“Tactical de-escalation is one key component of use of force, and the national discussion on this very topic will undoubtedly progress how such force is approached, investigated, reviewed, and adjudicated.”
MISSION STATEMENT
It is the mission of the Los Angeles Police Department to safeguard the lives and property of the people we serve, to reduce the incidence and fear of crime, and to enhance public safety while working with the diverse communities to improve their quality of life. Our mandate is to do so with honor and integrity, while at all times conducting ourselves with the highest ethical standards to maintain public confidence.
Purpose of the Use of Force Year-End Review

In 2015, the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) reaffirmed its commitment to transparency by compiling one of the most comprehensive and detailed publications on use of force (UOF) statistics that has ever been released to the public by a local law enforcement agency in the United States of America (United States). Over the past decade, developments in technology have assisted the Department in tracking and monitoring various forms of information, and when necessary, addressing concerning statistical trends and isolated outliers. The application of technology within law enforcement agencies, specifically as it relates to data driven measures, enhances accountability and transparency, has become a valuable crime prevention tool, and allows management to utilize resources more efficiently.

In December 2014, President Barack Obama signed an Executive Order establishing the Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The Task Force, which consists of a panel of law enforcement executives that work in collaboration with various stakeholders and civil rights experts, has the primary objective of identifying and addressing areas of concern with policing in the United States. As part of their recommendations, the Task Force identified six areas, or “pillars,” of focus. One of those pillars was an enhancement of law enforcement’s use of technology and data to improve community policing. As a result, the Police Data Initiative (PDI) was created in May 2015. Police Data Initiative is “a community of practice that includes leading law enforcement agencies, technologists, and researchers committed to improving the relationship between citizens and police through uses of data that increase transparency, build community trust, and strengthen accountability.” An integral part of PDI, as highlighted by the Task Force and acknowledged by President Obama, necessitates the obligation for law enforcement agencies to release their respective UOF data on a continuous basis.

Based on a Fact Sheet published by the White House in 2016 detailing the highlights and progress of President Barack Obama’s PDI, the Department was one of only 53 jurisdictions nation-wide, and 12 state-wide, to participate in the publication of UOF data. Although the Department was honored to be part of such an exclusive group of agencies, it became evident that inherent internal and external complexities existed, limiting many other law enforcement agencies’ ability to capture such data, which ultimately prevented them from participating in PDI at this early stage.

Since many complexities remain unresolved before standardized nationwide law enforcement statistics can be released by a centralized entity, the Department will continue to publish the annual Use of Force Year-End Review (Report), as requested by the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) in 2014. The first edition of the Report was published in February 2016, and following the release, BOPC President Matthew Johnson stated:

When I set forth a series of goals for the LAPD last year, I tasked the Department and Inspector General with preparing hard and unvarnished analyses through a series of audits and reports to determine what we can do better. In February, the Department issued the first of these reports – the Use of Force Report for 2015. That 300-page report, which is available to the public, provides a detailed analysis of the use of force by Los Angeles police officers in 2015, as well as a comparison to the prior five years. [...] It is by far the most comprehensive report of its kind in the nation, and further solidifies our commitment to transparency and accountability. It is an incredibly valuable tool for all of us to understand force used by Department personnel.

The Department has made a commitment to being at the forefront of transparency and accountability in policing, and is steadfast in the annual release of its use of force statistics through the Use of Force Year-End Review.
The important concept of tactical de-escalation emerged in 2016 and became a salient topic for law enforcement leaders in the United States, and within the Department. A productive national discussion on how and when police officers should resort to UOF resulted in the decision to define tactical de-escalation, communicate its expected use when feasible, and to further incorporate it into Department training and policy.

The Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners unanimously voted to revise the Department’s UOF policy in March 2016 by including an emphasis on de-escalation. The Los Angeles Police Inspector General (IG) Alexander Bustamante, BOPC President Matthew Johnson and Commissioner Sandra Figueroa-Villa have been instrumental in guiding and overseeing that process. Commissioner Sandra Figueroa-Villa shared her perspective by stating:

Not every situation can be de-escalated. Many times officers will have to use deadly force to defend themselves and others. Many times there is not enough time to react without endangering oneself or the public. De-escalation, however, is very important in situations where there is the time and space to accomplish it. We must continually teach officers to distinguish between the two scenarios and give them the tools and training to effectively de-escalate a situation whenever possible.

A revised UOF policy is currently being drafted and is projected to be adopted by the BOPC in the first half of 2017. However, the Department integrated the concept of tactical de-escalation into training, and officially defined tactical de-escalation in Use of Force – Tactics Directive No. 16 (October 2016), Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, as follows:

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Although the term “tactical de-escalation” was not specifically used by the Department in the past, many of the fundamental techniques and concepts that fall under the tactical de-escalation umbrella have long been incorporated in the training curriculum and successfully utilized by personnel in the field. An official definition and policy change does, however, provide officers a uniform framework to assist in performing their duties and refine their understanding of these techniques and of the Department’s expectations during potential UOF situations.

When discussing tactical de-escalation and UOF in general, it is important to adopt a holistic perspective and not overlook the significance of empathy.

It cannot be forgotten or ignored that UOF incidents have a tremendous physical and emotional effect on Department personnel, as well as the public. Commissioner Sandra Figueroa-Villa recognized this and discussed the importance of employee wellness:

I […] want to make sure that we do not lose sight of the impact such incidents have upon our officers and their families. We have a responsibility to them. We have a responsibility to always, always ensure that we are taking care of their health and welfare after an incident and that requires us to constantly revisit whether we are providing the necessary time, counseling, training, or support to assist them.

Independent of new training curriculums, policy changes, and directed resources, all stakeholders have to accept responsibility for their actions. The common goal must be to avoid creating situations that can potentially result in UOF incidents, which would solve the issue at its core.

The 2016 Use of Force Year-End Review is a tool for internal and external review of the Department’s performance and activities. Continued productive dialogue based on information and data published herein will work to benefit all stakeholders within the City of Los Angeles. The Department constantly evolves and adapts to current conditions, which is evident, for example, with the new UOF policy. Tactical de-escalation is one key component of UOF, and the national discussion on this very topic will undoubtedly progress as such force is approached, investigated, reviewed, and adjudicated.
Commissioner Johnson was appointed to the BOPC in 2015 and was immediately elected President by his fellow Police Commissioners. Commissioner Johnson is an entertainment attorney and the managing partner of Ziffren Brittenham LLP. He is a graduate of Rutgers University and New York University School of Law.

Commissioner Soboroff was appointed to the BOPC in 2013. Commissioner Soboroff is a prominent business leader and public servant throughout the Los Angeles area. He is a senior fellow at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Public Policy, a member of the Board of Councilors at the University of Southern California School of Public Policy, and the Chairman of the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University.

Commissioner McClain-Hill was appointed to the BOPC in 2016. She is an attorney, co-founder, and Managing Director of the Los Angeles-based Strategic Counsel PLC. Commissioner McClain-Hill received a Bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles and later her Juris Doctorate from the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.

Commissioner Figueroa-Villa was appointed to the BOPC in 2013. She has extensive experience working in the non-profit sector and substantial involvement in addressing social issues in Los Angeles. Commissioner Figueroa-Villa has been appointed to various commissions and boards in the Los Angeles area and is a graduate of the California State University, Los Angeles.

Commissioner Goldsmith was appointed to the BOPC in 2016. She is the President and CEO of the Liberty Hill Foundation, an institution dedicated to providing funding and leadership training for community-based organizations within Los Angeles County. Commissioner Goldsmith received her Master’s Degree in Public Administration from California State University, Long Beach, and is a graduate of Kenyon College.

“In my view, the work we are doing - from the widespread roll-out of digital in-car video and body cameras, revising our UOF policy, strengthening the Department’s response to homelessness and mental health issues, addressing implicit bias, and providing unparalleled transparency in the aftermath of officer involved shootings - shows we are not only moving in the right direction, but leading the nation.”

- BOPC President Matthew Johnson
Recommendation 1
That the BOPC revise current policy regulations pertaining to the deployment of rifles and slug ammunition only during certain tactical situations.

Status
Department Notice published and submitted to BOPC for final approval.

Recommendation 2
That the BOPC, with the assistance of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), revise the UOF policy to emphasize that deadly force shall only be exercised when reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impractical.

Status
This recommendation is subject to the Meet and Confer process.


Recommendation 3
That the Department documents de-escalation and reasonable alternative strategies/attempts by officer(s) during deadly force incidents.

Status
This recommendation is subject to the Meet and Confer process.

Technical aspects currently being examined by Force Investigation Division (FID) and Use of Force Review Division (UOFRD).

Recommendation 4
That the BOPC, with the assistance of the OIG, revise the UOF policy to include de-escalation as one of the factors to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s UOF.

Status
This recommendation is subject to the Meet and Confer process.

Recommendation 5
That the Department ensure all personnel assigned to Resources Enhancement Services Enforcement Team (RESET) units be provided specialized training prior to engaging in any enforcement action with homeless individuals or those suffering from mental health issues.

Status
Operations Order #5 published and disseminated Department-wide in June 2016.

Recommendation 6
That the Department continue reinforcing the concept of de-escalation during all UOF related training. Ensure Department personnel demonstrate a sound understanding of de-escalation concepts as part of the selection process for promotions. Ensure de-escalation be included in curriculum for supervisor schools.

Status
Use of Force – Tactics Directive No. 16 (October 2016), Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, was published; course material for supervisor school is currently being researched.

Recommendation 7
That the Department ensure de-escalation concepts are adequately addressed in both recruit and in-service training curriculum. The Board of Police Commissioners directs the Department to conduct comparison to other agencies’ training concerning de-escalation for best practices.

Status
Pending approval for Department personnel to conduct site visits at other agencies.


Recommendation 8
That the Department provide the BOPC a presentation of current de-escalation techniques, as taught to recruit and in-service personnel.

Status
Police Sciences and Training Bureau (PSTB) presented requested items at 1/31/2017 BOPC meeting.

Recommendation 9
That the Department evaluate current training materials and ensure the concept-based model be appropriately integrated in tactical scenarios.

Status
Police Sciences and Training Bureau completed examination and presented requested items at 1/31/2017 BOPC meeting.

Recommendation 10
That the Department evaluate and ensure consistency between recruit and in-service training relative to the emphasis of de-escalation and the goal of minimizing the use of deadly force.

Status
Police Sciences and Training Bureau completed examination and is awaiting further instruction.

Recommendation 11
That the Department design future training with the emphasis of maximizing officer performance, safety, and accountability. That the BOPC be notified of all changes to existing training regarding de-escalation, less-lethal/lethal force, and mental health.

Status
The Department will ensure future training emphasizes said requirements and will notify the BOPC of such changes.

Recommendation 12
That the Department ensure the inclusion of the OIG in Tactics and Training Review Committee (TTRC) meetings and codify such in TTRC protocols.

Status
Department has and will continue to ensure the OIG’s attendance in said meetings. Special Order with codified language actualized on 4/20/2016.

In 2016, the BOPC unanimously approved 12 recommendations from the OIG concerning the Department’s policies, training, and investigative procedures relative to UOF. These recommendations represent the Department’s desire to improve, be more transparent, provide better training, and mitigate UOF incidents.
Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Under rapidly evolving circumstances, especially when a suspect poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, officers may not have sufficient time or reasonable options to resolve the situation without the need to use objectively reasonable force.
2016 Use of Force Year-End Review
Los Angeles Police Department

2016 BY THE NUMBERS

NCUOF INCIDENTS

- 5% increase from 2015
- In which a less-lethal device was utilized

TASER EFFECTIVENESS

- 5% increase from 2015

UD INCIDENTS

- 13% decrease from 2015

TASER DEVICES PURCHASED BY THE DEPARTMENT

- 4,400+ in 4Q 2016, representing a 137% inventory increase

LERII INCIDENTS

- 31% decrease from 2015

UDF UPDATE CLASS

- 77% department-wide completion rate as of year-end

LEVEL 1 NCUOF INCIDENTS

- 13% decrease from 2015

Baton use during NCUOF incidents fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 24 incidents

DECEASED SUSPECT TOXICOLOGY CONTAINING AMPHETAMINES

- 10% decrease from 2015

*Data for 2016 was based on Coroner reports received by FID to date.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USE OF FORCE

YEAR-END REVIEW

2016

TRAINING

As highlighted in the 2015 Report, Department training is evolutionary and adaptable to emerging developments in policing, and society as a whole. Therefore, the Department continued its efforts of evaluating the current UOF training curriculum for relevancy and effectiveness in 2016, and implemented improvements when deemed necessary.

The Department has consistently upheld the expectation that, when practical, its officers resolve situations safely and with the least amount of force possible. It is important to recognize, though, that each UOF incident is unique, and in many circumstances, when officers are faced with an imminent threat of death posed by a suspect, de-escalation strategies may be futile. As BOPC President Matthew Johnson stated, “Sometimes the threat is too immediate, the potential injury to others or the officer is too grave. When there is time, however, we should never take a life when we have the option of resolving a situation without doing so.”

The subject of de-escalation has been revived as part of the dialogue between the BOPC and the Department as a mechanism for reducing UOF occurrences, especially Officer Involved Shooting (OIS) incidents. Though the Department’s current UOF policy does not specifically reference or require de-escalation during an incident, concepts of de-escalation have long been included in Departmental training curriculum.

Police Academy Training

In 2008, the Department implemented a completely redesigned Academy curriculum, which was geared towards problem based learning (PBL). The Department recognized that the Academy’s tradition of strong, tactical skill training must continue, but it also established that improvements had to be made to maximize critical thinking and capitalize on initiative and human potential. The training goal was implemented to compliment tactical strengths by developing officers who are self-motivated, interdependent, community oriented, critical thinkers and problem solvers.

Through the examination of best practices in law enforcement training, three key constructs were identified as a lens for all Department training for recruits, active officers and civilians. These constructs, as discussed by Luann Pannell, Director of Police Training and Education (PTE), in the article, “Changing the Training Paradigm,” are as follows:

1. Training the Whole Person - Peak performance is achieved through utilization of all three learning domains: psychomotor domain – physical skills and strength; cognitive domain – critical thinking and problem solving; and affective domain – utilizing emotional intelligence. Preparing people for all facets of their job will develop more resilient individuals, and ultimately, a more resilient workforce.

2. In a Team, By a Team, to be a Team - Public safety requires team effort. All officers must develop individual skills within the framework of a team. Teamwork should facilitate self-assessment, appreciation for the skills of others, and increases the value on collaboration. Teamwork incorporates respect for other teams both inside the Department and within the community.

3. Through an Event, Not to an Event - To be comprehensively effective, training must be conducted within an experiential learning environment that requires critical thinking all the way through an event. Training “through an event” includes training not only for the skills needed in a crisis, but for the ongoing response once the tactical operation concludes. Leaders must learn to anticipate the ongoing needs of their people, the political environment, and the resources they need once the crisis is over. Understanding the context and ensuring follow-through with key stakeholders will improve the Department’s response for future incidents.

Academy Hours

The Department’s basic police Academy is currently 912 hours in duration, exceeding the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) requirement of 664 hours of mandated training. Class sizes generally range from 30 to 50 recruits. A new recruit class typically starts every four weeks, and each class is in training for six months. There can be as many as six academy classes operating at any one time. The Department’s goal is to exceed all POST minimum training requirements.

Academy Testing

The design of the Academy is to build confidence through basic scenarios at the beginning of the program and to enhance competency by introducing increasingly complex scenarios and reality based training as the Academy progresses. Students must pass 26 POST Learning Domain exams and 14 scenario tests to graduate.

Recognizing that police officers need to be critical thinkers and excellent problem solvers, in 2016, POST began training the Whole Person - Peak performance is achieved through utilization of all three learning domains: psychomotor domain – physical skills and strength; cognitive domain – critical thinking and problem solving; and affective domain – utilizing emotional intelligence. Preparing people for all facets of their job will develop more resilient individuals, and ultimately, a more resilient workforce.
In 2016, the Department’s MHT course is nationally recognized and allows officers to learn the vital skills to safely and compassionately interact with persons suffering from mental illness. The Department serves as a National Law Enforcement/Mental Health Learning site. In October 2016, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Conference in San Diego featured the course in the newly launched Police Mental Health Toolkit. Earlier in the year, the course earned the 2016 Los Angeles County Productivity and Quality Award, Special Merit Plaque, “Mental Health Training for First Responders.” Since its inception, 28.3 percent (151/533) of the Department’s FTOs have completed the course.

In June 2016, the Department expanded its FTO Update course from 24 to 32 hours. The course now includes MHT components and UOF de-escalation and command and control concepts. Also included are public trust components, such as constitutional policing, fair and impartial policing, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) cultural competency. As of year-end 2016, 23.8 percent (127/533) of the FTOs have completed the course.

Museum of Tolerance (MOT)
The Department continues to harness the powerful experiential environment at the Museum of Tolerance (MOT) to assist officers in understanding complex societal issues such as unconscious bias, biased policing, and their effects on community trust building. All recruit officers spend a full day at the MOT during their academy experience. The Museum of Tolerance developed an interactive 10-hour course for in-service officers on Building Public Trust, which incorporates training on diversity as well as the State mandated training on racial profiling.

Department personnel attended 27 classes in 2016, compared to 42 classes in 2015. The Museum of Tolerance allocates the number of classes based on availability.

Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course (LETAC)
The Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course is a 32-hour course that incorporates a high concentration of scenario based training. Seven different scenarios reinforce and enhance officers’ basic tactical knowledge and skills. The course includes in-depth discussion on the Department’s UOF policy and its guiding principle of the Reverence for Human Life, various force options, command and control concepts, tactical planning, tactical communication, and firearms safety. In 2016, due to an increased focus in crime reduction in the fourth quarter, the Department reduced the amount of LETAC classes.

In 2017, there will be 20 LETAC classes for officers with approximately 25 students per session. In addition, there will be two sessions for extensive retraining requirements and two for supervisors, for a total of 26 sessions, or approximately three sessions per deployment period (DP).

De-Escalation Tactics
In October 2016, the Department approved UOF - Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques. This document reiterates the Department’s guiding principle of Reverence for Human Life, defines de-escalation, and introduces the acronym PATROL to easily recall and articulate the techniques of de-escalation (Planning; Assessment; Time; Reposition and/or Containment; Other Resources; and, Lines of Communication).

In November 2016, command staff received a full day of training in de-escalation. Sworn personnel will begin receiving training on this topic in early 2017.

Other Training
The Department relies on additional training platforms to maintain proficiency standards for sworn personnel. Force Option Simulators (FOS) present scenarios in a virtual reality-based environment that requires officers to rely on their skills, knowledge, and experience in addressing challenging situations that may or may not require UOF.

Following an actual UOF incident, tactical debriefs address training needs in a collaborative setting between officers and instructors.

The Department designed another two-hour block for Civilian Staff Training Day and for Civilian Supervisor School, which will be implemented in 2017. The Department is currently reviewing and updating existing course material for Supervisor School, Supervisor Update Course, and the upcoming Command Development Course.

Force Option Simulator
A newly constructed building at the Elysian Park Academy will house the new VirTra Shooting Systems simulator. The VirTra prototype is a 180 degree shooting simulator that emits an electric shock to the user. As such, it is effective for simulated, scenario, and reality based training.

In 2016, the Department decreased the number of scenarios requiring deadly force to teach and demonstrate that the use of sound tactics can conceivably prevent dangerous situations from rising to a higher level of force. In addition, the MHT course incorporates the FOS and further enables officers to practice their de-escalation skills.

Tactical Debriefs
The use of Tactical Debriefs affords the involved parties the opportunity to enhance performance, reinforce best practices, and cultivate lessons learned. Officers involved in Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incidents are required to participate in Tactical Debriefs after their respective cases have been adjudicated. Lead instructors for Tactical Debriefs are typically the Training Division supervisors who were present during the UOF Review Board (UOFRB). As such, the supervisors are aware of all concerns and/or issues identified during the adjudication process and can appropriately tailor the training to address those issues.

In a broader sense, Tactical Debriefs have yielded recommendations such as the utilization of smaller sized targets to simulate changes in shooting distance, quick target switches to induce fast-paced, high stress decision making, and slow fire settings for both recruit and in-service training.

LESS-LETHAL DEPLOYMENT

The Department’s guiding value when using force shall always be the Reverence for Human Life. When a situation warrants the use of UOF, and when practicable, Department personnel can utilize a variety of less-lethal force options to safely defuse a situation. These devices afford officers the opportunity to seek cover and increase the distance between themselves and suspects, which are both fundamental concepts of time for tactical decision-making. When officers are able to safely and effectively deploy such devices, the risk of injury to themselves, the suspect(s), and the public can be reduced. Less-lethal weapons can also be effective in preventing situations from escalating, reducing the necessity for more serious levels of force.

The following less-lethal tools are currently at the disposal of Department personnel during daily field operations and other tactical occurrences:

Taser
The Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle is an electroshock weapon that causes neuro-muscular incapacitation of a suspect. The device induces stimulation of the motor nerves, that causes neuro-muscular incapacitation of a suspect. In early 2016, the academic year was expanded to include three weeks of examinations, which include two midterms and one final. The exams incorporate all the Learning Domains introduced up to that point and the questions are integrated into each scenario. In 2016, the Academy expanded the pilot testing of this new examination process. It is anticipated that POST will formally implement this new testing process by early 2017.

In-Service Training
As a result of the Department’s comprehensive review of its training curriculum, new courses have been developed and procedures have been updated.

Use of Force Update Class (10-Hour)
Since October 2015, the Field Operations Training Unit (FOTU) has taught the mandated 10-hour UOF Update Class to all sworn personnel. The course consists of classroom training and six practical scenarios, four of which are live situations. The scenarios are designed to enhance critical thinking and problem solving by utilizing various training and de-escalation strategies. The UOF Update Class is critical in addressing contemporary issues involving UOF, dealing with persons involved in a mental health crisis, constitutional policing, preservation of human life, and strengthening de-escalation skills. Officers are also afforded the opportunity to re-familiarize themselves with the use of less lethal force weapons; including the beanbag shotgun, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, and the Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle (TASER).

The Department set the ambitious goal of completing this training by the end of 2016. As of year-end 2016, 7,153 employees of the required 9,237, or 77 percent, completed the course. The remaining 23 percent are expected to complete the training by May 2017. On average, the FOTU teaches three classes per week with 40 to 45 students per class.

Field Training Officer (FTO) Course
In October 2015, State of California (State) Senate Bill 29 was enacted, requiring FTOs to complete a minimum of eight hours of Crisis Intervention Behavioral Health Training. In early 2016, the Department’s Mental Evaluation Field Training Officer (FTO) Course will formally implement this new testing process by early 2017. On average, the FOTU completes the training by May 2017. The Department set the ambitious goal of completing this new examination process. It is anticipated that POST will formally implement this new testing process by early 2017.
The Department recently acquired the next generation TASER, model X26P. This model has the following improvements from the previous model:

- Consistent performance and complete data capture due to a new all-digital architecture;
- Improved ergonomics; and,
- Green color for easy identification by officers and the community.

On September 21, 2015, the Office of Operations (OO) published Notice No. 4, TASER X26P Deployment, which directs all patrol officers to carry a TASER on their person. At the time, the Department had 3,205 TASERs and holsters. In the fourth quarter of 2016, the Department purchased an additional 4,400 new TASERs and holsters, sufficient to equip all on-duty uniformed officers assigned to patrol and traffic divisions. The Department planned to distribute all TASER units by the end of the year.

The Department recently approved the use of the new 25-foot TASER cartridge, which increases the distance between an officer and their intended target by four feet.

Beanbag Shotgun

The Department’s beanbag shotgun is a Remington 870 shotgun which has been reconfigured with a green slide handle and stock, rifled barrel, and side saddle ammunition holder to distinguish it as a less-lethal device. The beanbag shotgun fires the LAPD Super-Sock round, a 12-gauge cartridge containing a fabric bag filled with non-penetrating pellets. The Super-Sock rounds are designed to be non-penetrating. When the rounds strike a target, they deliver blunt trauma by distributing energy over a broad surface area.

Throughout 2016, Motor Transport Division has installed beanbag shotgun mounts in the passenger compartment area of patrol vehicles for faster access. The passenger compartment mounting system is currently installed in 40 percent (533/1,343) of the Department’s patrol vehicles.

40mm Impact Launcher

The 40-millimeter (40mm) Impact Launcher is a direct impact device that delivers a foam, or sponge, type round at the desired target. The 40mm Impact Launcher was initially only authorized for use by Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), however, in August 2016, PSTB instituted a pilot program to evaluate whether the 40mm Impact Launcher was suitable for field deployment in the Department’s patrol function and additional units within Metropolitan Division. Personnel at the following Divisions participated in this pilot program:

- Metropolitan Division;
- Southeast Patrol Division;
- Central Patrol Division;
- Pacific Patrol Division; and,
- Mission Patrol Division.

Based on the results and feedback from the field testing, PSTB concluded that modifications were needed to the device before the 40mm Impact Launcher could be certified for Department use. The manufacturer addressed the Department’s concerns and installed a fixed front sight, changed the color to the Department’s standard “less-lethal green,” and developed a reloading component. Police Sciences and Training Bureau extended the pilot program through January 31, 2017 in order to evaluate the manufacturer’s updates. If the 40mm Impact Launcher is approved for general field deployment, the usage and reporting requirements will be the same as those of the beanbag shotgun.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Department is steadfast in its effort to create, implement, and evaluate programs and training geared toward enhancing community relations while curtailing crime and UOF occurrences throughout the City of Los Angeles. As such, discretion for resource allocation is given to each of the three Department Offices (OO, Office of Administrative Services [OAS], and Office of Special Operations [OSO]), and subsequently, to the four geographic Bureaus reporting to OO (Operations-Central Bureau [OCB], Operations-South Bureau [OSB], Operations-West Bureau [OWB], and Operations-Valley Bureau [OVB]).

Office of the Chief of Staff

In 2016, the Office of the Chief of Staff established the Family Liaison Section to provide assistance in the form of improved communication and coordination to family members of those who have been killed in encounters with the police, or who have died while in Department custody. The unit is staffed by two sergeants on a full-time basis. These employees respond to OIS and In-Custody deaths. The unit is staffed by two sergeants on a full-time basis.

Involving Reports of Persons with Mental Illness

The availability of other resources; The training and experience of the officer; The proximity or access to weapons of the subject; Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus subjects; and, The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.

Deadly Force

During the rare and unfortunate circumstances where a combination of complex factors warrant the use of deadly force to stop a threat to the public or police officers, the Department authorizes such force to be utilized by personnel in any of the following situations:

1. Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,
2. Prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,
3. Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical,

The Department’s UOF policies are more restrictive than state and federal law. For example, State and Federal law allows officers to shoot at moving vehicles where the suspect is using the vehicle itself as a weapon, while Department policy prohibits officers from using deadly force in such circumstances. The Department examines reasonableness using the constitutional standard set forth in Graham v. Connor and the State of California legal standards set forth in California Penal Code Section 835a, and from the articulable facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles police officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances as those of the evaluated incident. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;
- Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape; and,
- The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
- The time available to an officer to make a decision;
- The availability of other resources;
- The training and experience of the officer;
- The proximity or access to weapons of the subject; Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus subjects; and,
- The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.

Office of Operations

Response Protocols for Calls Involving Edged Weapons and Metal Illness

On November 16, 2016, OO published and disseminated Communications Divisional Order Nos. 8 and 9, which delineates the response protocols for field units responding to calls involving subjects armed with edged weapons and/or reports of persons suffering from possible mental illness.

Based on Divisional Order No. 8 (Response Protocol for Calls Involving Knives, Swords, or any Edged Weapons), the Department has mandated that field units responding to such calls for service are equipped with either a beanbag shotgun, or a 40mm less-lethal launcher. In addition, a field supervisor shall accompany the responding unit(s). The goal of the Order is to pre-position resources so officers have a wide tactical choice of less-lethal options and to necessitate command and control measures.

Divisional Order No. 9 (Field Supervisor Response to Calls Involving Reports of Persons with Mental Illness) requires field supervisors to accompany responding units to all calls involving reports of persons suffering, or perceived suffering, from mental illness. Similar to Divisional Order No. 8, the goal is to provide additional command and control measures with the intention of defusing the situation, and possibly reducing the need to use force.

THE USE OF FORCE

The Department UOF Policy

It is the policy of the Department that personnel may only use the amount force that is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

In the past, there was no consolidated mechanism or point of contact to effectively communicate with family members of those who have been killed in encounters with the police or who died while in police custody. The creation of the Family Liaison Section enables the Department to better inform relatives of decedents about the often complicated and seemingly convoluted investigative, and sometimes lengthy, process that results from OIS or IOD occurrences.

Involving Reports of Persons with Mental Illness

The浓度 of improved communication and coordination to family members. The unit is staffed by two sergeants on a full-time basis. These employees respond to OIS and In-Custody deaths. The unit is staffed by two sergeants on a full-time basis.

Involving Reports of Persons with Mental Illness

The concentration of complex factors warrant the use of deadly force to stop a threat to the public or police officers, the Department authorizes such force to be utilized by personnel in any of the following situations:

1. Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,
2. Prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,
3. Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical,
avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury.

In response to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Hayes v. County of San Diego, the Department revised its UOF policy in 2014 to include consideration of officers’ tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force when evaluating the objective reasonableness of an incident.

**Categorical Use of Force**

A CUOF is defined as:

- An incident involving the use of deadly force (e.g., discharge of a firearm) by a Department employee;
- All uses of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid or locked carotid hold (CRCH);
- All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custodial care of the Department (also known as an ICD);
- A UOF incident resulting in death;
- A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a Law Enforcement Related Injury Investigation, or LERII;
- All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death;

**Note:** Serious bodily injury, as defined in California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4), includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Loss of consciousness;
- Concussion;
- Bone fracture;
- Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
- A wound requiring extensive suturing; and,
- Serious disfigurement.

- Officer involved animal shootings;
- Tactical and non-tactical unintentional discharges;
- An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required. Under Department policy, a canine contact is not a UOF but has been included in this category to satisfy the provisions of the Consent Decree; and,
- Incidents where the Department has agreed to conduct similar critical incident investigations for a non-Department entity, such as a Los Angeles Fire Department Arson Unit.

All other reportable UOF incidents, including the discharge of a TASER, the use of a chemical irritant control device, or all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes with an impact weapon or device which do not result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death which have been approved to be handled as a Level 1 Non-Categorical Use of Force (NCUOF) by the Commanding Officer (CO), FID, are classified as NCUOF incidents.

**Non-Categorical Use of Force**

A reportable NCUOF is defined as an incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses a less-lethal control device or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee’s direction, overcome resistance of a person during an arrest or a detention, or defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person.

The following incidents are not reportable as a NCUOF incident:

- The use of a C-grip, firm grip, or joint lock to compel a person to comply with an employee’s direction which does not result in an injury or complained of injury;
- The UOF reasonable to overcome passive resistance due to physical disability, mental illness, intoxication, or muscle rigidity of a person (e.g., use of a C-grip or firm grip, joint lock, joint lock walk down or body weight) which does not result in an injury or complained of injury;
- Under any circumstances, the discharge of a less-lethal projectile weapon (e.g., beanbag shotgun, TASER, 37mm or 40mm projectile launcher, any chemical control dispenser or Compressed Air Projectile System) that does not contact a person;
- Force used by an organized squad in a crowd control situation, or a riotous situation when the crowd exhibits hostile behavior and does not respond to verbal directions from Department employees.

**Note:** Isolated incidents resulting from a crowd control situation may require a UOF investigation as determined by a supervisor at the scene.

- Any incident investigated by FID and determined not to rise to the level of a CUOF.
An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm. These incidents are categorized into Hits or No Hits. (2016 LAPD Manual 3/796)

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in 40 OIS incidents, a decrease of eight incidents, or 17 percent, compared to 2015.

In 2016, 20 of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or 50 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (e.g. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a 17 percentage point increase compared to 2015.

Ten of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or 25 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for a 21 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015.

Five of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or approximately 13 percent, originated during off-duty occurrences. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to eight percent in 2015.

In 2016, 36 Hispanic officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 69 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a 14 percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2015.

Ten White officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a 13 percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2015.

Three Black officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2015.

In 2016, 21 personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 40 percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a 30 percentage point decrease compared to 70 percent in 2015.

Twenty-one personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 40 percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a 22 percentage point increase compared to 18 percent in 2015.

Seven personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2015.
In 2016, 145 rounds were fired during all 40 OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 305 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 160 rounds, or 52 percent.

In 2016, an average of 3.6 rounds were fired during OIS incidents, which represented 2 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a six percentage point decrease compared to 2015.

In 2016, 23 Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 56 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2015.

Thirteen Black suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 32 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015.

One White suspect was involved in an OIS incident, which represented two percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to 38 percent in 2015.
In 2016, most suspects involved in OIS incidents were in the 18-23 age group. Specifically, 14 of the 41 total suspects, or 34 percent, were included in this age group. The 18-23 age category accounted for a 19 percentage point increase compared to 23 percent in 2015.

The 24-29 age group represented the second largest age category, with 10 out of the 41 total suspects, or 24 percent. The 24-29 age category accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 23 percent in 2015.

The 30-39 age category accounted for the third largest age category, with six out of the 41 total suspects, or 15 percent. The 30-39 age category accounted for a 29 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015.

In 2016, four of the 41 total suspects, or 10 percent, involved in OIS incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 21 percentage point decrease compared to 31 percent in 2015.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner - Coronor. Therefore, all decedents, or 100 percent, with completed toxicology reports at the time of publication of this Report had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s).

In 2016, 12 of the 41 total suspects, or 29 percent, involved in OIS incidents were verified as documented gang members. This accounted for a six percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2015.
Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner.

In 2016, nine of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 90 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of 38 percentage points when compared to 52 percent in 2015.

In 2016, four of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 40 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to 53 percent in 2015.

In 2016, one of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 10 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for alcohol. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to five of 21 decedents, or 24 percent, with positive toxicology results for alcohol in 2015.

In 2016, two of the 41 total suspects, or five percent, involved in OIS incidents were homeless.

In 2016, 25 firearms were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 61 percent of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a 21 percentage point increase compared to 40 percent in 2015.

Four replica/pellet guns were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 10 percent of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015.

Two suspects were perceived to be armed with a weapon (perception-based shooting), which represented five percent of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to six percent in 2015.

One suspect, representing two percent, was determined to be unarmed. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to four percent in 2015.

Five edged weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 21 percent in 2015.

---

1 The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.
In 2016, 19 suspects died from police gunfire, resulting in a wound during an OIS-No Hit incident and was not included in the analysis below.

One suspect in 2016 suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound during an OIS-No Hit incident and was not included in the analysis below.

In 2016, 19 suspects died from police gunfire, resulting in a death occurring in 48 percent of the 40 total OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 21 deaths, the number of deceased suspects decreased by two individuals, or 10 percent, in 2016.

In 2016, 19 suspects died from police gunfire, resulting in a death occurring in 48 percent of the 40 total OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 21 deaths, the number of deceased suspects decreased by two individuals, or 10 percent, in 2016.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 12 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 56 percent in 2015.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 56 percent in 2015.

In 2015, 47 out of the 76 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 62 percent, were adjudicated as "Tactical Debrief." This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 86 percent in 2014.

In 2015, 65 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 86 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2014.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 12 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 56 percent in 2015.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 56 percent in 2015.

In 2015, 11 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 14 percent, were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014.

In 2015, 11 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 14 percent, were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014.

In 2015, 47 out of the 76 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 62 percent, were adjudicated as "Tactical Debrief." This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 86 percent in 2014.

In 2015, 65 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 86 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2014.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015.

In 2015, 11 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 14 percent, were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015.

In 2015, 11 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 14 percent, were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014.

In 2015, 47 out of the 76 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 62 percent, were adjudicated as "Tactical Debrief." This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 86 percent in 2014.

In 2015, 65 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 86 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2014.

Nineteen of the decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 19 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015.
In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

Three Black suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a 19 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015.

In 2016, two White suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 25 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a 19 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015.
In 2016, most suspects involved in ICD incidents were in the 30-39 age group. Specifically, four of the eight total suspects, or 50 percent, were included in this age group. The 30-39 age category accounted for a 28 percentage point increase compared to 22 percent in 2015.

The 50-59 age group represented the second largest age category, with two out of the eight total suspects, or 25 percent. The 50-59 age category accounted for an eight percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2015.

In 2016, none of the eight total suspects involved in ICD incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.

In 2016, none of the eight total suspects involved in ICD incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.

In 2016, one of the eight total suspects, or 13 percent, involved in ICD incidents was verified as a documented gang member. The remaining seven suspects were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

Of the eight decedents involved in ICD incidents in 2016, two decedents, or 25 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Six decedents, or 75 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner. Therefore, all decedents, or 100 percent, with completed toxicology reports at the time of publication of this Report had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s).

In 2015, six of the nine decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 67 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). This accounted for a 33 percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2014.
Suspect - Toxicology Analysis

Of the eight decedents involved in ICD incidents in 2016, two decedents, or 25 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Six decedents, or 75 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner - Coroner.

In 2016, one of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 50 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of six percentage points when compared to four of nine decedents, or 44 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015.

In 2016, one of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 50 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of 28 percentage points when compared to two of nine decedents, or 22 percent, with positive toxicology results for marijuana in 2015.

In 2016, neither of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents with completed toxicology reports had positive results for alcohol. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of 22 percentage points when compared to two of nine decedents, or 22 percent, with positive toxicology results for alcohol in 2015.

Suspect - Homeless3

In 2016, none of the eight total suspects involved in ICD incidents were homeless.

Suspect - Cause/Manner of Death4

In 2016, one of the eight decedents, representing approximately 13 percent, died from suicide. The remaining seven decedents, or approximately 88 percent, currently have pending cause/manner of death classifications, pending completion of their respective investigations by FID.

3 The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. The Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

4 The Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner determines the cause/manner of death. There is currently a backlog of cases due to personnel shortage at the Coroner’s office.
An incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses a less-lethal control device or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee’s direction; overcome resistance of a person during an arrest or a detention; or, defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person (2016 LAPD Manual 4/245.05).

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in 1,925 NCUOF incidents, an increase of 100 incidents, or five percent, compared to 2015.

**LEVEL TOTALS**

In 2016, 1,790 NCUOF incidents were Level II occurrences, which represented 93 percent of the 1,925 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 91 percent in 2015.

**FORCE OPTION**

In 2016, TASERs were utilized in 355, or 20 percent, of the 1,925 NCUOF incidents. This number accounted for a six percentage point decrease compared to 10 percent in 2015.

In 2016, strikes/kicks/punches were utilized in 573, or 30 percent, of the 1,925 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2015.

In 2016, beanbag shotguns were utilized in 135 NCUOF incidents, which represented seven percent of the 1,925 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to nine percent in 2015.
In 2016, Department personnel activated a TASER device 1,330 times during 573 NCUOF incidents in which TASERs were utilized, resulting in average of 2.32 activations per incident. This accounted for a seven percent increase compared to the 2015 average activations per incident of 2.16.

In 2016, TASER activations were effective 768 times during NCUOF incidents, which represented 58 percent of the 1,330 total activations. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 53 percent in 2015.

In 2016, 1,068 of the Department’s 1,925 NCUOF incidents, or 55 percent, originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. This represented no change when compared to 2015.

In 2016, 1,885 White officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented seven percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015.

In 2016, 3,216 Hispanic officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 53 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015.

In 2016, 1,885 White officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 31 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015.

In 2016, 547 of the Department’s 1,925 NCUOF incidents, or 28 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (e.g. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 30 percent in 2015.
In 2016, 632 Department personnel sustained injuries during the 1,925 NCUOF incidents throughout the year, which represented 10 percent of the 6,087 total personnel. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 12 percent in 2015.

In 2016, the 23-27 age group was the largest category of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 436 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 22 percent. The 23-27 age category was consistent when compared to 2015.

In 2016, the 28-32 age group represented the second largest age category, with 365 out of the 1,995 total suspects, or 18 percent. The 28-32 age category accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 19 percent in 2015.
In 2016, 541 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 27 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015.

In 2016, 863 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 43 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 45 percent in 2015.

In 2016, 503 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 25 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be homeless. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 23 percent in 2015.

In 2016, 1,697 suspects sustained injuries during the 1,929 NCUOF incidents throughout the year, which represented 85 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This represented a two percentage point decrease compared to 87 percent in 2015.
In 2016, Department personnel responded to 937,024 calls for service throughout the City of Los Angeles. The 2016 total translated to 1.8 calls for service being generated every minute.
On a per capita basis, the Department has approximately 25 officers per 10,000 residents.

SERVICE TO OUR COMMUNITIES
We are dedicated to enhancing public safety and reducing the fear and the incidence of crime. People in our communities are our most important customers. Our motto “To Protect and to Serve” is not just a slogan - it is our way of life. We will work in partnership with the people in our communities and do our best, within the law, to solve community problems that affect public safety. We value the great diversity of people in both our residential and business communities and serve all with equal dedication.

REVERENCE FOR THE LAW
We have been given the honor and privilege of enforcing the law. We must always exercise integrity in the use of the power and authority that have been given to us by the people. Our personal and professional behavior should be a model for all to follow. We will obey and support the letter and spirit of the law.

COMMITMENT TO LEADERSHIP
We believe the Los Angeles Police Department should be a leader in law enforcement. We also believe that each individual needs to be a leader in his or her area of responsibility. Making sure that our values become part of our day-to-day work life is our mandate. We must each work to ensure that our co-workers, our professional colleagues, and our communities have the highest respect for the Los Angeles Police Department.

INTEGRITY IN ALL WE SAY AND DO
Integrity is our standard. We are proud of our profession and will conduct ourselves in a manner that merits the respect of all people. We will demonstrate honest, ethical behavior in all our interactions. Our actions will match our words. We must have the courage to stand up for our beliefs and do what is right. Throughout the ranks, the Los Angeles Police Department has a long history of integrity and freedom from corruption. Upholding this proud tradition is a challenge we must all continue to meet.

RESPECT FOR PEOPLE
Working with the Los Angeles Police Department should be challenging and rewarding. Our people are our most important resource. We can best serve the many and varied needs of our communities by empowering our employees to fulfill their responsibilities with knowledge, authority, and appropriate discretion. We encourage our people to submit ideas, we listen to their suggestions, and we help them develop to their maximum potential. We believe in treating all people with respect and dignity. We show concern and empathy for the victims of crime and treat violators of the law with fairness and dignity. By demonstrating respect for others, we will earn respect for the Los Angeles Police Department.

QUALITY THROUGH CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
We will strive to achieve the highest level of quality in all aspects of our work. We can never be satisfied with the "status quo." We must aim for continuous improvement in serving the people in our communities. We value innovation and support creativity. We realize that constant change is a way of life in a dynamic city like Los Angeles, and we dedicate ourselves to proactively seeking new and better ways to serve.
The Department’s general policing activities are managed through the Office of Operations (OO), which is responsible for a majority of the Department’s sworn personnel. There are four bureaus within OO, which are further divided into 21 geographical Areas, four traffic divisions, Criminal Gang and Homicide Division, and COMPSTAT Division. The Office of Operations is overseen by First Assistant Chief Michel Moore.
The Office of Administrative Services, overseen by Assistant Chief Jorge Villegas, is responsible for various technical and administrative functions of the Department. Assistant Chief Villegas also serves as the chairman of the UOFRB.

The Office of Special Operations, overseen by Assistant Chief Beatrice Girmala, is responsible for various specialized uniform and investigative resources within the Department, and is allocated the second most sworn personnel between the four Offices.
The Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy promotes the Department’s steadfast commitment to building public trust through community partnerships, accountability, and effective policies and procedures that protect and serve the City of Los Angeles. Comprised of three groups, six police divisions, and three sections, OCPP performs essential Department functions including policy development and coordination, strategic planning, risk management, internal auditing and compliance, legislative affairs, public communications, coordination of the Department’s extensive youth programs, and community engagement efforts that embody the Department’s long-standing commitment to community policing. Police Administrator III Arif Alikhan, who holds a civilian rank equivalent to that of a sworn Assistant Chief, oversees OCPP.

Professional Standards Bureau exercises functional command over Force Investigation Division, Special Operations Division, and Internal Affairs Group. When a personnel complaint is generated as a result of an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy finding for a UOF, or for any misconduct discovered during the UOF investigation, IAG assumes investigative responsibility of such complaint. Once the investigative process is complete, the findings are forwarded through the respective chain of command to the COP for final disposition.

Additionally, PSB oversees both the administrative and criminal aspects of OIS and other CUOF investigations, and ensures all OIS occurrences are presented to the Los Angeles County District Attorney for evaluation of any criminal implications pertaining to the involved officer(s). Force Investigation Division has the investigative responsibility for criminal actions taken against and/or by Department personnel during CUOF incidents.

Professional Standards Bureau is overseen by Deputy Chief Debra McCarthy.
The motto, “To protect and to serve,” states the essential purpose of the Los Angeles Police Department. The Department protects the rights of all persons within its jurisdiction to be free from criminal attacks, to be secure in their possessions, and to live in peace. The Department serves the people of Los Angeles by performing the law enforcement function in a professional manner, and it is to these people that the Department is ultimately responsible.

**STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT**

**POPULATION AND AREA**

As of 2015, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the City of Los Angeles population to be approximately 3.9 million residents, living within a geographical area encompassing 468 square miles. The City of Los Angeles is proudly comprised of a diverse and multi-ethnic population from a vast cultural spectrum. Based on current estimates of 3.9 million residents, Los Angeles is California’s most populous city and the second most populous in the nation after New York City. The median household income from 2010 through 2014 was approximately $49,682. However, for the same period, approximately 22.4 percent of the total population was below the poverty level.

**ECONOMY**

As a dynamic economic hub with vibrant tourist locations and attractions, Los Angeles boasts a successful economy and greatly contributes to the economic impact of the State, which ranked as the world’s sixth-largest economy in 2016, with an annual gross domestic product of $2.3 trillion, surpassing France from the preceding year. Based on the 2016 Global Cities Index, a distinguished performance indicator that measures a city’s “ability to attract and retain global capital, people and ideas, as well as sustain that performance in the long term,” Los Angeles ranks sixth worldwide and is categorized as one of the 15 Global Elite. Based on 2012 Census figures, the City of Los Angeles had 497,999 businesses within its boundaries.

In August 2015, the City was selected by the United States Olympic Committee as the host city for the 2024 Summer Olympic Games. Currently, the City is one of two candidates for the Olympic bid; the other being Paris.

**CITY CRIME STATISTICS**

**Violent Crime**

In 2016, 28,084 violent crime incidents (i.e. homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults) occurred throughout the City of Los Angeles. The 2016 total accounted for an increase of 2,595 incidents, or 10 percent, compared to 25,489 incidents in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 20,961 incidents, 2016 was 7,123 incidents, or 34 percent, above the five-year annual average.

The City experienced 294 homicides in 2016, accounting for an increase of 11 individuals, or 3.9 percent, from 283 individuals in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 20,961 incidents, 2016 was 7,123 incidents, or 34 percent, above the five-year annual average.

Based on the 2015 U.S. Census Bureau’s estimated population figures for the City of Los Angeles, approximately 1.9 million of the total 3.9 million residents, or 49 percent, are of Hispanic descent. Approximately 1.1 million, or 28 percent, are White. Asian/Pacific Islanders represent 452,000 residents, or 12 percent. Black residents represent nine percent of the population with 241,000 individuals, and 101,000 residents, or three percent, are designated as “Other” ethnicities.

---

United States Census Bureau, Los Angeles City QuickFacts, October 14, 2015.
In 2016, 17,084 suspects involved in violent crime incidents in the City of Los Angeles were of Black descent, which represented 43 percent of all 39,941 suspects involved in violent crime incidents during the year. During the same period, 16,443 suspects, or 41 percent, were Hispanic. White suspects involved in violent crime incidents represented 3,100 individuals, or eight percent. Lastly, 3,314 suspects, or eight percent, were classified with Asian/Pacific Islander, Other, or Unknown ethnic origins.

**Part I Crime**
In 2016, 125,430 Part I Crime incidents (i.e. homicides, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, burglaries/thefts from motor vehicles, personal/other thefts, and auto thefts) occurred throughout the City of Los Angeles. The 2016 total accounted for an increase of 6,546 incidents, or 5.5 percent, compared to 118,884 incidents in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 108,043 incidents, 2016 was 17,386 incidents, or approximately 16 percent, above the five-year annual average.

**Part II Crime**
In 2016, 93,262 Part II Crime incidents (or “less serious” offenses including simple assaults, forgery/countersfeiting, embezzlement/fraud, receiving stolen property, weapon violations, prostitution, sex crimes, crimes against family/child, narcotic drug laws, liquor laws, drunkenness, disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, gambling, driving under the influence, and moving traffic violations) occurred throughout the City of Los Angeles. The 2016 total accounted for a decrease of 926 incidents, or one percent, compared to 94,208 incidents in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 91,686 incidents, 2016 was 1,596 incidents, or 1.7 percent, above the five-year annual average.

**LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT STATISTICS FOR 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity No. of Suspects Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander 255 1%</td>
<td>62,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black 17,084 43%</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic 16,443 41%</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 971 2%</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White 3,100 8%</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown 2,088 5%</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 39,941 100%</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 17,084 suspects involved in violent crime incidents in the City of Los Angeles were of Black descent, which represented 43 percent of all 39,941 suspects involved in violent crime incidents during the year. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 39,988 calls, or 4.5 percent, from 897,036 in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 21,415 calls for service, 2016 was 94,605 calls, or 11.2 percent, above the five-year annual average.

**Department Public Contact Information**
Department personnel contacted 1,560,746 individuals in 2016, which included those detained during field detentions and calls for service. This figure, however, is only a fraction of the total number of individuals Department officers interact with on an annual basis (not accounting for interactions with members of the public other than those detained during field detentions and/or calls for service). The 2016 total accounted for an increase of 43,383 individuals, or 2.9 percent, from 1,517,381 individuals contacted in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 1,687,754 individuals contacted, 2016 was 126,950 individuals, or 7.5 percent, below the five-year annual average.

**Department Field Detention Information**
Department personnel stopped 627,677 individuals in 2016 during observation-related field detentions (including both vehicle and pedestrian stops). This accounted for an increase of 7,332 individuals, or one percent, compared to 620,345 in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 543,383 individuals stopped, 2016 was 224,990 individuals, or 26.2 percent, below the five-year annual average.

**Ethnicity of Subjects Stopped by Department Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number of Subjects</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian 344</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black 17,084</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian 7,067</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic 2,088</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 24,055</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White 9,283</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 52,267</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, Department personnel stopped 627,677 individuals during observation-related field detentions. Of those 627,677, a total of 290,632 subjects were of Hispanic descent, which represented 46 percent. Blacks were the second most frequent ethnic group to be stopped, with 171,107 individuals, or 27 percent. Further, White subjects accounted for 18 percent of the Department’s field detentions with 112,661 individuals. American Indian, Asian, and Other ethnicities accounted for less than 10 percent combined.

**Department Citation Information**
A total of 223,111 traffic citations were issued in 2016. Additionally, 33,817 Release from Custody (RFC) arrest reports, which are tendered in lieu of confinement for misdemeanor-related violations, were issued.

**Department Arrest Information**
The Department had 106,775 total arrests in 2016, which accounted for a decrease of 7,618 individuals, or 6.7 percent, compared to 114,393 arrests in 2015. When compared to the 2011 through 2015 annual average of 136,196 arrests, 2016 was 29,421 individuals, or 21.6 percent, below the five-year annual average.
In 2016, 6,135 suspects arrested by Department personnel for violent crime incidents throughout the year. During the same period, 4,247 arrestees, or 34 percent, were Black. White violent crime arrestees accounted for 1,509 individuals, or 12 percent. The remaining 696 violent crime arrestees, or six percent, were classified with either Asian/Pacific Islander or Other ethnic designations.

Firearms Recovered by the Department
In 2016, there were 5,908 firearm recoveries resulting from all Department field operations. This figure excludes firearms acquired through the Department’s 2016 Gun Buyback Program.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE OVERVIEW
Department personnel were involved in 86 CUOF incidents and 1,925 NCUOF incidents in 2016. The combined total of 2,011 UOF incidents was an increase of 93 incidents, and 1,925 NCUOF incidents in 2016. The combined total Department personnel were involved in 86 CUOF incidents.

Statistical Snapshot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>No. of Arrestees</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4,247</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>6,135</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,587</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 1,560,764 documented public contacts. During those documented public contacts, 627,677 individuals were stopped during observation-related field detentions (including both vehicle and traffic stops), 106,775 arrests were effected, 2,011 UOF incidents occurred (40 of which were OIS incidents).

Public contacts resulting in Arrests
In 2016, 106,775 arrests were effected, representing seven percent of all 1,560,764 documented public contacts throughout the year.

The infographic below depicts 2016 arrests, UOF incidents, and OIS incidents per 1,000 public contacts:

Public contacts resulting in UOF Incidents
In 2016, 2,011 UOF incidents occurred, representing 0.13 percent of all 1,560,764 documented public contacts throughout the year.

The following depicts the remaining category totals and their respective percentages:

- Off-duty: seven incidents, or eight percent;
- On-Duty, Tactical: four incidents, or five percent;
- Other: three incidents, or three percent;
- Citizen Flag Down: two incidents, or two percent;
- On-Duty, Non-Tactical: two incidents, or two percent;
- Station Call: one incident, or one percent; and,
- Unknown: five incidents, or six percent.

Only 0.13 percent of the Department’s 1,560,764 public contacts resulted in a UOF. More notably, of the same number of public contacts, only 40 incidents, or 0.0026 percent, resulted in an OIS. However, the Department understands the impact of every UOF and has implemented thorough investigative, review, and adjudicative processes to ensure that Department policies are being adhered to, and most importantly, to safeguard the constitutional rights of the public.

Use of Force Incidents per 1,000 public contacts: 1.3 (0.03%).

OIS Incidents per 1,000 public contacts: 0.03 (0.003%).
Non-Categorical Use of Force Incidents
In 2016, 1,925 NCUOF incidents occurred throughout the City of Los Angeles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 1,068 of the Department’s 1,925 NCUOF incidents, or 55 percent, originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. During the same period, 547 incidents, or 28 percent, occurred during field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops).

The following depicts the remaining category totals and their respective percentages:
- Citizen Flag Down: 149 incidents, or eight percent;
- Other: 138 incidents, or seven percent;
- Station Call: 20 incidents, or one percent; and,
- Unknown: three incidents, or less than one percent.

Ethnicity of Suspects Involved in OIS Incidents
- In 2016, 23 Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 56 percent of the 41 total suspects. Black suspects accounted for 13 of the 41 total incidents, which represented 56 percent of the 41 total suspects. In 2016, eight American Indian suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 41 total suspects.

Source of Activity for NCUOF Incidents
- The following depicts the remaining Department sworn personnel categories according to ethnicity along with their respective totals and percentage breakdowns:
  - American Indian: 749 personnel, or eight percent;
  - Black: 3,249 personnel, or 33 percent;
  - Filipino: 233 personnel, or two percent;
  - Asian/Pacific Islander: 749 personnel, or eight percent;
  - Other: 27 personnel, or less than one percent;

Sworn Personnel by Rank
- The Department has 6,778 employees that are at the rank of police officer, which represents 68 percent of the total Department personnel. The following depicts the remaining Department sworn personnel categories according to rank along with their respective totals and percentage breakdowns:
  - Commanders and Above: 33 personnel, or less than one percent;
  - Captains: 78 personnel, or one percent;
  - Lieutenants: 270 personnel, or three percent;
  - Sergeants: 1,243 personnel, or 18 percent; and,
  - Detectives: 1,539 personnel, or 15 percent.
Statistical Snapshot

Sworn Personnel by Gender

Males represent 8,109 of the 9,941 total Department personnel, or 82 percent, and females represent 1,832 employees, or 18 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9,941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 [...] my office is actively working with the LAPD to ensure that officers are properly trained in preservation of life and de-escalation techniques that can make deadly encounters between police and citizens less frequent.

- Mayor Eric Garcetti
20% of CUOF Incidents Involved the Use of a Less-Lethal Force Option

In 2016, a less-lethal weapon was utilized in 16 out of the 79 CUOF incidents (excluding UD incidents).
As highlighted in the 2015 Report, Department training is evolutionary and adaptable to emerging developments in policing, and society as a whole. Therefore, the Department continued its efforts of evaluating the current UOF training curriculum for relevancy and effectiveness in 2016, and implemented improvements when deemed necessary.

The Department has consistently upheld the expectation that, when practical, its officers resolve situations safely and with the least amount of force possible. It is important to recognize, though, that each UOF incident is unique, and in many circumstances, when officers are faced with an imminent threat of death posed by a suspect, de-escalation strategies may be futile. As BOPC President Matthew Johnson stated, “Sometimes the threat is too immediate, the potential injury to others or the officer is too grave. When there is time, however, we should never take a life when we have the option of resolving a situation without doing so.”

The subject of de-escalation has been revived as part of the dialogue between the BOPC and the Department as a mechanism for reducing UOF occurrences, especially OIS incidents. Though the Department’s current UOF policy does not specifically reference or require de-escalation during an incident, concepts of de-escalation have long been included in Departmental training curriculum.

In 2014, the Department evaluated its training to identify areas where improvements could be made, with a particular focus on the subject of UOF. The goal of this review was to develop training to implement procedures that would improve performance and emphasize de-escalation of force and the continued institutionalization of Preservation of Life. The review also found that there is a national discussion on four key training topics, which has become the platform on how the Department designs and implements training:

1. Building public trust/preservation of life;
2. Teaching UOF de-escalation techniques;
3. Dealing with persons believed to be mentally ill; and,
4. Mastering laws of arrest such as consensual encounters, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.

Beginning with recruits in the Academy, Department training emphasizes critical thinking and problem solving, which are key constructs with respect to de-escalation, empathy, and reasoning. As recruits progress throughout the Academy, they are exposed to more complex training (both classroom and scenario-based) for continued enrichment of Preservation of Life, de-escalation, tactical decision-making, and UOF competency. When new officers transition to the field upon graduation, the Department continues reviewing and tracking their aptitude of the techniques taught to them in the Academy. When officers successfully complete the 11 months of mandatory probationary field training, they are required to complete an 84-hour course for further enrichment.

The Department offers a substantial catalog of in-service training courses for the roughly 10,000 sworn personnel. In 2016, the Department integrated numerous de-escalation concepts in a multitude of training curricula. To enhance comprehension, competency, and use of de-escalation strategies, the Department made the tremendous shift from a basic cognitive teaching approach to a practical, hands-on application of the material through reality-based training scenarios. These mandated practical situations, offered through both basic police academy training and the UOF Update Class, afford officers the opportunity to exercise tactical decision-making in high-stress, yet controlled settings. As BOPC President Johnson affirmed, “This type of training takes officers out of the classroom, away from the computer and puts them into roll-playing situations as close to real-life scenarios as possible.”

Chief of Police (COP) Charlie Beck’s highly acclaimed concept of “Relationship-Based Policing” (RBP) continued in 2016. The RBP model establishes the expectation that Department personnel build one-on-one personal relationships with members of the community by breaking down barriers, improving communication, and providing all stakeholders with a better understanding of each other’s perspectives and needs.

Currently, the Department’s training program operates like a small college or university and has 147 POST certified courses in its catalog. In fact, for many years, the Department has used the name “LAPD University” in reference to the many classes it has developed over time. The Academy curriculum teaches basic police concepts, which would be the equivalent of 100 level classes, while the Command Development Courses are considered graduate classes, or at the 500 level. Department training managers are able to gain a better understanding on how to develop career paths for their personnel by utilizing the newly organized online library and creating new courses to address additional training needs.

Elysian Park Academy
On September 15, 2016, the world famous LAPD Elysian Park Academy celebrated the grand re-opening of its newly renovated grounds. Since its founding in the early 1900’s, LAPD’s Elysian Park Academy has long been synonymous with the Department’s excellence in law enforcement training and innovation.

POLICE ACADEMY TRAINING
In 2008, the Department implemented a completely re-designed Academy curriculum, which was geared towards PBL. The Department recognized that the Academy’s...
range from 30 to 50 recruits. A new recruit class typically starts every four weeks, and each class is in training for six months. There can be as many as six academy classes operating at any one time. The Department’s goal is to exceed all POST minimum training requirements.

**Academy Testing**

The design of the Academy is to build confidence through basic scenarios at the beginning of the program and to enhance competency by introducing more advanced scenarios and reality-based training as the Academy progresses. Students must pass 26 POST Learning Domain exams and 14 scenario tests to graduate.

Recognizing that police officers need to be critical thinkers and excellent problem solvers, in 2016, POST began experimenting with a new written testing system. Students read a law enforcement scenario and must answer several questions specific to each scenario. Under this new testing format, each student must pass three written examinations, which include two middlers and one final. The exams incorporate all the Learning Domains introduced up to that point and the questions are integrated into each scenario.

In 2016, the Academy participated in the pilot testing of this new examination process. It is anticipated that POST will formally implement this new testing process by early 2017.

**IN-SERVICE TRAINING**

As a result of the Department’s comprehensive review of its training curriculum, new courses have been developed and procedures have been updated.

**UOF Update Class (10-Hour)**

Since October 2015, the FOTU has taught the mandated 10-hour UOF Update Class to all sworn personnel. The course consists of classroom training and six practical scenarios, four of which are live situations. The scenarios are designed to enhance critical thinking and problem solving by utilizing various communication and de-escalation strategies. The UOF Update Class is critical in addressing contemporary events involving UOF, de-escalation, and the use of less lethal force weapons.

**Field Training Officer Course**

In October 2015, State Senate Bill 29 was enacted, requiring FTOs to complete a minimum of eight hours of Crisis, Intentional, Behavioral Health Training. In early 2016, the Department’s MEU created the 40-hour MHIT course, which far exceeds the minimum standard.

The Department’s MHIT course is nationally recognized and allows officers to learn the vital skills to safely and compassionately interact with persons suffering from mental illness. The Department currently serves as a National Law Enforcement/Mental Health Learning Site. In October 2016, the ICP Conference in San Diego featured the course in the newly launched Police Mental Health Toolkit. Earlier in the year, the course earned the 2016 Los Angeles County Productivity and Quality Award, Special Merit Plaque, “Mental Health Training for First Responders.” Since its inception, 28.3 percent (151/533) of the Department’s FTOs have completed the course.

In June 2016, the Department expanded its FTO Update course from 24 to 32 hours. The course now includes MHIT components and UOF de-escalation and command and control concepts. Also included are public trust components such as constitutional policing, fair and impartial policing, and LGBTQI cultural competency. As of year-end 2016, 23.8 percent (127/533) of the FTOs have completed the course.

**POST Perishable Skills**

The California Commission on Police Officer Standards and Training requires a minimum of 24-hours of Continual Professional Training every two years for certified peace officers. Fourteen training hours shall address perishable skills, such as arrest and control (ARCON), tactical communications (COMM), driving, and firearms. The Department obtained approval from POST to re-write the entire 24-hour curriculum to integrate new topics, including building public trust, preservation of life, and procedural justice. The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training approved the new curriculum and the Department presented the first pilot classes in February and August 2016. The Department’s goal for the 2015-2016 training cycle was 96 percent compliance.

The following table depicts the percentages of Department personnel who completed their perishable skills training based on Department and Bureau totals (information up to November 2016):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Department Total</th>
<th>Department Total (Excl. Leave Exposed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrest &amp; Control</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
<td>98.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>97.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Department continues to harness the powerful experiential environment at the MOT to assist officers in understanding complex societal issues, such as unconscious bias, biased policing, and their effects on community trust building. All recruit officers spend a full day at the MOT during their academy experience. The Museum of Tolerance developed an interactive 10-hour course for in-service officers on Building Public Trust, which incorporates training on diversity as well as the State mandated training on racial profiling.

In November 2016, command staff received a full day articulating the techniques of de-escalation. The Department designed another two-hour block for Civilian Staff Training Day and for Civilian Supervisor School, which will be implemented in 2017. The Department is currently reviewing and updating existing course material for Supervisor School, Supervisor Update Course, and the upcoming Command Development Course.

The Department continued to harness the powerful experience environment at the MOT to assist officers in understanding complex societal issues, such as unconscious bias, biased policing, and their effects on community trust building. All recruit officers spend a full day at the MOT during their academy experience. The Museum of Tolerance developed an interactive 10-hour course for in-service officers on Building Public Trust, which incorporates training on diversity as well as the State mandated training on racial profiling.

**Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course**

The Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course is a 32-hour course that incorporates a high concentration of scenario based training. Seven different scenarios reinforce and enhance officers’ basic tactical knowledge and skills. The course includes in-depth discussion on the Department’s UOF policy and its guiding principle of the Reverence for Human Life, various force options, command and control concepts, tactical planning, tactical communication, and firearms safety. In 2016, due to an increased focus in crime reduction in the fourth quarter, the Department reduced the amount of LETAC classes. In 2017, there will be 22 LETAC classes for officers with approximately 25 students per session.

**De-Escalation Tactics**

In October 2016, the Department approved UOF - Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-escalation Techniques. This directive reiterates the Department’s guiding principle of Reverence for Human Life, defines de-escalation, and introduces the acronym PATROL to easily recall and articulate the techniques of de-escalation.

In November 2016, command staff received a full day of training in de-escalation. Sworn personnel will begin receiving training on this topic in early 2017.

**Other Training**

The Department relies on additional training platforms to maintain proficiency standards for sworn personnel. Force Option Simulators present scenarios in a virtual reality-based environment that requires officers to rely on their skills, knowledge, and experience in addressing challenging situations that may or may not require UOF.

Following an actual UOF incident, tactical debriefs address training needs in a collaborative setting between officers and instructors.

The Department designed another two-hour block for Civilian Staff Training Day and for Civilian Supervisor School, which will be implemented in 2017. The Department is currently reviewing and updating existing course material for Supervisor School, Supervisor Update Course, and the upcoming Command Development Course.

**Force Option Simulators**

A newly constructed building at the Elsian Park Academy will house the new VirTra Shooting Systems simulator. The VirTra prototype is a 180 degree shooting simulator that emits an electric shock to the user. As such, it is effective for simulated, scenario, and reality based training.

In 2016, the Department decreased the number of scenarios requiring deadly force to teach and demonstrate that the use of sound tactics can conceivably prevent dangerous situations from rising to a higher level of force.

**Tactical Debriefs**

The use of Tactical Debriefs afford the involved parties the opportunity to enhance performance, reinforce best practices, and cultivate lessons learned. Officers involved in UOF incidents are required to participate in Tactical Debriefs after their respective cases have been adjudicated. Lead instructors for Tactical Debriefs are typically the Training Division supervisors who were present during the UOFRB. As such, the supervisors are aware of all concerns and/or issues identified during the adjudication process and can appropriately tailor the training to address those issues.

In a broader sense, Tactical Debriefs have yielded recommendations such as the utilization of smaller sized targets to simulate changes in shooting distance, quick target switches to induce fast-paced, high stress decision making, and slow fire settings for both recruit and in-service training.

**Firearms Qualification Requirements**

The Department requires its sworn personnel to qualify with their primary duty weapons on a regular basis to ensure that police officers who are authorized to carry a firearm maintain their shooting proficiency and use sound judgment with regards to the use of lethal force. A qualification schedule has been created, which implements a combination of handgun, shotgun, and FOS tests.

Employees are required to qualify once within a two-month cycle, not including the one-month shotgun cycle. There are a total of six qualification cycles in a calendar year. Sworn employees (lieutenants and below), reserve officers, and security officers with less than 20 years of service qualify as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Required Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>February/March</td>
<td>Handgun - Duty Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>April/May</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>June/July</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>September/October</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>November/December</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sworn employees (lieutenants and below), reserve officers, and security officers with 20 to 29 years of service qualify as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Required Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Shotgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>February/March</td>
<td>Handgun - Duty Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>April/May</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>June/July</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>September/October</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Captains and above with less than 30 years of service qualify as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Required Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>February/March</td>
<td>Handgun - Duty Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>April/May</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June/July</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>September/October</td>
<td>Handgun - Practice Ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All sworn employees (regardless of rank), reserve officers, and security officers with 30 years or more of service are required to qualify one time per calendar year at their convenience during Cycles 2, 3, 5, or 6. This requirement shall be met with their primary duty handgun and duty ammunition.

To qualify on the handgun combat course, sworn employees, reserve officers, and security officers shall meet the minimum qualification requirements. Personnel who fail to achieve a qualifying score shall repeat the course until the minimum score for each target is attained in one relay, the maximum score is 300 points. When sufficient daylight exists, the minimum passing score is 210 points, with a minimum of 105 points on each target. During the hours of darkness, the minimum passing score is 180 points, with a minimum of 90 points on each target.

The handgun course is not scored; however, personnel must demonstrate proficiency with the shotgun to satisfy the qualification requirement.

**Failure to Qualify**

Officers who fail to qualify after a third attempt in a qualification cycle are required to attend firearms remediation. The Department does not currently track first or second attempt failures since weapon malfunctions and/or defective ammunition contribute to unsuccessful qualification attempts. A Department Failure to Qualify (FTQ) report is generated for officers who failed to qualify, which is transmitted to Internal Affairs Group (IAG). The IAG's Annual Complaint Report contains information on actions taken for FTQs.

When notified that an officer, reserve officer, or security officer under his or her command fails to meet the qualification requirement set forth by the Department and the officer does not have a valid exemption, the concerned CO may initiate a personnel complaint. Commanding officers shall be responsible for ensuring that their personnel receive sufficient training when/if they attempt to qualify but fail to do so, and are also responsible for administering disciplinary action for personnel who neglect to qualify.

The Shooting Qualification and Bonus (SQUAB) computer application was developed to document shooting qualifications and bonus scores for sworn personnel. Additionally, the system includes inventory and range maintenance functions and has the capability of recording firearms training sessions. The application is used at multiple locations and by other City entities for weapons qualification.

The information entered into SQUAB appears on an employee's Training Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS) II Report, showing a record of the employee's Training Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS) II Report, showing a record of the employee's qualification history for the last five years. The system generates the Department's FTQ report after each qualification cycle. That report is forwarded by Information Technology Division (ITD) to IAG for dissemination. A report can be generated by ITD upon request.
Information Technology Division tracks FTQs for Department personnel who have failed to receive a passing score after three or more attempts with their handgun. When the Firearms Unit receives the report from ITD, a mandatory two-hour remediation class is scheduled for the employee. Even if the employee received a passing score after the third or more attempts, the employee is required to attend firearms remediation. The remediation is completed by Training Division’s firearms instructors at Elysian Park Academy or at the Davis Training Facility. Depending on range availability, remediation is conducted one-on-one with an instructor. The instructor observes, diagnoses, and remediates the employee. The employee then shoots the Department qualification course again to demonstrate proficiency. The remediation is documented on a Training Division Record of Remediation/Supplemental Training Form and the information is entered into the Learning Management System.

Medical Exemptions
Sworn personnel who are unable to qualify due to an injury shall be examined by a physician. A statement shall be obtained from the physician imposing the medical restriction and an estimated time for which the officer should be exempt from qualification requirements.

Note: Temporary medical restrictions are valid for 30 days only. If a medical condition persists past 30 days and continues to inhibit an officer from meeting Department qualification standards, the officer must obtain a subsequent doctor’s statement every 30 days until the restriction is rescinded or is classified permanent and stationary.

An officer with a medical exemption who has not qualified with his or her duty firearm for one calendar year shall be served with a “Notice to Meet Firearm Qualification Requirements within 30 Calendar Days” (30-Day Notice). Once served, the officer has 30 days to determine if he or she is medically fit to qualify and successfully pass the minimum firearm qualification standards.

If the officer is unable to qualify with his or her duty firearm by the expiration of the 30-Day Notice, the officer shall be served with an “Order to Relinquish City-Issued Duty Firearm and Police Identification Card, and Restriction of Peace Officer Powers” (Order to Relinquish). A sworn employee who has returned to work from a temporary relief from duty, or inactive duty in excess of 365 calendar days, shall meet with his/her CO to begin the reintegration process and accomplish all reintegration tasks as directed by the Department. Training Division is responsible for determining what training is appropriate to bring the employee into compliance with the POST requirements and any other Department requirements that are consistent with the employee’s work restrictions. Training Division will re-issue all City-Issued equipment and will periodically update the returning employee’s CO as to the status of the employee in the reintegration process.

Vacation Exemptions
Officers are not exempt from qualification requirements due to vacation. Exemptions for qualification requirements may be granted for approved extended absences at the discretion of the concerned CO.

DEPARTMENT FIREARM QUALIFICATION STATISTICS

Firearms Qualification - Sworn Personnel

In 2016, the Department had 28,160 total firearm qualifications throughout the year. Qualification Cycle 2 contained the highest number of Department sworn personnel qualifying, with 8,515 employees, representing 30 percent of the total annual firearm qualifications. Comparatively, Cycle 2 contained the highest number of personnel qualifying during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015 with an annual average of 9,050 employees.

Three or More Attempts (Failure)

In 2016, 67 Department personnel failed to successfully qualify three or more times in the four firearm qualification cycles throughout the year. This accounted for a decrease of 54 individuals, or 45 percent, compared to 121 total personnel in 2015. Additionally, the 2016 total fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 99.5 total personnel by 32.5 individuals, or 33 percent.

Failure Rate

The failure rate is calculated based on the number of personnel who failed to successfully qualify three or more times within a particular cycle compared to the total of personnel attempting to qualify. In 2016, an average of 0.23 percent of Department personnel failed to successfully qualify throughout the year. This accounted for a 0.18 percentage point decrease compared to a 0.41 percent failure rate in 2015. When compared to the aggregate failure rate percentage from 2012 through 2015 of 0.32 percent, 2016 experienced a 0.09 percentage point decrease.

Failure to Qualify Complaints – Issued vs. Sustained

Of the 10 personnel who FTQ in 2016, and of whom we were subject to a personnel complaint, two personnel, representing 20 percent, received a sustained allegation for neglecting to abide by the Department’s qualification policy. This accounted for a 25 percent point decrease compared to 45 percent of sustained FTQ allegations in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of sustained FTQ allegations from 2012 through 2015 of 38 percent, 2016 experienced an 18 percentage point decrease.

REINTEGRATION
A sworn employee who has returned to work from a temporary relief from duty, or inactive duty in excess of 365 calendar days, shall meet with his/her CO to begin the reintegration process and accomplish all reintegration tasks as directed by the Department. Training Division is responsible for determining what training is appropriate to bring the employee into compliance with the POST requirements and any other Department requirements that are consistent with the employee’s work restrictions. Training Division will re-issue all City-Issued equipment and will periodically update the returning employee’s CO as to the status of the employee in the reintegration process.
In 2016, the Department decreased the number of scenarios requiring deadly force to teach and demonstrate that the use of sound tactics can conceivably prevent dangerous situations from rising to a higher level of force.
Tactical Debrief

Tactical debriefs afford the involved officers the opportunity to enhance performance, reinforce best practices, and cultivate lessons learned.

A tactical debrief of each FOS scenario is conducted by an instructor after each FOS qualification.
2016 Officer Involved Shooting Incidents

Involved Suspects by Ethnicity
- Black: 13
- Hispanic: 23
- White: 1
- Other: 1
- Unknown: 1

Involved Officers by Ethnicity
- Hispanic: 36
- Black: 3
- White: 10
- Other: 1
- Asian/Pacific Isl.: 2

Involved Suspects by Gender
- Male: 40
- Female: 0
- Unknown: 1

Involved Officers by Gender
- Male: 49
- Female: 3
- Unknown: 1

Office Involved Shooting Incidents
17% Decrease Compared to 2015

Suspect Weapons
- 25 Firearms
- 5 Edged Weapons
- 4 Replica/Pellet/BB Gun
- 2 Officer Perception
- 4 Other
- 1 None

Officer Injuries
53% Decrease Compared to 2015

Total Rounds Fired
52% Decrease Compared to 2015

Average Rounds Fired
44% Decrease Compared to 2015

Hit Ratio
- Total: 40
- 10% Point Increase Compared to 2015
LESS-LETHAL DEPLOYMENT

The Department’s guiding value when using force shall always be the Reverence for Human Life. When a situation warrants the UOF, and when practicable, personnel can utilize a variety of less-lethal force options to safely defuse a situation. These devices afford officers the opportunity to seek cover and increase the distance between themselves and suspects, which are both fundamental concepts of time for tactical decision-making. When officers are able to safely and effectively deploy such devices, the risk of injury to themselves, the suspect(s), and the public can be reduced. Less-lethal weapons can also be effective in preventing situations from escalating, reducing the necessity for more serious levels of force.

The following less-lethal tools are currently at the disposal of Department personnel during daily field operations and other tactical occurrences.

TASER

The Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle is an electroshock weapon that causes neuromuscular incapacitation of a suspect. The device induces stimulation of the motor nerves, causing uncontrollable muscle contractions that prevent a suspect’s ability to perform coordinated movements.

Because the Department recognizes that each tactical situation is unique and that officers must be given the flexibility to resolve the challenges they are faced with, there is no pre-set limit on the number of times the TASER can be activated in a particular situation.

On September 21, 2015, the Office of Operations published Notice No. 4, TASER X26P Deployment, which directs all patrol officers to carry a TASER on their person.

In 2016, officers utilized TASERs in 573 of the Department’s 1,925 total NCUOF incidents, representing 30 percent.

BEANBAG SHOTGUN

The Department’s beanbag shotgun is a normal Remington 870 shotgun which has been reconfigured with a green slide handle and stock, rifled barrel, and side saddle ammunition holder to distinguish it as a less-lethal device. The beanbag shotgun fires the LAPD Super-Sock round, a 12-gauge cartridge containing a fabric bag filled with non-lethal pellets. The Super-Sock rounds are designed to be non-penetrating. When the rounds strike a target, they deliver blunt trauma by distributing energy over a broad surface area.

37MM PROJECTILE LAUNCHER

The 37mm Projectile Launcher is a less-lethal shoulder weapon that fires various types of munitions. A rifled barrel and calibrated sighting system makes the device highly accurate when delivering rounds to their intended target. Typical munitions include blunt trauma and chemical agent ordinance.

On September 21, 2015, OO published Notice No. 4, TASER X26P Deployment, which directs all patrol officers to carry a TASER on their person. At the time, the Department had 3,205 TASERs and holsters. In the fourth quarter of 2016, the Department purchased an additional 4,400 new TASERs and holsters, sufficient to equip all on-duty uniformed officers assigned to patrol and traffic divisions. The Department planned to distribute all TASER units by the end of the year.

During Academy training, all recruit officers are required to successfully complete TASER training. For personnel who are familiar with prior TASER generation models and not currently certified to carry the new X26P model, the Department mandates that those employees complete an updated course (which is currently administered during the 10-hour UOF Update Class). Lastly, the Department approved the use of the new 25-foot TASER cartridge, which increases the distance between an officer and their intended target by four feet.

In 2016, officers utilized TASERs in 573 of the Department’s 1,925 total NCUOF incidents, representing 30 percent.
40MM IMPACT LAUNCHER

The 40-millimeter (40mm) Impact Launcher is a direct impact device that delivers a foam, or sponge, type round at the desired target. The 40mm Impact Launcher was initially only authorized for use by SWAT. However, in August 2016, PSTB instituted a pilot program to evaluate whether the 40mm Impact Launcher was suitable for field deployment in the Department’s patrol function and additional units within Metropolitan Division. Personnel at the following Divisions participated in this pilot program:

- Metropolitan Division;
- Southeast Patrol Division;
- Central Patrol Division;
- Pacific Patrol Division; and,
- Mission Patrol Division.

Based on the results and feedback from the field testing, PSTB concluded that modifications were needed to the device before the 40mm Impact Launcher could be certified for Department-wide use. The manufacturer addressed the Department’s concerns and installed a fixed front sight, changed the color to the Department’s standard “less-lethal green,” and developed a reloading component. Police Sciences and Training Bureau extended the pilot program through January 31, 2017, in order to evaluate the manufacturer’s updates. If the 40mm Impact Launcher is approved for general field deployment, the usage and reporting requirements will be the same as those of the beanbag shotgun.

OLEORESIN CAPSICUM SPRAY

Oleoresin capsicum spray is a chemical agent that is either extracted from cayenne pepper plants or produced by synthetic means. Oleoresin capsicum primarily affects the eyes, the respiratory system, and the skin by generating an intense burning sensation. The mucous membranes may swell, causing uncontrollable coughing, gagging, and/or gasping. Oleoresin capsicum can be an effective tool for law enforcement. However, it has proven to have varying degrees of effectiveness on individuals, with some even being immune. Additionally, OC spray may contaminate enclosed areas, is susceptible to wind and other weather factors, and can have unintended effects on officers and/or the public who are in close proximity.

BATON

A baton is an impact and/or control device used to push, move, or strike individuals who exhibit unlawful or hostile behavior. Currently, the Department deploys four versions of the baton; a collapsible baton, a side handle baton, a collapsible side handle baton, and a straight baton.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The FN-303 Less-Lethal Launcher is a semi-automatic shoulder weapon that fires non-lethal munitions and liquids. The device is powered by compressed air to fire the projectiles, which are loaded into an attached 15-round drum magazine. In November 2016, the Department completed a test program for the FN-303 and intends for Metropolitan Division and Custody Services Division to begin deploying the device by 2017.

In May 2016, the Department began testing more potent aerosol and gel-based OC sprays. Both sprays tested contain a higher concentration of OC. The Department anticipates to conclude testing by the end of 2016.

In May 2016, the Department switched to the Peacekeeper collapsible baton, an advanced less-lethal tool that affords officers a higher degree of functionality compared to previous collapsible baton models. The Department began issuing the Peacekeeper collapsible baton to new recruits in the Academy and has approved its private purchase for in-service personnel.

In the fourth quarter of 2016, the BOPC recommended that the Department acquire 1,100 new beanbag shotguns. The Department is currently researching a funding source for this purchase.

In the fourth quarter of 2016, the Department obtained funding to purchase approximately 21 hand-held ballistic shields, one for each geographic Area. These shields will stop most rounds up to light rifle fire.

Throughout 2016, Motor Transport Division installed beanbag shotgun mounts in the passenger compartment area of patrol vehicles for better access, compared to the previous storage method, when located in the trunk of the vehicle. The passenger compartment mounting system is currently installed in 40 percent (533/1,343) of the Department’s patrol vehicles.

2016 NCUOF LESS-LETHAL DEPLOYMENT PERCENTAGES

(compared to their respective 2012 through 2015 four-year annual averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASER</td>
<td>+35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beanbag Shotgun</td>
<td>+28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Impact Launcher</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC Spray</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the fourth quarter of 2016, the Department acquired funding to purchase approximately 21 hand-held ballistic shields, one for each geographic Area. These shields will stop most rounds up to light rifle fire.
After the Department successfully implemented the Department of Justice’s federal consent decree, the COP established OCPP to further institutionalize the reforms prescribed during the federal oversight. The purpose and function of OCPP is to analyze, develop, and implement those key elements, which support constitutional policing and policies for the community and Department personnel.

The Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy consists of three groups, six divisions, and three sections that perform essential Department functions meant to advance the Department’s shared vision for the future of Los Angeles. The following groups, divisions, and sections of OCPP are responsible for ensuring that the Department continues to advance the reforms instituted by a prior federal consent decree through coordinated and collaborative problem solving.

**Government Liaison Section**

Government Liaison Section works closely with local, state, and federal legislature and government leaders to ensure new legislation, which impacts the Department, reflects the priority to protect and serve the community. For instance, this section coordinates between the COP and the Los Angeles City Council, the Mayor, City Attorney, City Controller, Chief Legislative Analyst, and City Administrative Officers to provide information, insight, and recommendations relative to matters pending before the City Council and its committees. This same coordination occurs at the state and federal level to ensure Department policies and procedures are in accordance with the law.

**Community Policing & Policy Group**

In 2016, Community Policing and Policy Group was created to emphasize the Department’s commitment to community outreach, organizational policies, strategic vision, and youth programs.

The Community Policing and Policy Group is comprised of Community Relationship Division, Policies and Procedures Division, Strategic Planning Section, and the Youth Program Unit.

**Strategic Planning Section**

Strategic Planning Section ensures the Department’s Strategic Plan, LAPD in 2020, is effectively implemented. The plan is a blueprint to build a stronger, more efficient, and more collaborative law enforcement organization of the future with an ultimate vision of making Los Angeles the safest big city in the United States by 2020.

**Youth Programs Unit**

The Youth Program Unit oversees all the Department’s youth programs, including the Cadet Academy. First established in 1962, the Cadet program continues to develop our community’s youth by fostering leadership and ethical decision-making skills, while grooming youth participants to be responsible and productive citizens through education and community-service. Since 2013, nearly 8,000 cadets have successfully completed the 18-week Cadet Leadership Academy, cultivating social bonds that will last a lifetime.

**Community Relationship Division**

Community Relationship Division (CRD) was formed in 2015 as an innovative policing practice, concentrated in pursuing stronger relationships between the Department and the diverse and unique communities throughout the City of Los Angeles. The responsibilities of CRD include engaging in proactive outreach, utilizing best practices associated with relationship-based policing, and leveraging social media to strengthen the Department’s relationships with the community. Community Relationship Division’s responsibilities expanded the Department’s portfolio of public trust and confidence programs.

To assist with the Department’s efforts of maintaining public trust and fostering relationships with the community, CRD instituted a general practice of deploying a team of personnel to scenes of significant events; including major UOF incidents, such as OIS or ICD incidents. These response procedures afford CRD personnel the opportunity to convey essential information about the course of events regarding the incident to the public, offer various support services to effected stakeholders, while also soliciting valuable feedback from the public regarding the incident.

**Risk Management Legal Affairs Group**

Risk Management Legal Affairs Group is responsible for developing and implementing programs to reduce harms and mitigate risks to the community and to Department personnel, primarily in the areas of UOF, work injuries, employee involved traffic collisions, and workplace conflict.
The Risk Management Legal Affairs Group is comprised of Legal Affairs Division, Risk Management Division, and Ombuds Section. The commanding officer is the Department Risk Manager, who also serves as the Chair of the Risk Management Executive Committee (RMEC).

Legal Affairs Division
Legal Affairs Division coordinates with the Los Angeles City Attorney regarding legal matters affecting the Department, including UOF incidents. It provides investigative services to the City Attorney during litigation, and is responsible for Discovery and Public Records requests.

Risk Management Division
Risk Management Division includes the Risk Management Mitigation Unit, Analysis and Evaluation Section, and RMEC Support Unit.

The Risk Mitigation Unit includes a UOF team. To help advance the Department-wide efforts to mitigate financial risks resulting from UOF incidents, the team is dedicated to researching innovative solutions that foster programs to keep the Department’s workforce and community safe. This is a deliberate effort to improve how the organization serves the community and affirms its commitment to the reverence for human life.

The Analysis and Evaluation Section guides the Risk Mitigation Unit by capturing critical data valuable for the UOF problem solving team. Qualitative and quantitative data analyses assists in the creation and implementation of timely and appropriate solutions to UOF related matters.

The Risk Management Executive Committee Support Unit assists RMEC in their review of an employee’s work performance to assess risk management concerns. In cases that involve UOF, the Department may examine an employee’s conduct to determine if potential ongoing liability issues are present, especially once the BOPC has adjudicated a UOF incident. When deemed necessary and appropriate, RMEC may impose work restrictions and/or other mitigating efforts to rehabilitate the employee and take necessary corrective actions to address any performance, behavioral, or managerial concerns.

Public Communications Group
The Department values transparency and reverence for a free and open press, and is therefore committed to a positive and productive relationship with print, digital, and broadcast media from around the world. It is the responsibility of the Public Communications Group (PCG) to cultivate and maintain that important relationship by informing the media and the public about critical incidents (including UOF incidents), public safety issues, and other general police related information regarding the City of Los Angeles.

Public Communications Group maintains a strong connection with the press that is fostered through mutual respect. This connection is a bond that is held together by timely and accessible information. While the news media is PCG’s primary stakeholder, the group is committed to delivering that information to the public through several traditional and alternative methods including, news releases, press conferences, video vignettes, social media posts, online media pages, and direct “face-to-face” community outreach efforts.

A Public Information Officer supervisor is always “on-call,” ready to respond to every OIS or ICD incident (or other UOF incident deemed especially significant) and is responsible for managing the flow of information between the public and the Department throughout the event.

Public Communications Group consists of Media Relations Division and the Digital Section, which support the initiative to provide timely and accurate information to the press across all media.
The Department is steadfast in its effort to create, implement, and evaluate programs and training geared toward enhancing community relations while curtailing crime and UOF occurrences throughout the City of Los Angeles. As such, discretion for resource allocation is given to each of the three Department Offices (OO, OAS, and OSO), and subsequently, to the four geographic Bureaus reporting to OO (OCB, OSB, OWB, and OVB).

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
In 2016, the Office of the Chief of Staff established the Family Liaison Section to provide assistance in the form of improved communication and coordination to family members of those who have been killed in encounters with the police, or who have died while in Department custody. The unit is staffed by two sergeants on a full-time basis. These employees respond to OIS and ICD scenes, establish immediate liaison with the family of the decedent, and maintain contact with those family members throughout the entire administrative investigation and adjudication process.

In the past, there was no consolidated mechanism or single point of contact to effectively communicate with family members of those who have been killed in encounters with the police or who died while in police custody. The creation of the Family Liaison Section enables the Department to better inform relatives of decedents about the often complicated and seemingly convoluted investigative, and sometimes lengthy, process that results from OIS or ICD occurrences.

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS
Response Protocols for Calls Involving Edged Weapons
On November 16, 2016, OO published and disseminated Communications Division Divisional Orders Nos. 8 and 9, which delineates the response protocols for field units responding to calls involving subjects armed with edged weapons and/or reports of persons suffering from possible mental illness.

Based on Divisional Order No. 8 (Response Protocol for Calls Involving Knives, Swords, or any Edged Weapons), the Department has mandated that field units responding to such calls for service are equipped with either a beanbag shotgun or a 40mm less-lethal launcher. In addition, a field supervisor shall accompany the responding unit(s). The goal of the Order is to pre-position resources so officers have a wide tactical choice of less-lethal options and to necessitate command and control measures.

Response Protocols for Calls Involving Mental Illness
Divisional Order No. 9 (Field Supervisor Response to Calls Involving Reports of Persons with Mental Illness) requires field supervisors to accompany responding units to all calls involving reports of persons suffering, or perceived suffering, from mental illness. Similar to Divisional Order No. 8, the goal is to provide additional command and control measures with the intention of defusing the situation, and possibly reducing the need to use force.

Operations-Central Bureau
In 2016, OCB prioritized the attendance of field personnel whose primary function encompassed the response and interaction with the City’s homeless to the MHIT course. In addition, OCB worked intensely to comply with the Department’s guidelines pertaining to OCB personnel’s attendance of the UOF Update Class. At the conclusion of 2016, OCB had achieved a nearly 100 percent attendance rate.

Operations-South Bureau
In 2016, de-escalation and community relationship-building strategies were of immense discussion and implementation under the OSB command. Consequently, management re-emphasized the importance of de-escalation concepts to Bureau and Divisional training coordinators to ensure updated training curricula.

Operations-South Bureau successfully oversaw the Community Awareness Relationship Engagement Training, which is geared toward strengthening community relations and public trust by providing stakeholders with a better understanding of Department procedures and guidelines pertaining to UOF incidents.

Further, there were numerous Department community-based engagements throughout OSB, including visits at faith-based organizations, town hall meetings, community engagement conferences, training seminars, food give-a-ways, and a remembrance ceremony for murder victims.

Operations-South Bureau also participated in the 40mm less-lethal launcher program and continues building a cadre of personnel who can deploy the device during field operations.
Operations-West Bureau

Similar to OSB, OWB participated in the 40mm less-lethal launcher program in 2016, which will continue in 2017. Bureau management also devised and began deploying specialized field units to address mental health-related calls for service. Personnel assigned to these units were required to attend the Department’s MHIT course. When feasible, these units can respond Bureau-wide for mental health related calls for service or assist patrol or other specialized units who encounter subjects with possible mental health issues.

In accordance with OO Notice No. 4, OWB conducted two separate audits pertaining to compliance of TASER deployment by field personnel in each of the geographic Areas. Based on results from both audits, OWB documented 100 percent compliance.

Operations-Valley Bureau

Operations-Valley Bureau hosted various community engagements that included discussions on UOF occurrences and OVB’s goals and strategies to reduce UOF by its employees. Each of the geographic Areas reinforced the importance of de-escalation concepts to its field personnel and continued with compliance measures for personnel to attend the UOF Update Course. Areas within OVB also participated in the 40mm less-lethal launcher program and conducted audits pertaining to compliance of TASER deployment by field personnel, in accordance with OO Notice No. 4.

Family Liaison Section

In 2016, the Office of the Chief of Police established the Family Liaison Section to provide assistance in the form of improved communication and coordination with family members of those who have been killed in encounters with the police, or who have died while in Department custody.
In 2016, there were 5,908 firearm recoveries resulting from all Department field operations, 721 of which were recovered by Metropolitan Division.
Los Angeles Police Department
The Los Angeles Police Department experienced a 17 percent decrease in OIS incidents from 2015.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department experienced a nine percent decrease in OIS incidents from 2015.

Houston Police Department
The Houston Police Department experienced a 19 percent decrease in OIS incidents from 2015.

Chicago Police Department
The Chicago Police Department experienced a six percent decrease in OIS incidents from 2015.

Philadelphia Police Department
The Philadelphia Police Department experienced no change in the number of OIS incidents compared to 2015.

New York Police Department
New York Police Department experienced a 12 percent increase in OIS incidents from 2015.
In 2016, the Department had 40 OIS incidents, which was six fewer than the Chicago Police Department (CPD), but more than the New York Police Department (NYPD), Houston Police Department (HPD), Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD).

Of the 40 OIS incidents involving Department personnel in 2016, 19 suspects died from police gunfire, representing 48 percent of all OIS incidents. One decedent, representing approximately three percent, suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound. The following depicts the remaining agencies and their deceased suspect totals and percentages in relation to their respective 2016 OIS incident totals:

- **Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD):** 15 deceased, or 48 percent; CPD: 11 deceased, or 24 percent; HPD: six deceased, or 23 percent and, PPD: five deceased, or 22 percent.

Of the 201 OIS incidents involving Department personnel from 2012 through 2016, 70 suspects died from police gunfire, representing 35 percent of all OIS incidents. In comparison, the LASD had a higher percentage with 87 suspects who died from deputy gunfire during 191 OIS incidents, or 46 percent. The following depicts the remaining agencies and their five-year decedent totals along with their respective decedent per OIS incident percentages:

- **HPD:** 49 deaths, or 29 percent; **NYPD:** 50 deaths, or 26 percent; **PPD:** 40 deaths, or 23 percent; and, **CPD:** 62 deaths, or 19 percent.

**Firearm Qualification – Comparison**

Firearms qualification is an essential component of law enforcement training and aptitude. An improvement in marksmanship reduces the risk of unnecessarily jeopardizing innocent bystanders, stopping the threat with minimal force, and improves officers’ ability to protect themselves and the public from harm.

**Los Angeles Police Department**

Qualify four times per year with handguns; one time every two years with a shotgun and offers qualification on a FOS system (not mandatory). There are no years-of-service and/or rank exemptions.

**New York Police Department**

Qualify twice per year with handguns; unknown with a shotgun and unknown on a FOS system. There are no years-of-service and/or rank exemptions.

**Philadelphia Police Department**

Qualify once per year with handguns; twice with a shotgun and no qualification required on a FOS system. There are no years-of-service and/or rank exemptions.

**Houston Police Department**

Qualify once per year with handguns; once per year with a shotgun and no FOS qualification. There are no years-of-service and/or rank exemptions.

**Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department**

Qualify four times per year with handguns; one time every two years with a shotgun and offers qualification on a FOS system (not mandatory). There are no years-of-service and/or rank exemptions.
In 2016, an average of 0.23 percent of Department personnel failed to successfully qualify. This accounted for a 0.18 percentage point decrease compared to a 0.41 percent failure rate in 2015.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Other Use of Force Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles PD</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La County SD</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia PD</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago PD</td>
<td>Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Los Angeles PD

**Use of Force Curriculum**: Includes: Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS

- **Mental Health Training**: Includes: Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS
- **Firearms Training**: Includes: Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS
- **Arrest and Control**: Includes: 24-ESCALATION: 15.25

- **Community Relationship Training**: Includes: TASER: 12
- **Less-Lethal Training**: Includes: BEHAVING SHOTGUN: 2
- **De-Escalation Techniques**: Includes: CHEMICAL AGENT & O.C.: 6

- **Total**: 26.5 HRS

La County SD

**Use of Force Curriculum**: Includes: Force Option Simulator: 3 HRS

- **Mental Health Training**: Includes: BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT CRISIS & DE-ESCALATION: 5 HRS
- **Firearms Training**: Includes: Chemical Agents: 6 HRS
- **Arrest and Control**: Includes: 24-ESCALATION: 15.25

- **Community Relationship Training**: Includes: TASER: 12
- **Less-Lethal Training**: Includes: CHEMICAL AGENT & O.C.: 6
- **De-Escalation Techniques**: Includes: ARREST & CONTROL: 54

- **Total**: 15 HRS

Philadelphia PD

**Use of Force Curriculum**: Includes: UOF: 4

- **Mental Health Training**: Includes: VARIANTS BEHAVIOR: 7
- **Firearms Training**: Includes: CRISIS: 3
- **Arrest and Control**: Includes: POLICE-OFFICER RELATIONS: 2

- **Community Relationship Training**: Includes: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: 15
- **Less-Lethal Training**: Includes: TASER: 8
- **De-Escalation Techniques**: Includes: FORCE MITIGATION & MENTAL HEALTH AWARENESS: 16

- **Total**: 48 HRS

Chicago PD

**Use of Force Curriculum**: Includes: UOF: 4

- **Mental Health Training**: Includes: VARIANTS BEHAVIOR: 7
- **Firearms Training**: Includes: CRISIS: 3
- **Arrest and Control**: Includes: POLICE-OFFICER RELATIONS: 2

- **Community Relationship Training**: Includes: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: 15
- **Less-Lethal Training**: Includes: TASER: 8
- **De-Escalation Techniques**: Includes: FORCE MITIGATION & MENTAL HEALTH AWARENESS: 16

- **Total**: 58 HRS

:: Academy comparison information was not available for New York Police Department and Houston Police Department ::

LAPD

[Academy comparison information was not available for New York Police Department and Houston Police Department]
The Graphic Information Systems Section, under the command of Information Technology Bureau, is responsible for creating a variety of mapping resources for the Department.

2016 USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS (BY REPORTING DISTRICT)

Use of Force Occurrence
- No
- Very Low
- Low
- Moderate
- High
- Very High

Map excludes UOF incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.
2016 Violent Crime Occurrence & OIS Incidents

Geographical Areas

- Central Area
- Rampart Area
- South Valley Area
- North Hollywood Area
- West Valley Area
- Van Nuys Area
- North Hollywood Area
- Sanford Area

OIS Incidents

- Hit Incidents
- No Hit Incidents

Violent Crime Occurrence

- Very Low Density
- Low Density
- Moderate Density
- High Density
- Very High Density

Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.

OIS INCIDENTS (2012-2016)

Geographical Areas

- Central Area
- Rampart Area
- South Valley Area
- North Hollywood Area
- West Valley Area
- Van Nuys Area
- North Hollywood Area
- Sanford Area

OIS Incidents

- 2012
- 2013
- 2014
- 2015
- 2016

Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.
OIS-HIT INCIDENTS (2012-2016)

Geographical Areas
- Central Area
- Rampart Area
- Southwest Area
- Hollywood Area
- Harbor Area
- Wilshire Area
- West Valley Area
- Northwest Area
- 77th Street Area
- Newton Area
- Pacoima Area
- North Hollywood Area
- Descanso Area
- Southeast Area
- Mission Area
- Olympic Area
- Topanga Area

OIS-HIT Incidents
- 2012
- 2013
- 2014
- 2015
- 2016

Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.

OIS-NO HIT INCIDENTS (2012-2016)

Geographical Areas
- Central Area
- Rampart Area
- Southeast Area
- Hollywood Area
- Harbor Area
- Wilshire Area
- West Los Angeles Area
- 77th Street Area
- Newton Area
- Pacoima Area
- North Hollywood Area
- Descanso Area
- Southeast Area
- Mission Area
- Olympic Area
- Topanga Area

OIS-NO Hit Incidents
- 2012
- 2013
- 2014
- 2015
- 2016

Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.
## 2016 Unsheltered People (By Census Tract)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Areas</th>
<th>Number of Unsheltered People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garvanza Area</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys Area</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles Area</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood Area</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Area</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Area</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Area</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Area</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Los Angeles Area</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central Area</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Area</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Area</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topanga Area</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Area</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood Area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglewood Area</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Data
- Data from Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority

## 2016 Calls For Service

### Involving Possible Mental Illness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Areas</th>
<th>Volume of Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Area</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Area</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Area</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood Area</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood Area</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Area</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Area</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys Area</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley Area</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Area</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Data
- Data from Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority

---

Los Angeles Police Department

Use of Force Year-End Review

Prepared by LAPD/ADSD/GIS Mapping 02.08.17
LEGAL STANDARDS

The UOF by members of law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community. It is recognized that some individuals will not comply with the law or submit to detention or arrest unless compelled to do so by the UOF. Therefore, law enforcement officers are sometimes called upon to use force in the performance of their duties.

It is also recognized that members of law enforcement derive their authority from the public, and therefore, must be ever mindful that they are not only guardians, but are also the servants of the public. The Department’s guiding value when using force shall always be reverence for human life. When warranted, Department personnel may objectively use reasonable force to carry out their duties. Officers who use unreasonable force degrade the confidence of the community, expose the Department and fellow officers to legal, physical, and financial harm, and violate the rights of individuals upon whom unreasonable force was used. Conversely, officers who fail to use force when warranted may endanger themselves, the public, and fellow officers.

Federal Legal Standards

The United States Constitution and extensive case law dictates how all law enforcement organizations across the nation establish and maintain their UOF policies. The federal legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a UOF is the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Graham v. Connor, the United States Supreme Court determined that an objective reasonableness standard should apply to a civilian’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of his/her person. Graham states in part:

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.

In essence, the Supreme Court’s ruling established that the force used must be reasonable under the circumstances known to the officer at the time. Therefore, the Department examines all UOF incidents from an objective, rather than a subjective, standard.

Federal and State law defines general UOF policy standards and practices for all law enforcement agencies. The City of Los Angeles civilian police oversight body, the BOPC, however, further refines the Department’s UOF policy by establishing administrative standards. As a result, the Department’s prescribed policies and procedures are more restrictive when compared to the broader legal guidelines. Therefore, OBS incidents and other applications of force utilized by Department personnel can be adjudicated as out of policy by the BOPC; despite the lawfulness of the officer’s decisions or actions.

State of California Legal Standards

In accordance with California Penal Code Section 835a, law enforcement personnel may only use the amount force that is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to self-defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.

THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE POLICY

It is the policy of the Department that personnel may only use the amount of force that is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

The Department’s UOF policies are more restrictive than state and federal law. For example, State and Federal law allows officers to shoot at moving vehicles where the suspect is using the vehicle itself as a weapon, while Department policy prohibits officers from using deadly force in such circumstances. The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor, the State of California legal standards set forth in California Penal Code Section 835a, and from the articulable facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles police officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances as those of the evaluated incident. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the suspect;
- Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;
 Deadly Force

During the rare and unfortunate circumstances where a combination of complex factors warrant the use of deadly force to stop a threat to the public or police officers, the Department authorizes such force to be utilized by personnel in any of the following situations:

1. Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,
2. Prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,
3. Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed.

In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury.

In response to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Hayes v. County of San Diego, the Department revised its UOF policy in 2014 to include consideration of officers’ tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force when evaluating the objective reasonableness of an incident.

Warning Shots

Warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage.

Shooting at or From Moving Vehicles

Firearms shall not be discharged at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is threatening the officer or others with deadly force by means other than the vehicle itself. A moving vehicle shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an officer’s use of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of its occupants. Firearms shall not be discharged from a moving vehicle, except in exigent circumstances and in the immediate defense of life.

Note: It is understood that the policy in regards to discharging a firearm at or from a moving vehicle may not cover every situation that may arise. In all situations, Department members are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound judgment, attending to the spirit of this policy. Any deviations from the provisions of this policy shall be examined rigorously on a case-by-case basis. The involved officer must be able to articulate clearly the reasons for the use of deadly force. Factors that may be considered include whether the officer’s life or the lives of others were in immediate peril and whether there was no reasonable or apparent means of escape.

DEPARTMENT CATEGORIZATION OF UOF

The Department classifies UOF incidents as either a CUOF or a NCUOF, depending on the level of force used or severity of injuries sustained by the suspect and/or officer.

Categorical Use of Force

A CUOF is defined as:

- An incident involving the use of deadly force (e.g., discharge of a firearm) by a Department employee;
- All uses of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid or locked carotid hold;
- All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custodial care of the Department (also known as an In-Custody Death or ICD);
- A UOF incident resulting in death;
- A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a Law Enforcement Related Injury Investigation, or LERII;
- All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death;
- Officer involved animal shootings;
- Tactical and non-tactical unintentional discharges;
- An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required. Under Department policy, a canine contact is not a UOF but has been included in this category to satisfy the provisions of the Consent Decree; and,
- Incidents where the Department has agreed to conduct similar critical incident investigations for a non-Department entity, such as a Los Angeles Fire Department Arson Unit.

All other reportable UOF incidents, including the discharge of a TASER, the use of a chemical irritant control device, or all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes...
Non-Categorical Use of Force

A reportable NCUOF is defined as an incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses a less-lethal control device or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee's direction, overcome resistance of a person during an arrest or a detention, or defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person.

The following incidents are not reportable as a NCUOF incident:

- The use of a C-grip, firm grip, or joint lock to compel a person to comply with an employee's direction which does not result in an injury or complained of injury;
- The UOF reasonable to overcome passive resistance due to physical disability, mental illness, intoxication, or muscle rigidity of a person (e.g., use of a C-grip or firm grip, joint lock, joint lock walk down or body weight) which does not result in an injury or complained of injury;
- Under any circumstances, the discharge of a less-lethal projectile weapon (e.g., beanbag shotgun, TASER, 37mm or 40mm projectile launcher, any chemical control dispenser or Compressed Air Projectile System) that does not contact a person;
- Force used by an organized squad in a crowd control situation, or a riotous situation when the crowd exhibits hostile behavior and does not respond to verbal directions from Department employees.

Note: Isolated incidents resulting from a crowd control situation may require a UOF investigation as determined by a supervisor at the scene.

- Any incident investigated by FID and determined not to rise to the level of a CUOF.

Non-Categorical Use of Force Levels

All NCUOF incidents shall be classified as either a Level I or Level II incident.

A NCUOF shall be reported as a Level I incident under the following circumstances:

1. An allegation of unauthorized force is made regarding the force used by a Department employee(s); or,
2. The force used results in a serious injury, such as a broken bone, dislocation, an injury requiring sutures, etc., that does not rise to the level of a CUOF; or,

Note: If the investigating supervisor is unable to verify the seriousness of an injury or complaint of injury, it shall be reported as a Level I incident. If the injury requires admission to a hospital, the incident becomes a CUOF and will be investigated by FID.

3. The injuries to the person upon whom force was used are inconsistent with the amount or type of force reported by involved Department employee(s); or,
4. Accounts of the incident provided by witnesses and/or the subject of the UOF substantially conflict with the involved employee(s) account.

All other reportable NCUOF incidents that do not meet Level I criteria shall be reported as Level II incidents. This includes the use of an impact device or less-lethal munitions with hits.

Note: If the use of an impact device or less-lethal munitions causes a serious injury such as a broken bone, dislocation, or an injury requiring sutures, etc., and does not rise to the level of a CUOF, it shall be reported as a Level I incident.

with an impact weapon or device which do not result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death which have been approved to be handled as a Level I NCUOF by the CO of FID, are classified as NCUOF incidents.
627,677 INDIVIDUALS STOPPED

In 2016, Department personnel stopped 627,677 individuals during observation-related field detentions (including both vehicle and pedestrian stops).
MEDICAL CARE OF ARRESTEES

Once an arrestee is in the custody of the Department, a safe housing environment and access to adequate medical care are required.

The watch commander at the arresting officers’ geographical area inquires whether the arrestee has any medical problems prior to authorizing the booking procedures to begin.

Once at a Department custody facility, the initial medical assessment of an arrestee is twofold. First, the arresting officer(s) completes a standardized medical questionnaire. The questionnaire is utilized to identify any medical concerns, mental illnesses, use of prescribed medication, and substance use. Second, the officer(s) performs a visual screening of the arrestee for any visible injuries, impairment, and/or medical conditions that would require medical attention or an increased level of care.

If the arrestee reports or displays the need for medical treatment, onsite Medical Services Division personnel evaluate the arrestee within each of the three regional custody facility medical dispensaries (Metropolitan Detention Center, 77th Regional Jail, and Valley Regional Jail). If the level of care cannot be sufficiently provided at the Department’s custody facility, the arrestee is transferred to a contract hospital or the county jail for further treatment. If the treating physician at the contract hospital clears the arrestee to return to the detention facility, a re-screening is conducted and the level of care is monitored until the arrestee is transferred to another agency.

After the arrestee has been screened by the arresting officer(s) and evaluated by medical personnel, if needed, the booking officer conducts a second evaluation of the arrestee to identify any factors that necessitate special confinement. Once housed at the custody facility, the arrestee is observed in person by jail personnel at a minimum of every 30 minutes, exceeding the hourly check required under State Title 15 mandates.

Medical staff conducts sick-call visits to the housing units at approximately 0300 and 1500 hours each day to provide follow-up care. Medical staff also utilize the sick-call visits to address any new concerns by arrestees who did not report any initial medical issues.
The Investigation, Review, & Adjudication Process

CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE
The Department, like all other law enforcement agencies, is mandated by law to oversee and investigate all UOF incidents by its officers. The adjudication process for CUOF incidents involves a precise and systematic process with specific procedures. Officer involved shootings, for example, take on a different level of investigation and review compared to animal shootings or NCUOF incidents. Unlike NCUOF incidents, all CUOF incidents are followed by a formal adjudication process consisting of a comprehensive investigation, a thorough analysis of the force used by a UOFRB, recommended findings presented by the UOFRB to the COP, recommended findings by the COP to the BOPC, and the final adopted findings imposed by the BOPC.

Public Safety Statement
Immediately after a CUOF incident occurs, specifically an OIS, a Department supervisor will take a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from substantially involved personnel (SIP). The PSS is a cursory statement of what occurred in order to address public safety concerns. After obtaining sufficient information, the supervisor shall immediately cause the individual separation of SIP and/or other witness employees and order them not to discuss the incident with anyone other than the assigned investigators and/or the employee’s representative(s).

Separation and Transportation of Personnel
After the PSS has been obtained and all public safety concerns have been addressed (e.g., establishing a perimeter, protecting the crime scene, locating witnesses/evidence, managing the response of additional resources, etc.), the incident commander shall ensure that additional supervisors transport all SIPs and witness employees individually to the location of the FID interview as soon as practicable. Separation shall remain in effect until FID interviews all concerned employees.

Real Time Analysis and Critical Response Division Responsibilities
Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response Division (RACR) is responsible for making the following notifications within 20 minutes of being notified by the Area watch commander/incident commander that a CUOF incident has occurred:
- Force Investigation Division;
- Office of the COP or his designee;
- Chief of Staff; and,
- Office of the Inspector General on behalf of the BOPC.

As soon as possible after being notified of a CUOF incident, but not required within 20 minutes, RACR is responsible for making notifications to the following entities:
- Commanding Officer, Professional Standards Bureau (PSB);
- Involved employee(s) CO;
- Department Risk Manager; and,
- Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office (LADA) for those cases identified in the roll out protocol governing such notifications.

Initial Notification and Call-Out Procedures
Currently, RACR notifies the on-call FID Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the CUOF incident, who coordinates for FID personnel to respond to the scene within one hour of notification. The first arriving FID investigator ensures that on-scene personnel have secured the crimes scene(s), generated crime scene logs, and have established a perimeter.

Force Investigation Division
Upon arrival at the scene of a CUOF incident, FID personnel assume responsibility of the overall investigation. As part of the investigation, FID personnel conduct interviews with all involved parties, locate and collect evidence, manage crime scenes, coordinate the acquisition of photographs, and liaise with other relevant Department and non-Department entities.

Force Investigation Division was established on August 22, 2004 as the Department entity responsible for the administrative investigation of all UOF incidents determined to be “Categorical” in the Federal Consent Decree (between the Department and the United States Department of Justice). Force Investigation Division is comprised of four Administrative Investigation Sections comprised of two teams each: a Criminal Apprehension Team; an Investigative Support Team; and an Investigative Support Section.
Resources Utilized by FID
Depending upon the type of CUOF incident, the following Department resources may be utilized:

Command Post Unit:
Forensic Science Division (FSD) comprised of Field Investigation, Firearms Analysis, Narcotics Analysis, Quality Assurance, Questioned Documents, Serology/DNA, Toxicology and Trace Analysis Units; Technical Investigation Division (TID) comprised of the Electronics, Latent Print, Photography and Polygraph Units; and, Air Support Division (aerial photographs).

Additionally, the following Department and/or outside entities may respond:

Media Relations Section;  Robbery Homicide Division; Office of the Inspector General; Officer Representation Section; Los Angeles Police Protective League; Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office; Justice System Integrity Division; Crimes Against Police Officers Section (CAPOS); and, Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner.

Investigative Procedures & Guidelines Following the Field Investigation
Force Investigation Division is obligated to complete the investigation and forward the case to UOFRD within 240 days of the date of the CUOF incident date.

Further Investigation (as deemed necessary)
As necessary, FID investigators conduct additional investigative inquiries, as requested by the COP or the BOPC.

Inclusion of Other Investigative Entities

During the course of the initial investigation, evidence and/or other facts about the incident may emerge, warranting joint-investigations amongst several investigative entities. Factors that contribute to the decision on whether to incorporate joint-investigations are typically identified while FID conducts their initial investigation or during the preliminary notification process of information obtained from supervisors who respond to the incident. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the death of, or serious bodily injury sustained by, a police officer as a result of the suspect’s actions, the identification of a Department employee as the victim of a crime directly related to the incident being investigated, or allegations of serious misconduct on behalf of the officer. In such events, the Department may involve the following:

Robbery-Homicide Division;
Internal Affairs Group; and,
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Crimes against Police Officers Section.

Forensic Science Division & Technical Investigation Division

Forensic Sciences Division and TID include the Criminalistics Laboratory and the Technical Laboratory. In the broadest sense, FSD and TID’s functions are to facilitate the collection, comparison, and interpretation of all types of physical evidence found at crime scenes, or collected from suspects and victims, and to provide expert testimony in these areas.

The Criminalistics Laboratory is a part of the Hertzberg-Davis Forensic Science Center at the Los Angeles Regional Crime Laboratory. The 180,000 square foot forensic science facility is located on the campus of California State University, Los Angeles, and is shared by the Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, California State University, Los Angeles, the California Forensic Science Institute, and the California Criminalistics Institute.

The Criminalistics Laboratory is comprised of the Field Investigation Unit, Firearm Analysis Unit, Narcotics Analysis Unit, Quality Assurance Unit, Questioned Documents Unit, Serology/DNA Unit, and the Toxicology and Trace Analysis Unit. The Technical Laboratory encompasses the Electronics, Latent Print, Photography and Polygraph Units.

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

There are four specific situations that Department employees may be involved in that generate a mandated referral to BSS. These situations include OIS incidents, CUOF incidents (other than OIS incidents), bloodborne pathogen exposure, and military deployment. Appointments are arranged by the employee’s CO and are conducted on-duty.

For more information regarding the Department’s mandated process and protocols relevant to BSS referrals, refer to the Officer Wellness and Suitability to Return to Duty section on page 144.

72-Hour Briefing

Within 72-Hours of an OIS (or other significant CUOF incident wherein a briefing is deemed necessary by the COP), an initial briefing is scheduled for the COP and other concerned command staff members. During the briefing, FID provides a preliminary presentation of the incident and answers questions by the COP and attending staff members.

Although the briefing is an initial assessment of the incident, based on preliminary information, many basic facts are available at this stage. The objective of the briefing is to address issues that require immediate Department attention. The involved employees of the incident do not attend the briefing.

General Training Update (GTU)

In addition to the Tactical Debrief, which occurs after adjudication, substantially involved personnel also receive directed training, or the GTU, within 90 days following a CUOF incident. Areas of concern regarding the incident are addressed by any of the levels of initial review. Those subject matters are then conveyed to UOFRD, who oversees and coordinates the completion of the directed training. In addition to topics requested by commanding staff to be addressed, five mandatory subjects (six if an OIS occurred) are required for CUOF incidents. The mandatory GTU topics include:

- Command and Control;
- Equipment Required and Maintained;
- Tactical Communications;
- Tactical Planning;
- Use of Force Policy; and, FOS (for OIS incidents only).

Note: As of January 2017, Tactical De-Escalation was added to the mandatory GTU subjects.

General Training Updates are typically administered by personnel assigned to the training unit at the involved employee(s) Area or division of assignment. Upon completion of the GTU, the concerned Area or division forwards documentation to UOFRD for tracking and documentation purposes, and the training is updated on the employee’s Training Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS) II Report.

Statute of Limitations for Adjudication

To ensure that CUOF incidents are properly reviewed and adjudicated in a timely manner, time limitations are implemented for various levels of investigation and review. These include:

The statute date, or completion date for the entire process, which is one year from the CUOF incident date (or the date the incident is reported to a Department supervisor); FID’s completion of the entire CUOF incident, which is within 240 calendar days from the date of incident; and,

in determining the proper adjudication for a CUOF incident, the following sections are extensively evaluated by all levels of review (including the UOFRB, the COP, the OIG, and the BOPC):

Adjudication: Tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Debrief</td>
<td>Tactical Debrief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Disapproval</td>
<td>Extensive Retraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice to Correct Deficiencies</td>
<td>Personnel Complaint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjudication: Drawing/Exhibiting of Firearm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Policy/No Further Action</td>
<td>Tactical Debrief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Disapproval/ Out of Policy</td>
<td>Extensive Retraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice to Correct Deficiencies</td>
<td>Personnel Complaint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjudication: Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Policy/No Further Action</td>
<td>Tactical Debrief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Disapproval/ Out of Policy</td>
<td>Extensive Retraining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice to Correct Deficiencies</td>
<td>Personnel Complaint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The COP’s recommended findings, which shall be submitted to the BOPC within 60 calendar days prior to the administrative statute date.

Review & Findings

Upon completion of FID’s investigation of a CUOF incident, UOFRD receives and completes a comprehensive review and analysis of the incident. Use of Force Review Division then schedules a UOFRB.

In Policy/No Further Action

In the case of a review of one or more of the following:

• Notice to Correct Deficiencies
• Personnel Complaint

Adjudication: Out of Policy

Tactical Debrief plus (one or more of the following):

• Extensive Retraining
• Notice to Correct Deficiencies
• Personnel Complaint

Adjudication: Use of Force

Tactical Debrief plus (one or more of the following):

• Extensive Retraining
• Notice to Correct Deficiencies
• Personnel Complaint
Factors Considered in Determining Appropriate Findings

Tactix: Was the officer’s tactical decision making during and prior to the incident, considered a substantial deviation from Department training and, if so, was that decision making justifiable?

Drawing/Exhibiting: Did the officer have a reasonable belief that the tactical situation could potentially escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified?

Use of Force: Was the officer’s force objectively reasonable and carried out in accordance with the Department’s UOF policy?

Office of the Inspector General

All FID investigations are closely overseen by the OIG. The OIG’s oversight begins immediately following the occurrence of a CUOF. The OIG has a 24-hour response capability, and is promptly notified following the occurrence of a CUOF. The OIG responds to CUOF incidents and monitors the conduct of FID’s on-scene investigation, assessing compliance with applicable policy standards, as well as more generally working to ensure the overall quality of the investigative work being performed. As the investigation progresses over the months that follow the incident, the OIG maintains its oversight role. The OIG’s oversight of each investigation culminates in a detailed review of every completed investigation case file, and a written assessment of such to the BOPC of the quality of that investigation. In practice, the OIG works closely with FID in order to ensure that, whenever possible, investigative issues identified during the course of the investigation are addressed and resolved.

Chief of Police

Once the COP’s report to the BOPC of each CUOF case is completed, it is reviewed by the OIG. The OIG evaluates the COP’s findings and reports its own, independent set of recommendations to the BOPC for use in its adjudication of the case. In cases where the OIG concurs with the findings of the COP, it will recommend to the BOPC that it adopt those findings. If the OIG believes additional or different findings are necessary, it will so recommend to the BOPC, which promotes transparency and accountability within the organization.

Office of the Inspector General

Personnel from the OIG and representatives from LADA are notified of CUOF incidents. The OIG responds to the scene to monitor the conduct of FID’s on-scene investigation, assessing compliance with applicable policy standards.

Post-Adjudication Procedures Internal Process Report (IPR)

Immediately following the adjudication process, UOFRD forwards an IPR Form, which lists the individual findings for each substantially involved employee, to the involved employee’s CO. The CO personally meets with the employee(s) and discusses the incident and the adopted BOPC findings. Additionally, the CO shall discuss any adverse actions related to the incident as a result of a finding of Administrative Disapproval or Out of Policy.

Tactical Debrief, Extensive Retraining, & Disciplinary Proceedings

Under current policy, an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy determination will result in one or more of the following: extensive retraining, notice to correct deficiencies, or a personnel complaint. If such findings are adopted, the COP will render a decision on which of the outcomes are most suitable to address the employee’s actions.

The formal debriefing of all CUOF incidents, also referred to as the Tactical Debrief, is a critical part of the process for the employees, the Department, and law enforcement in general. It affords all parties the opportunity to identify what was successful and which areas require improvement. The Tactical Debrief addresses topics that could assist in the modification or enhancement of the Department’s commitment to best practices and overall employee performance. Curriculum and class instruction are formatted to promote dialogue and an open forum between personnel and the instructors, thus allowing a more suitable platform for collaboration and overall enrichment. The Tactical Debrief is facilitated by a member of the Department’s Training Division and occurs within 90 days after the BOPC’s adjudication of the incident.

Extensive Retraining is conducted by Training Division. The facilitator of the Extensive Retraining course tailors the training to be incident specific and verifies that the areas of concern are included in the course curriculum.

If a Notice to Correct Deficiencies is ratified, the CO of the employee will complete and submit the necessary documentation, which is to be recorded on the employee’s TEAMS II Report.

In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for the Department to initiate a personnel complaint. Those instances include when training alone is insufficient, has already been provided and proven ineffective, and/or the employee disregarded Department policy or procedure(s).

The Investigation, Review & Adjudication Process

In such cases, the employee could face an official reprimand, demotion, suspension, or termination. For further information regarding the Department’s complaint process relative to UOF incidents, refer to the Personnel Complaints Resulting from Use of Force Incidents sections on page 140.

Department Personnel Tracking & Monitoring

Following the enactment of the Federal Consent Decree in 2001, the Department was required to implement numerous reform measures to track the trajectory and scope of its performance and consent decree adherence. One such measure was the development of the computerized TEAMS II database.

TEAMs II is the Department’s version of a risk management database, wherein information is collected about each officer’s UOF involvement, civilian complaints, training activities, commendations, vehicle accidents, and other performance measures. Once a threshold in any of those fields is reached, the system automatically alerts supervisors about officers whose patterns of activity seem more at risk than their peers. The TEAMs II system is an effective human resource management tool for the Department, which promotes transparency and accountability within the organization.

Non-Categorical Use of Force

The adjudication process for NCUOF incidents differs with respect to the chain of investigation, review, analysis, and adoption of findings compared to UOF incidents. Nonetheless, the implementation of highly precise, systematic, and proficient levels of review ensures that all NCUOF cases receive the highest degree of evaluation and proper disposition by the Department.

Investigation of a NCUOF Level I Incident

Supervisors are required to record witness statements, document injuries and medical treatment (when applicable) of involved suspects or employees, and acquire photographs of the NCUOF incident scene.

Investigation of a NCUOF Level II Incident

The process for documenting/reporting Level II incidents shall mirror that of a Level I incident, with the following exceptions:

- Tape-recording non-Department employee witnesses is optional;
The requirement for an “Incident Overview” is eliminated; and, The related crime and/or arrest report or Employee’s Report will serve as documentation of statements for the subject of the UOF, witnesses, and involved Department employees. Any discrepancies between statements shall still be addressed in “Investigating Supervisor’s Notes.”

Note: Discrepancies that constitute a substantial conflict between witness or suspect accounts and the involved employee(s) account shall be reported as a Level I incident.

Watch Commander Responsibility
As part of the watch commander’s evaluation of the NCUOF incident, they shall:

Evaluate whether or not the amount of force used was reasonable and consistent with actions reported by the involved Department employee(s), ensuring that all relevant tactical actions, UOF application(s) and policy issues are addressed. The watch commander/OIC shall evaluate the force that was used, not the force options that could have been considered; Ensure that all supervisors are interviewed regarding their conduct at the scene during the incident; and, Evaluate the actions of each of these supervisors.

Commanding Officer Responsibility
Upon receipt of a NCUOF investigation, the CO of the concerned Bureau/Area/Division shall:

Utilize the Area/Division Training Coordinator to evaluate the incident; Contact subject matter experts (e.g. Training Division) to obtain additional information, as needed; Review all reports and make a recommendation on the disposition; and, Notify the employee of UOFRD’s final disposition as soon as practicable.

Commanding Officer, UOFRD, Responsibility
The director of the OAS is the Department’s review authority for the administrative review of all UOF incidents. For NCUOF incidents, that authority is generally exercised through the CO of UOFRD, who shall:

Review the NCUOF investigation and all related reports to ensure compliance with Department policy and procedure; and, Approve or disapprove the recommended disposition and provide a written rationale for any finding that differs from that of the bureau CO;

Post-Adjudication Procedures
Following adjudication of a NCUOF incident, the following shall occur:

Recordation of training into the concerned employee’s TEAMS II report; and, If applicable, directed training for issues or deficiencies identified from the incident, and/or initiation of a personnel complaint.

CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

1. Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incident occurs
2. Force Investigation Division (FID) personnel responds and conducts the CUOF incident investigation
3. Chief of Police (COP) 72-Hour Briefing (all OIS and any other significant CUOF incident)
4. General Training Update completed within 90 days of the CUOF incident for all substantially involved personnel
5. Use of Force Review Division (UOFRD) receives completed FID investigation for analysis and schedules a Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB)
6. UOFRB is convened, chaired by the Director of Office of Administrative Services
7. COP receives UOFRB recommendations and evaluates the incident. COP reports his recommendations to the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC)
8. BOPC receives COP recommendations and evaluates the incident. BOPC adjudicates the incident. COP determines appropriate outcome based on BOPC decision

NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

1. Non-Categorical Use of Force (NCUOF) incident occurs
2. A supervisor responds and conducts the NCUOF incident investigation
3. Watch Commander and Training/TEAMS II Coordinator reviews the supervisor’s completed investigation
4. Area/Division Commanding Officer reviews the NCUOF investigation
5. Bureau Commanding Officer reviews the NCUOF investigation
6. Use of Force Review Division (UOFRD) reviews the NCUOF investigation
7. BOPC receives COP recommendations and evaluates the incident. BOPC determines appropriate outcome based on BOPC decision
8. UOFRD may endorse the recommendations or; UOFRD may direct training and/or discipline
PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS
RESULTING FROM USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS

INITIATION & INVESTIGATION PROCESS
The initiation process for complaints resulting from UOF findings of Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy differs depending on whether the force was classified as a CUOF or NCUOF incident.

Categorical Use of Force
The Board of Police Commissioners adjudicates the UOF and determines the findings for each involved employee. If an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy finding is adopted, the COP determines which of the below listed outcomes is most appropriate to address the employee’s actions. Such remedial actions may include:
- Completion of extensive retraining;
- Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or
- Personnel complaint.

If the COP determines a personnel complaint is appropriate, UOFRD initiates the complaint through the Complaint Management System and transmits it to the Complaint Classifications Unit (CCU), IAG. Complaints resulting from CUOF incidents are investigated by CCU.

Because the FID investigation and subsequent review process are exhaustive, these complaints are commonly initiated within two months of the administrative statute date. To complete the complaint investigation within such short time period, CCU investigators generally use the FID investigation, interviews, and transcripts to complete the complaint, though on occasion, ancillary allegations and discrepancies necessitate additional investigation.

Non-Categorical Use of Force
Personnel complaints and/or training resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings for NCUOF incidents may be initiated by one of the following at any point throughout the UOF review cycle:
- Divisional CO;
- Bureau CO; or
- Commanding Officer, UOFRD.

Commanding Officer, UOFRD
Ultimately, the CO of UOFRD either approves or disapproves the bureau’s recommended disposition. When there is a finding of Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy, UOFRD may recommend training and/or discipline.

Complaints associated with NCUOF incidents are generally investigated by CCU, and occasionally by other IAG investigators. The investigators review all reports and interviews related to the UOF, probe ancillary allegations, and address discrepancies as they would any other type of allegation.

ADJUDICATION PROCESS
The Department’s adjudication process begins with the accused employee’s CO and goes through multiple levels of review. Upon completion of a disciplinary complaint investigation, the employee’s CO is responsible for reviewing the investigation, determining whether misconduct occurred, and recommending the disposition, and penalty, if applicable. Consistent with the Department’s standards, adjudicators must determine by a preponderance of evidence whether misconduct occurred. Preponderance of evidence means the weight of evidence on one side is greater than the evidence presented for the other side. The adjudicator must make a determination for each allegation based on factual, reasonable consideration of the evidence and statements presented in the investigation.

Theoretically, the possible disciplinary dispositions for all complaints of misconduct include:
- Sustained;
- Unfounded (the act did not occur);
- Exonerated (the act occurred but was justified, lawful and proper);
- Not Resolved (when evidence does not clearly prove or disprove the allegation);
- Insufficient Evidence to Adjudicate; or,
- Withdrawn by the COP used only by the COP when an allegation would be better adjudicated by a court; imposing discipline is legally prohibited; the alleged act is minor misconduct and significant time has passed; or evidence has been lost or destroyed).

However, when force known to have occurred is found to be Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy, and the COP has determined it should be addressed with a personnel complaint, the most likely disposition is sustained.

The CO submits the adjudication disposition recommendation up the chain of command to the employee’s bureau CO. The bureau CO can concur with the recommendation, or if the bureau CO disagrees with the recommended adjudication, the bureau CO will prepare correspondence to IAG explaining the disagreement, the bureau’s recommended adjudication, and the rationale for the bureau recommendation. This is referred to as a Military Endorsement.
The next level of review is done in a group setting referred to as a “Case Analysis Team.” This group consists of the COs of PSB and IAG, the captains assigned to PSB and IAG, the Department Advocate, and the lieutenants preparing to present sustained cases to the COP. The purpose of the meeting is to provide an opportunity for the presenters to brief the group on each case being presented to the COP. The presenters include a synopsis of the supporting evidence, or lack thereof, discuss errors made by the adjudicator(s) in the findings or recommended penalty, a risk analysis of the employee, which includes disciplinary history, and other unusual circumstance(s) that may affect the final decision by the COP. The group asks questions to ensure that all pertinent areas of the investigation were covered and that the final disposition of findings is sound. The recommended penalty is also evaluated to ensure it is within a range consistent with that which other similarly situated officers have received for similar misconduct. Once the group agrees the findings and penalty are appropriate, the case is ready for presentation to the COP.

All personnel complaints resulting from CUOF incidents found to be Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy by the BOPC are presented to the COP for final adjudication and penalty.

Complaints resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings for NCUOF incidents are subject to the same review process as all other types of complaints. When the recommended adjudication is sustained with a penalty of an official reprimand or greater, IAG submits the completed investigation and recommendation to the COP for final adjudication and penalty consideration.

### POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

When a complaint is sustained, under City Charter Section 1070(b), the COP may:

- Temporarily relieve the employee from duty pending a hearing before and decision by a Board of Rights; or
- Suspend the employee for a total period not to exceed 22 working days with loss of pay and with or without reprimand; or
- Demote the employee in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or
- Demote the employee in rank, with or without temporary relief from duty or cancellation of such relief from duty.

If the COP desires to suspend an employee for more than 22 days, or believes removal is the appropriate penalty, the matter is referred to a Board of Rights.

### BOARD OF RIGHTS

A Board of Rights is considered a de novo hearing. The Board is composed of two sworn Department members (at the rank of Captain or above), and one civilian member from the BOPC’s list of approved hearing officers. Members of the Board of Rights must make an independent assessment of the matter based solely on the evidence presented to them at the hearing (City Charter Sections 1070(f), 1070(h), and 1070(i)).

The Board of Rights will determine by majority vote if the officer is Guilty or Not Guilty based on the preponderance of evidence (City Charter Section 1070(j)). If the Board of Rights finds the officer Not Guilty, the complaint concludes and the COP may not impose a penalty.

If the officer is found Guilty, under City Charter Section 1070(n), the Board of Rights recommends a penalty, which is prescribed by written order of:

- Suspension for a definite period not exceeding 65 working days with total loss of pay, and with or without reprimand; or
- Demotion in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or
- Reprimand without further penalty; or
- Removal.

In determining the final penalty, the COP will consider the Board of Rights’ recommendation, but has the authority to impose a lesser penalty than recommended. The Chief of Police, however, may not impose a higher penalty (City Charter Section 1070(p)).

### APPEAL PROCESS

The appeal process for complaints resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings on UOF incidents vary depending on the penalty imposed.

If the complaint is sustained with no penalty, a penalty of admonishment, or an official reprimand, the officer may request an Administrative Appeal to be held before a civilian hearing officer selected from the BOPC’s list of approved hearing officers. The standard used is a preponderance of the evidence. The hearing officer’s recommendation is provided to the COP for consideration. The decision of the COP is final (Memorandum of Understanding No. 24 – Police Officers, Lieutenant and Below Representation Unit, by and between the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Protective League, July 2014 – June 2018 [MOU, Article 9]).

If the penalty imposed is a demotion and/or suspension of one to 22 days, the officer may either appeal using the Administrative Appeal procedure [MOU Article 9], or opt for a Board of Rights [City Charter Section 1070(b)(2)].

If the officer elects an Administrative Appeal, the officer is admitting guilt, and the only issue to be appealed is the degree of penalty. The hearing officer’s report is submitted as a recommendation to the COP who makes the final determination. An Administrative Appeal may result in a lower level of discipline, but may not result in a higher penalty [MOU Article 9].

If the officer opts to appeal to a Board of Rights, the officer may appeal both the sustained finding and the penalty imposed. As explained above, under City Charter Section 1070(n), the Board of Rights can impose a penalty of:

- Suspension for a definite period not exceeding 65 working days with total loss of pay, and with or without reprimand; or
- Demotion in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or
- Reprimand without further penalty; or
- Removal.

The Chief of Police shall either uphold the recommendation of the Board of Rights or may, at his discretion, impose a penalty less severe than that ordered by the Board of Rights, but may not impose a greater penalty (City Charter Section 1070(p)).

Officers are also provided an opportunity to appeal the Department’s action when a CUOF results in Administrative Disapproval – Extensive Retraining. As set for in Article 9 of the MOU, CUOF adjudications of Administrative Disapproval – Extensive Retraining are subject to the Administrative Appeal process. The Department shall bear the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the Department’s action should remain.  

Out of Policy force findings for CUOF incidents in 2015 exceeded the 2012 through 2014 annual average by one percentage point.
The Department’s Behavioral Science Services is the oldest and most established in-house law enforcement psychological service entity in the United States. Since 1968, BSS has been a leader in the field of law enforcement psychology, having introduced not only the first in-house counseling service, but the first group of field-deployed police psychologists assigned to geographical Areas and Divisions. Behavioral Science Services police psychologists are experienced in debriefing officers exposed to a wide array of potentially traumatizing occurrences, including OIS and other CUOF incidents.

Officers involved in an OIS, including those who discharged their weapons and others who were immediately present, are mandated to visit BSS for individual psychological debriefings by a licensed psychologist. A CO can also order his/her personnel to BSS at their discretion if the employee was involved in a CUOF incident other than an OIS. The purpose of the debriefing is to evaluate the officer’s emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and physiological reactions to the incident. The debriefing is not an assessment of the officer’s global functioning, nor is it a fitness-for-duty evaluation. The appointment is scheduled between two and five days after the incident. Appointments are arranged by the concerned employee’s CO and are conducted on an on-duty basis.

Following the first session, the psychologist typically makes a recommendation to the concerned CO whether the officer should be allowed to return to their pre-incident work assignment. The psychologist may also direct the officer to return for additional mandated sessions, or suggest temporary non-field duties, if warranted.

To be reinstated to full work-duty status, an employee must receive approval from BSS and concurrence from the COP, via the employee’s concerned chain of command.

Behavioral Science Services provides individual and couples counseling to all Department personnel and their spouses. Although counseling is the primary service offered by BSS, the psychologists also provide training for Department personnel on topics such as stress management, suicide prevention, and anger management. Behavioral Science Services also provides organizational/psychological consultation to work groups within the Department. In addition, psychologists from BSS respond with SWAT personnel to hostage negotiations and barricaded suspect situations. Further, BSS designs and conducts research regarding various specialized areas related to law enforcement.

To assist with the Department’s commitment to providing employees wellness related services, BSS articulated specific organizational goals in 2016. Those goals include expanding wellness and injury reduction efforts, enhancing the quality of its pre-existing services, and automating its procedures for efficiency purposes. To effectively achieve these goals, BSS will:

- Examine ways of expanding wellness promotion activities to both sworn and civilian personnel;
- Publish public service announcement-style educational materials regarding various health and injury prevention subjects;
- Expanding proactive addiction prevention efforts of the Addiction Prevention Unit;
- Minimize the risk of compassion fatigue among staff;
- Develop, implement, and audit strategies to enhance clinical service delivery;
- Critically examine the various functions and tasks the organization performs for opportunities to automate and improve monitoring, service delivery, and efficiency; and,
- Implement real-time service delivery reporting and analysis.

For over 48 years, the Department’s BSS staff has provided innovative and unparalleled law enforcement related psychological and counseling services to sworn and civilian employees.
STATISTICAL
Analysis Section

CATEGORICAL
USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS
## Categorical Use of Force Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OIS Incidents</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIS-Hit Incidents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIS-No Hit Incidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Shooting Incidents</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional Discharge Incidents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Shot Incidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Custody Death Incidents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carotid Restraint Control Hold Incidents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Related Injury Incidents</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Strike Incidents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K9 Contact Incidents Requiring Hospitalization</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Geographical Areas

- Central Area
- Rampart Area
- Southwest Area
- Hollenbeck Area
- North Area
- West Valley Area
- Northeast Area
- 77th Street Area
- Van Nuys Area
- Olympic Area
- Targoo Area
- Police Stations

**OIS Incidents**

- 2012
- 2013
- 2014
- 2015
- 2016
In 2016, seven of the 40 total OIS incidents, or approximately 18 percent, were categorized as Classification I shootings. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 21 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification I shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 24 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification I shooting incidents accounted for 46 of the 201 total OIS incidents, or 23 percent.

In 2016, six of the 40 total OIS incidents, or 15 percent, were categorized as Classification V shootings. This accounted for a 20 percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification V shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 29 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification V shooting incidents accounted for 53 of the 201 total OIS incidents, or 26 percent.

Five incidents, or approximately 13 percent, were categorized as Classification III, IV, VI shootings. Two incidents, or five percent, currently have unknown Classifications, pending completion of the investigations by FID.

In 2016, 20 of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or 50 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a 17 percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of OIS incidents resulting from field detentions based on officers’ observations from 2012 through 2015 of 27 percent, 2016 experienced a 23 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, field detentions based on officers’ observations represented the second largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 64 of the 201 total incidents, or 32 percent.

In 2016, 10 of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or 25 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for a 21 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of OIS incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 55 percent, 2016 experienced a 30 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 99 of the 201 total incidents, or 49 percent.

In 2016, five of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents, or approximately 13 percent, originated during off-duty occurrences. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to eight percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of OIS incidents resulting from off-duty occurrences from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, off-duty occurrences represented the fourth largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 11 of the 201 total incidents, or five percent.

The remaining five incidents, or approximately 13 percent, in 2016 occurred during pre-planned activities, a station call, and one incident with an “Other” designation.
In 2016, 18 of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was an increase of four incidents, or 29 percent, compared to 2015. Forty-five percent of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - 40; Central Bureau - 18).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 41 OIS incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 10.25 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by an average of 9.75 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 10.25 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by an average of 18 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 22 OIS incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 5.5 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 1.5 incidents, or approximately 27 percent.

In 2016, six of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which was a decrease of one incident, or 11 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty percent of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - 40; South Bureau - eight).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 39 OIS incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 9.75 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 1.75 incidents, or 18 percent.
In 2016, four of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, a decrease of four incidents, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Ten percent of the Department’s OIS incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of four incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 remained unchanged compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average.

In 2016, April represented the month with the most OIS incidents with 37 out of the 201 total, or 18 percent. February represented the month with the least, consisting of 12 incidents, or six percent. The remaining 187 incidents, or 83 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining months.

The OIS percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:

### Day of Occurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 2012 through 2016, Sunday represented the day with the most OIS incidents with 37 out of the 201 total, or 18 percent. Monday represented the day with the least with 24 incidents, or 12 percent. The remaining 140 incidents, or 70 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining days of the week.

### Time of Occurrence

In 2016, 17 incidents, or approximately 43 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 23 incidents, or approximately 58 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. The five-year annual average for 2012 through 2016 was 16.8 OIS incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 23.4 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The time distribution was similar from 2012 through 2015, where 67 OIS incidents, or 42 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 94 incidents, or 58 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.
In 2016, 49 male officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 94 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 93 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents were male, representing 373 of the 391 total employees, or 95 percent.

In 2016, three female officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to seven percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase.

In 2016, 10 White officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a 13 percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 14 percentage points below the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 29 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for the second largest ethnic category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 309 of the 391 total employees, or 28 percent.

In 2016, 36 Hispanic officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 69 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a 14 percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 59 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents were Hispanic, representing 237 of the 391 total employees, or 61 percent.

In 2016, three Black officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 represented a two percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Black officers accounted for the fourth largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 17 of the 391 total employees, or four percent.

The remaining three employees, or six percent, involved in 2016 OIS incidents included two Asian/Pacific Islander officers and one Filipino officer.
The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in OIS incidents in 2016 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – two percent (one of 52 total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 23 percent (12 out of 52 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 48 percent (25 out of 52 total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 15 percent (eight out of 52 total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 12 percent (six out of 52 total officers).

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in three of the five categories and decreases in two, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – no percentage point change (two percent during four-year period; two percent in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – no percentage point change (23 percent during four-year period; 23 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 13 percentage point increase (35 percent during four-year period; 48 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – 17 percentage point decrease (32 percent during four-year period, 15 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – three percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period; 12 percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents had 6-10 years of service, representing 143 of the 391 total employees, or 37 percent. Officers with 11-20 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 115 employees, or 29 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 1-5 years of service were the third largest group, with 24 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 6-10 years of service were the fourth largest group, with 25 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with more than 20 years of service were the fifth largest group, with 16 percent, during the same five-year period.

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in four of the five years of service categories and a decrease in one when compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in OIS incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2016. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – no percentage point change (two percent during four-year period; two percent in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – no percentage point change (23 percent during four-year period; 23 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 13 percentage point increase (35 percent during four-year period; 48 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – 17 percentage point decrease (32 percent during four-year period, 15 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – five percentage point increase (seven percent during four-year period, 15 percent in 2016).

In 2016, 46 employees at the rank of police officer were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 88 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 91 percent in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 20 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer during the four-year period from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents at the rank of police officer, representing 364 of the 391 total employees, or 93 percent.

In 2016, five employees at the rank of detective were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 10 percent of the 52 total employees. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to one percent in 2015. The percentage of detectives involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the Department’s overall detective total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of detective from 2012 through 2015 of one percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, employees at the rank of detective accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 10 of the 391 total employees, or three percent.

The remaining employee involved in an OIS incident in 2016, representing two percent of the 52 total employees, was at the rank of lieutenant.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, employees at the rank of sergeant accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 14 of the 391 total employees, or four percent. However, no sergeants were involved in any of the OIS incidents in 2016.
In 2016, six personnel assigned to Hollywood Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 52 total employees. This represented a one percent point increase compared to 2015 (eight out of 76 employees). When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Hollywood Division from 2012 through 2015 of seven percent, 2016 experienced a five percent point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 21 personnel assigned to Hollywood Division out of the Department’s 391 total employees for the five-year period were involved in OIS incidents, representing five percent.

In 2016, six personnel assigned to Rampart Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 52 total employees. This represented an eleven percent point increase compared to 2015 (four out of 76 employees). When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Rampart Division from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced an eight percent point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 27 personnel assigned to Rampart Division out of the Department’s 391 total employees for the five-year period were involved in OIS incidents, representing seven percent.

In 2016, six personnel assigned to Southeast Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 52 total employees. This represented a one percent point increase compared to 2015 (eight out of 76 employees). When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Southeast Division from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the 52 total personnel involved in OIS incidents in 2016:

- Central Bureau: 18 personnel, or 35 percent;
- West Bureau: seven personnel, or 13 percent;
- South Bureau: nine personnel, or 17 percent;
- Valley Bureau: six personnel, or 12 percent;
- CTSOB: 11 personnel, or 21 percent; and,
- Other: one personnel, or two percent.

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in three of the six Bureau categories and decreases in three, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Central Bureau: nine percentage point increase (26 percent during four-year period, 35 percent in 2016);
- West Bureau: three percentage point increase (10 percent during four-year period, 13 percent in 2016);
- South Bureau: two percentage point decrease (19 percent during four-year period, 17 percent in 2016);
- Valley Bureau: thirteen percentage point decrease (25 percent during four-year period, 12 percent in 2016);
- CTSOB: seven percentage point increase (14 percent during four-year period, 21 percent in 2016); and,
- Other: four percentage point decrease (six percent during four-year period, two percent in 2016).
In 2016, 21 personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 40 percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a 24 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of 64 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to investigative assignments were involved in OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to investigative assignments from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to investigative assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 16 of the 391 total employees, or four percent.

In 2016, seven personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 52 total personnel. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of 19 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, representing 50 of the 391 total employees, or 13 percent.

In 2016, there were 29 single shooter OIS incidents, which represented 73 percent of the 40 total incidents. This accounted for an eight percentage point increase compared to 65 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of single shooter OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a 19 percentage point increase.

In 2016, there were 10 double shooter OIS incidents, which represented 25 percent of the 40 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 21 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of double shooter OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 27 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease.

In 2016, there were nine officers sustained injuries during the 40 OIS incidents throughout the year. This accounted for a 53 percent decrease compared to 19 injured officers in 2015. However, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 10 injured officers, 2016 was one officer, or 10 percent, below the four-year annual average.
In 2016, 47 handguns were utilized during OIS incidents, which represented 90 percent out of the 52 total weapon types. This represented no change compared to 90 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 80 percent, 2016 experienced a ten percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during OIS incidents, representing 325 of the 398 total weapons, or 82 percent.

In 2016, five rifles were utilized during OIS incidents, which represented 10 percent out of the 52 total weapon types. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rifles utilized during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, rifles were the second most utilized weapon type during OIS incidents, representing 47 of the 398 total weapons, or 12 percent.

The use of shotguns has consistently decreased during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. The following depicts the aggregate percentage of shotguns utilized compared to total weapon types from OIS incidents during the five-year period:

- 2012: nine percent;
- 2013: eight percent;
- 2014: seven percent;
- 2015: six percent;
- 2016: none.

In 2016, 145 rounds were fired during all 40 OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 305 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 160 rounds, or 52 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 449 rounds fired, 2016 was 304 rounds, or 68 percent, below the four-year annual average.

In 2016, an average of 3.6 rounds were fired during OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 average of 6.4 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 2.8 rounds, or 44 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 11.2 rounds fired per incident, 2016 was 7.6 rounds, or 68 percent, below the four-year annual average.
In 2016, 125 rounds were fired from handguns during OIS incidents, which represented 86 percent of the 145 total rounds fired. This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rounds fired from handguns during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015, rounds fired from handguns were the most frequent round type compared to the aggregate percentage of rounds fired from shotguns.

In 2016, 166 rounds were fired from shotguns, which represented 11 percent of the 145 total rounds fired. This represented a ten percentage point increase compared to 59 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 59 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point increase.

In 2016, there were seven OIS incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired, which represented 18 percent of the 40 total incidents. This accounted for a three percentage point increase compared to 15 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point decrease.

In 2016, there were seven OIS incidents in which 11-15 rounds were fired, which represented the majority of occurrences, consisting of 127 of the 201 total incidents, or 63 percent. Incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired accounted for the second largest category with 33 incidents, or 16 percent, during the same five-year period.

In 2016, there were 32 OIS incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired, which represented 80 percent of the 40 total incidents. This accounted for an 11 percentage point increase compared to 69 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 59 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point increase.

In 2016, there was one OIS incident in which 11-15 rounds were fired, which represented three percentage points above the four-year annual average. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the hit ratio during OIS incidents, representing 565 of the 1,941 total rounds fired, was 29 percent.

The 2016 total number of rounds fired compared to the total number of rounds which struck their intended targets resulted in a hit ratio of 48 percent. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to 38 percent in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 aggregate hit ratio of 28 percent, 2016 was 20 percentage points above the four-year annual average. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the hit ratio during OIS incidents, representing 565 of the 1,941 total rounds fired, was 29 percent.
### SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during OIS incidents.

### SUSPECT - ETHNICITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 23 Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 56 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a six percent point increase compared to 50 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic population total. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 represented no percentage point change compared to the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 47 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group involved in OIS incidents, representing 27 of the 202 total suspects, or 13 percent.

In 2016, 13 Black suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 32 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for an increase of one suspect, or seven percentage points, compared to 25 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 11 percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 31 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Black category was the second most represented ethnic group involved in OIS incidents, representing 63 of the 202 total suspects, or 31 percent.

### SUSPECT - GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 40 male suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 98 percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 96 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in OIS incidents were male, representing 195 of the 202 total suspects, or 97 percent.

### SUSPECT - AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and Above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, one White suspect was involved in an OIS incident, which represented two percent of the 41 total suspects. This accounted for a 15 percentage point decrease compared to 17 percent in 2015. The percentage of White suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was 26 percentage points below the City’s overall White population total. Additionally, the percentage of White suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2016 was six percentage points below the City’s overall White violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a 12 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 24-29 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents, consisting of 50 of the 202 total suspects, or 25 percent.

In 2016, most suspects involved in OIS incidents were in the 18-23 age group. Specifically, 14 of the 41 total suspects, or 34 percent, were included in this age group. The 18-23 age category accounted for a 19 percentage point increase compared to 15 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 24-29 age range from 2012 through 2015 of 22 percent, 2016 experienced a 12 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 18-23 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents, consisting of 47 of the 202 total suspects, or 23 percent.

The remaining suspect currently has an “Unknown” gender, pending completion of the FID investigation.
In 2016, the 30-39 age group represented the third largest age category, with six out of the 41 total suspects, or 15 percent. The 30-39 age category accounted for a 29 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 30-39 age range from 2012 through 2015 of 27 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 0-17 age group was one of the least represented age categories of suspects involved in OIS incidents, consisting of nine of the 202 total suspects, or four percent.

Two of the suspects’ ages in 2016 remain unknown, pending completion of the investigations by RPD. The remaining four suspects in 2016 were in the age ranges of 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and above.

In 2016, four of the 41 total suspects, or 10 percent, involved in OIS incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 21 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 0-17 age range from 2012 through 2015 of two percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 26 percent, 2016 experienced a 16 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2015 of two percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 78 percent, 2016 experienced a 13 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for 79 of the 202 total suspects involved in OIS incidents, or 39 percent.

The remaining 29 suspects involved in 2016 OIS incidents, representing 71 percent, were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

### Suspect - Perceived Mental Illness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, of the 41 total suspects, or 10 percent, involved in OIS incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 26 percent, 2016 experienced a 16 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for 46 of the 202 total suspects, or 23 percent.

### Suspect - Gang Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gang Member</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No/Unknown</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, 12 of the 41 total suspects, or 29 percent, involved in OIS incidents were verified as documented gang members. This accounted for a six percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were documented as gang members from 2012 through 2015 of 42 percent, 2016 experienced a 13 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for 79 of the 202 total suspects involved in OIS incidents, or 39 percent.

### Deceased Suspect Toxicology Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown/Pending</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicity results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicity reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner. Therefore, all decedents, or 100 percent, with completed toxicity reports at the time of publication of this Report had positive toxicity results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s).

In 2015, 16 of the 21 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 76 percent, had positive toxicity results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to 67 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of decedents with positive toxicity results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s) during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2014 of 78 percent, 2015 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects with positive toxicity results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s) during OIS incidents accounted for 55 of the 71 total decedents, or 77 percent.
Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coronor.

In 2016, nine of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 90 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of 38 percentage points compared to 11 of 21 decedents, or 52 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS incidents with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 31 of the 71 total decedents, or 44 percent.

In 2016, one of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 10 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for alcohol. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to nine of 21 decedents, or 43 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS incidents with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 31 of the 71 total decedents, or 44 percent.

In 2016, four of the 10 decedents involved in OIS incidents, or 40 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to nine of 21 decedents, or 43 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS incidents with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 31 of the 71 total decedents, or 44 percent.

In 2016, five edged weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 61 percent out of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a 21 percentage point increase compared to 40 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of firearms utilized by suspects during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 55 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, firearms were the most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 113 of the 202 total weapons, or 56 percent.

In 2016, six edged weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent out of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 21 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of edged weapons utilized by suspects during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 19 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, edged weapons were the second most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 35 of the 202 total weapons, or 17 percent.

In 2016, four replica/pellet guns were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 10 percent out of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of replica/pellet guns utilized by suspects during OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, replica/pellet guns were the fourth most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 13 of the 202 total weapons, or six percent.

In 2016, two suspects were perceived to be armed with a weapon (perception-based shooting), which represented five percent of the 41 total weapon types. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to the aggregate percentage of perception-based weapons utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 13 of the 202 total weapons, or six percent.
One suspect in 2016 suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound during an OIS-No Hit incident and was not included in the analysis below.

In 2016, 19 suspects died from police gunfire, resulting in a death occurring in 48 percent of the 40 total OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 21 deaths, the number of deceased suspects decreased by two individuals, or 10 percent, in 2016. However, the 2016 percentage of deaths relative to the number of incidents accounted for a four percentage point increase compared to 44 percent in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 17.75 deceased suspects, 2016 was 1.25 decedents, or seven percent, above the four-year annual average. Additionally, when compared to the aggregate percentage of suspect deaths from police gunfire from 2012 through 2015 of 44 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase.

Sixty-eight percent of the Department’s 40 OIS incidents in 2016 included a suspect struck by police gunfire (either suffering a fatal or non-fatal injury).

Also in 2016, two suspects sustained injuries during OIS-No Hit incidents from causes other than police gunfire.

In 2016, nine suspects sustained injuries from police gunfire during eight OIS incidents, resulting in an injury from police gunfire (other than a fatal injury) occurring in 20 percent of the 40 total OIS incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 17, the number of injured suspects decreased by eight individuals, or 47 percent, in 2016. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 15 injured suspects, 2016 was six individuals, or 40 percent, below the four-year annual average. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, an average of 13.8 suspects sustained non-fatal injuries from police gunfire each year.

One suspect involved in a 2016 OIS incident died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound and was not included in the analysis below.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 12 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Hispanic suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, five individuals, or 26 percent, were Black. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 19 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Black suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 24 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black suspects accounted for the second highest ethnic decedent count, representing 22 of the 90 total decedents, or 24 percent.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, one individual, or five percent, was White. This accounted for a 14 percentage point decrease compared to 19 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased White suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, five individuals, or 26 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 19 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Hispanic suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase.

One suspect involved in a 2016 OIS incident died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound and was not included in the analysis below.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, 12 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Hispanic suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, five individuals, or 26 percent, were Black. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 19 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Black suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 24 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black suspects accounted for the second highest ethnic decedent count, representing 22 of the 90 total decedents, or 24 percent.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2016, one individual, or five percent, was White. This accounted for a 14 percentage point decrease compared to 19 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased White suspects from OIS incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White suspects accounted for the third highest ethnic decedent count, representing 12 of the 90 total decedents, or 13 percent.

The remaining decedent involved in a 2016 OIS incident, representing five percent of the 19 total decedents, was designated with an “Other” ethnic classification.
## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2015, 47 out of the 76 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 62 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 86 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 87 percent, 2015 experienced a 25 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 275 of the 337 total Tactics findings, or 82 percent.

In 2015, 75 out of the 76 total OIS Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 98.7 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a 3.3 percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 99.6 percent, 2015 experienced a 0.9 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Drawing/Exhibiting findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 335 of the 337 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, or 99.4 percent.

In 2015, 65 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 86 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of eight percent, 2015 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, only two of the 337 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing nine percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

In 2015, 11 out of the 76 total OIS Lethal force findings, representing 14 percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 0.4 percent, 2015 experienced a 0.9 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, only two of the 337 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 0.6 percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY (ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL)

In 2015, 29 out of the 76 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 38 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 24 percentage point increase compared to 14 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 0.9 percent, 2015 experienced a 25 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, only two of the 337 total Tactics findings, representing eight percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 0.4 percent, 2015 experienced a 0.9 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, 32 of the 337 total Lethal force findings, representing nine percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

---

1. Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.
In 2016, 14 of the 27 total OIS-Hit incidents, or 52 percent, were categorized as Classification II shootings. This accounted for a 31 percentage point increase compared to 21 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification II shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 29 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification II shooting incidents accounted for 47 of the 154 total OIS incidents, or 31 percent.

In 2016, five of the 27 total OIS-Hit incidents, or approximately 19 percent, were categorized as Classification V shootings. This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification V shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification V shooting incidents accounted for 47 of the 154 total OIS incidents, or 31 percent.

Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside of the Los Angeles city limits.
In 2016, four of the 27 total OIS-Hit incidents, or 15 percent, were categorized as Classification I shootings. This accounted for a four percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification I shootings incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 22 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2015, Classification I, IV, VI shootings. One incident, representing four percent, currently has an unknown Classification, pending completion of the investigation by FID.

In 2016, 11 of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was a decrease of one incident, or eight percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 41 percent of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - 27; Central Bureau - 11).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 36 OIS-Hit incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of nine incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by two incidents, or approximately 22 percent.

In 2016, 14 of the Department’s 27 OIS-Hit incidents, or 52 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). Nine incidents, or 33 percent, originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. The remaining four incidents, or 15 percent, occurred during a pre-planned activity, two off-duty occurrences, and one incident designated as “Other.”

From 2012 through 2016, radio calls and observation stops were the most represented sources of OIS-Hit incidents, accounting for 88 incidents, or 57 percent, and 43 incidents, or 28 percent, out of 154 total incidents, respectively.

In 2016, five of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 29 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 19 percent of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - 27; South Bureau - five).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 25 OIS-Hit incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 6.25 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 1.25 incidents, or 20 percent.
In 2016, three of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, a decrease of two incidents, or 40 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 11 percent of the Department's OIS-Hit incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - 27; West Bureau - three).

In 2016, five of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 4.5 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 44 percent.

In 2016, three of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, a decrease of three incidents, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 11 percent of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department - 27; Outside Areas - three).

In 2016, five of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of nine incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 1.5 incidents, or approximately 33 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 36 OIS-Hit incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of nine incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by four incidents, or approximately 44 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, three of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 4.5 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 40 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 11 percent of the Department’s OIS-Hit incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - 27; West Bureau - three).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 12 OIS-Hit incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of three incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 remained unchanged compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average.
In 2016, August represented the month with the most OIS-Hit incidents with five occurrences, or approximately 19 percent, out of 27 total incidents for the year. January, April, July, and October each had the second most incidents with three incidents, or 11 percent, respectively; with a combined total of 12 incidents, or 44 percent. The remaining 10 incidents, or approximately 37 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining months of the year.

From 2012 through 2016, August represented the month with the most OIS-Hit incidents, representing 17 out of the 154 total incidents, or 11 percent. The remaining 137 incidents, or 89 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining 11 months.

The OIS-Hit percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:

- January through March: 39 incidents, or 25 percent;
- April through June: 37 incidents, or 24 percent;
- July through September: 40 incidents, or 26 percent;
- October through December: 38 incidents, or 25 percent.

The OIS-Hit percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:

- January through March: 39 incidents, or 25 percent;
- April through June: 37 incidents, or 24 percent;
- July through September: 40 incidents, or 26 percent;
- October through December: 38 incidents, or 25 percent.

In 2016, OIS-Hit incidents were fairly evenly distributed between night and day, or the two time frames used in this report. Thirteen incidents, or 48 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 14 incidents, or 52 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

However, the time distribution was more distinct from 2012 through 2015, where 57 OIS-Hit incidents, or 45 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 70 incidents, or 55 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The five-year annual average for 2012 through 2016 was 14 OIS-Hit incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 16.8 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

In 2016, eight OIS-Hit incidents, or 30 percent, occurred on a Sunday. Tuesday represented the second most frequent day of the week with five incidents, or 19 percent.

From 2012 through 2016, Sunday represented the day with the most OIS-Hit incidents with 26 out of 154 total occurrences, or 17 percent. Friday had the second most occurrences, with 25 incidents, or 16 percent.

In 2016, 36 male officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 95 percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 94 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents were male, representing 318 of the 332 total employees, or 96 percent.

In 2016, two female officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented five percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to six percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase.

Office Gender:

- In 2016, 36 male officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 95 percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 94 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents were male, representing 318 of the 332 total employees, or 96 percent.

In 2016, two female officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented five percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to six percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase.
In 2016, 26 Hispanic officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 8 percent of the 332 total employees. This accounted for a 13 percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 22 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of nine percentage points below the Department’s overall increase compared to six percent in 2015. The percentage decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of nine percentage points below the Department’s overall increase compared to 29 percent in 2015. The percentage decrease compared to 22 percentage points above the Department’s aggregate Hispanic total.

In 2016, nine White officers were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 2 percent of the 332 total employees. This accounted for a five percentage point decrease compared to 29 percent in 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percent in 2016); and, More than 20 years of service – four percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period, 13 percent in 2016).

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in three of the five categories, a decrease in one, and one that remained unchanged, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – one percentage point increase (two percent during four-year period, three percent in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – two percentage point increase (24 percent during four-year period, 26 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 11 percentage point increase (34 percent during four-year period, 45 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – four percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period, 13 percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents had 6-10 years of service, representing 117 of the 332 total employees, or 35 percent. Officers with 11-20 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 96 employees, or 29 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 1-5 years of service were the third largest group, with 81 personnel, or 24 percent, followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which had 31 officers, or nine percent. Officers with less than one year of service, which represented seven officers, accounted for only two percent of the total.

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in four of the five years of service categories and a decrease in one when compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – one percentage point increase (two percent during four-year period, three percent in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – two percentage point increase (24 percent during four-year period, 26 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 11 percentage point increase (34 percent during four-year period, 45 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – four percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period, 13 percent in 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of five percent, 2016 represented no percentage change.

- When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 28 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black officers accounted for the fourth largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 16 of the 332 total employees, or five percent.

- In 2016, one Asian/Pacific Islander officer was involved in an OIS-Hit incident, which represented three percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to six percent in 2015. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was five percentage points above the Department’s overall Asian/Pacific Islander total.

- When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Asian/Pacific Islander personnel from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Asian/Pacific Islander officers accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 18 of the 332 total employees, or five percent.
In 2016, 34 employees at the rank of police officer were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 89 percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 92 percent in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 21 percentage points above the Department’s overall detective total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 94.5 percent, 2016 experienced a 5.5 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing six of the 332 total employees, or 2 percent.

In 2016, three employees at the rank of detective were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented eight of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, one percent, the rank of detective accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing six of the 332 total employees, or two percent.

The remaining employee involved in an OIS-Hit incident in 2016, representing three percent of the 38 total employees, was at the rank of lieutenant.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, employees at the rank of sergeant accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 12 of the 332 total employees, or four percent. However, no sergeants were involved in any OIS-Hit incidents in 2016.

In 2016, employees assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for the second largest category with a total of 44 employees, or 13 percent, during the year. Personnel assigned in the majority of OIS-Hit incidents, representing 48 of the 332 total employees, or 14 percent. Personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for the second largest category with a total of 44 employees, or 13 percent, during the same five-year period.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the years 2012 through 2016:

- 7th Street
- Central
- Metropolitan
- Specialized Units
- Administrative
- Central
- Security Services
- Area
- Other

In 2016, seven personnel assigned to Hollenbeck Division were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 18 percent of the 38 total employees. This represented no percentage change compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Hollenbeck Division from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase.

In 2016, six personnel assigned to Hollywood Division were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 16 percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to six percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Hollywood Division from 2012 through 2015 of eight percent, 2016 experienced an eight percentage point increase.

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 38 total employees. This accounted for an eight percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2015. However, when compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of thirteen percent, 2016 experienced no percentage change.

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Southeast Division were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 38 total employees. This represented no percentage change compared to 2015 (eight out of 62 employees). However, when compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Southeast Division from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase.

The remaining 15 Department personnel, or 39 percent, were fairly evenly distributed amongst the remaining Areas/Divisions. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Hollenbeck Division were involved in the majority of OIS-Hit incidents, representing 48 of the 332 total employees, or 14 percent. Personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for the second largest category with a total of 44 employees, or 13 percent, during the same five-year period.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the years 2012 through 2016:

- Central Bureau: 12 personnel, or 32 percent;
- West Bureau: seven personnel, or 18 percent;
- South Bureau: six personnel, or 16 percent;
- Valley Bureau: five personnel, or 13 percent;
- CTSOB: five personnel, or 13 percent; and,
- Other three personnel, or eight percent.
In 2016, 18 personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 47 percent of the 38 total personnel. This accounted for a 32 percentage point decrease compared to 79 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 67 percent, 2016 experienced a 20 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in OIS-Hit incidents were assigned to patrol, representing 216 of the 332 total employees, or 65 percent.

In 2016, 14 personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 37 percent of the 38 total personnel. This accounted for a 24 percentage point increase compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of nine percent, 2016 experienced a 20 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 64 of the 332 total employees, or 19 percent.

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 38 total personnel. This accounted for an eight percentage point increase compared to five percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 44 of the 332 total employees, or 13 percent.

In 2016, nine officers sustained injuries during the 27 OIS-Hit incidents throughout the year. This accounted for a 56 percent decrease compared to 16 injured officers in 2015. However, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 8.25 injured officers, 2016 was 0.75 injured officers, or nine percent, above the four-year annual average.
Historically, from 2012 through 2016, OIS-Hit incidents involving a single shooter represented the majority of occurrences, consisting of 80 of the 154 total incidents, or 52 percent. Incidents involving two shooters accounted for the second largest category with 43 incidents, or 28 percent, for the same five-year period.

In 2016, 33 handguns were utilized during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 87 percent out of the 38 total weapon types. This accounted for a five percentage point decrease compared to 92 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2016 of 79 percent, 2016 experienced an eight percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 270 of the 337 total weapons, or 80 percent.

In 2016, five rifles were utilized during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 13 percent out of the 38 total weapon types. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rifles utilized during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 79 percent, 2016 experienced a decrease of 120 rounds, or 52 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 284.75 rounds fired, 2016 was 8.3 rounds, or 66 percent, below the four-year annual average.

In 2016, 113 rounds were fired during all 27 OIS-Hit incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 233 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 120 rounds, or 52 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 397.75 rounds fired, 2016 was 284.75 rounds, or 72 percent, below the four-year annual average.

In 2016, an average of 4.2 rounds were fired during OIS-Hit incidents. When compared to the 2015 average of 6.1 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decreased of 1.9 rounds, or 31 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 12.5 rounds fired per incident, 2016 was 8.3 rounds, or 66 percent, below the four-year annual average.
In 2016, 93 rounds were fired from handguns during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 82 percent of the 113 total rounds fired. This accounted for a 15 percentage point decrease compared to 97 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rounds fired from shotguns during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 86 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, rounds fired from shotguns was the second most frequent round type fired during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 68 of the 1,704 total rounds, or 11 percent.

In 2016, 20 rounds were fired from rifles during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 18 percent of the 113 total rounds fired. This accounted for a 17 percentage point increase compared to 71 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rounds fired from shotguns during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 51 or more rounds, or four percent, respectively.

In 2016, there were 20 OIS-Hit incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired, which represented 74 percent of the 27 total incidents. This accounted for a three percentage point increase compared to 71 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 57 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point increase.

In 2016, there were six OIS-Hit incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired, which represented 22 percent of the 27 total incidents. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 16 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 18 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase.

In 2016, there was one OIS-Hit incident in which 11-15 rounds were fired, which represented four percent of the 27 total incidents. When compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 11-15 rounds were fired during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, OIS-Hit incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired represented the majority of occurrences, representing 92 of the 154 total incidents, or 60 percent. Incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired represented the second largest category with 29 incidents, or 19 percent, during the same five-year period. Incidents in which 16-20 rounds were fired and 51 or more rounds were fired were the third largest categories, with eight incidents each, or five percent, respectively.
The hit ratio during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 565 of the 1,704 total rounds fired, was 33 percent.

In 2016, 15 Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 54 percent of the 28 total suspects. This accounted for a four percentage point decrease compared to 58 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 52 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents were Hispanic, representing 81 of the 155 total suspects, or 52 percent.

In 2016, nine Black suspects were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 32 percent of the 28 total suspects. This accounted for an 11 percentage point increase compared to 21 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points above the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 11 percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 26 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Black category was the second most represented ethnic group involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 42 of the 155 total suspects, or 27 percent.

In 2016, one White suspect was involved in an OIS-Hit incident, which represented four percent of the 28 total suspects. This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015. The percentage of White suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was 24 percentage points below the City’s overall White violent crime offender total. Additionally, the percentage of White suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the City’s overall White violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a 12 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the White category was the third most represented ethnic group involved in OIS-Hit incidents, representing 21 of the 155 total suspects, or 14 percent.

Three suspects with an “Other” designation were involved in 2016 OIS-Hit incidents, representing 11 percent of the 28 total suspects.
In 2016, 28 male suspects were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 100 percent of the 28 total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 95 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 95 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents were male, representing 149 of the 155 total suspects, or 96 percent.

In 2016, 28 male suspects were involved in OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 100 percent of the 28 total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 95 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 95 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents were male, representing 149 of the 155 total suspects, or 96 percent.

In 2016, the age category of 24-29 represented the second largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 40 of the 155 total suspects, or 26 percent. In 2016, the 0-17 age category accounted for a 15 percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects in the 30-39 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 28 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 30-39 represented the largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 41 of the 155 total suspects, or 26 percent.

One suspect’s age in 2016 remains unknown, pending completion of the investigation by FID. The remaining suspect in 2016 was in between the age range of 40-49.

In 2016, the 18-23 and 24-29 suspect age categories were the most represented age groups of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents, each with eight suspects, or 18 percent (36 percent combined), respectively. The 0-17 and 30-39 age categories represented the second largest age groups, each with five suspects, or 18 percent (36 percent combined), respectively.

In 2016, the 18-23 age category accounted for an 18 percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 18-23 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 18-23 represented the third largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 34 of the 155 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2016, the 24-29 age category accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 24 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 24-29 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 25 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 18-23 represented the third largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 34 of the 155 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2016, the 0-17 age category accounted for a 15 percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects in the 30-39 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 28 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 30-39 represented the largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 41 of the 155 total suspects, or 26 percent.

One suspect’s age in 2016 remains unknown, pending completion of the investigation by FID. The remaining suspect in 2016 was in between the age range of 40-49.

In 2016, the 18-23 and 24-29 suspect age categories were the most represented age groups of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents, each with eight suspects, or 18 percent (36 percent combined), respectively. The 0-17 and 30-39 age categories represented the second largest age groups, each with five suspects, or 18 percent (36 percent combined), respectively.

In 2016, the 18-23 age category accounted for an 18 percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 18-23 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 18-23 represented the third largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 34 of the 155 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2016, the 24-29 age category accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 24 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 24-29 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 25 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 18-23 represented the third largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 34 of the 155 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2016, the 30-39 age category accounted for a 35 percentage point decrease compared to 53 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects in the 30-39 age group from 2012 through 2015 of 28 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age category of 30-39 represented the largest age category of OIS-Hit incidents, with 41 of the 155 total suspects, or 26 percent.

In 2016, four of the 28 total suspects, or 14 percent, involved in OIS-Hit incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 18 percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis, accounted for 39 of the 155 total suspects, or 25 percent.
In 2016, five of the 28 total suspects, or 18 percent, involved in OIS-Hit incidents were verified as documented gang members. This accounted for a 16 percentage point decrease compared to 34 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were documented as gang members from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for 55 of the 155 total suspects involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 35 percent.

The remaining 23 suspects involved in 2016 OIS-Hit incidents, representing 82 percent, were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner.

In 2016, nine of the 10 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 90 percent, had completed toxicology reports with positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of 38 percentage points when compared to nine of 21 decedents, or 43 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS-Hit incidents with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine accounted for 28 of the 71 total decedents, or 39 percent.

In 2016, four of the 10 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 40 percent, had positive toxicology reports for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to five of 21 decedents, or 24 percent, with positive toxicology results for alcohol in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS-Hit incidents with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 31 of the 71 total decedents, or 44 percent.

Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016, 10 decedents, or 53 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Nine decedents, or 47 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner.

In 2016, nine of the 10 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 90 percent, had completed toxicology reports with positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of 38 percentage points when compared to nine of 21 decedents, or 43 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS-Hit incidents with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine accounted for 28 of the 71 total decedents, or 39 percent.

In 2016, four of the 10 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 40 percent, had positive toxicology reports for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to five of 21 decedents, or 24 percent, with positive toxicology results for alcohol in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS-Hit incidents with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 31 of the 71 total decedents, or 44 percent.

In 2016, one of the 10 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents, or 10 percent, had completed toxicology reports with positive results for alcohol. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of three percentage points when compared to five of 21 decedents, or 24 percent, with positive toxicology results for alcohol in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in OIS-Hit incidents with positive toxicology results for alcohol accounted for 17 of the 71 total decedents, or 24 percent.
In 2016, one of the 28 total suspects, representing four percent, involved in OIS-Hit incidents was homeless.

In 2016, 16 firearms were utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 57 percent out of the 28 total weapon types. This accounted for a 28 percentage point increase compared to 29 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of firearms utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2016, firearms were the most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 79 of the 155 total weapons, or 51 percent.

In 2016, five edged weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 18 percent out of the 28 total weapon types. This accounted for an eight percentage point decrease compared to 26 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of edged weapons utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2016, edged weapons were the second most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 34 of the 155 total weapons, or 22 percent.

In 2016, three replica/pellet guns were utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, which represented 11 percent out of the 28 total weapon types. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of replica/pellet guns utilized by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, replica/pellet guns were the fourth most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS-Hit incidents, representing 10 of the 155 total weapons, or six percent.

One suspect, representing four percent, in 2016 was determined not to be armed nor did they utilize any force type. The remaining three suspects, representing 11 percent, utilized an automobile, physical force, and one was deemed to be perceived with a weapon.

* The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.
Of the 19 decedents involved in OIS-Hit incidents in 2016, 12 individuals, or 63 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved deceased Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 54 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a 26 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 252 of the 292 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, or 87 percent. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 291 of the 292 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, or 99.7 percent.

In 2015, 41 out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Tactics findings, representing 66 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 92 percent, 2015 experienced a 26 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 252 of the 292 total Tactics findings, or 86 percent.

In 2015, 54 out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Lethal force findings, representing 87 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 96 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 94 percent, 2015 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 270 of the 292 total findings, or 92 percent.
In 2015, 21 out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Tactics findings, representing 34 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 23 percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of six percent, 2015 experienced a nine percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of eight percent, 2015 experienced a 26 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, 22 of the 292 total Lethal force findings, representing seven percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a 23 percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of six percent, 2015 experienced a seven percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2014.

In 2015, one out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing two percent, was adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a 100 percentage point increase compared to 0.3 percent, resulting in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

In 2015, eight out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Lethal force findings, representing 13 percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a nine percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of six percent, 2015 experienced a seven percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2014.

In 2015, one out of the 62 total OIS-Hit Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing two percent, was adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a 100 percentage point increase compared to no “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings for Drawing/Exhibiting in 2014. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, only one of the 292 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 0.3 percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.
An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm. These incidents are categorized into Hits or No Hits (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in 13 OIS-No Hit incidents, an increase of three incidents, or 30 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2016, there were a total of 34 OIS-No Hit incidents, resulting in an annual average of 8.5 incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 4.5 incidents, or 53 percent.

In 2016, six of the 13 total OIS-No Hit incidents, or 46 percent, were categorized as Classification II shootings. This accounted for a 26 percentage point increase compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification II shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification II shooting incidents accounted for six of the 47 total OIS-No Hit incidents, or 13 percent.

In 2016, two of the 13 total OIS-No Hit incidents, or 15 percent, were categorized as Classification IV shootings. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Classification IV shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, Classification IV shooting incidents accounted for six of the 47 total OIS-No Hit incidents, or 13 percent.

In 2016, one incident, representing eight percent, was categorized as a Classification V shooting. The remaining incident currently has an unknown Classification, pending completion of the investigation by FID.

In 2016, of the 13 total OIS-No Hit incidents, or 46 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). Three incidents, or 23 percent, were off-duty occurrences. Two incidents, or 15 percent, resulted from pre-planned activities. The remaining two incidents, or 15 percent, resulted from a radio call generated by Communications Division and a station call.

From 2012 through 2016, observation stops and radio calls were the most represented sources of OIS-No Hit incidents, accounting for 21 incidents, or 45 percent, and 11 incidents, or 23 percent, out of 47 total incidents, respectively.
In 2016, seven of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was an increase of five incidents, or 250 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 54 percent of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - 13; Central Bureau - seven).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 5.75 incidents, or approximately 460 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, representing no change from 2015. Approximately eight percent of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - 13; West Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, seven OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The West Bureau count for 2016 remained unchanged compared to the same four-year period.

In 2016, three of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which was an increase of one incident, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 23 percent of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - 13; South Bureau - three).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 14 OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 3.5 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.5 incidents, or approximately 14 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 67 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately eight percent of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - 13; Valley Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, four OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The West Bureau count for 2016 remained unchanged compared to the same four-year period.
In 2016, one of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, a decrease of one incident, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately eight percent of the Department’s OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department - 13; Outside Areas - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, four OIS-No Hit incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 remained unchanged compared to the same four-year period.

The OIS-No Hit percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:

- January through March: 15 incidents, or 32 percent;
- April through June: 14 incidents, or 30 percent;
- July through September: eight incidents; or 17 percent; and,
- October through December: 10 incidents, or 21 percent.

In 2016, April and December represented the months with the most OIS-No Hit incidents, each accounting for three occurrences, or approximately 23 percent, out of 13 total incidents for the year. June represented the month with the second most incidents with two, or 15 percent. The remaining five incidents, or approximately 38 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining months of the year.

From 2012 through 2016, January represented the month with the most OIS-No Hit incidents with eight out of the 47 total occurrences, or 17 percent. The month of June accounted for the second most OIS-No Hit incidents with six out of the 47 total, or 13 percent. August did not account for any of the OIS-No Hit incidents during the same five-year period. The remaining 33 incidents, or 70 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining months.

From 2012 through 2016, Sunday represented the day with the most OIS-No Hit incidents with 11 out of 47 total incidents, or 23 percent. Wednesday had the second most incidents, with nine incidents, or 19 percent.
In 2016, four OIS-No Hit incidents, or 31 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while nine incidents, or 69 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The time distribution was more distinct from 2012 through 2015, where 10 OIS-No Hit incidents, or 29 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 24 incidents, or 71 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The five-year annual average for 2012 through 2016 was 2.8 OIS-No Hit incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 6.6 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

In 2016, one female officer was involved in an OIS-No Hit incident, which represented seven percent of the 14 total employees. This accounted for a 36 percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was 25 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 64 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were Hispanic, representing 39 of the 59 total employees, or 66 percent.

In 2016, one Black officer was involved in an OIS-No Hit incident, which represented seven percent of the 14 total employees. This accounted for a 36 percentage point increase compared to 43 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was three percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 93 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease compared to 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were male, representing 55 of the 59 total employees, or 93 percent.

In 2016, 13 male officers were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 93 percent of the 14 total employees. This represented no percentage point change compared to 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was 11 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 93 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were male, representing 55 of the 59 total employees, or 93 percent.

In 2016, four OIS-No Hit incidents, or 31 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while nine incidents, or 69 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The time distribution was more distinct from 2012 through 2015, where 10 OIS-No Hit incidents, or 29 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 24 incidents, or 71 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The five-year annual average for 2012 through 2016 was 2.8 OIS-No Hit incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 6.6 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

In 2016, 13 male officers were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 93 percent of the 14 total employees. This represented no percentage point change compared to 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was 11 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 93 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease compared to 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was three percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. No Black officers were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black officers accounted for only one of the 59 total employees, or two percent, involved in OIS-No Hit incidents.
OFFICER - YEARS OF SERVICE

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – none;
- 1-5 years of service – 14 percent (two out of 14 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 57 percent (eight out of 14 total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 21 percent (three out of 14 total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – seven percent (one out of 14 total officers).

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in three of the five categories, an increase in one, and one that remained unchanged, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – unchanged (none in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – seven percentage point decrease (21 percent in 2015, 14 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 17 percentage point increase (40 percent during four-year period, 57 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – 15 percentage point decrease (36 percent during four-year period, 21 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – unchanged (seven percent during four-year period, seven percent in 2016).

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in two of the five years of service categories, an increase in one, and two that remained unchanged, when compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in OIS-No Hit incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – unchanged (none during four-year period, none in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – four percentage point decrease (18 percent during four-year period, 14 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 37 percentage point increase (40 percent during four-year period, 57 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – 15 percentage point decrease (36 percent during four-year period, 21 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – unchanged (seven percent during four-year period, seven percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents had 6-10 years of service, representing 26 of the 59 total employees, or 44 percent. Officers with 11-20 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 19 employees, or 32 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 1-5 years of service were the third largest group, with 10 personnel, or 17 percent, followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which had four officers, or seven percent. Officers with less than one year of service were not involved in any of the OIS-No Hit incidents during the five-year period.

OFFICER - RANK

In 2016, 12 employees at the rank of police officer were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 86 percent of the 14 total employees. This represented no change compared to the same percentage of police officers involved in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 89 percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were at the rank of police officer, representing 52 of the 59 total employees, or 88 percent.

In 2016, two employees at the rank of detective were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 14 percent of the 14 total employees. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2015. The percentage of detectives involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was one percentage point below the Department’s overall detective total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of detective from 2012 through 2015 of four percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, employees at the rank of detective accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, representing four of the 59 total employees, or seven percent.
OFFICER - AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, four personnel assigned to Rampart Division were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 29 percent of the 14 total employees. No personnel assigned to Rampart Division were involved in an OIS-No Hit incident during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to 77th Street Division were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 14 percent of the 14 total employees. This accounted for a 22 percentage point decrease compared to 2015.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 14 percent of the 14 total employees. This represented a seven percentage point increase compared to 2015. Similarly, when compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 42 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point decrease compared to 2015.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 21 percent of the 14 total personnel. This accounted for an eight percentage point decrease compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 42 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the officers involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were assigned to patrol (along with personnel assigned to specialized assignments), representing 22 of the 59 total employees, or 37 percent.

The following is the Bureau of assignment for the 14 total personnel involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016:

- Central Bureau: six personnel, or 43 percent;
- South Bureau: three personnel, or 21 percent;
- Other: two personnel, or 14 percent;
- CT SOB: two personnel, or 14 percent; and,
- Valley Bureau: one personnel, or seven percent; and,
- West Bureau: none.

OFFICER - UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, seven personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 50 percent of the 14 total personnel. This accounted for a seven percentage point increase compared to 43 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point increase.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 21 percent of the 14 total personnel. This accounted for an eight percentage point decrease compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 42 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease.
No Department personnel were killed or injured during OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016. In addition, no officers were killed during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015.

From 2012 through 2016, seven officers sustained injuries, which accounted for annual average of 1.4 injured officers for the five-year period.

In 2016, there were 12 single shooter OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 92 percent of the 13 total incidents. This accounted for a 22 percentage point increase compared to 70 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of single shooter OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 71 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point increase compared to 81 percent in 2015.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, OIS-No Hit incidents experienced an 18 percentage point decrease. For the same five-year period.

In 2016, 14 handguns were utilized during OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 100 percent out of the 14 total weapon types. This accounted for a 19 percentage point increase compared to 81 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 87 percent, 2016 experienced a 13 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during OIS-No Hit incidents, representing 55 of the 61 total weapons, or 90 percent.

In 2016, 32 rounds were fired during all 13 OIS-No Hit incidents. When compared to the 2015 total of 72 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 40 rounds, or 56 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 51.25 rounds fired, 2016 was 19.25 rounds, or 38 percent, below the four-year annual average.
In 2016, 32 rounds were fired from handguns during OIS-No Hit incidents. When compared to the 2015 average of 7.2 rounds fired, 2016 experienced a decrease of 4.7 rounds, or 65 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of six rounds fired per incident, 2016 was 3.5 rounds, or 58 percent, below the four-year annual average.

In 2016, there were 12 OIS-No Hit incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired, which represented 92 percent of the 13 total incidents. This accounted for a 32 percentage point increase compared to 60 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired during OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of nine percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease.

In 2016, there was one OIS-No Hit incident in which 6-10 rounds were fired, which represented eight percent of the 13 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 10 percent in 2015. In addition, when compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired during OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, OIS-No Hit incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired represented the majority of occurrences, consisting of 35 of the 47 total incidents, or 74 percent. Incidents in which 11-15 rounds were fired represented the second largest category with five incidents, or 11 percent, followed by incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired, representing four incidents, or nine percent.
The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during OIS-No Hit incidents.

In 2016, eight Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 38 percent of the 21 total suspects. This accounted for a 16 percentage point increase compared to 2015 of 20 percent. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the age group of 18-23 represented the largest age category of OIS-No Hit incidents, with 16 of the 47 total suspects, or 34 percent.

In 2016, four Black suspects were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 26 total suspects. This accounted for a five percentage point change from 2012 through 2015. The percentage of Black suspects in 2016 was 22 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 50 percent, 2016 experienced a 16 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Blacks were the most represented ethnic group involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, representing 18 of the 47 total suspects, or 38 percent.

In 2016, American Indian suspects were classified with an “Unknown” ethnic designation, pending completion of the investigation by FID.

In 2016, 12 males suspects were involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 92 percent of the 13 total suspects. One suspect was classified with an “Unknown” gender designation, pending completion of the investigation by FID. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of the suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were male, representing 46 of the 47 total suspects, or 98 percent. No females were involved in any of the OIS-No Hit incidents from 2012 through 2016.
In 2016, none of the 13 total suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were homeless. The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Overall, 15 percent of the 47 total suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were homeless. 

In 2016, one of the 13 total suspects, representing eight percent, involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were homeless.

In 2016, nine firearms were utilized by suspects during OIS-No Hit incidents, which represented 69 percent out of the 13 total weapon types. This accounted for an 11 percentage point decrease compared to 80 percent in 2015. The remaining four suspects, representing 31 percent, used an automobile, physical force, a replica/pellet gun, and one deemed to be perceived with a weapon. Through 2016, firearms were the most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS-No Hit incidents, representing 34 of the 47 total weapons, or 72 percent. The remaining four suspects, representing 31 percent, used an automobile, physical force, a replica/pellet gun, and one deemed to be perceived with a weapon.

The remaining six suspects involved in 2016 OIS-No Hit incidents, representing 46 percent, were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, seven of the 13 total suspects, or 54 percent, involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were verified as documented gang members. This accounted for a 14 percentage point increase compared to 40 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were documented as gang members from 2012 through 2015 of 50 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for 24 of the 47 total suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents, or 51 percent.

In 2016, none of the 13 total suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically from 2012 to 2016, suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis, accounted for seven of the 47 total suspects, or 15 percent.

In 2016, three of the 13 total suspects, or 23 percent, were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.
From 2012 through 2016, no suspects involved in OIS-No Hit incidents died or sustained injuries as a direct result of police gunfire. The data, however, reflects 10 injuries and one death sustained by suspects by causes other than police gunfire. The data, however, reflects 10 injuries and one death sustained by suspects by causes other than police gunfire. One suspect, representing eight percent of the 13 total suspects, suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound.

In 2016, two suspects, representing 15 percent of the 13 total suspects, sustained injuries during OIS-No Hit incidents from causes other than police gunfire. One suspect, representing eight percent of the 13 total suspects, suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound.

In 2016, two suspects, representing 15 percent of the 13 total suspects, sustained injuries during OIS-No Hit incidents from causes other than police gunfire. One suspect, representing eight percent of the 13 total suspects, suffered a fatal self-inflicted gunshot wound.

In 2015, eight out of the 14 total OIS-No Hit Lethal force findings, representing 57 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This account for a 17 percentage point increase compared to 40 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 23 percent, 2015 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 35 of the 45 total findings, or 78 percent.

In 2015, three out of the 14 total OIS-No Hit Lethal force findings, representing 21 percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 20 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 23 percent, 2015 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, 10 of the 45 total Lethal force findings, representing 22 percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

In 2015, 11 out of the 14 total OIS-No Hit Lethal force findings, representing 79 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 80 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 77 percent, 2015 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 35 of the 45 total findings, or 78 percent.

In 2015, six out of the 14 total OIS-No Hit Tactics findings, representing 43 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 17 percentage point decrease compared to 60 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 55 percent, 2015 experienced a 12 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 23 of the 45 total Tactics findings, or 51 percent.

In 2015, 14 out of the 14 total OIS-No Hit Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for no percentage point change compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 97 percent, 2015 experienced a three percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Drawing/Exhibiting findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 44 of the 45 total Drawing/Exhibiting findings, or 98 percent.

*Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.
An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm at an animal (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in 14 Animal Shooting incidents, an increase six incidents, or 75 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 57 Animal Shooting incidents, resulting in an annual average of 14.25 incidents. The 2016 count fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.25 incidents, or two percent.

In 2016, four of the Department’s 14 Animal Shooting incidents, or 29 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for a 34 percentage point decrease compared to 63 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 46 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the second largest source category of Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for 30 of the 71 total incidents, or 42 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s 14 Animal Shooting incidents, or 14 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from field detentions based on officers’ observations from 2012 through 2015 of 8 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, field detentions based on officers’ observations represented the third largest source category of Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for 12 of the 71 total incidents, or 17 percent.

In 2016, three of the Department’s 14 Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was an increase of two incidents, or 200 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-one of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - 14; Central Bureau - three).

In 2016, one of the Department’s 14 Animal Shooting incidents, or seven percent, originated from an off-duty occurrence. This accounted for a six percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents originating from off-duty occurrences from 2012 through 2015 of nine percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, off-duty occurrences represented the fourth largest source category of Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for six of the 71 total incidents, or eight percent.

Five of the 14 Animal Shooting incidents, or 36 percent, currently have “Unknown” source of activity classifications, pending completion of the investigations by FID.

In 2016, two of the Department’s 14 Animal Shooting incidents, or 14 percent, originated from pre-planned activities. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 13 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from pre-planned activities from 2012 through 2015 of 25 percent, 2016 experienced an eleven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, pre-planned activities represented the second

A bystander was struck by a round fired by a Department employee during an Animal Shooting in 2016. This incident was classified as an Animal Shooting since the round struck the animal as intended, but travelled through it and struck the bystander who had no role in the incident.

---

19In the year 2016, the incident was classified as an Animal Shooting since the round struck the animal as intended, but travelled through it and struck the bystander who had no role in the incident.
In 2016, six of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which was an increase of one incident, or 20 percent, compared to 2015. Forty-three percent of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - 14; South Bureau - six).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 24 Animal Shooting incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of six incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 represented no change when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average.

In 2016, two of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of two incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.5 incidents, or 20 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau. No Animal Shooting incidents occurred in Valley Bureau in 2015. Fourteen percent of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - 14; Valley Bureau - two).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five Animal Shooting incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 60 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, which represented no change when compared to 2015. Seven percent of the Department’s Animal Shooting incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department - 14; Outside Areas - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, eight Animal Shooting incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of two incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by one incident, or 50 percent.
In 2016, the 14 Animal Shooting incidents were fairly evenly distributed throughout the 12 months of the year.

From 2012 through 2016, the Animal Shooting percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis was as follows:

- January through March: 18 incidents, or 25 percent;
- April through June: 16 incidents, or 23 percent;
- July through September: 23 incidents; or 32 percent; and,
- October through December: 14 incidents, or 20 percent.

In 2016, 14 male officers were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented approximately 88 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was six percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 89 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were male, representing 73 of the 82 total employees, or 89 percent.

In 2016, two female officers were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented approximately 13 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 11 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase.
In 2016, nine Hispanic officers were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 56 percent of the 16 total employees. This accounted for a six percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was 10 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 26 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were Hispanic, representing 45 of the 82 total employees, or 55 percent.

In 2016, five White officers were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 31 percent of the 16 total employees. This accounted for a seven percentage point decrease compared to 38 percent in 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was two percentage points below the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 11 percent, 2016 represented a one percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were Hispanic, representing 45 of the 82 total employees, or 55 percent.

In 2016, one Black officer was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented six percent of the 16 total employees. This accounted for a seven percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 11 percent, 2016 represented a five percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2014, Black officers accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, representing eight of the 82 total employees, or 10 percent.

The remaining employee, or six percent, involved in a 2016 Animal Shooting incident was Filipino.

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – none (none out of 16 total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 25 percent (four out of 16 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 19 percent (three out of 16 total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 44 percent (seven out of 16 total officers);
- More than 20 years of service – 13 percent (two out of 16 total officers).

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in three of the five categories, a decrease in one, and one that remained unchanged when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – no percentage point change (none in 2015, none in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – 25 percent point increase (23 percent during four-year period, 25 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 13 percentage point decrease (32 percent during four-year period, 19 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – nine percentage point increase (35 percent during four-year period, 44 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – four percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period, 13 percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents had 11-20 years of service, representing 30 of the 82 total employees, or 37 percent. Officers with 6-10 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 24 employees, or 29 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 1-5 years of service were the third largest group, with 19 employees, or 23 percent, followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which had eight employees, or 10 percent. Officers with less than one year of service, which represented one employee, accounted for only one percent of the total.
In 2016, all of the employees involved in Animal Shooting incidents were at the rank of police officer. This represented no percentage point change when compared to 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016 was 32 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 95 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were at the rank of police officer, representing 79 of the 82 total employees, or 96 percent.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to Foothill Division were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented a 19 percentage point increase compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Foothill Division from 2012 through 2015 of three percent, 2016 experienced a 16 percentage point increase.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to Newton Division were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented a six percentage point decrease compared to 25 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Newton Division from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a 13 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Newton Division had the third most personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, representing seven of the 82 total employees, or nine percent.

In 2016, three personnel assigned to Southeast Division were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented a 19 percentage point increase compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Southeast Division from 2012 through 2015 of eight percent, 2016 experienced a 13 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Southeast Division had the second most personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, representing eight of the 82 total employees, or 10 percent.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to 77th Street Division were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented approximately 13 percent of the 16 total employees. This represented a 25 percentage point decrease compared to 38 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to 77th Street Division from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 77th Street Division had the most personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, representing 15 of the 82 total employees, or 18 percent.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented approximately 13 percent of the 16 total employees. There were no personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division involved in an Animal Shooting from 2012 through 2015.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the 16 total personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2016:

- Central Bureau: four personnel, or 25 percent;
- West Bureau: two personnel, or 13 percent;
- South Bureau: five personnel, or 31 percent;
- Valley Bureau: three personnel, or 19 percent;
- CTSOB: two personnel, or 13 percent; and,
- Other: none.

### Offcer - Unit of Assignment

**Officer - Rank**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain and Above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention Officer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Officer - Area/Division of Assignment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division/Area/Bureau</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77th Street</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foothill</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampart</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarzana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiskey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Traffic Division</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2016, three personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 19 percent of the 16 total personnel. This accounted for a 19 percentage point increase compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, representing 22 of the 82 total employees, or 27 percent. The remaining two involved officers, or approximately 13 percent, in 2016 were assigned to Metropolitan Division.

In 2016, two officers sustained injuries during the 14 Animal Shooting incidents throughout the year. No officers were injured during Animal Shooting incidents in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 0.5 injured officers, 2016 was 1.5 officers, or 300 percent, above the four-year annual average.

In 2016, all of the personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents utilized handguns, which represented no percentage point change compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during Animal Shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced an 11 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during Animal Shooting incidents, representing 75 of the 82 total weapons, or 91 percent.

In 2016, 52 rounds were fired during all 14 Animal Shooting incidents, which was the highest total during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, one outlier incident accounted for 18 rounds fired, which represented 35 percent of the 52 total rounds. When compared to the 2015 total of 14 rounds fired, 2016 experienced an increase of 38 rounds, or 271 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 32 rounds fired, 2016 was 20 rounds, or 63 percent, above the four-year annual average.

One outlier incident in 2016 accounted for 35 percent of the four-year annual average.

In 2016, an average of 3.7 rounds were fired during Animal Shooting incidents. When compared to the 2015 average of 1.8 rounds fired, 2016 experienced an increase of 1.9 rounds, or 111 percent. Additionally, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 2.3 rounds fired per incident, 2016 was 1.4 rounds, or 61 percent, above the four-year annual average.
One outlier incident in 2016, which accounted for 35 percent of the 52 total rounds, skewed the average for the year.

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, rounds fired from handguns during Animal Shooting incidents, representing 171 of the 180 total rounds, or 95 percent.

In 2016, all 52 rounds fired were from handguns during Animal Shooting incidents. This represented no change when compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of rounds fired from handguns during Animal Shooting incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 93 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point increase.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shooting Tactics findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 98 percent, 2015 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 65 of the 66 total Tactics findings, or 98 percent.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shooting Tactics findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all the adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shooting Drawing/Exhibiting findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all the adjudicated Drawing/Exhibiting findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shootingless Lethal force findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all the adjudicated Non-Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shooting Less Lethal force findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all the adjudicated Less Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

In 2015, all eight Animal Shooting Lethal force findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all the adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

2016 Use of Force Year-End Review

Los Angeles Police Department

2016 Use of Force Year-End Review

Los Angeles Police Department
The unintentional discharge of a firearm by a Department employee regardless of cause. Unintentional discharges are evaluated and categorized as “Accidental Discharges” or “Negligent Discharges” (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in seven Unintentional Discharge incidents, a decrease of one incident, or 13 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 41 Unintentional Discharge incidents, resulting in an annual average of 10.25 incidents. The 2016 count fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 3.25 incidents, or 32 percent.

In 2016, four of the Department’s seven Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department – seven; Central Bureau - two). In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, eight Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of two incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 represented no change compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average.

From 2012 through 2016, on-duty non-tactical situations were the most frequent source of Unintentional Discharge incidents, accounting for 20 of the 48 total incidents, or 42 percent. Off-duty situations were the second most common, accounting for 15 incidents, or 31 percent, followed by on-duty tactical situations, accounting for 13 incidents, or 27 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.25 incidents, or 20 percent.
### Operations-West Bureau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, two of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, which was a decrease of one incident, or 33 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 29 percent of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department – seven; West Bureau – two).

### Operations-Valley Bureau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foothill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topanga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, one of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 67 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 14 percent of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department – seven; Valley Bureau – one).

### Outside Jurisdiction

In 2016, one of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, which represented no change compared to 2015. Approximately 14 percent of the Department’s Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department – seven; Outside Jurisdiction – one).

### Month of Occurrence

In 2016, two of the seven Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 29 percent, occurred in February. The months of June, July, August, September, and November each had one incident. Based on data for the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the month of occurrence for Unintentional Discharge incidents.
In 2016, two of the seven Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 29 percent, occurred on Monday and Tuesday, respectively. Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday each had one incident. Based on data for the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for Unintentional Discharge incidents.

In 2016, three of the seven Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 43 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while the other four incidents, representing 57 percent, occurred between 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the time of occurrence for Unintentional Discharge incidents.

**OFFICER INFORMATION**

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, unintentional discharge BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the Unintentional Discharge incident.

**OFFICER - GENDER**

In 2016, six male officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 86 percent of the seven total employees. This accounted for a 23 percentage point increase compared to 63 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2016 was four percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 80 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were male, representing 39 of the 48 total employees, or 81 percent.

In 2016, one female officer was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 14 percent of the seven total employees. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 38 percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point decrease.

**OFFICER - ETHNICITY**

In 2016, three Hispanic officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 14 percent of the seven total employees. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, Hispanic officers accounted for 15 of the 41 total officers, or 37 percent, involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved Hispanic officers accounted for 18 of the 48 total officers, or 38 percent.
In 2016, two Black officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 29 percent of the seven total employees. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, Black officers accounted for six of the 41 total officers, or 15 percent, involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved Black officers accounted for eight of the 48 total officers, or 17 percent.

Compared to 2015, the following categories experienced a decrease of one officer (three in 2015, two in 2016), or 50 percent. Officers with more than 11-20 years of service accounted for two out of the four total officers, or 50 percent; and, White officers accounted for 16 of the 41 total officers, or 39 percent, involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for 16 of the 48 total officers, or 33 percent.

In 2016, the remaining two officers belonged to the Asian/Pacific Islander and Filipino ethnic groups, respectively. While no White officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2016, White officers represented the largest ethnic group during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015. White officers accounted for 16 of the 41 total officers, or 39 percent, involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved White officers accounted for 16 of the 48 total officers, or 33 percent.

### Officer - Years of Service

- **Less than 1 year:**
  - 2012: 0
  - 2013: 0
  - 2014: 0
  - 2015: 0
  - 2016: 0

- **1-5 years:**
  - 2012: 0
  - 2013: 0
  - 2014: 0
  - 2015: 0
  - 2016: 0

- **6-10 years:**
  - 2012: 0
  - 2013: 0
  - 2014: 0
  - 2015: 0
  - 2016: 0

- **11-20 years:**
  - 2012: 0
  - 2013: 0
  - 2014: 0
  - 2015: 0
  - 2016: 0

- **More than 20 years:**
  - 2012: 0
  - 2013: 0
  - 2014: 0
  - 2015: 0
  - 2016: 0

Compared to 2015, the following categories experienced changes in 2016:

- 1-5 years of service – decrease of one officer (three in 2015, two in 2016), or 50 percent.
- 6-10 years of service – decrease of one officer (three in 2015, four in 2016), or 33 percent; and,
- 11-20 years of service – decrease of one officer (two in 2015, one in 2016), or 50 percent.

Officers with less than one year of service and more than 20 years of service remained unchanged in 2016 from 2015 at zero.

From 2012 through 2016, officers with 11-20 years of service were the group representing the largest percentage of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, with 16 out of the 48 total officers, or 33 percent. Officers with six to 10 years of service were the second largest group with 14 employees, or 29 percent. Officers with one to five years of service were the third largest group with 13 employees, or 27 percent.

### Officer - Rank

In 2016, the seven employees involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 100 percent, were at the rank of police officer. This accounted for a 12 percentage point increase compared to 88 percent in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2016 was 32 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 85 percent, 2016 experienced a 15 percentage point increase. From 2012 through 2016, a majority of employees involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were at the rank of police officer, representing 42 of the 48 total employees, or 88 percent.

### Officer - Area/Division of Assignment


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division/Area/Bureau</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foothill</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollenbeck</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampart</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topanga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Traffic Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2016, two officers assigned to Central Division were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 29 percent of the seven total officers. The remaining five officers, or 71 percent, were assigned to 77th Street Division, Olympic Division, Van Nuys Division, West Los Angeles Division, and Metropolitan Division. Based on data for the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the officer’s area of assignment for Unintentional Discharge incidents.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, representing eight of the 48 total employees, or 17 percent.

In 2016, one officer assigned to Metropolitan Division was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 14 percent of the seven total personnel. This accounted for an increase of one employee compared to zero in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of seven percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point increase. From 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division represented four of the 48 total employees, or eight percent.

In 2016, four personnel assigned to patrol were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 57 percent of the seven total personnel. This accounted for a 19 percentage point increase compared to 38 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were assigned to patrol, representing 25 of the 48 total employees, or 52 percent.

In 2016, two personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 29 percent of the seven total personnel. This accounted for a four percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, representing eight of the 48 total employees, or 17 percent.

No Department personnel were killed during Unintentional Discharge incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, four officers sustained injuries during Unintentional Discharge incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2016, seven handguns were utilized during Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 100 percent out of the seven total weapons. This accounted for a 25 percentage point increase compared to 75 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during Unintentional Discharge incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 70 percent, 2016 experienced a 30 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during Unintentional Discharge incidents, representing 36 of the 48 total weapons, or 75 percent.

During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, rifles and shotguns were the second most frequent weapon type used with six incidents, or 13 percent, respectively.
In 2016, one of the seven incidents, or 14 percent, involved a Smith and Wesson semi-automatic, and one of the seven incidents, or 14 percent, involved an Intratec 9mm, which was mishandled while attempting to unload it after being recovered as evidence.

In 2015, four out of the eight total Unintentional Discharge Tactics findings, representing 50 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 39 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of three percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of three percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014.

In 2015, four of the eight total Unintentional Discharge Tactics findings, representing 50 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 39 percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Tactical Debrief" findings from 2012 through 2014 of nine percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014.

"Administrative Disapproval" findings from 2012 through 2014 of three percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of three percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of three percent, 2015 experienced a 47 percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2014.
The death of an arrestee or detainees who is in the custodial care of the Department (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in eight ICD incidents, a decrease of one incident, or 11 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 22 ICD incidents, resulting in an annual average of 5.5 incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 2.5 incidents, or 45 percent.

In 2016, three of the Department’s eight ICD incidents, or 38 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for an 18 percentage point decrease compared to 56 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 50 percent, 2016 experienced a 12 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the largest source category of ICD incidents, accounting for 14 of the 30 total incidents, or 47 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s eight ICD incidents, or approximately 13 percent, originated from a field detention based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a nine percentage point decrease compared to 22 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD incidents resulting from field detentions based on officers’ observations from 2012 through 2015 of 27 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, field detentions based on officers’ observations represented the second largest source category of ICD incidents, accounting for seven of the 30 total incidents, or 23 percent.

The remaining four incidents, or 50 percent, in 2016 occurred during a citizen flag down, a pre-planned activity, and two incidents with “Other” designations.

In 2016, one of the Department’s eight ICD incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which represented a decrease of one incident, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 13 percent of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - eight; Central Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, six ICD incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.5 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 fell below the four-year annual average by 0.5 incidents, or 33 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which represented no change when compared to 2015. Twenty-five percent of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - eight; South Bureau - two).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five ICD incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 60 percent.
In 2016, one of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, a decrease of one incident, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Approximately 13 percent of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - eight; West Bureau - one).

In 2016, two of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was 50 percent, compared to 2015. Five percent of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - eight; West Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, three ICD incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.75 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.25 incidents, or 33 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 60 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, three ICD incidents occurred within Custody Services Division, which represented no change when compared to 2015. Twenty-five percent of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred within Custody Services Division (Department - eight; Custody Services Division - two).

In 2016, none of the Department’s ICD incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five ICD incidents occurred in areas outside (Custody Services - two). The Outside Jurisdiction count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents. The Outside Jurisdiction count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 157 percent.
2016 Use of Force Year-End Review

Los Angeles Police Department

MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the individual months of occurrence for ICD incidents.

The ICD percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:

- January through March: three incidents, or 10 percent;
- April through June: 11 incidents, or 37 percent;
- July through September: seven incidents; or 23 percent;
- October through December: nine incidents, or 30 percent.

DAY OF OCCURRENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, three ICD incidents, or 38 percent, occurred on a Sunday. Monday and Tuesday represented the second most frequent days of the week with two incidents each day, or 25 percent, respectively.

TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2016, five incidents, or approximately 62 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while three incidents, or approximately 38 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The time distribution, however, was more distinct from 2012 through 2015, where eight ICD incidents, or 36 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m.

OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, non-lethal, less-lethal, and/or lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the ICD incident.

In 2016, three of the eight ICD incidents involved some application of force against a suspect. Of those three incidents, 10 Department personnel were identified, based on the preliminary investigations, as having used some type of force.

OFFICER - GENDER

In 2016, all 10 personnel involved in ICD incidents throughout the year were male. This accounted for an eight percentage point increase compared to 92 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 91 percent, 2016 experienced a nine percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in ICD incidents were male, representing 70 of the 76 total employees, or 92 percent.
In 2016, six Hispanic officers were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 60 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 18 percentage point increase compared to 42 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 14 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 52 percent, 2016 experienced an eight percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in ICD incidents were Hispanic, representing 40 of the 76 total employees, or 53 percent.

In 2016, two Filipino officers were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 20 percent of the 10 total employees. No Filipino officers were involved in ICD incidents in 2015. The percentage of Filipino officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall Filipino total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Filipino personnel from 2012 through 2015 of five percent, 2016 represented an eight percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Filipino officers accounted for five of the 76 total employees, or seven percent.

In 2016, one White officer was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 10 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points below the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 32 percent, 2016 experienced a 22 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in ICD incidents, representing 22 of the 76 total employees, or 29 percent.

In 2016, one Asian/Pacific Islander officer was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 10 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a seven percentage point decrease compared to 17 percent in 2015. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was two percentage points above the Department’s overall Asian/Pacific Islander total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Asian/Pacific Islander personnel from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Asian/Pacific Islander officers accounted for five of the 76 total employees, or seven percent.

In 2016, one Black officer was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 10 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 15 percentage point decrease compared to 25 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 15 percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 30 percent, 2016 experienced a 25 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black officers accounted for 25 of the 76 total employees, or 33 percent.

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in ICD incidents in 2016 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- **Less than one year of service** – none (no involved officers);
- **1-5 years of service** – 10 percent (one out of 10 total officers);
- **6-10 years of service** – 30 percent (three out of 10 total officers);
- **11-20 years of service** – 50 percent (five out of 10 total officers); and,
- **More than 20 years of service** – 10 percent (one out of 10 total officers).

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in three of the five categories and increases in two, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- **Less than one year of service** – eight percentage point decrease (nine percent during four-year period, none in 2016);
- **1-5 years of service** – 14 percentage point decrease (24 percent during four-year period, 10 percent in 2016);
- **6-10 years of service** – three percentage point decrease (33 percent during four-year period, 30 percent in 2016);
- **11-20 years of service** – 26 percentage point increase (24 percent during four-year period, 50 percent in 2016); and,
- **More than 20 years of service** – one percentage point increase (nine percent during four-year period, 10 percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, officers with 6-10 years of service were the third largest group, with 17 personnel, or 22 percent, followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which had seven officers, or nine percent. Officers with less than one year of service, which represented six officers, accounted for eight percent of the total.
In 2016, five employees at the rank of police officer were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 50 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 50 percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 50 percentage point decrease compared to no involved detention officers were at the rank of police officer, representing 63 of the 76 total employees, or 83 percent. In 2016, six employees at the rank of detention officer were involved in ICD incidents, representing 12 of the 76 total employees, or 16 percent.

Historically, from 2012 through 2015, the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Custody Services Division from 2012 through 2015 of 11 percent, 2016 experienced a 39 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Custody Services Division accounted for 13 of the 76 total employees, or 17 percent.

In 2016, four personnel assigned to Harbor Division were involved in an ICD incident, which represented 40 percent of the 10 total employees. This represented a two percentage point decrease compared to 42 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Harbor Division from 2012 through 2015 of eight percent, 2016 experienced a 32 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Harbor Division accounted for nine of the 76 total employees, or 12 percent.

In 2016, one officer assigned to Metropolitan Division was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 10 percent of the 10 total employees. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, only one officer assigned to Metropolitan Division was involved in an ICD incident.

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Custody Services Division were involved in an ICD incident, which represented 50 percent of the 10 total employees. No personnel assigned to Custody Services Division were involved in any of the ICD incidents in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Custody Services Division from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a 38 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Custody Services Division accounted for 13 of the 76 total employees, or 17 percent.

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Custody Services Division were involved in an ICD incident, which represented 50 percent of the 10 total employees. No personnel assigned to Custody Services Division were involved in any of the ICD incidents in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Custody Services Division from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a 38 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, personnel assigned to Custody Services Division accounted for 13 of the 76 total employees, or 17 percent.
The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during ICD incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. No Department personnel were killed during ICD incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, however, no officers were injured during 2016 occurrences.

**Suspect Information**
The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during ICD incidents.

**Suspect Ethnicity**
In 2016, three Hispanic suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 25 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a 19 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015. The percentage of White suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was three percentage points below the City’s overall White population total. Additionally, the percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 17 percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 32 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Whites were the third most represented ethnic group involved in ICD incidents, representing nine of the 30 total suspects, or 30 percent.

When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 32 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 25 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 11 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 3 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Unknown suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 2 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved American Indian suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 1 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase.

**Suspect Gender**
In 2016, seven male suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 88 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 89 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 89 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in ICD incidents were male, representing 26 of the 30 total suspects, or 87 percent.

**Suspect Age**
In 2016, three Black suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented approximately 38 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a 16 percentage point increase compared to 22 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 29 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 32 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Blacks were the second most represented ethnic group involved in ICD incidents, representing 10 of the 30 total suspects, or 33 percent.

In 2016, two White suspect were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 25 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a 19 percentage point decrease compared to 44 percent in 2015. The percentage of White suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was three percentage points below the City’s overall White population total. Additionally, the percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2016 was 17 percentage points below the City’s overall White violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 32 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Whites were the third most represented ethnic group involved in ICD incidents, representing nine of the 30 total suspects, or 30 percent.

In 2016, seven male suspects were involved in an ICD incident, which represented approximately 13 percent of the eight total suspects. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 14 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease.
In 2016, most suspects involved in ICD incidents were in the 30-39 age group. Specifically, four of the eight total suspects, or 50 percent, were included in this age group. The 30-39 age category accounted for a 28 percentage point increase compared to 22 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 30-39 age range from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a 23 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 30-39 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in ICD incidents, accounting for 10 of the 30 total suspects, or 33 percent.

In 2016, the 50-59 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in ICD incidents, with two out of the eight total suspects, or 25 percent. The 50-59 age category accounted for an eight percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 50-59 age range from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 50-59 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in ICD incidents, accounting for nine of the 30 total suspects, or 30 percent.

In 2016, one decedent, representing approximately 13 percent of the eight total suspects, involved in an ICD incident was within the 40-49 age range. The 40-49 age category accounted for a 20 percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 40-49 age range from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 40-49 age group represented the third largest age category of suspects involved in ICD incidents, accounting for seven of the 30 total suspects, or 23 percent.

The remaining decedent, or approximately 13 percent, involved in an ICD incident in 2016 was within the age range of 60 and above. This individual’s death accounted for the only 60 and above age category statistic during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016.

In 2016, none of the eight total suspects involved in ICD incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects involved in ICD incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for six of the 30 total suspects, or 20 percent.

Of the eight decedents involved in ICD incidents in 2016, two decedents, or 25 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Six decedents, or 75 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner. Therefore, all decedents, or 100 percent, with completed toxicology reports at the time of publication of this Report had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s).

In 2015, six of the nine decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 67 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). This accounted for a 33 percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of decedents with positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s) during ICD incidents from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced a 33 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects with positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s) during ICD incidents accounted for 19 of the 22 total decedents, or 86 percent.
Of the eight decedents involved in ICD incidents in 2016, two decedents, or 25 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s). Six decedents, or 75 percent, are pending toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner.

In 2016, one of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 50 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for methamphetamine. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of six percentage points when compared to four of nine decedents, or 44 percent, with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in ICD incidents with positive toxicology results for methamphetamine accounted for eight of the 22 total decedents, or 36 percent.

In 2016, one of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 50 percent, with completed toxicology reports had positive results for marijuana. This partial 2016 percentage was an increase of six percentage points when compared to four of nine decedents, or 44 percent, with positive toxicology results for marijuana accounted for 2 of the 22 total decedents, or nine percent.

In 2016, neither of the two decedents involved in ICD incidents, or 25 percent, had positive toxicology results for cocaine. This partial 2016 percentage was a decrease of 22 percentage points when compared to two of nine decedents, or 22 percent, with positive toxicology results for cocaine in 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, deceased suspects in ICD incidents with positive toxicology results for alcohol accounted for 2 of the 22 total decedents, or nine percent.

In 2016, none of the eight total suspects involved in ICD incidents were homeless.

Of the five ICD incidents in 2016 in which suspects were armed with a weapon, two incidents, or 40 percent, included edged weapons. When compared to the aggregate percentage of edged weapons utilized by armed suspects during ICD incidents from 2012 through 2015 of seven percent, 2016 experienced a 33 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, suspects with edged weapons represent three of the 19 total armed suspects, or 16 percent.

Of the five ICD incidents in 2016 in which suspects were armed with a weapon, two incidents, or 40 percent, included physical force. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD suspects who utilized physical force from 2012 through 2015 of 63 percent, 2016 experienced a 23 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, suspects who used physical force represented 14 of the 19 total armed suspects, or 74 percent.

Of the four remaining ICD incidents in 2016, weapons were not a factor in three, or 38 percent. The remaining incident, representing approximately 13 percent, involved a suspect who used a weapon and/or force designated as “Other”.

---

22 The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.
Because ICD incidents only involve suspects who are deceased, this section does not include those who only sustained injuries (those who only sustained injuries, but are not deceased, are included in the LERII section).

In 2016, eight individuals died while in the Department’s custody. When compared to the 2015 total of nine, 2016 accounted for one less decedent, representing an 11 percent decrease. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 5.5 decedents from ICD incidents, 2016 was 2.5 decedents, or 45 percent, above the four-year annual average.

In 2016, one of the eight decedents, representing approximately 13 percent, died from suicide. The remaining seven decedents, or approximately 88 percent, currently have pending cause/manner of death classifications, pending completion of their respective investigations by FID. In 2015, five of the nine decedents, or 56 percent, died from accidental causes. This accounted for a 31 percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD decedents who died from accidental causes during the three-year period from 2012 through 2014 of 23 percent, 2015 experienced a 33 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, ICD decedents who died from causes/manners of death indicative of homicide accounted for eight of the 22 total decedents, or 36 percent. In 2015, two of the nine decedents, or 22 percent, died from causes and/or manners of death indicative of homicide. This accounted for a 53 percentage point decrease compared to 75 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD decedents who died from homicide during the three-year period from 2012 through 2014 of 31 percent, 2015 experienced a nine percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, ICD decedents who died from causes/manners of death indicative of homicide accounted for six of the 22 total decedents, or 27 percent.

In 2015, nine out of the 12 total ICD Tactics findings, representing 75 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for an 18 percentage point decrease compared to 93 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 94 percent, 2015 experienced a 19 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, representing 60 of the 66 total Tactics findings, or 91 percent.

In 2015, all 11 ICD Non-Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This represented no percentage point change when compared to 2014. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, only one of the 62 total Non-Lethal force findings, or two percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

In 2015, the one ICD Less-Lethal force finding was adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a 33 percentage point increase compared to 67 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “In Policy (No Further Action)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 90 percent, 2015 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Less-Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, representing 10 of the 11 total findings, or 91 percent.

23 The Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner - Coroner determines the cause/manner of death. There is currently a backlog of cases due to personnel shortage at the Coroner’s office.

24 Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.
In 2015, three out of the 12 total ICD Tactics findings, representing 25 percent, were adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval." This accounted for an 18 percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Administrative Disapproval" findings from 2012 through 2014 of six percent, 2015 experienced a 19 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2015, six of the 66 total Tactics findings, representing nine percent, resulted in an "Administrative Disapproval" outcome.

In 2015, no Lethal force findings were adopted. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, the only one Lethal force finding, which was adjudicated in 2012, resulted in an "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" outcome.
## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in two CRCH incidents, an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of five CRCH incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 60 percent.

### SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2016, one of the Department’s two CRCH incidents, or 50 percent, originated from a field detention based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). The other CRCH incident, representing 50 percent, originated from a citizen flag down.

### BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

**OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU**

In 2016, one of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau. No CRCH incidents occurred in Central Bureau in 2015. Fifty percent of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - two; Central Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, one CRCH incident occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.25 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 300 percent.

### SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Call</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Flag Down</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Planned</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Call</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-Duty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

**OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU**

In 2016, none of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, one CRCH incident occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.25 incidents.

### SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77th Street</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

**OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU**

No CRCH incidents occurred in West Bureau during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016.

### SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

**OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU**

In 2016, one of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau. Fifty percent of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - two; Valley Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, two CRCH incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.5 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.5 incidents, or 100 percent.

### SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foothill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topanga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department Total</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

An upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the modified carotid, full carotid, and locked carotid hold (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).
**OUTSIDE JURISDICTION**

In 2016, none of the Department’s CRCH incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, which represented no change compared to 2015.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, one CRCH incident occurred in an area outside the Department’s jurisdiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside Jurisdiction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TIME OF OCCURRENCE**

In 2016, both of the CRCH incidents occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, two of the five CRCH incidents, or 40 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while three incidents, or 60 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0600 - 1759</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 0559</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OFFICER INFORMATION**

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the CRCH incident.

**OFFICER - GENDER**

In 2016, the two officers involved in CRCH incidents, or 100 percent, were male. This represented no percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in CRCH incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 100 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OFFICER - ETHNICITY**

In 2016, one Hispanic officer was involved in a CRCH incident, which represented 50 percent of the two total employees. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, Hispanic officers accounted for one of the five total officers, or 20 percent, involved in CRCH incidents. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved Hispanic officers accounted for two of the seven total officers, or 29 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Day of Occurrence**

In 2016, one of the two CRCH incidents occurred on a Sunday. The other incident occurred on a Sunday. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for CRCH incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OFFICER - YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2016, the two officers involved in CRCH incidents, or 100 percent, were within the 6-10 years of service category. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel within the 6-10 years of service category from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced an 80 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, three of the seven total involved personnel, or 43 percent, were within the 6-10 years of service category.

During the same five-year period, two of the seven total involved personnel, or 29 percent, were within the 11-20 years of service category. One officer, representing 14 percent, was in the 1-5 years of service category, while the remaining employee had more than 20 years of service.

OFFICER - RANK

In 2016, the two employees involved CRCH incidents, or 100 percent, were at the rank of police officer. This accounted for no percentage point change compared to 100 percent of the same rank category in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in CRCH incidents in 2016 was 32 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 60 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, most of the officers involved in CRCH incidents were assigned to patrol, representing four of the seven total employees, or 57 percent.

From 2012 through 2015, none of the five involved personnel were assigned to a specialized assignment. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, only one of the seven employees, representing 14 percent, was assigned to a specialized assignment.

OFFICER - AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, one of the two involved officers involved in CRCH incidents was assigned to Foothill Division, while the other officer was assigned to Northeast Division. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the Area/Division and/or Bureau of assignment for employees involved in CRCH incidents.

OFFICER - UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, one of the two involved officers involved in CRCH incidents, representing 50 percent, was assigned to patrol, while the other officer was assigned to a specialized assignment.

When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 60 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, most of the officers involved in CRCH incidents were assigned to patrol, representing four of the seven total employees, or 57 percent.

From 2012 through 2015, none of the five involved personnel were assigned to a specialized assignment. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, only one of the seven employees, representing 14 percent, was assigned to a specialized assignment.
**OFFICER - INJURIES**

No Department personnel were killed during CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, eight officers sustained injuries during CRCH incidents during the same five-year period. In 2016, two officers sustained injuries during the two CRCH incidents throughout the year. This accounted for no change compared to two injured officers in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 1.5 injured officers, 2016 was 0.5 injured officers, or 33 percent, above the four-year annual average.

**SUSPECT INFORMATION**

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during CRCH incidents.

**SUSPECT - ETHNICITY**

In 2016, one Hispanic suspect was involved in a CRCH incident, which represented 50 percent of the two total suspects. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, Hispanic suspects accounted for three of the five total suspects involved in CRCH incidents, or 60 percent. Additionally, during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved Hispanic suspects accounted for four of the seven total suspects, or 57 percent.

In 2016, one White suspect was involved in a CRCH incident, which represented 50 percent of the two total suspects. During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, White suspects accounted for one of the five total suspects involved in CRCH incidents, or 20 percent. Additionally, during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, involved White suspects accounted for two of the seven total suspects, or 29 percent.

**SUSPECT - GENDER**

All suspects involved in CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016 were male.

**SUSPECT - AGE**

In 2016, the two suspects involved in CRCH incidents, or 100 percent were in the 18-23 age range. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 18-23 age range from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced an eighty percentage point increase. From 2012 through 2016, three of the seven total suspects, or 43 percent, were within the 18-23 age range.

**SUSPECT - GANG MEMBERSHIP**

In 2016, one of the two suspects involved in CRCH incidents was verified as a documented gang member. The remaining suspect was either not documented as a gang member or had an unknown gang affiliation. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for two of the seven total suspects, or 29 percent.

**SUSPECT - HOMELESS**

In 2016, one of the two total suspects, representing 50 percent, involved in CRCH incidents were homeless.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suspect Ethnicity: Carotid**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suspect Gender: Carotid**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.
**SUSPECT - WEAPON/FORCE**

In 2016, one of the two involved suspects, representing 50 percent, utilized physical force, while the other suspect utilized a weapon designated as "Other."

During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, five of the five total suspects, or 100 percent, utilized physical force during CRCH incidents. From 2012 through 2016, physical force accounted for six of the seven total suspect weapon categories, or 86 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edged Weapon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Device</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Force</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replica/Pellet</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUSPECT - INJURIES**

No suspects were killed during CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, six suspects sustained injuries during CRCH incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2016, one suspect sustained injuries during CRCH incidents. This accounted for no change compared to one injured suspect in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 1.25 injured suspects, 2016 was 0.25 injured suspects, or 20 percent, below the four-year annual average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION**

**TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY**

(No Further Action)

**ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY**

(Administrative Disapproval)

In 2015, the one CRCH Tactics finding was adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for no percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 100 percent, 2015 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, all five of the adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome.

In 2015, the one CRCH Lethal force finding was adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” From 2012 through 2014, none of the four CRCH Lethal force findings resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

---

26Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.
In 2016, Department personnel were involved in nine LERII incidents, a decrease of four incidents, or 31 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 42 LERII incidents, resulting in an average annual total of 10.5 incidents. The 2016 count fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by approximately 22 percent, originated from pre-planned detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops).

In 2016, two of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-two percent of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - nine; Central Bureau - two).

In 2016, three of the Department’s nine LERII incidents, or 33 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for a 29 percentage point decrease compared to 62 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of LERII incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 60 percent, 2016 experienced a 27 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the largest source category of LERII incidents, accounting for 28 of the 51 total incidents, or 55 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s nine LERII incidents, or approximately 22 percent, originated from pre-planned activities. There were no other LERII incidents resulting from pre-planned activities during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015.
In 2016, three of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, an increase of one incident, or 50 percent, compared to 2015. Thirty-three percent of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - nine; West Bureau - three).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, nine LERII incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 2.25 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 20 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was a decrease of three incidents, or 40 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-two percent of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - nine; West Bureau - three).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, nine LERII incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 2.25 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 40 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-two percent of the Department’s LERII incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - nine; West Bureau - three).
In 2016, three LERII incidents, or 33 percent, occurred on a Tuesday. Monday, Saturday, and Sunday each represented the second most frequent days of the week with two incidents each day, or 22 percent, respectively. From 2012 through 2016, Thursday represented the day with the most LERII incidents with 11 out of the 51 total, or 22 percent. The remaining 40 incidents, or 78 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining days of the week.

In 2016, six incidents, or approximately 67 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while three incidents, or 33 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. The 2016 time distribution varied when compared to the 2012 through 2015 time distribution, where 20 LERII incidents, or 48 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while 22 incidents, or 52 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The five-year annual average for 2012 through 2016 was 5.2 LERII incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and five incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

In 2016, 11 Hispanic officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 33 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 56 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 95 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in LERII incidents were male, representing 179 of the 189 total employees, or 95 percent.

In 2016, 31 male officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 94 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a three percentage point decrease compared to 97 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 95 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease.

In 2016, two female officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented six percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a three percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of five percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase.

In 2016, 11 Hispanic officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 33 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 56 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a 18 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Hispanic officers were involved in the majority of LERII incidents, representing 91 of the 189 total employees, or 48 percent.

In 2016, 11 Hispanic officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 33 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a 23 percentage point decrease compared to 56 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a 18 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Hispanic officers were involved in the majority of LERII incidents, representing 91 of the 189 total employees, or 48 percent.
In 2016, 15 White officers were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 45 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a 17 percentage point increase compared to 28 percent in 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 12 percentage points above the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 37 percent, 2016 experienced an eight percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in LERII incidents, representing 73 of the 189 total employees, or 39 percent.

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in LERII incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – none (no involved officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 18 percent (six out of 33 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 30 percent (10 out of 33 total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 9 percent (three out of 33 total officers).

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in four of the five categories and an increase in one, when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – eight percentage point decrease (eight percent in 2015, none in 2016);
- 1-5 years of service – five percentage point decrease (23 percent in 2015, 18 percent in 2016);
- 6-10 years of service – 11 percentage point decrease (41 percent in 2015, 30 percent in 2016);
- 11-20 years of service – 10 percentage point increase (26 percent in 2015, 45 percent in 2016); and,
- More than 20 years of service – one percentage point increase (five percent during four-year period, six percent in 2016).

Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in LERII incidents had 6-10 years of service, representing 72 of the 189 total employees, or 38 percent. Officers with 11-20 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 55 employees, or 29 percent, during the same five-year period. Officers with 1-5 years of service were the third largest group, with 45 personnel, or 24 percent, followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which had 10 officers, or five percent. Officers with less than one year of service, which represented seven officers, accounted for only four percent of the total.

Officer - Years of Service

In 2016, 30 employees at the rank of police officer were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 91 percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a four percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 96 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in LERII incidents were at the rank of police officer, representing 179 of the 189 total employees, or 95 percent.

In 2016, two employees at the rank of sergeant were involved in LERII incidents, which represented six percent of the 33 total employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 91 percent in 2015. The percentage of sergeants involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 23 percentage points below the Department’s overall sergeant total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of sergeant from 2012 through 2015 of three percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, employees at the rank of sergeant accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in LERII incidents, representing seven of the 189 total employees, or four percent.

The remaining employee involved in a LERII incident in 2016, representing three percent of the 33 total employees, was at the rank of lieutenant.
In 2016, 12 personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 36 percent of the 33 total employees. This represented 33 percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of two percent, 2016 experienced a 39 percentage point decrease compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of one percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 36 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division from 2012 through 2015 of 17 percent, 2016 experienced a ten percentage point decrease compared to 36 percent in 2015.

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in four of the six Bureau categories and increases in two, when compared to their respective aggregate percentages during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Central Bureau: 23 percentage point decrease (38 percent in 2015, 15 percent in 2016);
- West Bureau: 19 percentage point increase (eight percent in 2015, 27 percent in 2016);
- South Bureau: one percentage point increase (eight percent in 2015, nine percent in 2016);
- Valley Bureau: 32 percentage point increase (44 percent in 2015, 12 percent in 2016);
- CTSOB: 33 percentage point increase (three percent in 2015, 36 percent in 2016); and,
- Other: no percentage point change (no involved personnel in 2015, no involved personnel in 2016).

In 2016, there were percentage point decreases in four of the six Bureau categories and increases in two, when compared to their respective aggregate percentages during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Central Bureau: 22 percentage point decrease (37 percent during four-year period, 15 percent in 2016);
- West Bureau: six percentage point increase (21 percent during four-year period, 27 percent in 2016);
- South Bureau: one percentage point decrease (10 percent during four-year period, nine percent in 2016);
- Valley Bureau: 17 percentage point decrease (29 percent during four-year period, 12 percent in 2016);
- CTSOB: 33 percentage point increase (three percent during four-year period, 36 percent in 2016); and,
- Other: no change (no involved personnel during four-year period, no involved personnel in 2016).

In 2016, five personnel assigned to Olympic Division were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 33 total employees. No Olympic Division personnel were involved in LERII incidents during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015.

The remaining 11 Department personnel, or 33 percent, were fairly evenly distributed amongst the remaining Areas/Divisions.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the 52 total personnel involved in LERII incidents in 2016:

- Central Bureau: five personnel, or 15 percent;
- West Bureau: nine personnel, or 27 percent;
- South Bureau: three personnel, or nine percent;
- Valley Bureau: four personnel, or 12 percent;
- CTSOB: 12 personnel, or 36 percent; and,
- Other: no involved personnel.

In 2016, there were percentage point increases in three of the six Bureau categories, decreases in two, and one that remained unchanged when compared to 2015. The following depicts these changes:

- Central Bureau: 23 percentage point decrease (38 percent in 2015, 15 percent in 2016);
- West Bureau: 19 percentage point increase (eight percent in 2015, 27 percent in 2016);
- South Bureau: one percentage point increase (eight percent in 2015, nine percent in 2016);
- Valley Bureau: 32 percentage point increase (44 percent in 2015, 12 percent in 2016);
- CTSOB: 33 percentage point increase (three percent in 2015, 36 percent in 2016); and,
- Other: no percentage point change (no involved personnel in 2015, no involved personnel in 2016).
In 2016, nine personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 21 percent, 2016 assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in LERII incidents, representing 42 of the 189 total employees, or 22 percent.

No Department personnel were killed during LERII incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, 30 officers sustained injuries during LERII incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2016, seven officers sustained injuries during the nine LERII incidents throughout the year. This accounted for a 17 percent increase compared to six injured officers in 2015. However, when compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 5.75 injured officers, 2016 was 1.25 officers, or 22 percent, above the four-year annual average.

In 2016, six Black suspects were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 67 percent of the nine total suspects. This accounted for a 52 percentage point increase compared to 15 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 58 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. In addition, the percentage of Black suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 24 percentage points above the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 29 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Blacks were the second most represented ethnic group involved in LERII incidents, representing 20 of the 51 total suspects, or 39 percent.

In 2016, one Asian/Pacific Islander suspect was involved in a LERII incident, which represented 11 percent of the nine total suspects. No Asian/Pacific Islander suspects were involved in LERII incidents in 2015. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was one percentage point below the City’s overall Asian/Pacific Islander population total. In addition, the percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 10 percentage points above the City’s overall Asian/Pacific Islander violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Asian/Pacific Islander suspects from 2012 through 2015 of five percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Asian/Pacific Islanders represented three of the 51 total suspects, or six percent.

In 2016, two Hispanic suspects were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 22 percent of the nine total suspects. This accounted for a 40 percentage point decrease compared to 62 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 27 percentage points below the City’s overall Hispanic population total. In addition, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016 was 19 percentage points below the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Hispanics were the most represented ethnic group involved in LERII incidents, representing 20 of the 51 total suspects, or 39 percent.

In 2016, nine personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in LERII incidents, which represented 27 percent of the 33 total personnel. This accounted for a four percentage point decrease compared to 31 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in LERII incidents, representing 42 of the 189 total employees, or 22 percent.

In 2016, all nine suspects involved in LERII incidents were male. This accounted for an eight percentage point increase compared to 92 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 90 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in LERII incidents were male, representing 47 of the 51 total suspects, or 92 percent.
In 2016, three of the nine total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 33 percent, were in the 24-29 age group. The 2016 24-29 age category accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 31 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 24-29 age range from 2012 through 2015 of 21 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase compared to 15 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were documented as gang members from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percent increase compared to 15 percent in 2015.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

In 2016, the remaining three suspects, representing 33 percent of the nine total suspects involved in LERII incidents in 2016, were within the 18-23 age group, the 40-49 age group, and the 50-59 age group.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent, involved in LERII incidents were homeless.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved LERII incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent, involved in LERII incidents were homeless.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved LERII incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent, involved in LERII incidents were homeless.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved LERII incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent, involved in LERII incidents were homeless.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved LERII incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.

In 2016, four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent, involved in LERII incidents were homeless.

In 2016, two of the nine total suspects, or 22 percent, involved in LERII incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 24 percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of suspects involved LERII incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 43 percent, 2016 experienced a 21 percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 51 total suspects involved in LERII incidents, or 14 percent.

The remaining seven suspects, or 78 percent, involved in 2016 LERII incidents were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation.
In 2016, five LERII incidents involved physical force by suspects, which represented 56 percent of the nine total incidents. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of physical force-related LERII incidents utilized by suspects from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Non-Lethal force findings resulted in an "In Policy (No Further Action)" outcome, representing 92 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This varied when compared to the two Lethal force findings adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" in 2014. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, the only "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" Lethal force findings occurred in 2014.

In 2016, five LERII incidents involved physical force by suspects, which represented 56 percent of the nine total incidents. This accounted for a 10 percentage point increase compared to 46 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of physical force-related LERII incidents utilized by suspects from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically from 2012 through 2015, a majority of adjudicated Non-Lethal force findings resulted in an "In Policy (No Further Action)" outcome, representing 92 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This varied when compared to the two Lethal force findings adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" in 2014. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, the only "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" Lethal force findings occurred in 2014.
In 2015, eight out of the 39 total LERII Tactics findings, representing 21 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 17 percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2012 through 2014 of nine percent, 2015 experienced a 12 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2015, 18 of the 156 total Tactics findings, representing 12 percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome.

In 2015, one out of the 29 total LERII Non-Lethal force findings, representing three percent, was adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This represented no percentage point change when compared to 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of two percent, 2015 experienced a one percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2015, three of the 132 total Non-Lethal force findings, representing two percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

In 2015, one out of the 12 total LERII Less-Lethal force findings, representing eight percent, was adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” None of the LERII Less-Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” during the three-year period from 2012 through 2014.
**HEAD STRIKE INCIDENTS**

An intentional head strike with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization, or death (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in two Head Strike incidents, an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of five Head Strike incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1.25 incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 60 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE OF ACTIVITY**

In 2016, one of the Department’s two Head Strike incidents, or 50 percent, originated from a radio call. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Head Strike incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 40 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls (in addition to field detentions based on officers’ observations) represented the largest source category of Head Strike incidents, accounting for three of the seven total incidents, or 43 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s two Head Strike incidents, or 50 percent, originated from a field detention based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). When compared to the aggregate percentage of Head Strike incidents resulting from observation stops from 2012 through 2015 of 40 percent, 2016 experienced a 10 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, observation stops (in addition to radio calls) represented the largest source category of Head Strike incidents, accounting for three of the seven total incidents, or 43 percent.

**BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE**

**OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU**

There were no Head Strike incidents in OCB in 2016. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend for OCB.

**OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU**

There was one Head Strike incident in OSB in 2016, which occurred in Southwest Division. This represented an increase of one incident compared to none in 2015. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend for OSB.

**OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU**

There was one Head Strike incident in OWB in 2016, which occurred in Pacific Division. This represented an increase by one incident compared to none in 2015. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend for OWB.

**OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU**

There were no Head Strike incidents in OVB in 2016. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend for OVB.

**OUTSIDE JURISDICTION**

There were no Head Strike incidents in any Outside Jurisdiction in 2016.
MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2016, one of the two Head Strike incidents, representing 50 percent, occurred during the month of October, while the other incident, or 50 percent, occurred during the month of September. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the month of occurrence for Head Strike incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2016, one of the two Head Strike incidents, representing 50 percent, occurred on a Monday, while the other incident, or 50 percent, occurred on a Thursday. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for Head Strike incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2016, one of the two Head Strike incidents, representing 50 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while the other incident, or 50 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the time of occurrence for Head Strike incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0600 - 1759</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 0559</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the Head Strike incident.

Based on the preliminary investigations, one of the two Head Strike incidents in 2016 involved two officers. However, FID investigators had not yet determined which officer utilized the force option resulting in the Head Strike incident at the time of publication of this report. Therefore, both officers were included in the data.

OFFICER - GENDER

In 2016, all three involved personnel in Head Strike incidents were male. This represented no percentage point change when compared to 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in Head Strike incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 80 percent, 2016 experienced a 20 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Head Strike incidents were male, representing seven of the eight total employees, or 88 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICER - ETHNICITY

In 2016, two White officers were involved in Head Strike incidents, which represented 67 percent of the three total employees. The percentage of White officers involved in Head Strike incidents in 2016 was 34 percentage points above the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a 14 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in Head Strike incidents, representing three of the eight total employees, or 38 percent.

In 2016, one Hispanic officer was involved in one Head Strike incident, which represented 33 percent of the three total employees. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in Head Strike incidents in 2016 was 13 percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 80 percent, 2016 experienced a 27 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Head Strike incidents were Hispanic, representing four of the eight total employees, or 50 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>City of LA Department Personnel</th>
<th>Head Strike Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OFFICER - YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2016, the three personnel involved in Head Strike incidents were divided evenly between the 6-10 years of service category, the 11-20 years of service category, and more than 20 years of service. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of officers involved in Head Strike incidents had 11-20 years of service, accounting for four of the eight total officers, or 50 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICER - RANK

In 2016, all three involved personnel in Head Strike incidents were at the rank of police officer. This accounted for no percentage point change when compared to 2015. The percentage of police officers involved in Head Strike incidents in 2016 was 32 percentage points above the Department’s overall police officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 100 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, all involved employees in Head Strike incidents were at the rank of police officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain and Above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICER - AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, one involved officer was assigned to 77th Street Division, while the other two were assigned to Metropolitan Division. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with an employee’s Area/Division of assignment for Head Strike incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division/Area/Bureau</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77th Street</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasilli</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollenbeck</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hollywood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampart</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topanga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Los Angeles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whittier</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Traffic Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Units</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICER - UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2016, one officer assigned to patrol was involved in a Head Strike incident, which represented 33 percent of the three total personnel. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 60 percent, 2016 experienced a 27 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in Head Strike incidents were assigned to patrol, representing four of the eight total employees, or 50 percent.

The remaining two officers were assigned to Metropolitan Division. However, during the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, no involved personnel were assigned to Metropolitan Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OFFICER - INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed during Head Strike incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, four officers sustained injuries during Head Strike incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2016, two officers sustained injuries during the two Head Strike incidents throughout the year. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 0.5 injured officers, 2016 was 1.5 injured officers above the four-year annual average.

SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during Head Strike incidents.

SUSPECT - ETHNICITY

In 2016, both suspects involved in Head Strike incidents were Black. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced an 80 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Blacks and Hispanics were the only represented ethnic groups of suspects involved in Head Strike incidents, accounting for 43 percent and 57 percent of the seven total suspects, respectively.

SUSPECT - GENDER

In 2016, both suspects involved in Head Strike incidents were male. This represented no change when compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 80 percent, 2016 experienced a 20 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in Head Strike incidents were male, representing six of the seven total suspects, or 86 percent.

SUSPECT - AGE

In 2016, one of the two suspects was within the 0-17 age range, while the remaining suspect was within the 24-29 age range. Based on data for the five-year period, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with a suspect’s age for Head Strike incidents.

SUSPECT - PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2016, neither of the suspects involved in Head Strike incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects involved in Head Strike incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for one of the seven total suspects, or 14 percent.

SUSPECT - GANG MEMBERSHIP

The two suspects involved in Head Strike incidents in 2016 were either not documented as gang members or had an unknown gang affiliation. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for two of the seven total suspects involved in Head Strike incidents, or 29 percent.

SUSPECT - HOMELESS29

In 2016, one of the two total suspects, representing 50 percent, involved in Head Strike incidents was homeless.

---

29 The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.
**Suspect - Weapon/Force**

In 2016, one of the two suspects, or 50 percent, was armed with an edged weapon, while the remaining suspect, or 50 percent, utilized physical force. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, physical force accounted for the largest suspect weapon category with three out of seven force types, or 43 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edged Weapon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Device</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replica/Pellet</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, one of the two suspects, or 50 percent, was armed with an edged weapon, while the remaining suspect, or 50 percent, utilized physical force. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, physical force accounted for the largest suspect weapon category with three out of seven force types, or 43 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suspect - Injuries**

In 2016, both suspects involved in Head Strike incidents sustained injuries.

**Department Adjudication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing and Exhibiting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lethal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adjudication Data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.**

**Adjudication (Out of Policy)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing and Exhibiting</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lethal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CUOF Incidents - Head Strike**

The one Head Strike Tactics finding in 2015 was adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 67 percentage point increase compared to 33 percent of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings in 2014. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” findings from 2012 through 2014 of 25 percent, 2015 experienced a 75 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, findings of “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” accounted for the fewest number of Lethal force findings, with two of the five outcomes, or 40 percent.
In 2016, Department personnel were involved in four K9 Contact incidents, a decrease of one incident, or 20 percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 12 K9 Contact incidents, resulting in an annual average of three incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by one incident, or 33 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s four K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, originated from a radio call. When compared to the aggregate percentage of K9 Contact incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the second largest source category of K9 Contact incidents, accounting for six of the 16 total incidents, or 38 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s four K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, originated from a field detention based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a 10 percentage point decrease compared to 60 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of K9 Contact incidents resulting from observation stops from 2012 through 2015 of 42 percent, 2016 experienced an eight percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, observation stops represented the largest source category of K9 Contact incidents, accounting for seven of the 16 total incidents, or 44 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which represented no change compared to 2015. Twenty-five percent of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - four; Central Bureau - one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, four K9 Contact incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The Central Bureau count for 2016 represented no change compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average.

In 2016, none of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographical area of South Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 100 percent, compared to 2015.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, four K9 Contact incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The South Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by one incident, or 100 percent.

In 2016, two of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, which was an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2015. Fifty percent of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department – four; West Bureau – two).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, two of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.5 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 1.5 incidents, or 300 percent.
In 2016, none of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was a decrease of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2015.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, one K9 Contact incident occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.25 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.25 incidents, or 100 percent.

In 2016, one of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, which was an increase of one incident compared to zero 2015. Twenty-five percent of the Department’s K9 Contact incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department – four; Outside Jurisdiction – one).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, one K9 Contact incident occurred in an area outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of 0.25 incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 0.75 incidents, or 300 percent.

In 2016, three of the four K9 Contact incidents, representing 75 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while the other incident, or 25 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

During the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, seven of the 12 K9 Contact incidents, or 58 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while five incidents, or 42 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

In 2016, two of the four K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, occurred on a Wednesday. The other two incidents occurred on a Tuesday and a Saturday, or 25 percent, respectively. Based on data for the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for K9 Contact incidents.

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, K9 Contact deployment criteria BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the K9 Contact incident.

In 2016, the four officers involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 100 percent, were male. This represented no percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in K9 Contact incidents in 2016 was 18 percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 100 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, all officers involved in K9 Contact incidents were male, representing 100 percent of the 16 total involved employees.
In 2016, four White officers were involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 100 percent, were assigned to Metropolitan Division. From 2012 through 2016, all of the employees involved in K9 Contact incidents were assigned to Metropolitan Division.

When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 83 percent, 2016 experienced a 33 percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 17 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. From 2012 through 2016, all of the employees involved in K9 Contact incidents were at the rank of police officer.

In 2016, two officers involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, were within the 11-20 years of service category. From 2012 through 2015, 12 of the 16 total involved personnel, or 75 percent, were within the 11-20 years of service category. In 2016, two officers involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, had more than 20 years of service. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel with more than 20 years of service from 2012 through 2015 of 17 percent, 2016 experienced a 33 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, four of the 16 total involved personnel, or 25 percent, had more than 20 years of service.
OFFICER - INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed during K9 Contact incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, four officers sustained injuries during K9 Contact incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2016, no officers sustained injuries during K9 Contact incidents. This accounted for a 100 percent decrease compared to three injured officers in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of one injured officer, 2016 was one injured officer below the four-year annual average.

SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during K9 Contact incidents.

SUSPECT - ETHNICITY

In 2016, all four suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents were Hispanic. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 50 percent, 2016 experienced a 50 percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Hispanics were the most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, accounting for 63 percent of the 16 total suspects.

During the same five-year period, White and Black suspects both accounted for two suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 13 percent, respectively.

SUSPECT - GENDER

In 2016, the four suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 100 percent, were male. This represented no percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 100 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, all suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents were male, representing 100 percent of the 16 total involved suspects.

SUSPECT - AGE

In 2016, two suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, were in the 24-29 age range. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 24-29 age range from 2012 through 2015 of eight percent, 2016 experienced a 42 percentage point increase. From 2012 through 2016, three of the 16 total suspects, or 19 percent, were within the 24-29 age range.

In 2016, two suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent, were in the 30-39 age range. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 30-39 age range from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced a 17 percentage point increase. From 2012 through 2016, suspects in the 30-39 age range represented the most suspects of any age category with six of the 16 total suspects, or 38 percent.

SUSPECT - PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2016, none of the four total suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for one of the 15 total suspects, or seven percent.

SUSPECT - GANG MEMBERSHIP

In 2016, three of the four total suspects, or 75 percent, involved in K9 Contact incidents were verified as documented gang members. This accounted for a 25 percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were documented as gang members from 2012 through 2015 of 40 percent, 2016 experienced a 35 percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, suspects who were documented as gang members accounted for seven of the 14 total suspects involved in K9 Contact incidents, or 50 percent.

The remaining suspect involved in a 2016 K9 Contact incident, representing 25 percent, was either not documented as gang member or had an unknown gang affiliation.
**Suspect - Homeless**

In 2016, two of the four total suspects, or 50 percent, involved in K9 Contact incidents were homeless.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suspect - Weapon/Force**

In 2016, two of the four involved suspects, representing 50 percent, utilized an unknown weapon type, while the other two suspects did not utilize a weapon. During the five-year period from 2012 through 2016, physical force accounted for the largest suspect weapon category with four out of 16 weapon types, or 25 percent. Three suspects, or 19 percent, utilized a weapon type designated as “Other,” while two suspects, or 13 percent, utilized a firearm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edged Weapon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Device</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replica/Pellet</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suspect - Injuries**

No suspects were killed during K9 Contact incidents during the five-year period from 2012 through 2016. However, 14 suspects sustained injuries during K9 Contact incidents during the same five-year period. Additionally, two K9 Contact incidents were classified as “Does Not Apply.”

In 2016, four suspects sustained injuries during K9 Contact incidents. This accounted for no change compared to four injured suspects in 2015. When compared to the 2012 through 2015 annual average of 2.5 injured suspects, 2016 was 1.5 injured suspects, or 60 percent, above the four-year annual average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Department Adjudication**

**Tactical Debrief/In-Policy**

(No Further Action)

**Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy**

(Administrative Disapproval)

Of the four K9 Contact incidents in 2015, no Tactics were adjudicated.

In 2015, all four of the K9 Contact incidents were adjudicated as “consistent with established criteria” for K9 contact.

In 2015, all four of the K9 Contact incidents were adjudicated as “consistent with established criteria” for post contact procedures.

---

**CUOF Incidents - K9 Contact**

The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Homeless</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.

---

31 The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

32 Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.
It is the policy of the Department that personnel may only use the amount of force that is “objectively reasonable” to defend themselves, defend others, effect an arrest or detention, prevent escape, or overcome resistance.
An incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses a less-lethal control device or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee’s direction; overcome resistance of a person during an arrest or a detention; or, defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person (2016 LAPD Manual 4/245.05).

In 2016, Department personnel were involved in 1,925 NCUOF incidents, an increase of 100 incidents, or five percent, compared to 2015. In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 7,252 NCUOF incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1,813 incidents. The 2016 count exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 112 incidents, or six percent.

In 2016, 1,790 NCUOF incidents were Level II occurrences, which represented 93 percent of the 1,925 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 91 percent in 2015. Similarly, when compared to the aggregate percentage of Level II NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 91 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of NCUOF incidents were Level II occurrences, representing 8,369 of the 9,177 total incidents, or 91 percent.

In 2016, 135 NCUOF incidents were Level I occurrences, which represented seven percent of the 1,925 total incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to nine percent in 2015. Similarly, when compared to the aggregate percentage of Level I NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of nine percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 808 NCUOF incidents were Level I occurrences, which represented nine percent of the 9,177 total incidents.
**2016 Use of Force Year-End Review Los Angeles Police Department**

In 2016, TASERs were utilized in 573, or 30 percent, of the 1,925 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of TASER usage during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 21 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point increase.

In 2016, batons were utilized in 39, or two percent, of the 1,925 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2015. Similarly, when compared to the aggregate percentage of baton utilization during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of three percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point decrease.

In 2016, OC spray was utilized in 55, or three percent, of the 1,925 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to five percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of OC spray utilization during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of six percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point decrease.

In 2015, compared to the aggregate percentage of Strikes/Kicks/Punches utilized during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 29 percent, 2016 experienced an 11 percentage point decrease.

In 2016, Department personnel activated a TASER device 1,330 times during 573 NCUOF incidents in which TASERs were utilized, resulting in average of 2.32 activations per incident. This accounted for the four-year average by 0.25 activations per incident, or 12 percent.

In 2016, TASER activations were effective 768 times during NCUOF incidents, which represented 58 percent of the 1,330 total activations. This accounted for a five percentage point increase compared to 53 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of effective TASER activations from 2012 through 2015 of 60 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, TASER activations were effective 2,863 times out of the 4,838 total activations, or 59 percent.
In 2016, 1,068 of the Department’s 1,925 NCUOF incidents, or 55 percent, originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. This represented no change when compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of NCUOF incidents resulting from radio calls from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a four percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, radio calls represented the largest source category of NCUOF incidents, accounting for 4,779 of the 9,177 total incidents, or 52 percent.

In 2016, 547 of the Department’s 1,925 NCUOF incidents, or 28 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers’ observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 30 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of NCUOF incidents resulting from field detentions based on officers’ observations from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced a five percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, field detentions based on officers’ observations represented the second largest source category of NCUOF incidents, accounting for 2,960 of the 9,177 total incidents, or 32 percent.

The remaining 310 incidents, or 16 percent, in 2016 originated from citizen flag downs, station calls, and sources categorized as “Other.”

In 2016, 571 of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau, which was an increase of 17 incidents, or three percent, compared to 2015. Thirty percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department – 1,925; Central Bureau - 571).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 2,102 NCUOF incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 526 incidents. The Central Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 45 incidents, or approximately eight percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 1,840 NCUOF incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 460 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 77 incidents, or 17 percent.

In 2016, 326 of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred within the geographical area of West Bureau, which was a decrease of 24 incidents, or seven percent, compared to 2015. Seventeen percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department – 1,925; West Bureau - 326).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 1,303 NCUOF incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 326 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2016 represented no change when compared to the four-year annual average.
In 2016, 25 of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, an increase of six incidents, or 32 percent, compared to 2015. One percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department – 1,525; Valley Bureau - 466).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 1,912 NCUOF incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 478 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2016 fell below the 2012 through 2015 annual average by 12 incidents, or three percent.

In 2016, 466 of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, an increase of six incidents, or 32 percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-four percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the geographical area of Valley Bureau, which was an increase of 37 incidents, or nine percent, compared to 2015. Twenty-four percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, an increase of six incidents, or three percent.

In 2016, May represented the month with the most NCUOF incidents with 193 occurrences, or 10 percent, out of 1,925 total incidents for the year. The remaining 1,732 incidents, or 90 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining 11 months of the year.

From 2012 through 2016, March represented the month with the most NCUOF incidents with 849 out of the 9,177 total occurrences, or nine percent. The month of May represented the second most frequent month during the same five-year period with 815 incidents, or nine percent. The remaining 7,513 incidents, or 82 percent, were fairly evenly distributed throughout the remaining 50 months.

The NCUOF percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2012 through 2016 was as follows:
- January through March: 2,317 incidents, or 25 percent;
- April through June: 2,331 incidents, or 25 percent;
- July through September: 2,334 incidents; or 25 percent; and,
- October through December: 2,195 incidents, or 24 percent.

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 95 NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of 24 incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by one incident, or four percent.

In 2016, 25 of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred outside the Department’s jurisdiction, an increase of six incidents, or 32 percent, compared to 2015. One percent of the Department’s NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction (Department – 1,525; Outside Areas - 25).

In the four-year period from 2012 through 2015, 95 NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside the Department’s jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of 24 incidents. The total incident count for outside areas in 2016 exceeded the 2012 through 2015 annual average by one incident, or four percent.
In 2016, 301 NCUOF incidents, or 16 percent, occurred on a Saturday. Wednesday was the second most frequent day of the week with 293 incidents, or 15 percent.

In 2016, 6,087 Department personnel were involved in the 1,925 NCUOF occurrences throughout the year, resulting in an average of 3.2 officers per incident. This accounted for a three percentage point increase compared to an average of 3.1 officers per incident in 2015. When compared to the aggregate annual average of officers per incident from 2012 through 2015 of 2.8, 2016 experienced a 14 percent increase.

In 2016, 645 female officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 11 percent of the 6,067 total involved employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 10 percent in 2015. The percentage of female officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 90 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were male, representing 24,036 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 90 percent.

In 2016, 5,442 male officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 89 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 90 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points below the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 90 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were male, representing 24,036 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 90 percent.

In 2016, 5,442 male officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 89 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 90 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points below the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 90 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were male, representing 24,036 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 90 percent.

In 2016, 5,442 male officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 89 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 90 percent in 2015. The percentage of male officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points below the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 90 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were male, representing 24,036 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 90 percent.

In 2016, 301 NCUOF incidents, or 16 percent, occurred on a Saturday. Wednesday was the second most frequent day of the week with 293 incidents, or 15 percent.
In 2016, 3,216 Hispanic officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 53 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was seven percentage points above the Department’s overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Hispanic officers accounted for the third highest ethnic category of involved Department personnel in NCUOF incidents, representing 2,380 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or nine percent.

In 2016, 399 Black officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented seven percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015. The percentage of Black officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was three percentage points below the Department’s overall Black total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2012 through 2015 of seven percent, 2016 represented no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Black officers accounted for the fourth highest ethnic category of involved Department personnel in NCUOF incidents, representing 1,874 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or seven percent.

The remaining 55 employees, or less than one percent, involved in 2016 NCUOF incidents included 22 American Indian personnel and 33 personnel with an “Other” ethnic classification.

When compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents at the rank of police officer from 2012 through 2015 of 88 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of employees involved in NCUOF incidents were at the rank of police officer, representing 23,361 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 87 percent.

In 2016, 559 employees at the rank of sergeant were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented nine percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to eight percent in 2015. The percentage of sergeants involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the Department’s overall sergeant total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in NCUOF incident at the rank of sergeant from 2012 through 2015 of seven percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the sergeant category was the second largest category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 2,007 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or eight percent.

In 2016, 174 employees at the rank of detention officer were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented three percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This remained consistent when compared to 2015, as well as with the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in NCUOF incident at the rank of detention officer from 2012 through 2015. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, detention officers was the third largest category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 730 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or three percent.

In 2016, 1,885 White officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 31 percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented no change when compared to 2015. The percentage of White officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was two percentage points below the Department’s overall White total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of eight percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2012 through 2015 of 51 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, White officers accounted for the majority of employees involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 8,632 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 32 percent.

In 2016, 532 Asian officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented nine percent of the 6,087 total involved employees. This represented a one percentage point increase when compared to eight percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Asian personnel from 2012 through 2015 of nine percent, 2016 represented no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, Asian officers accounted for the second highest ethnic category of involved Department personnel in NCUOF incidents, representing 3,805 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 14 percent.

In 2016, 4,596 employees assigned to patrol were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 76 percent of the 6,087 total personnel. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 74 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2012 through 2015 of 76 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were assigned to patrol, representing 20,348 of the 26,714 total involved employees, or 76 percent.

In 2016, 813 employees assigned to specialized assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 6,087 total personnel. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 12 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to specialized assignments from 2012 through 2015 of 12 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2015, 3,270 personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 12 percent of the 26,714 total involved employees.

In 2016, 332 employees assigned to custody assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented five percent of the 6,087 total personnel. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to seven percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to custody assignments from 2012 through 2015 of five percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 1,396 personnel assigned to custody assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, representing five percent of the 26,714 total involved employees.

The remaining 346 employees, or six percent, involved in 2016 NCUOF incidents included 178 administrative personnel, 98 investigative personnel, three reserve officers, 66 traffic enforcement officers, and one employee with an “Other” assignment classification.
In 2016, 632 Department personnel sustained injuries during the 1,925 NCUOF incidents throughout the year, which represented 10 percent of the 6,087 total personnel. This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 12 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel who sustained injuries during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 13 percent, 2016 experienced a three percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 3,256 employees.

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied NCUOF against.

In 2016, 632 Department personnel sustained injuries, involved personnel in NCUOF incidents sustained injuries, which represented 1,472 of the 9,537 total suspects, representing 12 percent of the 26,714 total involved employees. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel who sustained injuries from 2012 through 2015 of 86 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 86 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 45 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease compared to 45 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the City’s overall Hispanic population total. However, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point change. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 4,265 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 45 percent.

In 2016, 752 Black suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 38 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This accounted for a four percentage point increase compared to 34 percent in 2015. The percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was 29 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 34 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was 29 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 34 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 4,265 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 45 percent.

In 2016, 891 Hispanic suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 45 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 46 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points below the City’s overall Hispanic population total. However, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 34 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was 29 percentage points above the City’s overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was five percentage points below the City’s overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2015 of 16 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 34 percent in 2015. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was four percentage points above the City’s overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 4,265 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 45 percent.

In 2016, 270 White suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 14 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This accounted for a one percentage point decrease compared to 15 percent in 2015. The percentage of White suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was 14 percentage points below the City’s overall White population total. However, the percentage of White suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2016 was six percentage points above the City’s overall White violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 15 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the White category accounted for the third most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 1,472 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 15 percent.

The remaining 82 suspects, or four percent, involved in 2016 NCUOF incidents included two American Indians, 33 Asians, 43 suspects with an “Other” classification, and four suspects with an “Unknown” ethnic classification.

In 2016, 1,696 male suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 85 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This accounted for a one percentage point increase compared to 84 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 86 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, a majority of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were male, representing 8,166 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 86 percent.

In 2016, 295 female suspect were involved in an NCUOF incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This represented no percentage point change when compared to 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female suspects from 2012 through 2015 of 14 percent, 2016 experienced a one percentage point increase. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 1,341 female suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 14 percent of the 9,537 total suspects.
In 2016, the 23-27 age group was the largest category of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 43% of the 1,995 total suspects, or 22 percent. The 23-27 age category percentage was consistent when compared to 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 23-27 age range from 2012 through 2015, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects, 21 percent.

In 2016, 863 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 43 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.  This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 21 percent, 2016 experienced a six percentage point increase.  Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 2,118 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis, representing 22 percent of the 9,537 total suspects.

In 2016, 541 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 27 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.  This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease.  Historically, from 2012 through 2016, the 28-32 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 1,887 of the 9,537 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2016, 541 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 27 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.  This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2012 through 2015 of 20 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease compared to 45 percent in 2015.

In 2016, 863 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 43 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol.  This accounted for a two percentage point decrease compared to 45 percent in 2015.  When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects who were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol from 2012 through 2015 of 33 percent, 2016 experienced no percentage point change.  Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 4,103 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol, representing 43 percent of the 9,537 total suspects.
In 2016, 503 of the 1,995 total suspects, or 25 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be homeless. This accounted for a two percentage point increase compared to 23 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved NCUOF suspects who were perceived to be homeless from 2012 through 2015 of 18 percent, 2016 experienced a seven percentage point increase. Historically from 2012 through 2016, 1,876 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be homeless, representing 20 percent of the 9,537 total suspects.

In 2016, 1,697 suspects sustained injuries during the 1,925 NCUOF incidents throughout the year, which represented 85 percent of the 1,995 total suspects. This represented a two percentage point decrease compared to 87 percent in 2015. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who sustained injuries during NCUOF incidents from 2012 through 2015 of 87 percent, 2016 experienced a two percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2012 through 2016, 8,287 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents sustained injuries, representing 87 percent of the 9,537 total involved suspects.

In 2015, 5,542 out of the 5,590 total NCUOF Tactics findings, representing 99 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Approval.” This was consistent with the Tactics findings for 2014, and also when compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Approval” findings from 2013 through 2014 of 99 percent. Historically from 2013 through 2015, a vast majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in an “Administrative Approval” outcome, representing 15,650 of the 15,772 total Tactics findings, or 99 percent.

In 2015, 48 out of the 5,590 total NCUOF Tactics findings, representing one percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This was consistent with the Tactics findings for 2014, and also when compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2013 through 2014 of one percent. Historically from 2013 through 2015, 122 of the 15,772 total Tactics findings, representing one percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” finding.

Adjudication data for 2016 was omitted from this Report since a vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2017.

**Use of Force - In Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administrative Approval</th>
<th>No Action</th>
<th>Non-Disciplinary Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5,012</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Use of Force - Out of Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Administrative Disapproval</th>
<th>Non-Disciplinary Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Department Adjudication**

- **Tactics**
  - *Admin. Approval*
  - *No Action*
  - *Non-Disciplinary Action*

- **Use of Force - In Policy**
  - *Administrative Approval*
  - *No Action*
  - *Non-Disciplinary Action*

- **Use of Force - Out of Policy**
  - *Administrative Disapproval*
  - *Non-Disciplinary Action*
In 2015, 14,839 out of the 14,870 total NCUOF Force findings, representing over 99 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Approval.” This was consistent with the Force findings for 2014, and also when compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Approval” findings from 2013 through 2014 of over 99 percent. Historically from 2013 through 2015, a vast majority of adjudicated Force findings resulted in an “Administrative Approval” outcome, representing 41,853 of the 41,926 total Force findings, or over 99 percent.

In 2015, 31 out of the 14,870 total NCUOF Force findings, representing less than one percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This was consistent with the Force findings for 2014, and also when compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2013 through 2014 of less than one percent. Historically from 2013 through 2015, 73 of the 41,926 total Force findings, representing less than one percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” finding.
F001-12: JANUARY 1, 2012
A uniformed sergeant observed the suspect standing next to a utility pole in an alley. As the sergeant drove closer, he observed the suspect raise his right hand and point a pistol at him. The sergeant then heard a gunshot and observed muzzle flash emanating from the suspect. The sergeant exited his police vehicle and observed the suspect begin to rapidly walk away from him while holding a handgun. The sergeant ordered the suspect to drop the handgun, which he failed to do. The suspect pointed the gun at the sergeant, resulting in an OIS.

F002-12: JANUARY 1, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a screaming man. Upon arrival, the officers knocked on the door and identified themselves as police officers. The suspect told the officers to go away and stated he was going to hurt somebody. The officers, in fear the suspect would harm himself or other individuals, forced entry into the apartment. The suspect pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F003-12: JANUARY 4, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to an apartment in an attempt to locate an assault with a deadly weapon suspect. Upon knocking at the location, the officers were met by a resident of the apartment. The officers asked the resident if the suspect was inside the residence. The resident told them that the suspect was inside and gave the officers permission to enter. The officers entered and observed the suspect standing against a corner wall in the living room. Officers ordered the suspect to place his hands behind his head; however, the suspect ignored the officers’ commands and produced a knife. The officers ordered him to drop the knife, but the suspect refused to obey commands and advanced towards them, resulting in an OIS.

F004-12: JANUARY 5, 2012
Uniformed officers observed a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. While attempting to stop the vehicle, officers observed the suspect open the front passenger door and exit the vehicle armed with a shotgun. The suspect pointed the shotgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.
F005-12: JANUARY 7, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon investigation. Officers arrived at the location and approached the residence on foot. The officers observed the suspect exit the residence and begin walking through the front yard. Officers gave the suspect several commands to stop, but he refused to comply, removed a handgun from his waistband and fired two rounds at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F006-12: JANUARY 17, 2012
While conducting surveillance, plainclothes officers observed a vehicle pull alongside their vehicle and come to a stop. The officers observed the suspect exit the vehicle, remove a handgun from his waistband and point it at them, resulting in an OIS.

F007-12: JANUARY 22, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male with a possible mental illness. The officers met with the PR, who told them that the suspect had assaulted her and directed the officers to the suspect, who was inside the residence in his bedroom. The officers contacted the suspect and ordered him to step out of the bedroom. The suspect ignored the officers' commands, reached into a dresser, and retrieved a handgun. The officers redeployed to the front of the residence and the suspect followed them with the gun. Officers ordered the suspect to drop the gun; however, he refused and continued to walk toward the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F010-12: FEBRUARY 23, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a carjacking. Additional uniformed officers observed the stolen vehicle being driven by the suspect and a vehicle pursuit was initiated. The pursuit terminated at a gas station when the suspect stopped his vehicle alongside another uninvolved vehicle. The suspect pointed a handgun at a customer, resulting in an OIS.

F011-12: MARCH 1, 2012
Plainclothes officers were conducting a multi-agency surveillance of a residence to apprehend a murder suspect. The suspect became aware of the officers presence and fled from the rear of the residence. The suspect failed to comply with officers' commands, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

F012-12: MARCH 2, 2012
Uniformed officers observed a suspect commit traffic violations while riding a bicycle. The officers attempted to stop the suspect, but he ignored the officers' commands to stop and fled on his bicycle. The officers followed in their vehicle and observed the suspect dismount the bike and begin to rapidly walk away from them. The suspect drew a semi-automatic pistol from his waistband and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F017-12: MARCH 21, 2012
Plainclothes officers heard a crime broadcast of a robbery and had a clear view of the crime location from their position. The officers monitored the location and observed the suspect exit the business carrying a trash bag over his shoulder with one hand, while holding his other hand near his front waistband area. The suspect then ran toward the restaurant where officers were located. Both officers took cover behind a nearby door frame, identified themselves as police officers and ordered the suspect to stop. The suspect fled, which prompted a short foot pursuit. The officers broadcast the information and a perimeter was established after the suspect temporarily evaded capture. The suspect emerged from the perimeter holding a handgun and pointed it at officers, resulting in an OIS.

F018-12: MARCH 24, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a call regarding a "415 man with a knife" at a residence. The PR reported that his family member, later identified as the suspect, was armed with a knife and broke down the front door of the residence. The officers' investigation determined that the suspect had threatened family members with the knife and had barricaded himself inside the residence with a handgun. A perimeter was established and notifications were made to Metropolitan Division. As officers at scene awaited the arrival of Metropolitan Division resources, the suspect exited the residence armed with a handgun and an OIS ensued.
Uniformed officers observed a vehicle fail to stop at a red phase tri-light signal. Officers pulled behind the vehicle and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The suspect failed to yield and a vehicle pursuit was initiated, wherein multiple units responded to the back-up. As the pursuit terminated, the suspect exited from the front passenger door of his vehicle and fled on foot. While running from pursuing officers, the suspect turned, raised his arms into a shooting position and simulated a firearm at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

Plainclothes officers in an undercover vehicle were monitoring an area where they believed a robbery was about to occur. The officers heard gunshots emanating from behind them and observed two males, later identified as the suspects, armed with handguns and firing in an easterly direction at unknown targets. The suspects fled the location and entered a nearby apartment complex. While following the suspects on foot, the officers observed both suspects point their firearms at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers observed a known gang member, later identified as the suspect, walking with another male and a female. The suspect made eye contact with the officers and grabbed his waistband. Believing he was armed, the officers negotiated a U-turn and observed the butt of a handgun in the suspect’s waistband. As the officers exited their vehicle, the suspect removed the handgun from his waistband and pointed it at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers observed a vehicle occupied by two males, later identified as the suspect and an additional individual, negotiate a right turn without signaling, then pull to the curb. The officers pulled behind the vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. The officers conducted a vehicle check, which revealed that the vehicle was reported stolen. The suspect, who was the driver, pulled away from the curb before the officers could take any action. The suspect then suddenly stopped the car and ran from the officers. One officer pursued the suspect while the other remained at the scene where the vehicle had stopped and took the other occupant into custody. During the foot pursuit, the suspect verbally threatened the pursuing officer that he was going to kill him and reached into his waistband, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was later apprehended.

Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call regarding an attempted suicide. Upon the officers’ arrival, the suspect threatened to shoot himself. The suspect refused to comply with officers’ commands and, while out on the balcony, fired a handgun at a LAPD helicopter, resulting in an OIS.

A firearm was recovered at the crime scene. However, TID did not provide a photograph of the weapon.
F043-12: JUNE 17, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call at a residence wherein the parents of the suspect demanded that he be removed from the property. Upon their arrival, officers made contact with the suspect and observed that he was armed with multiple knives. The suspect then cut his wrists and throat and advanced toward one of the officers while still armed with the knives, resulting in an OIS.

F046-12: JULY 19, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call regarding a battery investigation. The officers arrived and were directed to the suspect, who was located inside a locked bedroom. The officers attempted to make contact with the suspect, who opened the bedroom door but immediately closed it. The officers forced entry into the bedroom and observed the suspect produce a handgun and point it at them, resulting in an OIS.

F058-12: SEPTEMBER 3, 2012
Uniformed officers observed a large group of people running toward them. Moments later, the officers heard gunshots and observed a male suspect pointing a gun at an unknown victim, resulting in an OIS.

F060-12: SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle driven by an armed suspect. During the pursuit, the suspect drove through a red phase tri-light signal and collided with another vehicle, bringing both vehicles to a stop. The suspect exited his vehicle armed with an AK-47 rifle and pointed it at officers, resulting in an OIS. An AK-47 (no photo available) and a pistol were recovered.

F062-12: SEPTEMBER 26, 2012
While off-duty and at his residence, an officer was awoken when the suspect entered the bedroom from a sliding glass door. In fear for his safety and the safety of his family, the officer attempted to detain the suspect pending the arrival of local law enforcement. The suspect fled on foot and the officer pursued him, resulting in an altercation. During the altercation, the officer was able to arm himself with his Department issued firearm. The suspect ignored the officer's commands and attempted to disarm the officer, resulting in an OIS.

F067-12: OCTOBER 4, 2012
Uniformed officers observed four males in a parking lot drinking alcoholic beverages. The suspect, who was seated on a bicycle, began creating distance between himself and the officers. When officers ordered him to dismount the bicycle, the suspect dropped it and ran in an attempt to evade capture. A foot pursuit ensued, during which the suspect pointed a handgun at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F068-12: OCTOBER 6, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers responded to a LAFD help call for a man armed with a knife at a residence. The officers arrived and met with fire personnel inside the residence. Officers observed a female on the kitchen floor and a male suspect armed with a knife. The suspect failed to comply with the officers' commands and advanced toward the female with the knife in his hand, resulting in an OIS.

F069-12: OCTOBER 12, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers observed a known gang member spray painting gang graffiti on a wall. The gang member attempted to enter an awaiting vehicle, which was occupied by additional individuals, including the suspect. The officers detained all occupants of the vehicle and instructed them to take a position facing a wall. As officers were completing their search of the occupants, all fled on foot in separate directions, provoking a foot pursuit. Additional uniformed officers observed and ordered the suspect attempting to conceal himself under a parked vehicle. One officer grabbed the suspect by his ankles and attempted to pull him from beneath the vehicle. In doing so, he and an additional officer observed what they believed was a handgun in the suspect's hand, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.
F070-12: OCTOBER 17, 2012
Uniformed officers attempted to initiate a traffic stop on a vehicle, which contained two suspects. In the process of stopping the vehicle, both suspects fired at the officers. A brief vehicle pursuit ensued and terminated when officers rammed their patrol vehicle into the suspect vehicle, causing it to crash into a tree. The suspects were ordered to exit the vehicle, which they failed to do. One of the suspects pointed a gun at the other suspect’s head, resulting in an OIS.

F072-12: OCTOBER 18, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “415 man with a knife” at an apartment. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect in the apartment courtyard and ordered him to stop. The suspect turned toward one of the officers, reached inside his rear waistband area, and armed himself with a handgun. The suspect then pointed the handgun at the officer, resulting in an OIS.

F075-12: OCTOBER 30, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an attempted assault with a vehicle. Unbeknownst to the officers, the male suspect entered a market near the crime location and stole numerous items from the store. Upon their arrival, the officers observed the suspect running from the market through the parking lot while being chased by two market employees. One officer observed the suspect manipulating his waistband as he was running and a foot pursuit ensued. During the foot pursuit, the suspect entered a vehicle and attempted to run over one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect’s weapon was an automobile.

F079-12: NOVEMBER 15, 2012
Uniformed officers observed a known gang member and determined he was under the influence of a controlled substance. The officers initiated a pedestrian stop for further investigation. The suspect failed to comply with officers’ commands to put his hands up and fled on foot, provoking a foot pursuit. During the foot pursuit, the suspect produced a dark object from his waistband area and pointed it at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F082-12: NOVEMBER 24, 2012
Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call regarding a burglary investigation. Upon arrival, officers observed the suspect and attempted to detain him. In the process of doing so, the suspect armed himself with a wooden board and approached the officers. The suspect failed to comply with the officers’ commands and swung the board at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F083-12: DECEMBER 1, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an “ADW Suspect There Now.” Upon their arrival, the officers observed the suspect holding his girlfriend with a knife to her neck. Officers determined that the victim was in distress and ordered the suspect to drop the knife. The suspect refused and threatened to kill her, resulting in an OIS.

F085-12: DECEMBER 6, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a burglary in progress at an apartment. Upon their arrival, the officers met with the victim and observed that her right hand was bleeding. The victim stated that her ex-boyfriend, identified as the suspect, had cut her with a knife and was still in her apartment. The officers responded to the apartment and located the suspect inside. Officers observed the suspect holding the knife and ordered him to drop it. The suspect refused and lunged at one of the officers with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

A knife was recovered at the crime scene. However, TID did not provide a photograph of the weapon.

F086-12: DECEMBER 13, 2012
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect at a residence. Upon their arrival, the officers met with a female victim who had been assaulted by the suspect. The suspect subsequently barricaded himself in a bedroom and held two of his children hostage with a knife. SWAT was notified and responded to negotiate with the suspect. During the hostage rescue, SWAT officers made entry into the bedroom and confronted the suspect who was holding both children at knife-point, resulting in an OIS.
Uniformed officers were flagged down by a private security guard near an apartment complex. The security guard informed the officers that he had been threatened by the suspect, who was armed with a handgun. The suspect then fled the location on foot. A perimeter was established, the suspect’s location was identified and his movements were monitored. Officers observed the suspect attempt to enter a locked door, and a short foot pursuit ensued, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

During a New Year’s Eve gunfire suppression detail, uniformed officers heard the sound of gunfire. When they went to investigate, they observed the suspect shooting a rifle into the air. When ordered to drop the weapon, the suspect pointed the rifle at the officer, resulting in an OIS. The evaded capture which resulted in a foot pursuit. The rifle was discarded by the suspect and not recovered. However, multiple firearms were recovered as well as rifle magazines and ammunition.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a man armed with a knife. Upon arriving at the location, they contacted the suspect and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, the suspect attempted to disarm an officer, resulting in an OIS.

While off-duty, an officer became involved in a road rage incident. After believing he had evaded the suspect, the officer drove to his residence. The suspect appeared and struck the officer with his vehicle causing the officer to land on top of the vehicle. The suspect drove off with the officer on his vehicle, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect’s weapon was an automobile.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a man armed with a gun. Officers located the suspect, who then fled on foot. A perimeter was established and a search of the area was conducted. During the search, the suspect was located and given orders to surrender. The suspect pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was later apprehended.
Uniformed officers were assigned a protection detail outside the city of Los Angeles for a wanted murder suspect. A citizen approached the officers and pointed out the suspect’s vehicle. While officers were following the vehicle, the suspect stopped and exited his vehicle with a rifle and began shooting at them, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location after firing at the officers.

FID 012-13: FEBRUARY 8, 2013
Uniformed officers were assigned a protection detail outside the city of Los Angeles for a wanted murder suspect. Officers observed a vehicle approach the location driving erratically. Officers heard what they believed was gunfire coming from the vehicle, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an assault with a deadly weapon suspect armed with a handgun. Officers located the suspect who had his hands concealed inside a bag. The suspect approached the officers and stated he was going to kill them. The suspect refused to stop his advance and show his hands, resulting in an OIS.

FID 023-13: MARCH 8, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a man armed with a gun. Upon arrival, officers heard a victim yell that the suspect was armed and hurting her. Officers approached the residence and observed the suspect appear through window pointing a handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

Plainclothes officers were serving a search warrant at a residence. Upon identifying themselves, a suspect appeared holding a black object, which was pointed at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

FID 026-13: MARCH 16, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a robbery in progress. Upon arrival, the officers located the suspect inside a restaurant holding a handgun. The suspect exited the restaurant with the handgun and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 029-13: MARCH 9, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an assault with a deadly weapon. Upon arrival, they located the suspect who had an object concealed behind his back. The suspect yelled at the officers to kill him. The suspect fled, turned toward the officers, and pointed a silver object at them, resulting in an OIS.

FID 038-13: APRIL 29, 2013
Uniformed officers observed a vehicle driving erratically. Officers attempted to stop the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The pursuit left the city and terminated when the suspect crashed his vehicle and fled into a residence. The residence was surrounded and SWAT responded. SWAT officers asked for the suspect to surrender, which he refused to do. The suspect appeared with a handgun, pointed it at the officers, and an OIS ensued.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.
Plainclothes officers in different vehicles were returning to Central Facilities. They were stopped in traffic when they each observed a suspect emerge from a business firing a handgun into the establishment, resulting in an OIS.

Plainclothes officers working a task force observed a vehicle being driven erratically and requested uniformed officers conduct a traffic stop. Upon conducting the traffic stop, officers observed the suspect emerge from the vehicle armed with an assault weapon. The suspect pointed the rifle at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio of a burglary suspect. Upon arrival, they observed the suspect on a second story balcony holding a handgun. The suspect pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of an attempted suicide. Upon arrival, they observed a suspect armed with two knives. The suspect charged at the officers with the knives, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers attempted to initiate a consensual encounter on a pedestrian. While doing so, the suspect began running with his hand on his waistband. The officers followed the suspect on foot, and observed him remove a handgun from his waistband. The suspect pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a violent male with a possible mental illness. Upon arrival, they located the suspect inside of his residence armed with two knives. The suspect raised the knives and charged toward the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Plainclothes officers observed a suspect on a bicycle commit several vehicle code violations and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. When the officers attempted to stop the suspect, he fled on the bicycle. The suspect then abandoned the bicycle and ran on foot. The suspect produced a handgun and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Plainclothes detectives were returning to their Division and were stopped at the front gate entrance in their vehicle. The suspect approached their vehicle and began firing an unknown weapon at them, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.
vided a photograph of the weapon.

FID 069-13, JULY 28, 2013
Uniformed officers were stopped in traffic when the suspect walked past them holding a shotgun. When the officers directed him to drop the weapon, the suspect turned and pointed the shotgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.
FID 070-13: JULY 31, 2013
Uniformed officers observed a suspect acting irrationally and dressed in heavy clothing during hot weather. Officers made contact with the suspect, who assumed a shooting stance and pointed an unknown object at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a man with a gun. Upon arrival, they observed the suspect seated on a residential porch. The suspect produced a handgun and fired at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 078-13: AUGUST 20, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a shooting in progress. Upon arrival, they located the suspect who was in possession of a handgun. When the officers ordered him to drop the handgun, he turned and pointed it at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers observed a known gang member standing on the sidewalk. Upon attempting to make contact with him, he ran from the officers. The suspect stopped and pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 083-13: SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a shooting that had just occurred. Upon arrival at a business, the officers observed the suspect pointing a revolver at a victim. The officers attempted to make contact with the suspect, who then pointed the revolver at them, resulting in an OIS.

FID 085-13: SEPTEMBER 13, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a man armed with a gun. Upon arrival, they observed the suspect seated near a food truck holding a revolver. When they ordered him to drop the gun, he pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 088-13: OCTOBER 11, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an assault with a deadly suspect who was inside a camper parked in the driveway. The officers attempted to persuade the suspect to exit the camper, which he failed to do. The officers then used a pry tool to breech the camper door. While doing so, the suspect exited the camper armed with a hammer. The suspect raised the hammer at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a woman armed with a knife. Officers arrived and were directed to her apartment. While attempting to verbalize with her, the suspect charged the officers with a knife, resulting in an OIS.
2013

FID 091-13: OCTOBER 26, 2013
Uniformed officers were providing extra patrol in a housing project when they were flagged down by citizens. As they approached the citizens, they pointed toward a group of men, one of whom was in possession of a handgun. The suspect ran away, then turned towards the officers and pointed the handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers observed a known gang member standing on a street corner and decided to initiate a consensual encounter. As they approached, the suspect fled while holding his waistband. As the officers pursued him, he removed a revolver from his waistband and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 094-13: NOVEMBER 11, 2013
Plainclothes officers received information regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect. During a surveillance of the suspect’s residence, they observed him leave in a vehicle with two other individuals. The officers followed the suspect vehicle and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. The suspect exited the vehicle and ran from the officers. During a foot pursuit, the suspect pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

FID 095-13: NOVEMBER 17, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon. After speaking to the victim, the officers responded to the suspect’s residence, where they observed him on the balcony. The suspect pointed a shotgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

FID 097-13: NOVEMBER 22, 2013
Uniformed officers responded to a radio of a man armed with a gun. Upon arrival, they observed the suspect and made contact with him. The suspect drew a handgun from his waistband and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of shots fired at a residence. Upon arrival, the officers surrounded the location and attempted to convince the suspect to exit. The suspect refused and was observed to be in possession of a rifle. While awaiting the arrival of SWAT, the suspect pointed the rifle at the officers, resulting in an OIS. A pistol and rifle were recovered.

FID 101-13: DECEMBER 13, 2013
Officers observed a vehicle driving at a high rate of speed. When they attempted to stop the vehicle, a pursuit ensued. The suspect became involved in a traffic collision, after which he exited the vehicle and began walking towards the rear of the vehicle. A beanbag shotgun was deployed at the suspect and an OIS ensued. There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a robbery that had just occurred. After completing a report, the officers observed the suspect’s vehicle in the parking lot of a convenience store. While officers attempted to detain the occupants of the vehicle, the suspect pointed an unknown object at them, resulting in an OIS. There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was later apprehended.
**FID 104-13: DECEMBER 27, 2013**
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a man armed with a gun at a residence. While searching the backyard of the location, the suspect exited the detached garage armed with a handgun. The suspect pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

**F003-14: JANUARY 14, 2014**
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a robbery investigation at a business. Utilizing the tracking feature on the victim’s cell phone, officers tracked the suspect’s movements and verified his whereabouts. A foot pursuit ensued and the suspect entered a residence at gunpoint, resulting in an extensive standoff with numerous Department resources. At one point, the suspect emerged from the residence and pointed the handgun at an officer, resulting in an OIS. 

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

**F004-14: JANUARY 15, 2014**
Uniformed officers responded to an assault with a deadly weapon/domestic violence radio call at a residence. Upon their arrival, officers heard a single gunshot emanating from the residence. Officers located the suspect and a foot pursuit ensued. During the foot pursuit, an OIS occurred.

**F008-14: MARCH 6, 2014**
Plainclothes officers contacted a suspicious male and observed a handgun in his front waistband. The suspect failed to comply with officers’ commands and removed the handgun from his waistband, resulting in an OIS.

A firearm was recovered at the crime scene. However, TID did not provide a photograph of the weapon.

**F009-14: MARCH 24, 2014**
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a man armed with a knife and threatening to harm a female victim inside a residence. A LAPD helicopter arrived at scene before patrol officers. Personnel in the airship observed the suspect armed with a shotgun and information was broadcast to the responding units. Patrol officers arrived at scene and began formulating a tactical plan. While on the perimeter, the suspect emerged from the residence and pointed the shotgun at officers, resulting in an OIS.

A firearm was recovered at the crime scene. However, TID did not provide a photograph of the weapon.
F014-14: APRIL 4, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male armed with a knife who was attempting suicide. After using less-lethal force to effect the arrest of the suspect, which had no effect, the suspect charged at the officers with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

F016-14: APRIL 7, 2014
Two uniformed officers assigned to the front desk at a community police station observed a male, later identified as the suspect, enter the front lobby area. The suspect reached into his waistband, removed a handgun, and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F017-14: APRIL 13, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect armed with a knife inside a business. Officers arrived at the scene and observed the suspect walking away from the location. After ordering him to stop, the suspect removed a knife from a bag and charged at one of the officers with the knife raised above his head, resulting in an OIS.

F018-14: APRIL 21, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a possible assault with a deadly weapon suspect at a parking structure. A police sergeant assisted the responding officers and was the first to arrive at the scene. The sergeant made contact with the suspect, who emerged from behind a pillar holding a box cutter in his hand. After failing to comply with commands, the suspect began swinging the box cutter at the sergeant. The sergeant then utilized less-lethal force, which had no effect on the suspect and caused him to more aggressively and intently slash at the sergeant, resulting in an OIS.

F019-14: APRIL 24, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect armed with a machete in front of a residence. A police helicopter arrived over the scene and observed the suspect running from the location and into a nearby business. Officers deployed into the business and made contact with the suspect, who they verified was armed with a sword. Officers utilized less-lethal force against the suspect, which had no effect. The suspect then charged at the officers with the sword, resulting in an OIS.

F024-14: MAY 12, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a group fighting at a major entertainment venue. As officers arrived at the location, they observed a large group of individuals fighting and then heard gunfire. Officers tactically deployed along a planter and observed a suspect crouched in a shooting position while holding a handgun. The suspect pointed the handgun in the direction of an oncoming crowd of people running, resulting in an OIS.

F027-14: MAY 17, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect at a residence. Officers arrived and made contact with the person reporting. As they continued talking to the PR, large rocks were thrown at their police vehicle. Officers requested back-up and additional resources arrived at the scene. A male suspect then emerged and ran toward the officers holding a kitchen knife while making slashing motions at them with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

F033-14: JUNE 25, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a shooting in progress at a business. A perimeter was established after officers verified the suspect’s last known location. While conducting a search of the area, a police K-9 located the suspect and commands were given to the suspect to surrender. Officers observed a handgun near the suspect, which he gained possession of, resulting in an OIS.
2016 Use of Force Year-End Review
Los Angeles Police Department

2014

F038-14: JULY 13, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a burglary alarm activation at a business. As the officers were preparing to search the location, one officer observed a male suspect arm himself with a rifle and point it at him, resulting in an OIS.

F041-14: JULY 25, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a vandalism suspect at a residence. Upon their arrival, officers observed a male suspect holding two metal poles in his right hand and screaming. The officers gave the suspect numerous commands to drop the poles, which he failed to do. Officers then utilized less-lethal force against the suspect, which had no effect. The suspect advanced towards one of the officers with the metal poles, resulting in an OIS.

F042-14: JULY 30, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a shooting involving an off-duty law enforcement employee, which also involved a kidnapping. The suspect entered a vehicle and pointed a handgun at a female occupant, who was forced to remain inside the vehicle as the suspect fled the location. Officers located the vehicle and a vehicle pursuit ensued. At one point, the suspect stopped, exited his vehicle, and pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F047-14: AUGUST 11, 2014
Uniformed officers attempted to detain a male suspect regarding a narcotics investigation. As one officer approached the suspect, he immediately turned towards the officer and a physical altercation ensued. During the altercation, the suspect attempted to remove the officer’s service pistol from his holster, resulting in an OIS.

F049-14: AUGUST 12, 2014
While monitoring a location for narcotics activity, plainclothes officers observed a narcotic transaction. Officers attempted to detain the suspect who sold the item; however, he fled from the location. Officers searched the area and encountered the suspect, who again fled from the officers, provoking a foot pursuit. A physical altercation ensued with the suspect, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect used physical force against the officer.

F052-14: AUGUST 17, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a violent male with a mental condition at a residence. Upon arrival, officers observed the suspect in the rear of the location armed with a shotgun. Officers ordered the suspect numerous times to drop the shotgun; however, their efforts were ineffective. The suspect then charged at the officers with the shotgun, resulting in an OIS.

F053-14: AUGUST 18, 2014
Uniformed officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop after observing the occupant driving reckless. The driver failed to yield and a vehicle pursuit was initiated. At one point, the vehicle suddenly stopped and the front passenger exited the vehicle armed with an assault rifle and fired at officers, resulting in an OIS. The suspects continued fleeing, after which the vehicle collided into a building and the suspects fled on foot. As the suspects continued running, the front passenger again fired at officers with the rifle, resulting in a second OIS. Both suspects temporarily evaded capture and a perimeter was established. SWAT arrived at the scene and initiated a search of the area. The driver was subsequently located and taken into custody. While continuing with their search for the passenger, SWAT officers observed him emerge from behind a parked vehicle and begin firing at them with the rifle, resulting in a third OIS.

F054-14: SEPTEMBER 8, 2014
Uniformed officers responded to a domestic violence radio call at a residence. Upon their arrival, officers heard arguing emanating from the porch area of the residence. As the officers approached, they heard gunshots and a woman screaming. Additionally, they observed muzzle flashes coming from the silhouette of the suspect, who was standing on the front porch. The suspect began shooting into the house and then pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect attempted to disarm the officer.

OIS Synopses & Photographs of Weapons

F038-14: REPLICA/PELLET/BB
F041-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F042-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F047-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F049-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F052-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F053-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
F054-14: NO PHOTO AVAILABLE
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a man armed with a gun in front of a hospital. Upon their arrival, the officers observed the suspect pointing a handgun at motorists and followed him on foot while attempting to communicate with him. In the course of doing so, the suspect pointed his handgun at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding shots fired at a residence. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect leaving the location on foot. Officers initiated a foot pursuit, during which the suspect removed a handgun from his waistband and an OIS ensued. The suspect fled into the neighborhood and a perimeter was established. Metropolitan Division K-9 and SWAT personnel arrived at scene and conducted a search of the area. During the search, officers located the suspect and gave him numerous commands to surrender. The suspect refused and a K-9 was released, which resulted in a K-9 contact with the suspect. As the K-9 continued biting onto the suspect, he removed the pistol from his front waistband area and shot himself in the head.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male stabbing himself with a knife. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect walking on a nearby sidewalk and saw blood on his T-shirt, hands, and neck area. Officers also observed a black knife in his right hand. The officers ordered the suspect to drop the knife numerous times; however, he ignored their commands and continued cutting and stabbing himself. As officers continued following the suspect on foot, he suddenly turned towards the officers and began to advance toward them with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male stabbing himself with a knife. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect walking on a nearby sidewalk and saw blood on his T-shirt, hands, and neck area. Officers also observed a black knife in his right hand. The officers ordered the suspect to drop the knife numerous times; however, he ignored their commands and continued cutting and stabbing himself. As officers continued following the suspect on foot, he suddenly turned towards the officers and began to advance toward them with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a female stabbing another female at an entertainment center. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect armed with a handgun and fist fighting other females at the location. The officers ordered the suspect multiple times to drop the knife; however, the suspect refused to comply. The suspect then pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a burglary from a motor vehicle investigation in front of a residence. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect sitting inside a vehicle parked on the street. The suspect looked in the direction of the officers, immediately exited the vehicle and began running from the location. Officers initiated a foot pursuit of the suspect. At one point during the foot pursuit, the suspect pointed a handgun at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.
Uniformed officers were responding to a radio call and observed two males walking on the sidewalk. The officers then heard numerous gunshots, causing them to believe that they were being shot at. Both officers deployed out of their vehicle and took cover behind the engine block. Officers observed the suspect point a handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a “kidnap suspect there now” radio call. Upon the officers’ arrival, the victim advised the officers that the suspect had held him overnight at gunpoint in the residence and had refused to let him leave. A perimeter was established and numerous attempts to have the suspect surrender failed. Special Weapons and Tactics and K9 units responded as a result of the barricaded suspect and deployed on the residence. A citizen advised officers that the next door residence was abandoned and that there was a shed behind the house that should be checked. The officers responded to the back and subsequently observed the suspect armed with a pistol. After failed attempts to gain his cooperation, the suspect fired numerous rounds at officers through a window, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a subject attempting suicide at a residence. Los Angeles City Fire Department personnel were the first to arrive at scene and discovered a combative patient who locked himself inside a room. Officers, who responded to a back-up request by the LAFD, formed a contact team and entered the residence. During officers’ attempts to contact the suspect and allow medical personnel to treat him, the suspect stood up with a kitchen knife in his hand and moved toward officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call of a suspect firing a gun in the air. Officers arrived at the location and saw the suspect holding a firearm in his hand. Officers gave him orders to drop the gun, however the suspect pointed the firearm at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

While conducting crime suppression, uniformed officers observed a suspect whom they believed was attempting to conceal a weapon under his clothing. When the suspect saw the officers approaching, he began to walk away at a rapid pace. As the officers exited their vehicle, they directed the suspect to stop and show his hands. The suspect reached under his clothing, produced a shotgun, and fired a round, resulting in an OIS.
2015

F007-15: JANUARY 21, 2015
Uniformed officers initiated a vehicle pursuit of a vehicle containing four armed suspects. During the pursuit, the suspect’s vehicle struck several parked vehicles and came to rest in the middle of the street. The driver and the front passenger of the vehicle exited and ran, followed by the officers. As the officers chased after the driver, the suspect pointed a handgun at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F008-15: JANUARY 25, 2015
Off-duty detectives responded to the screams of a woman yelling for help at the end of the cul-de-sac outside the city. Following their 911 phone call to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the detectives approached the area of the screaming woman and observed a male straddling a woman on the ground. The suspect appeared to be strangling the woman with his hands. Both detectives approached, identified themselves as police officers, and ordered the suspect to stop his actions and raise his hands. The suspect did not comply and continued to strangle the woman, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect used physical force against a victim.

F011-15: FEBRUARY 9, 2015
While being pursued by uniformed patrol officers, the suspect (driver) drove erratically, struck several cars, and changed vehicles by carjacking a female victim at gunpoint. The pursuit eventually terminated and the suspect attempted a second carjacking; however, he was unsuccessful. The suspect then fled on foot carrying the firearm in his hand while being pursued by officers. Officers gave the suspect numerous verbal commands to drop his weapon and to get down on the ground; however, he refused. The suspect turned toward the officers with the gun in his hand, resulting in an OIS.

F017-15: FEBRUARY 26, 2015
While conducting a narcotics investigation, plainclothes officers observed several suspects on the porch of a residence. As the officers drove past the residence, they heard a gunshot behind them. Both officers looked back toward the residence and observed additional muzzle flashes emanating from the corner of the property. Officers stopped their vehicle and an OIS ensued.

F018-15: MARCH 1, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a robbery in progress. Upon their arrival, the officers contacted the suspect and a violent altercation occurred. An officer deployed a TASER, which struck the suspect but had no effect. During the altercation, the suspect attempted to disarm an officer by pulling on his handgun from the holster, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect attempted to disarm the officer.

F019-15: MARCH 3, 2015
Uniformed officers initiated a vehicle pursuit of a van that was involved in prior shooting incidents. The pursuit travelled into an alley, where two suspects exited the vehicle and fled on foot while the driver continued evading additional officers in the vehicle. As the passengers exited, officers pursued them on foot. During the foot pursuit, one of the suspects drew a pistol from his waistband and pointed it at the officers, resulting in an OIS.
F020-15: MARCH 5, 2015
Uniformed officers initiated a vehicle pursuit of a reckless driver. During the pursuit, the suspect’s vehicle and the officer’s vehicle collided. One officer was unable to exit the vehicle. As the suspect stood next to the door of the police vehicle, the officer was in fear of being ambushed, and an OIS ensued.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

F022-15: MARCH 14, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an assault with a deadly weapon suspect at a residence. Upon their arrival, the suspect’s father, who had a shoulder injury, stated the suspect was throwing items out of the house and had attacked him with a knife. As officers approached the residence where the suspect lived, the suspect pointed a handgun out of the window at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F023-15: MARCH 15, 2015
As plainclothes officers were driving in an unmarked Department vehicle, their vehicle was struck by gunfire. The officers then observed two suspects shooting at them, resulting in an OIS.

A firearm was recovered at the crime scene. However, TID did not provide a photograph of the weapon.

F025-15: MARCH 25, 2015
An off-duty officer was asleep in his residence and was awoken by noises and a flashlight illuminating the interior of the residence. The officer armed himself and exited the residence to further investigate. Upon exiting the front door, the officer observed an unfamiliar vehicle parked in his driveway. A male suspect suddenly appeared from a walkway to the rear yard that was adjacent to the driveway, and an OIS ensued.

There is no photograph available as the suspect did not have a weapon.

F026-15: MARCH 26, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a male with a possible mental illness who was stabbing himself in the throat and had a belt wrapped around his neck. Upon their arrival, the suspect’s mother directed officers to the suspect, who was lying on the kitchen floor bleeding profusely. The officers attempted to render aid while awaiting the arrival of a Fire Department Rescue Ambulance and verbalized with the suspect to stay calm. When the rescue ambulance arrived, one officer exited the residence to escort LAFD personnel back into the kitchen. The suspect suddenly leapt to his feet, grabbed two kitchen knives off the counter, and began to advance toward the officer. The officer redeployed out the residence and alerted his partner and the paramedics that the suspect had armed himself. As the officers were attempting to gain distance from the residence, the suspect exited the front door still armed with a knife in each hand and charged at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was not apprehended.

F027-15: MARCH 28, 2015
While off-duty and driving with a friend, an officer was driving behind a vehicle, driven by an unidentified male suspect. The suspect suddenly conducted a U-turn, causing the officer to brake to avoid a collision. The officer continued driving and was stopped to turn into a side street when he observed the suspect’s vehicle rapidly approaching the passenger side of his vehicle. As the suspect drove past the officer’s vehicle, the suspect pointed a handgun at them and fired two gunshots. The suspect fled the location in his vehicle, and the officer followed. The officer located the suspect, drew his service weapon, identified himself as a police officer, and gave the suspect commands to surrender. The suspect failed to comply, suddenly backed up, and again pointed a handgun at the officer, resulting in an OIS.

F029-15: APRIL 8, 2015
After hearing gunshots, uniformed officers observed a victim down in the middle of the street. The officers observed a suspect running away from the location and immediately requested additional resources, including an ambulance for the downed victim. A LAPD airship observed the suspect running from the scene and directed uniformed officers to the suspect’s location. As the officers tactically approached on foot, the suspect began to shoot at them, resulting in an OIS.

F031-15: APRIL 21, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a male stabbing himself. Upon their arrival, the officers attempted to make contact with the male. The suspect appeared at the apartment door armed with a hunting knife in his right hand and approached the officers. Officers verbalized with the suspect to drop the knife but he refused to comply and advanced toward officers, resulting in an OIS.
Uniformed officers responded to numerous radio calls of a man armed with a gun. Upon arrival, officers located the suspect and observed him armed with a handgun, which he alternately pointed at passing motorists, the officers, and himself. The officers attempted to contain the suspect as he began walking, while repeatedly giving him commands to drop the weapon. The suspect refused to obey the officers’ commands and kept waving the gun and pointing it at himself as he continued walking. Suddenly, the suspect turned and pointed the handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

While driving in an unmarked police vehicle, uniformed officers observed a suspect running away from them while holding his waistband area. Believing the suspect was armed, the officers exited their vehicle and pursued the suspect on foot. The suspect jumped over a gate into a driveway and jumped over a fence into the rear yard of another property. Officers contained the area where the suspect was last seen and began establishing a perimeter. Moments later, the suspect emerged from a parked vehicle holding a black handgun. One of the officers issued commands to the suspect to drop the gun; however, the suspect failed to comply and raised the handgun at the officer, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a man harassing customers and refusing to leave a business. Upon their arrival, the officers encountered the suspect and engaged him in conversation. The suspect agreed to leave the area and began to walk away. Moments later, the suspect became engaged in a fight with a security officer. While attempting to assist the security officer, the officers became involved in a struggle with the suspect and an OIS ensued.

Uniformed officers walked out of an LAPD Service Center and observed a group of three males standing in the parking lot across the street involved in a verbal dispute. Officers then observed the males begin walking away from the location and noted a fourth individual walk to the rear of a nearby parked vehicle, retrieve a handgun and begin walking toward the group of males. When the suspect pointed the handgun at the group, an OIS ensued.

Uniformed officers were flagged down by two victims who advised them that two suspects had threatened them with a gun. The victims directed the officers to the suspects, who were seen walking away from the location. The officers gave the suspects numerous commands to stop and both failed to comply. One suspect continued walking while the other crouched behind a car with his hands in his waistband. The crouched suspect then advanced on one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a suicidal man armed with a knife. Two uniformed supervisors arrived and observed the suspect sitting on the sidewalk. The supervisors awaited the arrival of the second unit, requested a bean bag and a Taser, and coordinated the deployment of the second unit. Two uniformed officers arrived and attempted to verbalize with the suspect from a distance. The suspect charged at one of the supervisors with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a domestic violence radio call. Comments of the radio call identified the suspect and advised he had battered his wife, was under the influence, and was possibly driving the victim’s van. Upon their arrival, the officers observed the suspect in the van and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The suspect failed to yield to the officers and a pursuit ensued. During the pursuit, the suspect called the California Highway Patrol via 911 and advised he had a gun in his lap and was suicidal. After fleeing through Los Angeles and neighboring cities, the suspect stopped his vehicle and exited with a handgun. An officer deployed a beanbag shotgun, firing numerous rounds at the suspect, which had no effect. The suspect pointed the handgun at officers resulting in an OIS. The suspect appeared unaffected by both the beanbag rounds and the gunfire and re-entered the vehicle and continued fleeing from the officers. When the pursuit terminated, the suspect exited the van, pointed the handgun at officers again, resulting in a second OIS.
While on patrol in a marked black and white police vehicle, uniformed officers were stopped in traffic when they observed a suspect on a nearby sidewalk advancing toward them with his hands wrapped in a gray cloth in a shooting stance. Believing they were about to be fired upon, the officers exited their car, ordered the suspect to drop the gun, and an OIS ensued.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a drive-by shooting. During the officers’ response, they heard gunfire emanating north of their location. The officers subsequently observed three to four suspects mid-block where additional shots were heard and muzzle flash from a firearm was seen. One of the suspects then turned and pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspects fled the location and were later apprehended.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon. The comments of the call indicated a woman was screaming and a man covered in blood was armed with a knife at the location. Upon their arrival with a secondary unit, officers were met in the middle of the street by a male covered in blood while armed with a large kitchen knife. The officers deployed out of their vehicle and directed the suspect to drop the knife. The suspect refused to comply and advanced toward the officers armed with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a vandalism suspect breaking business windows. Upon their arrival, the officers observed a smashed window and the suspect attempting to smash an additional window with a skateboard. When officers attempted to detain the suspect, the suspect fled on his skateboard and officers followed him in their patrol vehicle. Eventually, the suspect fell off his skateboard and the officers attempted to detain the suspect. A physical altercation ensued and one of the officers utilized the TASER on the suspect. The suspect was able to gain control of the TASER and used it on one officer who became incapacitated, resulting in an OIS by the partner officer.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a man armed with a knife. Upon their arrival, the officers observed the suspect was armed with a knife and began giving him commands to drop it. The suspect refused to comply, stood up and began to aggressively approach the officers. One officer utilized a TASER on the suspect, which had no effect. The suspect continued to advance on one of the officers while still armed with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

Citizens observed a suspect firing what was perceived to be live rounds into the air, causing numerous "shots fired" and "man with a gun" radio calls to be generated. A uniformed sergeant and two uniformed officers responded and observed the suspect sitting on a brick wall with what officers believed was a handgun between his legs. The suspect ignored officers’ verbal commands to drop the gun, resulting in an OIS.

Plainclothes officers were monitoring narcotic sales activity when they observed a suspect standing at the corner holding a handgun. The suspect ran from the location into a nearby alley while holding the handgun in plain view and the officers followed in their vehicle. The suspect attempted to scale a chain link fence, but his clothing became entangled and he became stuck on top of the fence. When the officers exited their vehicle, the suspect pointed his handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a robbery suspect that had just left a business. The comments of the radio call also indicated that the suspect was armed with a large knife. The officers observed the suspect walking away from the location and exited their police vehicles in an attempt to detain her. A foot pursuit ensued and officers chased the suspect into an alley where she armed herself with a large knife. Officers gave the suspect commands to drop it; however, she refused to comply and continued to flee before she suddenly stopped and turned toward the officers with the knife in hand. One officer utilized his TASER on the suspect, which had no effect. She began to advance on one of the officers while still armed with the knife, resulting in an OIS.
2015

F071-15: AUGUST 22, 2015
Uniformed patrol officers responded to a radio call regarding a violent male with a possible mental illness at a residence. Officers knocked on the apartment door and the subject of the radio call answered the door while in possession of knives. The suspect threw one of the knives at the officers and then fled on foot. Two additional units responded and observed the suspect running from the location. The officers exited their vehicles and observed the suspect running towards them in an aggressive manner while still in possession of a large knife, resulting in an OIS.

F072-15: AUGUST 22, 2015
While working crime suppression duties, uniformed officers observed a male walking in the street, obstructing vehicle traffic. The officers stopped their police vehicle in order to conduct a pedestrian stop for the observed violation. As the driver officer exited the vehicle, he observed the handle of a handgun protruding from the suspect’s jacket pocket and immediately voiced his observation to his partner. The suspect ran onto the adjacent sidewalk and the officers followed. The suspect turned in the direction of the officers with the handgun in his right hand, resulting in an OIS.

F075-15: AUGUST 27, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a neighbor dispute. Upon arrival, the officers determined that one of the parties involved in the dispute was using utilities from the other’s address without permission. The officers responded to investigate and encountered the suspect. A physical altercation ensued, during which the suspect picked up a metal tool and struck both officers on the head and shoulder area, resulting in an OIS.

F080-15: SEPTEMBER 10, 2015
While conducting a follow-up investigation, detectives observed a wanted shooting suspect driving in the vehicle used in the commission of the crime. The detectives followed him and broadcast their observations and location. The suspect suddenly negotiated a U-turn and drove towards the detectives. The detectives drove into a driveway, exited their vehicle, and were confronted by the suspect, resulting in an OIS.

F081-15: SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a man armed with a gun. Upon their arrival, officers observed the suspect and attempted to detain him. As the suspect continued walking away, officers observed that he was armed with handgun in his right hand. As the officers tactically deployed, the suspect pointed the handgun at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F082-15: SEPTEMBER 16, 2015
Numerous officers responded to a shots fired radio call. In addition to the call, two additional 911 calls were received, one of which was made by the shooting suspect. The responding personnel began to deploy on the residence when the suspect walked out the side door of the residence armed with a rifle. The suspect pointed the rifle at officers, resulting in an OIS.

F083-15: SEPTEMBER 27, 2015
Uniformed officers received a radio call of a woman armed with a knife. Upon their arrival, the officers were confronted by the suspect. The suspect failed to obey the officers’ commands and continued to approach the officers with the knife, resulting in an OIS.

F084-15: OCTOBER 3, 2015
Uniformed officers were stopped at a red tri-light signal waiting to negotiate a turn. The officers heard and saw their rear window explode. Believing they were being fired upon, the officers’ attention was drawn to a suspect who was standing to the rear of their vehicle. The officers exited their vehicle and an OIS ensued.
F087-15: OCTOBER 27, 2015
Uniformed officers attempted to detain the driver of a stolen vehicle, resulting in a physical altercation. The officers and suspect fell to the ground and fought over a knife that the suspect had armed himself with. During the physical altercation, the suspect attempted to remove an officer’s gun from the holster, resulting in an OIS.

F090-15: NOVEMBER 9, 2015
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a male in the middle of the street causing vehicles to swerve around him. Upon the officers’ arrival, the suspect reached into his waistband area, simulated drawing a handgun and ran toward the officers. The officers utilized a beanbag shotgun and TASER on the suspect, which had no effect. A physical altercation ensued and an officer was knocked to the ground. The suspect obtained control of the beanbag shotgun and stood over the officer with the beanbag shotgun, resulting in an OIS.

F095-15: DECEMBER 14, 2015
An off-duty officer was outside his private vehicle which was parked in front of his residence. The officer was confronted by a suspect armed with a handgun, resulting in an OIS.

F098-15: DECEMBER 19, 2015
Uniformed officers were monitoring a suspect receiving medical treatment after he was involved in a prior CUOF incident where he attempted to disarm an officer of his handgun. After medical treatment was provided and the suspect was cleared to be booked by the attending physician, the officers began handcuffing the suspect. In the process, the suspect attacked the officers with bodily force and a metal chair. Officers utilized TASERs to control him, which had no effect. The suspect attempted to disarm an officer of his handgun, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect attempted to disarm the officer.

F091-15: DECEMBER 29, 2015
Uniformed officers assisted in the service of a search and arrest warrant for a murder suspect. The suspect barricaded himself inside the residence and refused to surrender. After some time, the suspect fled the location and began climbing onto the roof of a storage shed in the rear yard of the property. While doing so, the suspect turned towards officers positioned nearby with an object that was believed to be a handgun in his hand, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.
F002-16: JANUARY 4, 2016
Undercover detectives were conducting surveillance for a wanted suspect. The detectives located the suspect, who attempted to flee from them in a vehicle. The suspect was involved in a traffic collision and fled on foot. As detectives confronted the suspect, he armed himself with a handgun, and an OIS ensued.

F005-16: JANUARY 16, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a robbery suspect. Officers were directed to the suspect’s location by an LAPD air unit. As officers stopped their patrol vehicle, they were confronted by the suspect, who had armed himself with a handgun. The suspect ran towards their patrol vehicle with the weapon pointed at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F007-16: JANUARY 17, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a man armed with a knife. As the officers arrived at the scene, they observed the suspect, who was armed with a large hunting knife, begin to walk toward them. The officers gave the suspect verbal commands to drop the knife, however the suspect refused and continued his advance. One officer deployed a TASER on the suspect, which had no effect. As the suspect continued advancing towards the officers with the knife in hand, an OIS ensued.

F008-16: JANUARY 30, 2016
While conducting crime suppression, uniformed officers attempted to stop two pedestrians. As the officers exited their patrol vehicle, one of the individuals, later identified as the suspect, fled on foot. While pursuing the suspect, one officer observed the suspect remove a handgun from his waistband and begin to turn towards the officer, resulting in an OIS.

F009-16: FEBRUARY 6, 2016
Having received information regarding a previously stolen vehicle, uniformed officers observed the vehicle driving on City streets and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. The driver pulled in to a driveway and produced a sawed off shotgun, resulting in an OIS.

F010-16: FEBRUARY 14, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding an assault with a deadly weapon suspect who had stabbed one individual inside a residence. As the officers approached the location, they observed the suspect standing on the roof of a motor home-type vehicle. The suspect, who was armed with a knife, then began to cut himself on the neck. The officers attempted to verbalize with the suspect to descend from the roof so they could render medical aid for his injuries, however he refused. The suspect managed to enter the motor home and sat in the driver’s seat. Believing the suspect would attempt to drive away, the officers gained entry into the motor home and deployed the TASER on the suspect, which appeared to have no effect. The suspect advanced towards one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F013-16: FEBRUARY 20, 2016
While off-duty and driving in his personal vehicle, an officer observed a drive-by shooting occur, which resulted in a homicide. The officer called 911 and reported his observations while following the suspect’s vehicle. While doing so, the driver of the suspect’s vehicle came to an abrupt stop and began firing numerous rounds at the officer, resulting in an OIS.
There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

F016-16: MARCH 15, 2016
While off-duty and inside his residence asleep, an officer heard multiple footsteps originating from the interior of his home. The officer armed himself with a handgun and exited his bedroom to investigate. As the officer entered the living room, he was confronted by two suspects. Both suspects immediately fled the residence through a window in the kitchen. As the suspects continued their escape, one turned and reached inside his waistband, resulting in an OIS.
There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

34 Force Investigation Division determined whether a recovered firearm had been used in prior crime(s) and/or was stolen through the use of Department resources.
F020-16: APRIL 3, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a screaming woman. Upon their arrival, the officers heard screaming originating from a dark colored SUV parked on the street. Upon further investigation, the officers observed a male suspect in the back seat of the SUV assaulting a woman. As the suspect continued choking and punching the female, an officer smashed one of the vehicle's windows to render aid to the victim. The suspect entered the driver's seat and drove the vehicle at an officer, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect's weapon was an automobile.

F021-16: APRIL 6, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male with a possible mental illness at a residence. Upon their arrival, the officer observed the suspect involved in a verbal dispute with family members. The officers attempted to intervene to diffuse the situation, however the suspect became irate and directed his aggressive behavior towards the officers. The officers deployed a TASER on the suspect, which had no effect. The suspect then barricaded himself inside a bedroom and armed himself with two knives. Metropolitan Division, SWAT, with the assistance of the Department's Crisis Negotiation Team, responded. After delivering gas inside the residence, the suspect fled through a bedroom window and charged at a SWAT officer with scissors. Officers deployed a TASER and a beanbag shotgun on the suspect, both of which had no effect. The suspect continued advancing toward one SWAT officer, ultimately cutting his arm with the scissors. An OIS subsequently ensued.

F022-16: APRIL 10, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a burglary in progress at an apartment. Comments of the radio call indicated the suspect had shattered a window and entered the location. Upon their arrival, officers were notified that the suspect was inside one of the apartment units holding an older male hostage with a knife to his neck. The officers entered the location and observed the suspect holding a knife against the neck of an elderly male. The officers repeatedly ordered the suspect to drop the knife, however he failed to comply, and an OIS ensued.

F024-16: APRIL 20, 2016
Uniformed officers observed a male, later identified as the suspect, commit a traffic violation while riding a bicycle during the hours of darkness. As the officers attempted to stop the suspect for the violation, he fled on his bicycle. After some time, the suspect dismounted the bicycle and fled on foot. As the officers gave chase, the lead officer observed the suspect remove a handgun from his waistband and turn towards him, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was later apprehended.

F025-16: APRIL 29, 2016
While on-duty and stopped at a red tri-light, two plainclothes detectives observed two individuals engaged in an altercation with a victim. The detectives observed one of the individuals arm himself with a handgun and begin to shoot at the victim, resulting in an OIS.

F027-16: APRIL 30, 2016
Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a domestic violence at an apartment. Comments of the radio call indicated the suspect had locked himself inside a bedroom and was assaulting his girlfriend. Upon their arrival, the officers entered the apartment and located a female who was unconscious and unresponsive. As one officer began providing medical attention to the female, the partner officer covered the hallway and remaining rooms. The covering officer encountered the suspect, who was armed with two knives. The officer ordered the suspect to drop the knives, however, he refused, and an OIS ensued.

F028-16: MAY 4, 2016
An off-duty detective was followed on foot by a male, later identified as the suspect, who subsequently produced a handgun and attempted to rob the detective of his property, which resulted in an OIS.

F029-16: MAY 13, 2016
Uniformed officers observed a group of males congregated by a parked vehicle. While attempting to detain the individuals, one fled from the group and the officers gave chase on foot. During the foot pursuit, the suspect produced a handgun and fired at the officers, striking one, and an OIS ensued.
Uniformed officers initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle that had a strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the cab. As the officers ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle, one suddenly ran from the officers in between two nearby parked vehicles. One officer observed the suspect reach for a handgun located in the suspect’s waistband, and an OIS ensued.

While conducting a traffic stop on a vehicle, uniformed officers observed the driver exit the vehicle armed with a handgun. As the suspect ran from the officers, he turned and pointed the handgun at one officer, resulting in an OIS.

While working a crime suppression detail, uniformed officers observed a group of male subjects standing on the sidewalk drinking alcoholic beverages. As the officers attempted to detain the individuals in the group, one began walking away from the officers while holding his waistband. One officer followed the suspect and ordered him to stop. The suspect abruptly stopped and turned towards the officer while making a furtive movement, resulting in an OIS.

While at a restaurant, an off-duty officer was the victim of a robbery. The suspect displayed a handgun at the officer and demanded his property, resulting in an OIS.

While awaiting the arrival of local law enforcement to respond to his residence in regards to a burglary investigation, an off-duty detective observed the suspects from the incident return. One suspect pointed a handgun at the detective and began shooting at him, resulting in an OIS. It was later discovered that the handgun was a paintball gun. Both the suspect and the weapon remain outstanding.

Following a vehicle pursuit, one of the occupants of the suspect vehicle exited and ran from officers. As the officers attempted taking the suspect into custody, the suspect armed himself with a handgun, and an OIS ensued.

Uniformed officers responded to a business dispute at a store. While at the location of the radio call, the suspect became irate and placed one of the officers in a choke hold. The suspect then attempted disarming an officer of their service pistol, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was not apprehended.

There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

There is no photograph available as the suspect attempted to disarm the officer.
1. F052-16: AUGUST 9, 2016
   Uniformed officers conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle for a minor traffic violation. As officers were speaking with the driver, he abruptly exited the vehicle armed with a handgun, and an OIS ensued.

2. F053-16: AUGUST 9, 2016
   Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a vandalism in progress. Upon their arrival, the officers exited their vehicle and approached a group of individuals. One individual, later identified as the suspect, ran from the group and immediately grabbed his front waistband. The officers pursued the suspect on foot and requested additional resources to respond. While approaching the corner of an intersection, the suspect fired at the officers with a handgun, resulting in an OIS.

3. F055-16: AUGUST 16, 2016
   While conducting routine patrol, an LAPD motor officer observed a vehicle commit a vehicle code violation and intended to initiate a traffic stop. Before doing so, the driver, later identified as the suspect, pulled the vehicle to the side of the road, exited, and began walking away. The officer ordered the suspect to stop, however he refused to obey commands. The suspect removed a handgun from his person and began running from the officer. The suspect turned towards the officer with the gun in hand, and an OIS ensued.

   While on routine patrol, uniformed officers observed a male suspect holding a rifle with an affixed bayonet walking on the sidewalk. Officers gave the suspect numerous commands to drop the rifle, however he refused, and an OIS ensued.

5. F059-16: SEPTEMBER 16, 2016
   While conducting an undercover narcotics investigation, an LAPD officer was approached by a male, later identified as the suspect, who attempted robbing him of his property. The suspect punched the officer in the face, backed away, lifted his shirt, reached for his waistband, and an OIS ensued.

   There is no photograph available as the incident was a perception shooting.

   Uniformed officers escorted an arrestee to a local hospital for a medical examination. During the examination, the suspect escaped custody and fled from the officers. The suspect attempted carjacking an individual near the hospital, resulting in an OIS.

   There is no photograph available as the suspect’s weapon was an automobile.

7. F063-16: OCTOBER 1, 2016
   While assigned to a crime suppression detail, uniformed officers observed a vehicle commit a vehicle code violation. As the officers attempted initiating a traffic stop on the vehicle, the driver failed to yield and a vehicle pursuit ensued. During the pursuit, one occupant, later identified as the suspect, fled on foot and was pursued by uniformed officers. While chasing the suspect, the officers observed the suspect armed with a handgun. The suspect turned towards the officers with the gun in hand, and an OIS ensued.

   Uniformed officers responded to a radio call regarding a male armed with a handgun. Officers located an individual who matched the description of the suspect based on the comments of the radio call and attempted initiating a pedestrian stop. Upon doing so, the suspect turned and pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.
F067-16: OCTOBER 23, 2016
While on routine patrol, uniformed officers observed a large group of individuals involved in an altercation. As the officers exited their vehicle to investigate, they observed a male individual, later identified as the suspect, armed with a handgun, and an OIS ensued. The suspect ran from the officers approximately one block, where a second OIS occurred.

F072-16: NOVEMBER 7, 2016
Officers initiated a pedestrian stop on a suspicious individual near a business. Upon doing so, the suspect pointed a handgun at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F078-16: NOVEMBER 28, 2016
Uniformed officers attempted to detain an individual, later identified as the suspect, regarding a burglary investigation. The suspect fled from the officers on foot into the backyard of a nearby residence. During the officers’ attempt to apprehend the suspect, he produced a handgun, and an OIS ensued.

F081-16: DECEMBER 11, 2016
Uniformed officers attempted to detain numerous individuals gathered at a residence. As officers approached the location, various individuals within the group ran from the residence and discarded multiple firearms. One of the individuals, later identified as the suspect, fired at the officers, resulting in an OIS.

F084-16: DECEMBER 17, 2016
While on routine patrol, uniformed officers recognized a wanted murder suspect. As the officers approached the suspect to detain him, he fled on foot. While being pursued by the officers, the suspect turned and pointed a handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

F085-16: DECEMBER 18, 2016
Uniformed officers observed an individual, later identified as the suspect, armed with a handgun in his waistband. When officers attempted to detain the suspect, he fled on foot. While being pursued by the officers, the suspect turned and pointed the handgun at them, resulting in an OIS.

F086-16: DECEMBER 20, 2016
A uniformed officer responded to an assault with a deadly weapon/shots fired radio call at a residence. While conducting the subsequent investigation at the location of the radio call, the officer observed one suspect from the incident riding his bike. As the officer approached the suspect to take him into custody, the suspect retrieved a handgun, resulting in an OIS.

There is no photograph available as the suspect fled the location and was later apprehended.
DEFINITIONS

Adjudication: Tactics, drawing/exhibiting a firearm, and UOF shall be evaluated during the adjudication process. The adjudication process for Categorical UOF (CUOF) incidents differs slightly from Non-Categorical UOF (NCUOF) with respect to the chain of investigation, review, and analysis (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792 and 3/793).

Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy – Drawing and Exhibiting and/or UOF: A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions of the employee relative to drawing/exhibiting a firearm or UOF were not within the Department’s policies (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Administrative Disapproval – Negligent Discharge: A finding, where it was determined that the unintentional discharge of a firearm resulted from operator error, such as the violation of a firearm safety rule (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Administrative Disapproval – Tactics: A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a Categorical UOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Animal Shooting: An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm at an animal (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Canine (K3) Contact: An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Carotid Restraint Control Hold: An upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the modified carotid, full carotid, and locked carotid hold (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Categorical UOF Incident: The use of deadly force (e.g., discharge of a firearm) by a Department employee; All uses of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid or locked carotid hold; All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custodial care of the Department (also known as an In-Custody Death or ICD); A UOF incident resulting in death; A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization (commonly referred to as a LERII); All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inaudient or accidental) head strikes that results in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death; Officer involved animal shootings; Non-tactical unintentional discharges; and, An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Cause/Manner of Death: The Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner defines the different manners of death based on the following criteria:

- Natural - due entirely (or nearly so) to natural disease processes;
- Homicide - due to a volitional act of another person;
- Suicide - due to injury that occurred with the intent to induce self-harm or cause one’s own death;
- Accident - due to injury when there is no evidence of intent to harm; and, Ununderstimated - inadequate information regarding the circumstances of death to determine manner; example: individual found unconscious with massive subdural hemorrhage; in the absence of information on the events leading up to death, it is impossible to determine if the hemorrhage is due to accidental fall, homicidal violence, etc.

For purposes of this Report, accidental deaths are further categorized into causes of death attributed to narcotic/alcohol overdose.

Force Options: All Department-approved physical force techniques (e.g. firm grip, strike, takedown) or devices (e.g. OC spray, baton, TASER) available to an officer. Force Options fall into the following three categories: Deadly Force; Less-Lethal force (e.g. TASER, bean bag), and Non-Lethal force (e.g. firm grip, takedown) (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

General Training Update: Standardized training provided by the employee’s command or Training Division personnel to personnel involved in a CUOF incident. The Training Update is not an inquiry into the specific details of the CUOF. The intent of the update is to provide involved personnel with standardized training material in tactical issues and actions readily identified in the CUOF incident as well as an update on the UOF policy. Training should be provided as soon as practicable before the involved officer(s) return to field duties, but within 30 days following the incident (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05 and 3/796.35).

Head Strikes: An intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight) and all unintentional (inaudient or accidental) head strikes that results in serious bodily injury, hospitalization, or death (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Homelessness: Per the Department’s Special Order No. 13, Policy Regarding Police Contacts with Persons Experiencing Homelessness, dated June 22, 2016, the terms “homelessness,” “homeless individual,” and “homeless person” shall refer to the following:

- An individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence;
- An individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings (including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground);
- An individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by federal, state, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); or,
- An individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided.

In-Custody Death: The death of an arrestee or detainee who is in the custodial care of the Department (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Law Enforcement Related Injury Investigation: A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a LERII (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Non-Categorical UOF: An incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses a less-lethal control device or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee's direction; overcome resistance of a person during an arrest or a detention; or, defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person (2016 LAPD Manual 4/245.05).


Officer Involved Shooting: An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm. These incidents are categorized into Hits or No Hits (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Serious Bodily Threat: Serious bodily injury, as defined in California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4), includes, but is not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member organ, a wound requiring extensive suturing, and serious disfigurement (2016 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

Source of Activity:
- Radio Call: Call for service directed by Communications Division;
- Observation: Contact initiated by officers based on reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or as a consensual encounter;
- Citizen Flag Down: Private person alert officers to a subject, an activity, or a location not otherwise observed by officers or reported to Communications Division;
- Pre-Planned: Any type of activity that requires an operational plan (e.g. search/arrest warrant services, task forces);
- Station Call: Non-coded or low priority incidents where officers are directed to a location by Department personnel, other than Communications Division;
- Ambush: An act or an incident so as to attack by surprise or lure officers resulting in an officer involved shooting; and,
- Off-Duty: Incident where officers are off-duty and not conducting official Department business.

- Homelessness, “homeless individual,” and “homeless person” shall refer to the following:

- An individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence;
- An individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings (including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground);
- An individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by federal, state, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); or,
- An individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided.
**Definitions**

**Substantially Involved Personnel:** Employee(s) applying force or who had a significant tactical or decision making role in the incident (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**Suicide by Cop:** Those incidents where the suspect appeared to intentionally provoke officers into believing that he posed a deadly threat that resulted in an OIS.

**Tactical Brief:** The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Brief is to enhance future performance. The Tactical Brief is conducted by the Categorical UOF Debrief Facilitator (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**Unintentional Discharge:** The unintentional discharge of a firearm by a Department employee regardless of cause. Unintentional discharges are evaluated and categorized as “Accidental Discharges” or “Negligent Discharges” (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**Use of Force –Tactics Directive:** A written directive that contains procedure and/or insight into UOF and tactics issues. UOF policy will continue to be expressed in the Department Manual but may be reiterated in UOF-Tactics Directives. UOF-Tactics Directives supersedes any Training Bulletins that have been published regarding the subject matter of the directives (2016 LAPD Manual 1/240.12).

**Use of Force:** In a complex urban society, officers are confronted daily with situations where control must be exercised to effect arrests and to protect the public safety. Control may be exercised through advice, warnings, and persuasion, or by the use of physical force. Officers are permitted to use force that is objectively reasonable to defend themselves or others, to effect an arrest or detention, and/or to prevent escape or overcome resistance, consistent with the Department’s Policy on the UOF (2016 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

**Use of Force Review Board:** The UOF Review Board shall convene at the direction of the Chair of the Board and shall: Avail itself of any facilities of the Department necessary to conduct a complete examination of the circumstances involved in the incident under investigation, report its findings and recommendations to the Chief of Police and upon adjournment, forward the UOF Internal Process Report, and other related reports to the Chief of Police (2016 LAPD Manual 2/092.50).

**Use of Lethal Force (Other):** An incident involving the use of deadly force by Department personnel. This type of force will encompass those forces that are not included in other CUOF classifications (2016 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**Warning Shots:** Warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage (2016 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).
**CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS**

The Department’s method of classifying CUOF incidents is based on the type of force used during the incident. The FID investigation may reveal that multiple force options were used during an incident, which could potentially be classified as different CUOF categories. For tracking purposes, and to avoid duplicate recording of an incident, the Department classifies an incident based on the most significant force used by Department personnel. However, all CUOFs are fully investigated and adjudicated, including additional force options not captured under the primary classification.

The Department maintains several data repositories on Department personnel, as well as details, regarding CUOF incidents. Use of Force Review Division queried the data for the 2016 Use of Force Year-End Review from internal databases. In addition, FID was instrumental in providing any outstanding information from their records. However, FID was unable to provide some information due to the ongoing nature of various CUOF investigations.

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

The query period included all CUOF incidents from January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2016.

**BUREAU AND AREA/DIVISION OF OCCURRENCE**

The Bureau and Area/Division of occurrence is the location where the CUOF incident occurred, regardless of where the incident originated or where the involved personnel were assigned. The exception is ICD incidents, where CSD is the Area/Division of occurrence, not the geographic Area where the jail facility is located.

**INVOLVED DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL**

For purposes of this Report, only Department personnel who received an adjudication finding, or has a pending finding, in the concerned force type for each respective CUOF incident are counted as involved employees. Department personnel are often at scene as part of the tactical situation, but do not apply force. The officers who did not utilize the relevant force were not counted as “involved” in this Report.

All employee statistics were based on their current status as of the date of the UOF incident.

**Department Personnel by CUOF Incident Type:**

- OIS: All employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the OIS incident were included in this Report.
- OIS-No Hit: All employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the OIS incident were included in this Report.
- Animal Shooting Incidents: All employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the Animal Shooting incident were included in this Report.
- CRCH Incidents: All employees who received, or were pending, non-lethal, less-lethal, and/or lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the CRCH incident were included in this Report.
- LERII Incidents: All employees who received, or were pending, non-lethal, less-lethal, and/or lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the LERII incident were included in this Report.
- Head Strike Incidents: All employees who received, or were pending, lethal force BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the Head Strike incident were included in this Report.
- K9 Contact Incidents: All employees who received, or were pending, K9 Contact deployment criteria BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the K9 Contact incident were included in this Report.

**Suspect – Injuries**

Suspect injuries include self-inflicted injuries, pre-existing medical conditions aggravated during the incident, accidental injuries, and those caused by Department personnel.

The cause and manner of death of decedents are determined by the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner - Coroner.

**Deceased Suspect Toxicology Results**

Toxicology results for deceased suspects were obtained by FID from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner. It is uncommon for suspects to release their medical records to the Department. Therefore, toxicology results could only be obtained for deceased suspects involved in OIS-Hit and ICD incidents.

**Suspect – Perceived Mental Illness**

A suspect was identified as having a perceived mental illness based on the following:

1. Officer(s) and/or investigator(s) perception of the suspect.
2. Suspect having self-reported mental illness;
3. Third-party statement; and/or,
4. Prior MEU contact resulting in a 5150 WIC hold or referral.

**Suspect – Gang Membership**

Gang membership status of suspects involved in CUOF incidents were determined through inquiry of Department resources.

**Suspect – Homelessness**

Per the Department’s Special Order No. 3.13, Policy Regarding Police Contacts with Persons Experiencing Homelessness, dated June 22, 2016, the terms “homelessness,” “homeless individual,” and “homeless person” shall refer to the following:

- An individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by federal, state, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); or,
- An individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided.

**Homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents was not tracked by the Department prior to 2016. However, at the request of the BOPC, such statistics were compiled for 2016 incidents and FID implemented means to capture homeless status as part of future investigations.”**

**Suspect – Perceived Suicide by Cop**

The incident where the suspect appeared to intentionally provoke officers into believing that he posed a deadly threat that resulted in an OIS.

**NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS**

All NCUOF data was queried by Application Development and Support Division from TEAMS II, as requested by UOFRD.

**ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS**

The query period included all NCUOF incidents from January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2016.

**BUREAU AND AREA/DIVISION OF OCCURRENCE**

Incident by Bureau and Area detailed where the NCUOF incident occurred, rather than where the involved officers were assigned.

**FORCE OPTION USED**

Each force option was counted once per incident, regardless of the number of times the force option was applied by one or more Department personnel. However, the force options were not mutually exclusive, as multiple force options could have been utilized in an incident. In such cases, all force options used were counted once per incident.

**TASER**

TASER activations were measured by the total number of times a TASER device was activated on a suspect during a NCUOF incident. All TASER activations were included in...
the total count when multiple activations occurred in an incident. Therefore, the total number of TASER activations exceeds the number of incidents in which a TASER was used.

**TASER Effectiveness**

Effectiveness captured whether a TASER activation caused the suspect to submit to arrest. Multiple TASER activations may have been required for the force option to prove effective.

**INVOLVED DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL**

For purposes of this Report, only Department personnel who received an adjudication finding, or has a pending finding, in the concerned force type for each respective NCUOF incident are counted as involved employees. Department personnel are often at scene as part of the tactical situation, but do not apply force. The officers who did not utilize the relevant force were not counted as “involved” in this Report. All employee statistics were based on their current status as of the date of the UOF incident.

**Officer – Injuries**

Officer injuries included all injuries sustained by a Department employee during the NCUOF incident.

**INVOLVED SUSPECTS**

Suspects included in this Report are those subject to Non-Categorical force used by Department personnel.

**Suspect – Perceived Mental Illness**

A suspect’s perceived mental illness for NCUOF incidents was determined based on officers’ observations and was not verified by MEU.

**Suspect – Perceived Impairment**

Officers’ observations were used to determine if a suspect was under the influence of alcohol and/or narcotics for NCUOF incidents. Suspects’ impairment status was not verified through field sobriety tests.

**Suspect – Perceived Homelessness**

Perceived homelessness for NCUOF incidents was determined based on officers’ observations and statements made by suspects.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CHARLIE BECK, CHIEF OF POLICE
JORGE A. VILLELAS, ASSISTANT CHIEF
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
JOHN McMahan, CAPTAIN III
COMMANDING OFFICER, USE OF FORCE REVIEW DIVISION

DIRECT PUBLICATION TEAM

JOHN McMahan, CAPTAIN III
JENS BACK, POLICE OFFICER III
RYAN GONZALES, POLICE OFFICER III
MARGARET CORREA, GRAPHICS DESIGNER II

AUTHORS

ROBERT VON VOIGT, SERGEANT II
JENS BACK, POLICE OFFICER III
RYAN GONZALES, POLICE OFFICER III
USE OF FORCE REVIEW DIVISION

GRAPHICS DESIGN

MARGARET CORREA, GRAPHICS DESIGNER II
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE

STATISTICIANS & ANALYSTS

TONY CHU, POLICE OFFICER III
GREGORY HALL, POLICE OFFICER III
DANIEL KEARNEY, POLICE OFFICER II
COLLEEN OLMEDO, MANAGEMENT ANALYST II
USE OF FORCE REVIEW DIVISION

PHOTOGRAPHY

JIN CHO, POLICE OFFICER II
COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP DIVISION
CORNEL PANOV, PHOTOGRAPHER III
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE

KEY CONTRIBUTORS

MICHEL MOORE, FIRST ASSISTANT CHIEF
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

ARIF ALIKHAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATOR III
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND POLICY

SEAN MALINOWSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF
CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE

WILLIAM MURPHY, DEPUTY CHIEF
COMMANDING OFFICER, POLICE SCIENCES AND TRAINING BUREAU

ROBERT LOPEZ, COMMANDER
COMMANDING OFFICER, FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION

JOHN NEUMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATOR I
COMMANDING OFFICER, COMSTAT DIVISION

Gregory Baek, Police Officer II, Office of the Chief of Police
Lyndon Barber, Police Officer III, Newton Area
Larry Barr, Lieutenant II, Use of Force Review Division
Billy Brockway, Lieutenant II, Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy
Robert Bean, Sergeant I, Use of Force Review Division
Michael Chan, Police Officer II, Community Relationship Division
Eva Chiavarolo, Secretary, Use of Force Review Division
Vuyette Cruz, Police Officer II, Hollywood Area
Evelyn Diab, Police Officer II, North Hollywood Area
Lei Lam, GIS Supervisor II, Application Development and Support Division
Damien Levesque, Detective III, Office of the Chief of Police
Natasha Madjd, Police Officer II, Hollywood Area
Cheryl Masters, Senior Management Analyst, Force Investigation Division
Raman Ortega, Police Officer III, I, Office of the Chief of Police
Mariana Patin, Police Officer III, Mission Area
Rafael Rodriguez, Police Officer II, Office of Administrative Services
Chad Scott, Police Officer III, Central Area
Siranush Simonyan, Police Officer II, Hollywood Area
David Stambaugh, Sergeant II, Use of Force Review Division
Wendy Sud, Senior Clerk Typist, Force Investigation Division
Christopher Suk, Police Officer II, Use of Force Review Division
Sofie Toledo, Detective III, Office of the Chief of Police
Melissa Zarris, Police Officer II, Rampart Area
Edith Zelaya, Police Officer III, Central Traffic Division
Edith Zelaya, Senior Clerk Typist, Office of Administrative Services