorized the application of the PIT. [REDACTED] authorized the PIT because [REDACTED] has been *taught* that the more time that passes, the greater the risk of *bodily harm* to the victim.

According to Sergeant [REDACTED] as the suspect's vehicle turned north on South Broadway from Rosecrans Avenue, [REDACTED] observed the PIT being conducted and the vehicle *spin around, facing* toward the officers. The suspect then *backed up* the vehicle over the *east curb* next to a *building*, at which time [REDACTED] observed a male, later identified as J. Castro, inside the cab of the truck making a *stabbing motion* towards the passenger in the vehicle. [REDACTED] then stopped [REDACTED] vehicle, opened [REDACTED] door, and heard *shots ring out.*

According to Officer [REDACTED], after Castro's vehicle came to a stop, [REDACTED] observed Castro with a knife stabbing a [REDACTED], later identified as [REDACTED] inside the truck. [REDACTED] then exited [REDACTED] vehicle, and drew [REDACTED] service pistol (Drawing/Exhibiting).

Note: Due to the nature of the crime, the victim is referred to by first name and last initial to maintain confidentiality.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] exiting the passenger door of the vehicle and Castro *lunged* towards [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] was exiting. Fearing that Castro would kill [REDACTED] if [REDACTED]

did not take immediate action, ■ fired four rounds to stop the deadly threat. Castro then exited the vehicle and ran northbound (Lethal Use of Force).

According to Officer ■, after the suspect's vehicle came to a stop, ■ observed Castro *stabbing some ■ multiple times*. ■ then exited ■ vehicle and drew ■ service pistol (Drawing/Exhibiting).

Note: The investigation revealed that Officer ■ did not place ■ police vehicle in park prior to exiting (Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Situational Awareness).

According to Officer ■ observed ■ exit the vehicle and Castro *proceeded to chase ■ with the knife*. As ■ aimed ■ service pistol at Castro, ■ observed *an officer* run in front of ■ ■ service pistol at low-ready and, when the officer moved out ■ way, ■ observed Castro *running towards ■ with the knife* then aimed ■ service pistol at Castro and fired two rounds. After firing ■ weapon, ■ assessed and observed that Castro was on the ground (Lethal Use of Force).

Note: Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) captured Officer ■ running in front of officers at the time of the OIS (Debriefing Point No. 1).

According to Officer ■, as ■ exited ■ vehicle, ■ observed Castro *stabbing towards the passenger seat*. ■ could not see if there was a victim in the vehicle and approached the vehicle to *render aid immediately*. ■ then heard *shots start to fire, dropped to the ground*, and returned to cover behind ■ ballistic door panel, then drew ■ service pistol (Drawing/Exhibiting).

According to Officer ■, after the suspect's vehicle came to a stop, ■ exited ■ vehicle, illuminated Castro with ■ spotlight, and observed Castro *stab ■ repeatedly with a knife*. ■ advised the other officers, *he's got a knife he's stabbing ■*. As ■ drew ■ service pistol, ■ observed that Castro was continuing to stab ■ (Drawing/Exhibiting).

According to Officer ■, ■ fled out of the passenger door, and Castro *immediately pursued ■* observed that Castro still had the knife *in his hands*, and in *immediate defense of ■ life*, ■ fired one round at Castro. ■ believed that ■ round struck Castro, because Castro *went down* (Lethal Use of Force).

Note: The investigation revealed that Officer ■ fired three rounds during the OIS.

According to Officer ■, after the vehicle came to a stop, ■ observed Castro *grab a knife and start stabbing ■* stopped ■ vehicle, exited, and drew ■ service pistol. ■ moved away from ■ ballistic door so that ■ would not *get caught between the door and the car*, and to *get a better field of view* so that he would not *endanger ■* when ■ fired ■ service pistol (Debriefing Point No. 2 and Drawing/Exhibiting).

Note: The investigation revealed that Officer ■ did not place ■ police vehicle in park prior to exiting (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Situational Awareness).

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] exit from the passenger side of the vehicle chased by Castro. In *defense of [REDACTED] life*, [REDACTED] began firing [REDACTED] service pistol at Castro as [REDACTED] moved forward toward [REDACTED] to have a better *angle* so that [REDACTED] was *outside his field of fire*. He continued to fire rounds at Castro until Castro *fell to the ground* (Lethal Use of Force).

Note: The investigation revealed that Officer [REDACTED] fired eight rounds during the OIS. A review of the video related to the incident revealed that Officer [REDACTED] fired [REDACTED] eighth round approximately 2.3 seconds after Castro had fallen to the ground.

According to Sergeant [REDACTED] after the OIS he formulated a tactical plan to approach and take Castro into custody. [REDACTED] directed the arrest team to hold their position while officers cleared the vehicle and to avoid any *crossfire*. Once the vehicle was cleared, [REDACTED] directed the arrest team to approach and take Castro into custody (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Less-Lethal Force Options).

Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) responded and treated Castro at the scene for a gunshot wound. [REDACTED] was transported by McCormick Ambulance Services to Harbor-University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center, where [REDACTED] was treated for a gunshot wound to [REDACTED] back.

[REDACTED] was treated by LACFD and then transported by RA to Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, where [REDACTED] was admitted to the Intensive-Care Unit for multiple stab wounds to [REDACTED] arms, chest, and back.

Sergeant [REDACTED] Serial No. [REDACTED] Southeast Patrol Division, responded and assumed the role of IC, due to Sergeant [REDACTED] involvement as a witness to the OIS. [REDACTED] ensured that Public Safety Statements (PSS) were obtained from the officers involved in the OIS, and that all involved personnel were separated and monitored.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Sergeant [REDACTED] along with Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. Administrative Disapproval, Officer [REDACTED].

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED].

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] (rounds 1-7). Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Officer [REDACTED] (8th round).

ANALYSIS

Detention

While on patrol, the officers observed a vehicle matching the description of a carjacking and possible kidnap suspect's vehicle. The officers verified that it was the suspect's vehicle and attempted to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to Tactical Debriefs is: "The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: "A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques).

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, upon termination of the vehicle pursuit, the suspect immediately began stabbing the kidnap victim inside the vehicle and continued to chase after the victim with a knife as [REDACTED] fled for [REDACTED] life from the vehicle. Faced with an immediate defense of life situation, the officers used lethal force to stop the threat.

[REDACTED]

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Crossfire (Substantial Deviation – Officer [REDACTED])

Does the surrounding area provide a clear background/foreground? Officers must be aware of where the bullet will go and where it may stop. Officers should not fire under conditions that would subject bystanders to death or possible injury, except in Imminent Defense of Life or to prevent serious bodily injury (Standardized Roll Call Training Program, Deployment Period No. 8/2007).

Officer [REDACTED] exited [REDACTED] police vehicle and ran in front of officers at the time of the OIS.

In this case, Officer [REDACTED] actions endangered [REDACTED] own life as well as prevented Officer [REDACTED] from taking immediate action to stop a deadly threat.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer [REDACTED] actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Utilization of Cover

Cover is defined as any object that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to seek cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding areas can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop certain rounds (gun, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department Basic Firearms Manual, January 2014).

Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXV, Issue 9 May 2003).

Officer [REDACTED] left the cover of [REDACTED] ballistic door while confronting a suspect armed with a knife.

The utilization of cover enables officers to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer's tactical options.

In this case, Officer [REDACTED] was concerned the suspect would drive [REDACTED] vehicle toward them and did not want to get caught between [REDACTED] door and [REDACTED] vehicle. Additionally, [REDACTED] believed

that [REDACTED] needed to move away from the door in order to obtain a better position to fire at the suspect to prevent striking the victim with [REDACTED] rounds.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that while identified as an area for improvement, Officer [REDACTED]'s actions were a reasonable and justified deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Situational Awareness – The investigation revealed that Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] exited their vehicles to engage an armed suspect without placing the vehicle in park. Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are reminded that not placing the vehicle park can place officers and the community in danger. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Less-Lethal Force Options – The investigation revealed that Sergeant [REDACTED] did not assign less-lethal cover officers as part of the arrest team when approaching the suspect. Although not required, I would have preferred that a less-lethal option was deployed in case the suspect attempted to resist officers with bodily force. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

Sergeant [REDACTED] declared [REDACTED] as the IC during the pursuit. After the OIS, [REDACTED] formulated a tactical plan to approach the suspect and take him into custody. Sergeant [REDACTED] responded and assumed the role of IC, due to Sergeant [REDACTED] involvement as a witness to the OIS.

The actions of these supervisors were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, I find that the tactics utilized by Officer [REDACTED] substantially, and unjustifiably, deviated from approved Department tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Additionally, I find that the tactics utilized by Sergeant [REDACTED] along with Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] did not deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made and a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Sergeant [REDACTED] along with Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On April 10, 2017, Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered, including Maintaining Cover.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: "An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.80).

According to Officer [REDACTED], after Castro's vehicle came to a stop [REDACTED] observed Castro with a knife stabbing a [REDACTED] inside the truck. [REDACTED] then exited [REDACTED] vehicle, and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

And at that point when I initially observed him stabbing the victim I drew my weapon - - I drew my firearm [REDACTED]

According to Officer [REDACTED], after suspect's vehicle came to a stop, [REDACTED] observed Castro stabbing a [REDACTED] multiple times. [REDACTED] then exited [REDACTED] vehicle and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

I do it the second I get out of the vehicle. I see he's stabbing [REDACTED] so I pretty much do it - - I'm

[REDACTED]

-- I'm -- I see it's immediate defense of her life as I said so I'm doing it as I'm getting out of the vehicle I'm un-holstering my weapon

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro stabbing a [REDACTED] repeatedly with a knife and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

I immediately announced to all officers "He's stabbing [REDACTED] He's stabbing [REDACTED] He's got a knife. He's stabbing [REDACTED]" to alert my partner and all other responding officers that there was a stabbing in progress going on; an attempt murder in progress going on in front of our very eyes. At which point, I drew my service weapon

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro grab a knife and start stabbing [REDACTED] and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

Immediately, as soon as I saw him stabbing...I would say it was almost simultaneously as I exited I unholstered so I -- I'm right-handed, sir. So, I threw the vehicle in park and as I exited the vehicle I unholstered and got my sight picture

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro stabbing towards the passenger seat and drew [REDACTED] service pistol.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

As I initially exited my vehicle and I saw the suspect making the stabbing motions on the seat next to him I drew my firearm based on the tactical situation and my reasonable belief that the situation may escalate to deadly force.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]'s Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

[REDACTED]

Note: In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional personnel that either drew or exhibited firearms during the incident. This Drawing/Exhibiting was appropriate and requires no specific findings or action in regard to these officers.

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Officer [REDACTED] – 9mm, four rounds in a northerly direction from an approximate distance of 45 feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro lunging toward the victim as [REDACTED] was exiting the vehicle. Fearing that Castro would kill [REDACTED] fired four rounds at Castro to stop his actions.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

When he then - - he then lunged towards the victim as she was exiting the vehicle and at that point I fired four rounds because I was in fear that if we didn't stop his actions he would possibly kill the victim so I was in fear for [REDACTED] life. He then exits the vehicle, runs northbound, and I think - - I just remember after I had finished shooting my fourth round I heard approximately one more shot fired. █

Officer [REDACTED] – 9mm, two rounds in a northerly direction from an approximate distance of 52 feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro stab [REDACTED] multiple times and proceed to chase [REDACTED] with the knife. Believing that Castro was attempting to kill [REDACTED] fired two rounds at Castro to stop his actions.

█

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

I fired because I believed that this guy was -- had stabbed this [REDACTED] multiple times and he was obviously trying to finish the job. He obviously was in the mindset like that the -- hey, the police are in front of me. I'm still going to kill [REDACTED] which is, you know, I -- that's pretty messed up. I don't know. That's -- he was obviously out of his mind or on something. So, he -- in my mind he was going to do whatever he could to try to -- try to make sure [REDACTED] died so we wanted to stop him before he could get to -- get to [REDACTED] again. So that -- that was it. He was run -- I saw -- I saw [REDACTED] run, I saw him run after [REDACTED] and so the second I could I raised my weapon and fired two rounds at him. The second -- after two rounds I lowered my weapon and I saw he was on the ground and then she -- I didn't see [REDACTED] so I assumed that [REDACTED] got away.

Officer [REDACTED] -- .45 caliber, three rounds in a northeasterly direction from an approximate distance of 46 feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed Castro chasing after [REDACTED] with the knife in his hand. In immediate defense of [REDACTED] life, [REDACTED] fired one round at Castro.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

I could see that he appeared to be determined to kill this [REDACTED] based on my experience as a police officer. He -- he -- [REDACTED] was able to break free of his grasp and -- and [REDACTED] fled from the vehicle out the passenger door. Again, [REDACTED] was facing us. [REDACTED] flees out and as he's -- he immediately pursues [REDACTED]

So, in immediate defense of [REDACTED] life knowing that he was going to chase [REDACTED] and kill [REDACTED] if he -- based on his actions I was convinced that he would finish the job I -- I fired my service weapon what I believe to be was one shot. And I felt that I had struck him because as I fired it appeared to me that he had received the -- the round into his body and -- and kind of jolted and went down but there were multiple shots being fired.

Officer [REDACTED] -- 9mm, eight rounds in a northeasterly direction from an approximate decreasing distance of 46 to 39 feet.

According to Officer [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] exit from the passenger side of vehicle chased by Castro. In defense of [REDACTED] life, [REDACTED] began firing [REDACTED] service pistol at Castro and continued to fire rounds at Castro until Castro fell to the ground.

Officer [REDACTED] recalled,

I see him get that look in his eye and grab the weapon and then start to stab. I put the

[REDACTED]

vehicle in park and I exit the vehicle. And I see him stabbing her and it looks like [REDACTED] going to lose vital organs, it's going to cause a lot of damage and in defense of [REDACTED] life I shot at the suspect. And I - - I wish I could tell you exactly how many rounds. I know it was more than five but I don't know how many and I fired until he dropped.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] (rounds 1-7), would reasonably believe that Castro's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]'s (rounds 1-7), Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I have determined, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer [REDACTED], when firing his eighth round, would not reasonably believe that Castro's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer [REDACTED]'s eighth round of Lethal Force to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/Body Worn Video (BWV) – Sergeant [REDACTED] along with Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], as well as Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]'s DICVS captured the OIS. Additionally, the OIS was captured by the DICVS from Shop numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Southeast Patrol Division personnel were not equipped with BWV at the time of this incident.

Outside Video – Video obtained from a surveillance camera located at [REDACTED] captured the OIS.

Respectfully,



CHARLIE BECK
Chief of Police

Date: 2-14-18

[REDACTED]