PRIORITY 1: REDUCTION OF CRIME

L.A. COMPSTAT

Shortly after Chief Bratton took leadership of the LAPD, he implemented the Compstat outcome management process that has proven highly successful in reducing crime in other major American cities. L.A. Compstat (which replaced the Department’s dysfunctional and ineffective FASTRAC system) is the mechanism that drives crime reduction by rapidly retrieving, mapping, and analyzing crime data, fostering problem solving with innovative strategies and tactics, and exacting accountability for productivity from all levels of the police organization.

L.A. Compstat is based upon four fundamental principles:

1 ACCURATE, TIMELY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATED TO ALL.
   To respond effectively to crime, officers at all levels of the LAPD are now provided the best accurate intelligence available on where particular types of crimes are occurring, when and how the crimes are being committed, and who the suspects are if known. The likelihood of an effective police response to crime increases proportionally as the accuracy of the crime intelligence shared by all increases.

2 RAPID DEPLOYMENT THAT IS SYNCHRONIZED AND FOCUSED.
   Personnel and other necessary resources are promptly deployed where crime has occurred. For a viable and coordinated response to a crime or quality of life problem, patrol personnel, detectives, and support personnel now bring their expertise and resources to bear in a synchronized effort.

3 EFFECTIVE TACTICS.
   Effective tactics based on analysis of accurate and timely crime intelligence are prudently designed to bring about crime reduction. In order to avoid simply displacing crime and quality of life offenses, and to bring about permanent change, these tactics are comprehensive, flexible, and adaptable to shifting crime trends identified and monitored.
4 RELENTLESS FOLLOW-UP AND ASSESSMENT.

An on-going process of rigorous follow-up and assessment is mandated to ensure that the desired results are actually being achieved. This evaluation component permits redeployment of resources to meet newly identified challenges once a problem has abated. It also permits assessment of the viability of particular tactics for developing future responses.

Simply put, L.A. Compstat uses computer crime-mapping and intensive anti-crime strategy meetings for developing and implementing new tactics, for coordinating patrol, detective, narcotics enforcement, and other special unit operations, and for exacting command accountability in addressing crime and disorder problems throughout the City.

- Although Compstat has been an effective tool in tracking and attacking crime problems, some LAPD Areas have not performed to the expectations of the Office of Operations. To address this issue, Compstat Plus has been created to more closely scrutinize these Areas and their crime-fighting strategies, and track their progress. It is an analysis tool, but as importantly, it is a mentoring tool to improve productivity. It is the goal of Compstat Plus to bring underachieving Areas up to the level of more productive peer commands in the crime reduction battle.

- To verify the accuracy of crime intelligence, an audit team is being established to identify suspect Compstat data, and to investigate reporting or computer system problems thought to produce errant information.

- To ensure that accurate and timely intelligence is available to all law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles region, the LAPD will soon begin routinely to invite to its weekly Compstat meetings representatives from the Los Angeles Unified School District Police, all police agencies from the surrounding Los Angeles communities including the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), and all federal law enforcement agencies operating in the City of Los Angeles – FBI, DEA, ATF, INS – as well as the Department of Homeland Security, to discuss crime trends in the City. This will help ultimately to create a first-of-its-kind multi-jurisdictional Compstat system that will be jointly funded by participating agencies thus maximizing the limited resources of all the County’s police forces.
L.A. Compstat goes beyond simple measures of police activity. Although statistics, maps, and strategy sessions are more visible aspects of L.A. Compstat, performance accountability is the driving force of this crime reduction process.

**ACCOUNTABILITY**

The outcome measure of progress at the LAPD today is proactive crime reduction, not simply reactive measurements of police activity, the historical gauge. The central focus for leadership is exacting accountability for crime reduction from Area Commanders.

Area Commanders today have the authority and duty to address crime and quality of life issues in the neighborhoods they serve, and they are held accountable for progress in their neighborhoods. At the weekly Compstat meetings, in addition to being questioned on all crime incidents, shootings, narcotics activity, gang activity, and calls for service in their Areas, Area Commanders are questioned on:

- deployment of patrol personnel by watch and by rank, including all discretionary units assigned to their commands, overtime usage and use of sick leave, and strategies for maximizing personnel effectiveness in response to crime trends;

- specific crime strategies and tactics for reducing the top two crimes by watch in their Area;

- debriefings of suspects conducted by detectives in their Area, the capture and analysis of all pertinent information, and the dissemination of collected information to all relevant parties, including citizens’ groups when appropriate; and

- complaints by the public against police officers as well as risk management activities (lawsuits, uses of force, etc.).

Twice each week, the Office of Operations holds crime control meetings with its direct reports from the four geographic Bureaus, the Special Operations Bureau, and the Detective Bureau to share intelligence, devise strategies, and make decisions on redeploying resources to more effectively fight crime.
CRIME STRATEGIES, INITIATIVES, AND TACTICS

Strategies, initiatives and tactics have been implemented or are planned to increase crime-fighting effectiveness while streamlining work processes and improving operating efficiencies.

GANGS STRATEGY AND TACTICS

More than half of the homicides committed in Los Angeles are gang-related. Although gangs have been an endemic problem in Los Angeles for several generations, today, gang crime is spreading into communities previously thought safe, into the suburbs, and into the region as a whole. And some Los Angeles gangs are exporting their criminal activities to other cities in the nation. The measures of success of this strategy will be the elimination of a gang’s stranglehold on a neighborhood as evidenced by the reduction of violent crime in that neighborhood, and prevention of the expansion of gang activities to other communities.

- In March 2003, the LAPD launched a new citywide effort known as Gang Impact Teams (GIT) in each of the 18 Areas. These teams include gang specialists, detectives, and narcotics officers, who work closely together to address the confluence of guns, illegal drugs, and gang members that drive much of the violent crime in Los Angeles. The mission of these Teams is to reduce gang-related violent crime through a collaborative, focused, and coordinated approach to disrupt this violence whether directed toward rival gang members or law-abiding residents of the City. These GIT teams represent a long-term, sustained effort that applies the four fundamental principles of L.A. Compstat, with emphasis on leadership and accountability. This marshalling of resources includes nurturing community support to reach out to gang members and show them an alternative to their culture of crime and violence.

- To augment GIT initiatives, the LAPD conducted between November 26, 2002 and May 31, 2003 the Community Safety Operations Center (CSOC) in 31 reporting districts in four Areas: Southeast, Southwest, Newton, and 77th Street. CSOC is a short-term initiative designed to place intense focus on the violent gangs that dominate these Areas. Seeking to organize community support to address violent gang activities that have been particularly
difficult to suppress, CSOC is a collaborative effort among the Special Operations Bureau, Area commands, outside agencies (federal, state, and local), and community groups. CSOC has the ability to redeploy resources as needed guided by real-time crime intelligence. The resources brought to bear in 2003 were significant: four platoons of the Metropolitan Division (180 officers in all), 24 motorcycle officers, some federal assets, an undercover Buy Team, and an average of 45 Gang Enforcement Detail officers that were available on any given day to pursue CSOC initiatives as directed. Comparing the January 1 through May 28 2003 period to the same period in 2002, violent crime decreased an average of 31% where CSOC was implemented in the Southeast Division; 22% in the Newton Division; 29% in the Southwest Division; and 6% in the 77th Street Division.26

• In response to a spike in violent crime in these areas at the beginning of this year, on March 28 the LAPD re-launched CSOC in five Areas: Newton, Hollenbeck, 77th, Southwest, and Southeast. Fewer resources are being used this time, due in large part to the fact that the Department has approximately 100 fewer personnel than it did at the time of the first CSOC initiative: one platoon from the Metropolitan Division (or about 25 people per day), 16 motorcycle officers, two squads of gang officers per day which amounts to about 16 officers, no Buy Team, and no federal assets. Violent crime decreased 8.4% in CSOC reporting districts between April and July 2004 compared to the same period in 2003. Through September 23, the unit has made 1,132 felony arrests, 880 misdemeanor arrests, and recovered 135 firearms.27

• In order to respond preemptively to the threat posed to society by violent gangs, the LAPD will continue to work tirelessly with local, state and federal, law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, as well as with community groups, in order to develop the necessary tools to collect and share information on gangs, and devise tactics for prevention, intervention, and prosecution of criminal gang activities. Towards this end, in early 2004 the LAPD and the FBI hosted a national gang symposium in Los Angeles to formulate a response to gang crime using the full range of prevention, intervention, and prosecution tools. The LAPD was instrumental in organizing the San Fernando Valley Community Gang Summit in June 2004 where clergy leaders representing more than 800 congregations met to
devise a concerted response to gang violence that will enable young gang members to find safe havens within the faith community and alternatives to their violent lifestyles. The LAPD also participated in a national conference on gang violence held in Anaheim in July 2004 that provided tools and training to more than 1,300 gang investigators, and conceived and hosted the National Executive Session on Gangs, held also in July 2004, that met to share effective strategies to stem the rise of gang violence. Two additional National Executive Sessions, also funded by the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office, will be held in Los Angeles in 2005.

**DISTRICT POLICING PILOT PROGRAM**

Ten percent of the criminal population commits 50% of crime, a report for the National Institute of Justice has estimated. And these crimes repeatedly occur in the same geographic areas, estimated at 10% of a city.28 By strategically focusing on the interaction of high risk people, places and activities – arresting the repeat perpetrators of serious crimes in the high crime areas – the LAPD can deploy most effectively its limited resources to move the organization closer to the tipping point in its fight against crime citywide.

To pursue this strategy, Chief Bratton has implemented a new and innovative crime-fighting structure created by Assistant Chief George Gascón called District Policing, as a pilot program in three geographically dispersed LAPD Areas of the City – Hollywood, Rampart, and Harbor. Optimally structured and focused crime-fighting entities have been created within these Areas utilizing existing resources.

Since this Pilot Program was fully implemented in January 2004, its effect in reducing crime has been notable. In the pilot areas, Part I crime, the seven most serious felony crimes, was down 15.8% in the First Half 2004 from year ago compared to a 9.6% reduction in three control group Areas (Hollenbeck, Wilshire, and North Hollywood). Much of this success was in reduction of property crimes which were down 14.5% in the pilot Areas compared to 7.3% in the control Areas. While violent crime was down by the same degree in both pilot and control Areas (nearly 20%), arrests for violent crimes in the pilot Areas increased more than 9% compared to 4% in the control Areas, suggesting that the success of District Policing in reducing violent crime may yet be fully realized.
Focus group interviews indicate that District Policing’s emphasis on community-policing-style problem-oriented collaboration between Senior Lead Officers (SLOs) and Watch Commanders in the pilot Areas is working well. Specialized units are being directed more effectively and morale is high. Pilot Area Captains and District Lieutenants laud the system as one of the most effective ways to leverage Department resources in support of the LAPD’s primary crime reduction mission. One significant drawback to the pilot program that will need to be addressed, however, is a set of equity and Consent Decree-related concerns that, as a result of Lieutenants coming out from behind their desks to lead the fight against crime in the field, the Sergeants underneath them shoulder more administrative burden in pilot Area police stations than do sergeants elsewhere in the City. In addition, patrol crossover among districts is problematic. An order clarifying the role and responsibilities of the Senior Lead Officers is also being reviewed.

The District Policing Pilot program will be conducted through the end of 2004 at which point a full evaluation of its impact on crime will inform a decision on whether or not to expand this program citywide.29
VEHICLE INTERVENTION INITIATIVES
Building on the reduction in vehicle pursuits brought about by creating new policies and procedures, additional changes will soon be forthcoming to expand the use of vehicle intervention techniques, such as tire deflation devices (spike strips) and “PIT” (bumping) maneuvers, for use in pursuit tactics. Tire deflation devices, as well as vehicle barricades, are being tested at certain special events and have been approved by the City Council for use at Los Angeles International Airport as a pilot program.

PUBLIC HOUSING SAFETY INITIATIVE
A memorandum of agreement with the City’s Housing Authority, authorizing officers to work overtime details in housing developments, at no cost to the Department, has been developed and approved by the Board of Police Commissioners and the City Council’s Public Safety Committee. This agreement, which will allow deployment of significant uniform resources to public housing to improve public safety, is scheduled for consideration by the Council’s Budget & Finance Committee at the time of this writing.

HOMICIDE / ASSAULT INITIATIVE
Despite the 21.3% decline in homicides in 2003, the City’s homicide rate last year was still more than twice the national average. And as of October 19, 2004, homicide was the only Part I crime not to decrease significantly (-0.24%) compared to the comparable period last year, even while shootings were down 4%. The Homicide/Assault Initiative is developing effective tactics to swiftly, assertively, effectively, and lawfully investigate these crimes. The mission is not only to more effectively solve these violent crimes, but also to prevent them.

ILLEGAL GUNS INITIATIVE
The widespread availability of illegal guns, and the sense of impunity on the part of many people who carry them, is behind much of the violence in Los Angeles. The Illegal Guns Initiative is developing tactics that target and apprehend those involved in the distribution and sale of illegal guns, as well as reduce any sense of impunity among those who possess these illegal weapons — seizure of 388 firearms from one individual on September 17, 2004, illustrates the success of this strategy.
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

The narcotics problem in Los Angeles is widespread and to significant degree, gang driven. To confront this dynamic, the Narcotics Division (ND) has developed a multi-pronged approach to narcotics enforcement. The ND Major Violators Section (MVS), in collaboration with federal and other law enforcement agencies, seizes large quantities of drugs ($121.2 million in 2004 through July, or 67% of the total street value seized by the Department) with relatively few arrests – 369 in 2004 through July. Frustratingly, such large seizures have done little to drive down street supply or drive up street drug prices in Los Angeles, perhaps because some, perhaps most, of these seized drugs were destined for other markets in the country. In view of this, the Narcotics Division also employs an undercover Buy Team to discourage would-be sellers by making street-level arrests – 776 in 2004 through July. Because these undercover operations produce compelling evidence, the narcotics charges that result produce a high rate of court convictions. The Narcotic Enforcement Details (NED) in the Area Gang Impact Teams (GIT) round out the strategy by responding to community complaints, making half as many arrests per officer as the Buy Team but seizing about 6.5 times as much drugs in street value. 35

Given that narcotics commerce is at the root of many violent crimes as well as a deterioration of quality of life in many neighborhoods, the Narcotics Enforcement Initiative will be refined to more assertively suppress this illegal commerce. The centerpiece of this change will be new practices that ensure that MVS, the Buy Team, and NED work more closely together in coordinating activities and gathering and sharing intelligence. And, in view of the fact that patrol officers make 75% of all narcotics arrests,36 consideration will be given to providing all patrol officers narcotics enforcement training. The people of Los Angeles, especially those who live in drug-infested neighborhoods, have the need and the right to expect that the LAPD will always respond immediately to their reports of neighborhood drug activity.

YOUTH CRIME INITIATIVES

The work of the Juvenile Division focuses on child abuse and exploitation, juvenile narcotics enforcement, and training and evaluating other Department entities on juvenile-related policies and procedures. The Juvenile Division also supervises the Department’s magnet school and youth programs. Currently, 131 sworn personnel are authorized...
and 105 officers are deployed. Recently, the Juvenile Division realigned its mission to focus on Part I crime reduction working directly with Area stations, specifically Area detectives, to target the most criminally active ten percent of juvenile suspects. The Juvenile Division is balancing this “ten percent” approach with the longer-term goal of steering first-time youth offenders away from a life of crime.37

- Juvenile Coordinators, established within Area detective units two years ago, comprise a critical link between Area patrol officers, who handle the majority of juvenile arrests, and expert knowledge within the Juvenile Division. This knowledge exchange is intermittent in practice, however, and will receive additional attention, so that patrol officers may keep abreast of the latest changes in juvenile policy and juvenile crime trends.

- Consideration is being given to working with Probation on a “soft-knock” program – knocking on the doors of juveniles who are on probation but not going to school, which is required.

- Consideration is also being given to implementing new practices that will improve collaboration between the Juvenile Division and the Area’s Gang Impact Teams (GITs) in sharing information on juveniles and coordinating enforcement actions to suppress juvenile criminal activities.

Juvenile Narcotics Section officers in plain clothes made 547 juvenile and 146 adult arrests through August 2004, an increase over last year of 67% and 38%, respectively. The School Investigation Buy Unit, which addresses drug selling in the Los Angeles Unified School District, made 107 arrests in Spring 2004.38

Through August this year, the Juvenile Division has maintained an 83% case clearance rate, with a goal of 85%, and an 89% criminal filing rate, exceeding its goal of 80%.39

**DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INITIATIVE**

Child and spousal abuse accounts for more than a quarter of all violent crimes in the City. Abuse breeds more abuse and other violence. Children in households where domestic violence is common may turn to gangs as family substitutes. Abused children often grow up to
become abusers themselves. Adult victims often are trapped in a cycle of repeated abuse driven by intimidation, co-dependence, or lack of mobility. The Domestic Violence Initiative is developing tactics in conjunction with social service agencies for effective intervention, and for protection and support of victims, in domestic violence cases.

**SEX CRIMES INITIATIVE**
The heinous crimes of rape, forced sodomy, and sexual abuse of children, leave life-long mental scars on victims that often far exceed any physical harm done by these assaults. The Sex Crimes Initiative, propelled by a major reorganization of sex crime units and increased collaboration with rape crisis organizations such as the Santa Monica Rape Crisis Treatment Center, is developing tactics to enhance investigations of stranger and serial rapes, family sexual abuse, and other sex crimes capitalizing on recent developments in DNA analysis to identify sexual predators.

**CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**
The total Part I crime case clearance rate for the First Half 2004 was 27.5%, up from 24.2% for the same period in 2003. These rates compare to 21.1% of Part I crimes cleared for the full year 2001, 18.4% in 2002, and 23.5% in 2003. This increase in the clearance rate can be attributed to continuous improvement in detective operations citywide. Strategies and tactics, including the Compstat process, focus on debriefing arrestees, the expansion of detective-initiated arrests, an increase in number of search warrants, re-assignment and refocusing of detective resources, and the use of specialized units such as the Gang Impact Teams, have resulted in higher clearance rates in nearly all crime categories.

LAPD detectives must investigate every case assigned to them, even those thought to have low solvability potential, a fact that has produced a significant backlog in case clearances. At the end of May 2003, that backlog stood at 10,664 cases. As of the end of June 2004, the number had been cut by almost half to 5,589. This was achieved by the realignment of detective resources with the detective reorganization in June 2003 resulting in greater operational efficiencies, specific backlog task forces, improved communications with the City Attorney and District Attorney offices, and a renewed command emphasis on

“With police resources overtaxed, its difficult to commit detectives to older cases. Yet each unsolved case gives lawlessness and street justice further momentum, making fresh cases harder to crack. A long-term decline in homicides will require money and sustained political will.”

– Prof. Eric Monkkonen, UCLA
“Getting Away with Murder in South L.A.’s Killing Zone,” L.A. Times, January 1, 2004

**THE CRIMINAL CASE CLEARANCE RATE IS IMPROVING. THE CASE BACKLOG HAS BEEN CUT IN HALF.**
the importance of a timely investigation of all cases with workable leads. The backlog volume remains significant, however, and could persist to some degree for some time at the present detective staffing level.\textsuperscript{41}

**CALLS FOR SERVICE**

Dispatched calls for service (CFS) provide a good indicator of demand placed on police personnel and resources.\textsuperscript{42} With some success, the City is making efforts to reduce the percentage of calls that result in dispatches. In 2003, Mayor Hahn introduced a 3-1-1 information system, and calls to 9-1-1 that are not police-related are now being transferred to 3-1-1. Also, 9-1-1 operators today are spending more time with the caller to identify the true purpose of the call and to determine if dispatch is actually necessary. Weeding out those calls that do not require immediate police assistance both speeds up response times for true emergencies and frees more officer-time for proactive policing.

Calls necessitating a Code Three response, that is where there is an immediate or potential threat of loss of life, rose 17.1\% between 1999 and 2003. In the first Half 2004, however, calls that require a Code Three response were down 20.6\% from the comparable year ago period.

**LAPD CALLS FOR SERVICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total 9-1-1 Calls</th>
<th>Total Dispatched</th>
<th>% Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,712,560</td>
<td>842,317</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,854,149</td>
<td>887,985</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,792,721</td>
<td>970,597</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,813,143</td>
<td>890,835</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,854,448</td>
<td>864,904</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st H. 2004</td>
<td>887,281</td>
<td>421,067</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD
In May 2004, the Department revised its procedure for prioritizing emergency calls, eliminating the Code Two-High category that did not allow officers to utilize their lights and sirens in the course of their response. Many emergency calls formerly designated Code Two-High are now dispatched as Code Three, where lights and sirens can be used.

This policy change has led to a significant 33% drop in response time. By the end of the First Half 2004, response time to emergency calls for service averaged 6.6 minutes, surpassing the eight-minute goal set at the beginning of 2004.43

LAPD CFS PRIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Code 3</th>
<th>Code 2</th>
<th>Code 1</th>
<th>% Code 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>187,093</td>
<td>361,546</td>
<td>293,678</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>199,899</td>
<td>369,120</td>
<td>318,966</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>208,370</td>
<td>379,176</td>
<td>320,051</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>218,128</td>
<td>374,722</td>
<td>297,985</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>218,997</td>
<td>361,378</td>
<td>284,529</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1H '04</td>
<td>86,987</td>
<td>154,692</td>
<td>150,078</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD
Code 3: an immediate or potential threat of the loss of life;
Code 2: emergency calls of an urgent nature but where loss of life is not being threatened;
Code 1: police response is required but not needed immediately (e.g., not life threatening or urgent);
FALSE BURGLAR ALARM CALLS

The LAPD must respond to every alarm call. The high number of false alarms drains and debilitates police resources.

Burglar alarm calls, although slowly decreasing as a percentage of total dispatched calls for service, still represent over 12% of all calls. More than 93% of these alarm calls are false alarms, a percentage that has remained relatively constant over recent years.44

The LAPD has estimated it spends $11.1 million annually responding to false alarms.45

LAPD BURGLAR ALARM CALLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Alarm Calls</th>
<th>Total False Alarms</th>
<th>% False Alarm Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>142,672</td>
<td>130,780</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>133,294</td>
<td>122,012</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>129,202</td>
<td>118,898</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>125,076</td>
<td>114,420</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>121,973</td>
<td>112,146</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>107,642</td>
<td>101,061</td>
<td>93.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Los Angeles Police Commission Investigation Division dispatched calls.

In an attempt to deal with the false alarm problem, the Los Angeles Police Commission proposed to the City Council a Verified Response Alarm policy for the LAPD. This policy would require that “a burglar alarm be verified by private guard response, remote video electronic monitoring, or an eyewitness confirmation of potential criminal activity from the homeowner, business proprietor, or other responsible party.”46 The police would not respond to any address that had two or more
false alarms within a 12-month period without such verification. In late September 2004, the City Council unanimously approved an alternative policy that would fine homeowners and businesses $115 for the first false alarm with the fine increasing by $50 for each subsequent false alarm.47

**LAPD DEPLOYMENT**

With limited manpower and vehicular resources, the LAPD is struggling to maintain the delicate balance between deploying officers for reactive 9-1-1 response and deploying officers for proactive crime suppression.

**AREA DEPLOYMENT**

Bolstering enforcement strength at the Area level to increase greater police presence on the streets has long been one of the LAPD’s primary goals.

- The creation of Gang Impact Teams (GIT) in 2003 has allowed nearly 400 officers to be redeployed within the 18 LAPD Areas for gang suppression duties.48

- The number of officers assigned to the Areas today represents nearly two-thirds of the total Department. But this total does not account for those officers on military leave, sick leave, or light duty status. When those officers are excluded from the deployment analysis, the percentage of total officers available for Area deployment drops to 54%.

- The LAPD has instituted “force multiplier” deployment days in which all officers and detectives assigned to administrative positions within the Offices of Support Services, Human Resources, and Operations now must work two days each deployment period in field operations to supplement patrol. These resources are flexibly deployed to Areas that display certain crime patterns or problems.

**LAPD AREA DEPLOYMENT, SWORN PERSONNEL AS OF JUNE 26, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>3,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detectives</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIT</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Area Duties</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick / IOD / loans / Military etc.</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AREA DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>4,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ASSIGNED</td>
<td>5,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD Compstat Section.
Because of understaffing, detectives do not work between 2:00 AM and 6:00 AM each day, although some are on call during these hours to respond to homicides and other serious incidents. The speed of response by detectives during these early morning hours, however, remains slow. To address this problem, the Detective Bureau is considering options that would provide for around-the-clock detective deployment.

**NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT**

Understaffing also handicaps narcotics enforcement. At the end of the First Half 2004, only 308 officers were assigned to the Narcotics Division, just 3% of LAPD budgeted strength, a lower percentage than in most other large city police departments which have more deployment flexibility because of much greater force strength relative to population and land area. Even more problematic, the LAPD has only one undercover Buy Team for the entire city, limiting the Department’s ability to visibly impact drug selling on the street and also “turn” sellers to inform on their suppliers. The LAPD would like to increase the number of Buy Teams for deployment as needed citywide, but the freeze on promotions has made finding adequately experienced supervision difficult. Despite these challenges, the LAPD increased narcotics arrests in 2003 by 57.2% over 2002. But narcotics enforcement remains primarily a patrol function because of the small size of the Narcotics Division; patrol officers make 75% of all narcotics arrests.49

**WARRANTS ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT**

The backlog of outstanding felony fugitive warrants is increasing. As of August 31, the backlog stood at 18,040 of which 938 were warrants for homicide and attempted homicide.

At the end of April, the latest date for which backlog numbers can be compared to previous years, the overall backlog was approximately 49% greater than it was one year before, and 70% greater than in 2002. The number of outstanding homicide and attempted homicide warrants, however, was down 2.9% compared to 2003 and 3.8% compared to 2002.

There are about 86,000 more felony warrants in the Los Angeles County Warrant System.
In addition to felony warrants, the LAPD has about 500,000 misdemeanor warrants to clear but lacks the resources to pursue these wanted people except those whose involvement in more serious crimes is suspected.

Warrant service has received more attention under Chief Bratton, and officer activity has increased, but felony warrants are increasing faster than can be served by the current number of Section investigators.

Warrant service is shared by the Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS) and detectives (both centralized and Area-based). The primary burden, however, falls on FWS investigators who serve warrants for narcotics-related offenses, approximately 55% of all outstanding felony warrants currently.

The Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS) has 28 investigators citywide who serve warrants; this is an increase of ten investigators since this time last year, but only half the number from three years ago; some former FWS investigators currently work to comply with Consent Decree mandates.

In 2003, the 800 Area detectives citywide, struggling to reduce high case backlogs as a priority, served only 100 warrants for homicide and an additional 459 felony arrest warrants of all other types, amounting to less than one warrant per detective annually.

Apprehension of wanted fugitives is an obvious way to quickly lower crime, yet higher demands on the utilization of scarce police resources means that assigning warrant service its due priority is not feasible without an increase in force size.

**RE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS**
Other deployment changes have been made to address operational priorities in the context of an understaffed Department.

- The Department is streamlining the manner in which incoming telephone calls for complaints, tips, media requests, and so on are managed after hours. The Department is considering redeploying to the field at least half of the sworn staff of the Command Post, a 24-hour communications hub (adjoining one of the City’s 9-1-1 call centers) that receives incoming information of an urgent nature. Representatives (PSRs), who work just outside this office and are trained to field 9-1-1 calls, would replace the sworn officers.
• In response to the Consent Decree’s mandate that the LAPD deal more effectively in engagement with the mentally ill, 16 new positions have been created in both the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU), which tracks officer interactions with individuals who have mental disorders, and the System-wide Mental Assessment Response Team (SMART), the unit that handles mental evaluations in the field. MEU and SMART are now operational seven days a week for 20 hours each day. Because of this, the Department is better positioned to comply with provisions of the Consent Decree that require MEU notification when people believed to have mental illnesses are detained against their will. SMART teams, which consist of one police officer and one clinician from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, bring specialized expertise to better help the mentally ill. In addition, these Teams save time for front-line patrol officers estimated to be between 280 and 430 hours a month.53

• 14 of 20 positions within D.A.R.E. (the national Drug Abuse Resistance Education program) have been reassigned to the above mentioned SMART initiative. Studies cited by the U.S. Department of Justice have questioned the effectiveness of D.A.R.E. in reducing crime.

• The eight-position unit assigned to maintaining the Narcotics Information Network (NIN) was cut. The function of the Network, which safeguards undercover operations by eliminating police assignment conflicts that could expose an officer’s cover, is now handled by the Western State Information Network (WSIN), a project of the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LACRCIC, and also known as L.A. Clear), a resource on crime-fighting efforts for the region’s law enforcement agencies including the LAPD. In essence, this shift eliminates a system within the LAPD that was a direct duplication of the services provided by L.A. Clear.
SUPPORT SERVICES

Civilian vacancies also handicap the LAPD’s ability to optimize critical crime support services, especially in the areas of evidence collection, evidence identification, and records entry. The civilian staff has not been at full strength in more than eleven years. At the end of the First Half 2004, the LAPD had 555 vacant civilian positions of 3,583 authorized.54

The LAPD has had difficulty hiring qualified people to staff these positions. Low salaries have been cited by some as a reason for high attrition and the inability to hire, although salaries are thought to be comparable to equivalent jobs in other local municipalities. Whatever the cause, the City’s hiring freeze in effect from October 2003 through August 2004 has exacerbated the problem. The result is that many essential functions normally handled by civilian personnel have to be performed by uniformed officers, at much higher cost, officers many of whom would otherwise be assigned to enforcement duties.

FINGERPRINT SEARCHES

Prints obtained from violent crimes in active cases have a target turn-around time of thirty days for examination; and because solving violent cases is a high priority, the Scientific Investigation Division (SID) is meeting this timeframe. Due primarily to staffing shortages, however, and in part to slow computer connection speeds that have recently been corrected, backlogs remain in a number of categories. Around 6,000 latent prints from cold cases of violent crimes prior to 1986, many of them unsolved homicides, have not been run through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (LAFIS). SID will enter any of these cold cases on a “request only” basis.

SID has a similar cold case backlog of 6,880 latent prints from property crimes for 2001 and 2002 which have not been entered into LAFIS. All of the 2003 property crimes, however, have been run through LAFIS. The 2004 backlog of cases at the end of June 2004 numbered 2,285 automated searches and 128 manual comparisons. Attention to the backlog is focusing on more recent crimes. The backlog from the oldest property crimes will be administratively cleared when these crimes reach the three-year statute of limitations.
There has been an increase in the automated search backlog of more than 800 latent prints to be entered into LAFIS in just the past three months. This backlog is mainly attributable to the implementation of a new technology that allows for the first time automated reading of palm prints, approximately 40% of all print lifts. Prints previously unreadable can now be read, increasing the backlog in the short term but solving more crimes in the long term.

• SID, currently, has open positions for four latent print specialists and two supervisors. To eliminate the current backlog, SID has requested additional positions to allow four technicians on the morning watch to focus solely on LAFIS examinations of already-lifted fingerprints.55

NARCOTICS ANALYSES
Narcotics analyses are not currently backlogged, due in part to effective coordination with the District Attorney’s office to streamline filing requirements. The crime lab averages about 370 cases each week, up from 250 last year. s6

FIREARMS EXAMINATIONS
There was a backlog of firearms examinations numbering 2,113 as of June 30, 2004, as well as more than 1,700 images that have yet to be run through the NIBIN (National Integrated Ballistics Information Network) system.

A new program – “Walk-in Wednesday” – has helped reduce the Firearms Analysis Unit backlog. However, the success of the program and its emphasis at Compstat has increased the demand for service. Detectives make appointments with the Firearms Analysis Unit to personally deliver firearms and other evidence that they deem top priority. In most instances, these are gang-related cases and approximately half of them result in “hits” within the system. The program also relieves the Firearms Analysis Unit’s overhead cost of case prioritizing, evidence handling, and tracking the chain of custody to protect evidence integrity.

• Currently, one vacant Firearms Examiner and five vacant Criminalist positions contribute to the delays in processing firearms evidence. To meet current and emerging needs, the Firearms Analysis Unit has requested these positions and two additional Criminalists to be budgeted in FY2005/06.
• Compounding this problem, training new firearms examiners requires two years.57

DNA ANALYSES
As of June 30, 2004, there was a backlog of approximately 250 screen and profiling serology cases, with an additional 87 cold cases, mostly homicides. SID counts their backlog according to the number of cases specifically presented for analysis by detectives, although the total amount of DNA evidence that has been collected during the course of investigations may be greater. Analyzing evidence contained in every case containing possible body fluids would be cost prohibitive, and many cases can be closed without the need for DNA analysis.

With the City’s hiring freeze over, SID plans to outsource fewer backlogged cases after filling and training employees for the seven vacant Criminalist and four vacant Laboratory Technician positions.58

NEW REGIONAL CRIME LAB
A regional crime lab to be shared by the LAPD, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and Cal State / LA is currently under construction and is scheduled for completion by December 2006. This new crime lab is expected to relieve some congestion currently experienced in SID. Once the new facility is occupied and SID is fully staffed with trained analysts, the Criminalistics Laboratory will be in a position to effectively tackle the reduction of existing backlogs in the Serology/DNA and Firearms Analysis Units.59

RECORDS ENTRY
Scarce Department resources have produced a serious data entry backlog. Priority in handling records management is given to data mandated by law and the Consent Decree.

• Field Data Reports (FDRs), that collect data intended to identify signs of racial profiling, are required by the Consent Decree and are given data entry priority. FDRs are completed during motor vehicle and pedestrian stops, and describe the officer’s motivation for conducting the stop, and search if it occurs, along with the officer’s perception of the individual’s apparent ethnicity.
Field Interview (FI) cards, on the other hand, that document all police/public contacts that do not result in an arrest or citation, and provide critical crime-fighting intelligence such as suspect and vehicle descriptions, are not required by law or Consent Decree and, therefore, do not receive data entry priority. As a result, there has been an enormous backlog in entry of FI data into the LAPD records system since the end of 2002. Only 3,641 Field Interviews for the full year 2003, and 4,848 for 2004 through the third week in July, have been entered into the system, compared to 77,695 Field Interviews for the full year 2002. This difference stems from the fact that only four records entry clerks have been handling the task of data entry, and are overwhelmed. The total FI card entry backlog of more than 281,000 cards would take them more than six years to eliminate. The difficulty the Department has had in the past in hiring civilian staff, the recent City hiring freeze, and the need to assign most records personnel now working at the Department to higher priority needs (such as entering the half million citations issued each year in addition to Consent Decree mandated data) have combined to make the Field Interview records backlog an intractable problem at this time.

One solution to this backlog going forward is Portable Officer Data Devices (PODDs). PODDs are designed to use technology as a “force multiplier” to reduce the burden of record entry. Officers in the field can enter information into a small hand-held device, which automatically populates relevant LAPD databases wirelessly, reducing the burden on records management personnel and the amount of lag time before investigators have access to information related to officer stops. Currently, 1,200 PODDs are available, more than half of these are in the field at any given time for use by patrol and traffic officers.

PODDs, which went into use in June 2004, have had a significant impact on the FDR entry backlog. About 70,000 FDRs per month are currently entered into the Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop database, and the vast majority is entered with PODDs. As a result, FDRs are not currently backlogged, and the Department is saving between $200,000 and $300,000 per year in SCANTRON costs alone.
• PODDs are also designed to handle Field Interview (FI) data. Once more PODDs are available, FI data entry on PODDs may become mandatory. If that were to occur, the Department would be able to quickly obtain the valuable crime-fighting intelligence from Field Interviews and avoid perpetuating the FI backlog. One potential problem with using PODDs to enter FI data, however, is that officers feel less able to observe their surroundings and a suspect they are interviewing while typing information into the PODD. The Department is reviewing the issue of the current FI backlog in order to determine its disposition. Influencing this discourse is the fact that Field Interview cards have a “shelf life,” after which the information they contain is unlikely to benefit investigators.

• PODDs also have the capacity to process citations, but the law requires that individuals who are stopped by the police receive a printed receipt for their traffic ticket, and patrol cars are not currently equipped with printers.

**DEPARTMENT MANUAL**

The Department Manual is difficult to use, difficult to update, and below the standard of most manuals used by large city police departments. In short, it is not very user-friendly. In addition, it does not highlight critical policing tasks, such as use of force, or emphasize expectations of behavior based on the Department’s core values. Instead, it simply amasses thousands of rules, procedures, audits, and processes in a voluminous tome of more than 600 pages. The Department Manual needs to be thoroughly revised to eliminate the unnecessary, simplify the complex, stress the critical, and clarify expectations. But this may have to wait until additional staff can be hired. There are 21 people in the Planning and Research Division (PRD) assigned to the Herculean task of just updating the manual, three people short of authorized strength.