ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 097-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duty-On (X) Off ( ) Uniform-Yes (X) No ( )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. Hollywood</td>
<td>11/22/13</td>
<td></td>
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**Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>8 years, 7 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer B</td>
<td>5 years, 8 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Reason for Police Contact**

Officers responded to a call of a man armed with a handgun walking down the street. Upon arrival they attempted to contact the subject who pulled a handgun from his waistband and pointed it at the officers resulting in an officer-involved shooting (OIS).

**Subject(s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deceased (X)</th>
<th>Wounded ( )</th>
<th>Non-Hit ( )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Subject: Male, 18 years of age.

**Board of Police Commissioners’ Review**

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division investigation (including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board recommendations; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police; and the report and recommendations of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

Because state law prohibits divulging the identity of police officers in public reports, for ease of reference, the masculine pronouns (he, his, and him) will be used in this report to refer to male or female employees.

The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on November 4, 2014.
Incident Summary

On the date and time noted, a resident called 911 to report that she had just driven past a man armed with a gun. The man was walking on down the street, talking on a cellular phone in one hand, while holding a handgun in his other hand.

Communications Division (CD) broadcast, “Any North Hollywood unit, 415 man with a gun, [location].”

Initially, two North Hollywood Gang Enforcement Detail uniformed Police Officers broadcast that they would handle the call, however, two North Hollywood Patrol Division uniformed Police Officers, Officer A and B, were driving in the area when they realized they were close, and decided to respond to the call.

Note: According to Officer A, he attempted to broadcast that they were responding to the call; however, the radio frequency was busy.

As the officers approached the location, driving at approximately 15-20 miles per hour, they observed the suspect, later identified as the Subject, 18 years of age, walking across the roadway.

The Subject matched the original description and Officer A stated, “I believe that may be the guy.” The officers decided to detain the Subject. They intended to “prone” him out, i.e. initiate a high risk pedestrian stop, and wait for backup officers to arrive prior to taking the Subject into custody.

Officer B accelerated their vehicle towards the Subject and activated the vehicle’s overhead blue lights and forward facing red light. Both officers also illuminated the Subject with their spotlights.

Note: Officer A believed that only the vehicle headlights and spotlights were activated.

Officer B quickly decelerated the vehicle and stopped facing southeast, approximately 14 feet from the Subject. Simultaneous to Officer B stopping their vehicle, Officer A shouted out his open passenger window to the Subject, “Hey, come here.” The Subject immediately stopped and turned to his right to face the officers.

Note: According to Officer A, The Subject started to walk toward the officers from the southeast corner.

As the officers began to exit their vehicle, the Subject moved his shirt out of the way of his front waistband with his left hand, while simultaneously reaching into his front waistband area with his right hand. According to Officer A, the Subject armed himself with a black handgun in his right hand and pulled the weapon upward from his front waistband as he began to walk backwards away from the officers while still facing them.
Note: According to Officer B, at this point he could not actually see what the object in the Subject’s waistband was; however, Officer B believed that the object was a handgun.

In response to the Subject arming himself, and in fear that he was going to be shot by the Subject, Officer A opened his car door, unholstered his pistol, and, while still seated in his vehicle, fired three rounds in a southeast direction, aiming at the Subject’s center body mass from a distance of approximately 42 feet.

Officer A assessed and observed that the Subject was turning to his right in an apparent effort to shield himself from the gunshots. At this point Officer A could not see the Subject’s hands, but feared that the Subject could still completely draw the handgun from his waistband and may already be turning back toward the officers. In continued fear that he was going to be shot by the Subject, Officer A stood up and fired three additional rounds in a southeast direction, aiming at the Subject’s center body from a distance of approximately 42 feet. Officer A assessed again and observed the Subject fall to the pavement on his side (Officer A could not recall which side the Subject fell on).

Simultaneously to Officer A engaging the Subject, Officer B, also in fear that the Subject was going to shoot him, opened his car door, unholstered his pistol, and leaned down to his left to take cover behind the front part of his vehicle. While still seated in his vehicle, Officer B fired four rounds in a southeast direction, aiming at the Subject’s center body mass from an increasing distance of approximately 35 to 45 feet. Officer B assessed, observed the Subject fall backwards on the pavement and heard a heavy metal sound hit the ground, which later was determined to be the Subject’s handgun.

Note: According to Officer B, as the officers engaged the Subject, he continued to walk backwards at a quick pace while still facing the officers. Officer A only recalled the Subject turning to his right at the moment of the Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS). The location of the gunshot wounds on the Subject were more consistent with the Subject turning to the left at the time of the OIS.

At the time of the OIS, two area residents, Witness 1 and Witness 2, were driving in the area when they observed the officers activate their patrol car’s emergency lights and approach the Subject who was standing in the street (Witness 1 observed the Subject running in the street and then stop as the officers approached).

Witness 1 and Witness 2 observed the Subject face the patrol car, produce a handgun and point it at the officers. They heard gunshots and observed the Subject fall down. (Witness 1 believed he saw the Subject fire approximately six rounds at the officers. However, the investigation determined that the Subject did not fire his weapon).

The Subject lay on the ground, rolling on his back from side to side. His head pointed away from the officers toward the southeast, and his feet pointed toward the officers to
the northwest. The officers observed the Subject’s handgun approximately one to two feet northwest of his head. The officers exited their vehicle and maintained cover behind their respective ballistic side panel car doors.

Both officers attempted to simultaneously broadcast a help call. A review of North Hollywood’s frequency identified that one of the officers is heard broadcasting “(Unreadable) shots fired! (Unreadable)” Officer B told his partner that he would handle communications himself.

Officer B broadcast, “Suspect’s down, officers ok, get me a backup, airship, supervisor…Everybody eastbound [location], suspect is down, officers ok, can I get a RA (Rescue Ambulance) please, approximately 20 years old.”

Officers C, D, E. and F were going end of watch at North Hollywood Station when they heard the help call broadcast. The officers entered their vehicles and responded to the incident.

Meanwhile, Officers B and A yelled commands at the Subject, telling him “Don’t go for the gun!” Officer B yelled, “Don’t you fucking move or I’ll fucking shoot you!” Officer A conducted a tactical reload by placing the magazine from his pistol in a pants pocket and inserting a fully loaded magazine from his magazine pouch in his pistol.

**Note:** Witness 1 and Witness 2 observed the Subject’s gun on the street within reach of the Subject, and heard the officers shout commands at the Subject to not move. The officers motioned at them to move back. Witness 1 put his vehicle in reverse and then made a right turn and drove away from the scene eastbound.

Officer B told his partner that he was going to deploy their shotgun and to continue to cover the Subject while he did so. Officer B holstered his pistol, retrieved the shotgun from the shotgun rack in the center of the front cab area, chambered a round, and took cover behind the driver’s side ballistic side panel door.

Officers C and D arrived at scene and parked to the right of the primary vehicle, followed by Officers E and F, who parked to the left of the primary vehicle.

Officers E and F exited their vehicle and unholstered their duty weapons. Officer F formulated a plan to approach the Subject and take him into custody. Officer F was designated to handcuff the Subject while Officers E, B, and A were designated as cover officers.

Officers C and D exited their vehicle, but did not unholster their weapons. Officer C directed traffic away from the incident while Officer D monitored the approach of the arrest team.
The officers approached in a line; from left to right, Officer E, Officer F, Officer B, and Officer A. Officer E continued to give commands to the Subject, stating, “Don’t go for the gun!”

Officer F grabbed hold of the Subject’s right wrist and turned the Subject over face down on the pavement. Officer F pulled the Subject’s wrists behind his back and handcuffed him. While handcuffing the Subject, Officer F squatted and knelt down next to the Subject (instead of putting his knee on the Subject’s back) because the Subject was “wheezing,” and “looked like he was dying.”

Simultaneous to Officer F handcuffing the Subject, Officer E used his left foot to slide the Subject’s handgun on the pavement away from the Subject and out of his reach.

Officer B broadcast, “27, it’s going to be a Code 4. Suspect is in custody, male, approximately 20 years of age. Can we get the RA please?”

Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) personnel arrived on scene and started to treat the Subject for multiple gunshot wounds before transporting him to the hospital. Officers F and E followed behind the LAFD Rescue Ambulance in their patrol car.

**Note:** According to Officer E, neither he nor his partner rode in the back of the RA with the Subject because the LAFD personnel needed space to medically treat the Subject. According to Officer F, the LAFD personnel did not require them to ride in the back of the RA because the Subject appeared unresponsive.

**Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners’ Findings**

The BOPC reviews each Categorical Use of Force incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all other pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: Tactics of the involved officer(s); Drawing/Exhibiting of a firearm by any involved officer(s); and the Use of Force by any involved officer(s). All incidents are evaluated to identify areas where involved officers can benefit from a tactical debriefing to improve their response to future tactical situations. This is an effort to ensure that all officers’ benefit from the critical analysis that is applied to each incident as it is reviewed by various levels within the Department and by the BOPC. Based on the BOPC’s review of the instant case, the BOPC, made the following findings:

A. **Tactics**

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s tactics to warrant Administrative Disapproval.

B. **Drawing/Exhibiting**

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be in policy.
C. Lethal Use of Force

By a 4 to 1 vote, the BOPC found Officer A’s lethal use of force to be in policy.

Basis for Findings

A. Tactics

- In its analysis of this incident, the BOPC identified the following tactical considerations:

  1. Debriefing Point No. 1 – Body Armor (Substantial Deviation) - Officer B

     Body Armor: All sworn personnel shall wear Department approved body armor when assigned to field related duties. All body armor issued, or purchased for use by Department personnel, shall meet or exceed Department specifications, and shall also be certified according to the most current National Institute of Justice (NIJ) standards at the time of purchase. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Section 4, Volume 216.52)

     Officer B was not wearing his body armor while attired in full uniform and assigned field patrol duties.

     Officer B stated that he just received new body armor from Supply Division and had not yet configured the shoulder and side straps, and also intended to sew an item onto the carrier (outer portion of the body armor). At the time of the OIS, Officer B indicated that he had not worn his body armor for past three days/shifts while working field patrol. Additionally, Officer B stated that his old body armor was approximately three years past its shelf-life of five years, making it approximately eight years old.

     Officers assigned to uniform field duties shall wear their body armor. Officers working field patrol duties often face situations that can escalate to deadly incidents. As such, it is Department policy that officers working uniformed field duties/patrol wear their body armor. Officers might respond to a situation wherein enforcement action may become necessary during a tactical incident and body armor can save their life. In addition, Officer B is to be reminded that body armor is currently replaced on a schedule of every five years to ensure its integrity and effectiveness to stop fired projectiles.

     In conclusion, Officer B’s failure to don his body armor substantially and unjustifiably deviated from Department policy and approved Department tactical training, thus warranting a finding of Administrative Disapproval. The BOPC directed that the topic of Body Armor be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.
Debriefing Point No. 2 – Tactical Planning/Communications/Approach

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack. (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21)

There is an equation that saves lives, “Distance + Cover = Time.” Time allows officers the opportunity to communicate with the suspect, plan tactics, and if necessary call for additional resources. Once the suspect is contained, time is on the side of the officers. Entering the suspect’s space prematurely or forcing a suspect to take action may only escalate the situation (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXV, Issue 9, May 2003).

Officers A and B decided to respond to the radio call, and Officer A read the descriptors of the man with a gun to Officer B as they responded. The officers did not discuss specific tactics or a tactical plan prior to initiating contact with the Subject.

Note: During the UOFRB, Commanding Officer, North Hollywood Area, advised the Board that this was the officers’ first day working together.

Officers should discuss tactics when working together, especially when not familiar with one another’s tactical knowledge or assumed roles, and discuss various scenarios that they may encounter. Communication and tactical planning is crucial to maintaining the tactical advantage, especially with suspects believed to be armed with a firearm. Approaching a suspect believed to be armed with a firearm without the benefit of having a sound tactical plan placed Officers A and B at a tactical disadvantage. Officer B stated that he had a tactical plan to approach The Subject and order him to a prone position until back up units arrived; however, he did not communicate this plan to Officer A.

Note: Officer A stated that near the officers’ start of watch; they discussed tactics and what type and caliber of handgun they were carrying, but did not elaborate further on the discussion.

Officers routinely find themselves in dangerous situations that are unpredictable. Whenever possible, officers should develop a tactical plan and communicate this plan to their partner. Having a plan and communicating the plan can minimize confusion relating to tactical roles and responsibilities. The importance of effective tactical planning and clear communication can never be understated [sic] and are paramount for effective field operations.

Police work is inherently dangerous, especially when dealing with suspects believed to be armed with a firearm. As a result, it would have been beneficial
for Officers A and B to develop and communicate a tactical plan prior to initiating contact with The Subject.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that Officers A and B’s actions deviated from approved Department tactical training; however, the deviation was not unreasonable due to the amount of time that the officers had to respond. The BOPC did expect that officers maintain a tactical advantage that includes clear communications. The BOPC will direct that this topic be thoroughly discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

3. Debriefing Point No. 3 – Radio Communications - Code-Six

*Code Six: When a unit is conducting a field investigation and assistance is anticipated, a “Code Six,” followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go “Code Six” until it arrives at the scene of a call. (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40)*

Officers A and B did not notify CD of their arrival at the location of the radio call.

Officers are given discretion regarding when to go Code-Six. Although Officers A and B were not the primary unit assigned the call, they were near the location of the radio call and decided to respond. As Officers B and A approached the location of the call, they observed a male that matched the suspect description by both physical descriptors and clothing, walking southbound at the intersection. Officer A advised Officer B that he believed that the male *might be* the subject of the radio call, the 415 man with a gun.

**Note:** A review of the North Hollywood Area base frequency revealed that there was approximately one minute and thirty seconds from the completion of the initial radio broadcast and the help broadcast by Officers B and A following the OIS.

Officers are trained to balance officer safety with the requirement to go Code-Six, and are afforded discretion in determining the appropriate time to make Code-Six broadcasts. In this instance, a review of the North Hollywood Area base frequency revealed that there were several broadcasts on the frequency, and the gang unit asked CD for a better location for the suspect. It is possible that it was during this time that Officer A’s Code-Six broadcast was not properly received, as indicated by his statement. However, having identified the Subject as the potentially armed suspect from approximately a half a block away, Officers A and B had an expectation to advise CD and nearby units of their location, status and observations. In conclusion, a broadcast to advise CD and other units that they were at scene would have been tactically advantageous.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that Officers A and B’s actions did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Officers A and B are to be reminded of the importance of a timely Code-Six broadcast which will advise additional units of their location and status, should assistance become necessary. Therefore, the BOPC directed that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

4. Debriefing Point No. 4 – Pedestrian Contacts/High-Risk Stops

When officers make contact with suspects during a pedestrian stop, they should position themselves for the greatest safety and tactical advantage. During the initial contact it makes it more difficult to point a weapon at the officer. (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 22)

Proper safety tactics demand that officers exit their patrol vehicles to conduct pedestrian contacts. Approaching and conducting the contact on foot allows officers to devote complete concentration to observing the pedestrian, better visibility of the pedestrian, better mobility (rather than being trapped in a vehicle), the ability to detain and search an individual, if necessary, and greater advantage if a foot pursuit should occur. (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21)

Time allows officers the opportunity to communicate with the suspect, plan tactics, and if necessary call for additional resources. Once the suspect is contained, time is on the side of the officers. Entering the suspect’s space prematurely or by forcing a suspect to take action may only escalate the situation. (Training Bulletin, Volume XXXV, Issue 9 May 2003)

Officer B stopped the police vehicle at an estimated 10 feet from the Subject. Officer A was seated in the passenger seat of the police vehicle with his window down and yelled “Hey, come here” to the Subject.

Note: The FID investigation reflects the Subject was moving away from the officers’ and that the actual estimated distance from the suspect at the time they fired their weapons was between 35 and 45 feet.

The BOPC’s expectations are that when officers initiate pedestrian contacts, they strive to maintain the tactical advantage and deploy in a manner that affords them the highest level of officer safety; however, in some cases, contact with pedestrians while seated inside the police vehicle may occur.

In this instance, with the knowledge that the Subject was possibly armed, and matching the description of the suspect from the radio call, it would have been
tactically prudent for Officer A to not initiate verbal contact with the Subject while seated in the police vehicle. The BOPC noted that Officer A displayed command presence by ordering the Subject to come here, even though the Subject did not comply.

The BOPC also recognized that, although the vehicle was relatively close to the Subject, the vehicle was not positioned parallel to him and stopped in a position facing the Subject, allowing both officers the ability to address the threat posed while still seated in the vehicle, maintaining the tactical advantage.

The BOPC determined that Officers A and B’s actions, did not represent a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training as both officers were able to effectively respond to the threat from a position of tactical advantage from behind the ballistic doors.

5. Debriefing Point No. 5 – Contact and Cover/Handcuffing

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues… (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training Learning, Domain No. 22)

Following the OIS, Officers A and B maintained their positions behind cover of the police vehicle ballistic doors and waited for additional resources to arrive prior to approaching and handcuffing the Subject.

It is not unusual for an armed suspect to have more than one firearm or other weapon on their person. Immediately after the OIS, both officers attempted to simultaneously broadcast a help call and their broadcasts were not clearly transmitted/received. Officer B told his partner that he would handle communications. Officer B then broadcast the suspect was down, requested back-up units, advising units to respond, as well as requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA).

Officer A conducted a tactical reload as Officer B provided cover. Officer B advised his partner that he was going to retrieve the shotgun, as Officer A continued to provide cover.

Officers E and F arrived, exited their police vehicles, and drew their service pistols. Officer F formulated a plan to approach the Subject and take him into custody. Officer F was designated to handcuff the Subject while Officers E, B, and A were designated as cover officers.
As the officers approached the Subject, Officer E used his left foot to slide the Subject’s handgun away from his reach as Officer F handcuffed the Subject without further incident.

After the OIS, the officers communicated and utilized proper contact and cover roles to take the Subject into custody. Although the philosophy behind a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance by discussing areas where improvements could be made, oftentimes, discussions pertaining to positive aspects of the incident lead to additional considerations that would be beneficial in future incidents. Therefore, the BOPC directed that the topic of Contact and Cover/Handcuffing be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

- The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

After a thorough review of the incident, the BOPC determined that the identified areas for improvement neither individually nor collectively substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training.

In conclusion, a Tactical Debrief is the appropriate mechanism for the significantly involved personnel to evaluate the events and actions that took place during the incident and assess the identified tactical considerations to better handle a similar incident in the future. The BOPC directed Officers A and B to attend a Tactical Debrief.

B. Drawing/Exhibiting

- Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: “An officer’s decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer’s reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm.” (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.80)

Officers A and B responded to a radio call of a 415 man with a gun. Upon their approach, the officers observed the Subject, who matched the description of the suspect, walk across the street at an intersection. Officer B stopped the police vehicle at a southeast angle at the southwest corner of the intersection. Officer A yelled hey come here out of the window of the police vehicle at which time the Subject turned and faced the officers, reached toward his front waistband and removed a handgun.
Believing the situation had risen to the point where deadly force may become necessary, Officers A and B drew their service pistols.

After the OIS, while maintaining their positions, Officer B retrieved the shotgun from inside the vehicle while Officer A continued to provide cover.

**Note:** In addition to the above listed employees, there were additional personnel that drew or exhibited firearms during this incident. Their drawing/exhibiting was appropriate and requires no specific findings or action.

In evaluating the actions of Officers A and B, the BOPC took into consideration that they were aware that the Subject was possibly armed with a firearm. The Subject’s actions and furtive movements toward his waistband caused the officers to believe that the incident had escalated to a life-threatening situation.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers A and B, while faced with similar circumstances would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officers A and B’s Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

**C. Lethal Use of Force**

- **Officer A** – .40 caliber, six rounds in two sequences of fire, from approximately 42 feet.
  
  **First Sequence** – Three rounds
  
  Officer A observed the Subject use his right hand to reach in his front waistband and begin to pull out a handgun. Officer A believed the Subject was going to remove the handgun from his waistband and shoot him. In defense of his and his partner’s life, he discharged three rounds from his service pistol to stop the Subject’s actions.

  **Second Sequence** – Three rounds
  
  Officer A assessed the situation, and observed the Subject still maintaining a grip on the handgun, and believing that the Subject still posed a deadly threat, fired three additional rounds at the Subject to stop his actions.

- **Officer B** – .45 caliber, four rounds in a southeasterly direction from an increasing distance of approximately 35 to 45 feet.
Note: Detectives from FID were only able to locate three casings attributable to Officer B’s service pistol. However, the magazine round count was consistent with him firing a total of four rounds.

Officer B observed the Subject turn and face the officers, while reaching with both hands toward his front waistband. The Subject then began to walk backward. Officer B believed that the Subject was *pulling out his gun*, even though he did not see the handgun at this time. Based on the type of radio call and the Subject’s perceived actions of removing a handgun from his front waistband, Officer B believed the Subject was going to shoot him, and in defense of his life, Officer B discharged four rounds from his service pistol to stop the Subject’s actions.

Based on the Subject’s actions of retrieving the handgun from his front waistband, Officers A and B’s decision to discharge their respective service pistols to stop the Subject’s actions and protect their lives was objectively reasonable.

In conclusion, an officer with similar training and experience as Officers A and B would reasonably believe that the Subject presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of Lethal Force in order to address this threat would be reasonable.

The BOPC found that Officers A and B’s Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.