PRIORITY 2: COMPLIANCE WITH CONSENT DECREE

ACTION MANDATES

On June 15, 2001, the City of Los Angeles negotiated a voluntary agreement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to DOJ’s allegations accusing the LAPD of “engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests, and unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” Specifically, DOJ noted “serious deficiencies” in the training, supervision, investigations, and discipline of officers, and said the LAPD failed “to identify and respond to patterns of at-risk officer behavior.” The Police Commission and Chief Bratton have made reform of the LAPD in all these areas a top priority and have made substantial progress toward that goal.

According to DOJ, LAPD supervisors at times failed to direct, evaluate, or monitor officer performance in the field adequately. This failure in direct supervision created an environment where some officers engaged in misconduct with neither intervention nor detection by LAPD supervisors.

• The Consent Decree has become a central aspect of the LAPD’s comprehensive program to provide the maximum level of protection and service possible, and do so with the highest ethical standards. As noted by the Independent Monitor, however, problems achieving compliance with several action mandates continue to exist – most notably, investigations of Categorical Uses of Force, and TEAMS II, the risk management tracking system designed to capture all activity required by the Consent Decree. Overall, however, the Monitor and the Department remain optimistic that full compliance, with the exception of TEAMS II, will be achieved by the 2006 target date:
“CLEARLY, IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT ENVISIONED BY THE CONSENT DECREE, A FIRM COMMITMENT AT THE TOP OF THE DEPARTMENT IS REQUIRED. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS FIRM COMMITMENT IS IN PLACE. THE CHALLENGE REMAINS TO IMBUE THAT COMMITMENT THROUGHOUT BOTH MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT AS A WHOLE. THE PROCESS IS ON-GOING AND CONSTANTLY EVOLVING, BUT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL ULTIMATELY BE SUCCESSFUL.”

– Report of the Independent Monitor for the Quarter ending June 30, 2004

- Compliance with the Consent Decree, it has been estimated, will cost the City of Los Angeles $34 million in amortized costs of required computer systems, such as TEAMS II, over the five-year implementation period, as well as additional personnel costs.

Chief Bratton has often stated that one of his three highest priorities is timely and complete compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree.

- The Chief has established a separate Bureau (the Consent Decree Bureau, or CDB) solely dedicated to ensuring that the LAPD complies with the mandates of the Consent Decree under the leadership of Gerry Chaleff, a prominent criminal defense attorney, co-author of the Consent Decree, and former Police Commission President. Chief Chaleff, a civilian with a rank equivalent to the sworn rank of a Deputy Chief, reports directly to the Chief of Police.

- Prior to April 2003, the LAPD ran its officer-involved shooting, anti-corruption, and internal affairs investigations operations separately. In April 2003, the Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) was created and its size increased to 271 deployed sworn personnel, unifying all of these components, with a common purpose of preventing and investigating internal wrongdoing, under one command. As of this year, the restructured Bureau includes a new Force Investigation Division (45 filled positions as of September 3, 2004) with a redefined and dedicated mission to improve investigation of Officer Uses of Force and Officer-Involved Shootings. The LAPD accepts all public complaints of these types, as well as all others, and is conducting integrity tests of all Department units to ensure that complaints are actually being taken and investigated.

“TIMELY AND COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH ALL MANDATES OF THE CONSENT DECREE IS ONE OF MY THREE HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR THIS DEPARTMENT.”

– William J. Bratton
The LAPD is confident that the establishment of CDB and restructuring of PSB will positively influence crime-fighting efforts:

- A higher level of professionalism and greater productivity are resulting from monitoring police behavior to ensure that highest standards are maintained.

- High ethical standards and practices are being institutionalized as a result of proactive auditing of high-risk positions and activities to ensure compliance with state law.

- As a result of enhanced training for supervisors and managers, risk management issues are being identified and addressed long before they become problems.

Audits currently conducted by Consent Decree Bureau staff look, in an objective manner, for conduct that could indicate improper policing, the so called “Rampart triggers.” This information is then shared with the proactive elements of the Professional Standards Bureau for immediate review and field follow-up with integrity tests. It is anticipated that by July of 2006 when full compliance with the Consent Decree is achieved, these audit and inspection functions of the Consent Decree Bureau will be transferred to the expanded and comprehensive Professional Standards Bureau.

**COMPLIANCE PROGRESS**

Bureaus, Areas, and Divisions have substantial authority to choose and implement their own strategies to achieve Consent Decree compliance by June 2006, and are being trained and held accountable for those decisions through audits and at Compstat meetings.

- Mandatory meetings are being held with Consent Decree Bureau staff, Area and Bureau command staff, and the commanding officers of divisions and specialized units.

- Each Area now has its own Consent Decree Coordinator who has the authority to affect change within the Area in order to achieve Consent Decree compliance.
• The Consent Decree Bureau will continue to provide the Bureaus, Areas, and Divisions with the resources they need, including training and feedback on audit results. The Bureau will also issue Department notices explaining any compliance problems, reports to the Director of the Office of Operations and Bureau heads, and in Compstat meetings. Monthly training on compliance strategies will be given to Area command personnel and Consent Decree coordinators.

• The Consent Decree Bureau is implementing recommendations for changes in compliance strategies based on weekly inspections that the Civil Rights Integrity Division (CRID) and geographic Bureau Gang Coordinators (BGCs) are conducting.

• Emphasis on the Consent Decree within L.A. Compstat meetings is being increased each month, with additional compliance requirements included in discussions as Areas implement compliance-achieving procedures outlined elsewhere in this Plan. Special L.A. Compstat sessions are held specifically for the Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) and the Force Investigation Division (FID) to address these operational issues.

Through the use of command emphasis, training, tracking, and accountability, the Office of Operations has made emphatically clear that failure to achieve full compliance with the Consent Decree will not be tolerated. With this focus, deficient commands have been improved, and progress with all commands continues.

• A report card system has been implemented to grade Areas on compliance based on data derived from inspections and audits by the Civil Rights Integrity Division.

On June 15, 2004 the Department completed its third year under the Consent Decree. The Federal Monitor believes that as of June 30, 2004, the LAPD has complied with 94 of the Decree’s 152 provisions, and has yet to achieve compliance with 47 provisions. The Monitor has withheld decision on the remaining 11. Of those 47 provisions on which the Department is not yet in full compliance, 80% compliance or better has been achieved for 17. The Department’s assessment as of September 1, 2004, indicates compliance with 128 provisions, noncompliance with 22 provisions (although with 17 of those, 80% or better compliance had been achieved), and judgment withheld on two provisions.67
Chief Bratton has expressed confidence that the Department will be in substantial compliance with nearly all provisions of the Decree by June 15, 2006. The exceptions are provisions that relate to TEAMS II, the risk management program that helps identify employees with at-risk behaviors. Because of technological complications with TEAMS II beyond the control of the Department, TEAMS II is not expected to be fully functional until mid-2005, so meeting the Consent Decree requirement of two years of substantial compliance under TEAMS II by June 15, 2006 will not be possible.

**DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM**

**COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE**

In response to concerns that the LAPD was ignoring public complaints against police officers, the LAPD, at the direction of its former chief, Bernard Parks, developed a detailed process for investigating complaints of all types against officers and especially the use of force by police officers. The current process for handling complaints is exceptionally thorough, and each complaint is reviewed by three levels of the organization: the Area or Division level, the Bureau level, and ultimately by the Professional Standards Bureau. If the allegations in a complaint are “sustained” against an officer, a fourth level of review is added: the Chief of Police.68

All complaints alleging inappropriate officer behavior are accepted and can be received by any Department supervisor, either from the complainant directly in person, over the phone, or in any form of print, even if the complainant chooses to remain anonymous.

The number of complaints reported against LAPD officers more than doubled between 1997 and 1998, and grew by half again in 2000. By 2002, compared to 2000, the number of complaints against officers decreased by 45.3%.
One reason for the decrease in complaints reported against officers in 2002 may be that officers had fewer interactions with the public, thus reducing the opportunities to generate complaints.

- Arrests of all types decreased 30.0% from 1999 through 2002.69

- The reason for the drop in arrests and contacts appears to have arisen from work slowdowns based upon a combination of officers’ lack of faith in the fairness of the disciplinary system and fear of the consequences of citizen’s complaints. As demonstrated by the Chief’s survey in October 2003:

  – 92.5% of officers agreed that “the threat of community complaints prevents LAPD officers from being proactive on the street.”

  – 89.3% agreed that “because of fear of being unfairly disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in doing their jobs.”

  – 76.7% agreed with the statement, “I am afraid that I will be punished for making an honest mistake.”

- When arrests and citations increased in 2003, the number of complaints reported against officers increased at a similar rate. Between the beginning of January and the end of June 2004, 3,009 complaints were filed against the police, an increase of 20.4% over First Half 2003. Of these, 2,392 came from outside the Department, and 617 came from within, increases of 22.3% and 13.4% respectively.70 These increases in complaints, while troubling, need to be viewed in the context of increased interactions between officers and the public. During the First Half 2004, LAPD officers made 75,219 arrests and issued 270,608 citations, up 8.4% and 18.1% respectively.71 In addition, there were tens of thousands of field interviews with the public that did not result in arrest or citation. Also contributing to the increase in complaint intake this year was the Stanley Miller flashlight-striking incident on June 23 (discussed further on in this document). Analysis shows that public complaints against the police often spike after well-publicized incidents of this nature.
The Chief of Police signs off on every act of discipline where a penalty is imposed. A unique aspect of the LAPD discipline process, however, is that the Chief is not the final arbiter of discipline for his officers. Any officer who does not accept the recommended punishment can opt for a Board of Rights hearing. In such instances, the Chief cannot increase the penalty meted out by the Board, although he may reduce the penalty at his discretion.

**INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE**

The average length of time Department-wide for investigating complaints against officers is nearing the five-month goal set by the Consent Decree. At the end of May 2003, 1,861 complaints had been open more than one year. The backlog was so serious that around 231 of these cases had exceeded the statute of limitations for processing the complaints, and officers involved in those cases could no longer be disciplined for any wrongdoing. These out-of-statute cases have been closed and a new tracking system implemented to prevent reoccurrence of this situation.

The number of complaints still open at the end of 2003 was less than half of what it was just three years prior, as the chart to the right demonstrates.

In the wake of the Rampart Scandal, the LAPD was forced to operate under an onerous and inefficient complaint investigation process. Every complaint, regardless of severity, was investigated in exactly the same way. The processes of investigating complaints and administering discipline were so cumbersome and unpredictable that many officers no longer had a clear idea of what behavior would or would not result in discipline.

Upon his appointment, Chief Bratton, working with the Police Commission, streamlined the procedure for investigating public complaints and administering discipline making it more uniform and fair.

- All public complaints have and will continue to be accepted, regardless of perceived merit, and appropriate discipline will be imposed if any officer has been found to refuse to take a complaint from a the public.
The Chief and the Police Commission revamped the burdensome complaint investigation process and enhanced operations, however, by restructuring and assigning additional personnel to the Department entity charged with investigating public complaints and officer misconduct. These changes, along with continuing reengineering of the procedures and paperwork involved in the investigative process itself, is producing quickly resolved, high-quality complaint investigations.

• The Professional Standards Bureau, under the creative and energetic leadership of Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, who was recruited from his former position as Irvine Chief of Police, has been created to include the Internal Affairs Group (IAG) and the Special Operations Division, with a consolidated surveillance process that will encompass ethics enforcement, internal surveillance, and electronic support.

• In the past, the LAPD was perceived to have failed to appropriately investigate all criminal acts committed by officers and thereafter submit the investigations to the District Attorney for possible prosecution. Indeed, past disputes between the LAPD and the various prosecutors were legend. In recognition of the highly complex legal nature of investigating police misconduct, PSB specifically structured IAG into two divisions: one to handle investigations of criminal conduct, and the other to handle investigations of administrative violations. This single move has tremendously strengthened the relationship between the LAPD Professional Standards Bureau and the various prosecutors. In practice, the IAG Classification Unit determines the nature of the investigation (criminal or administrative) and assigns the case to the appropriate division. The goal is to improve complaint classification, investigation, and adjudication. If the Classification Unit cannot decide what type of investigation is needed, the determination is made after a consultation with the District Attorney's Office.

• Board of Rights hearings are the sole vehicle for removing officers from the Department. The Department has concluded that the Board of Rights process is best used efficiently when reserved for the most severe cases of officer misconduct – when seeking to remove an individual rather than trying to impose a penalty beyond the 22 days maximum suspension the Chief of Police may impose. With this philosophy in place, the total number of Board of Rights
hearings has steadily decreased, from 203 involving sworn personnel in 1999 to 95 in 2003, a 53.2% drop. The cost savings of this policy is substantial: a 30.5% reduction in total cases between 2002 and 2003 saved the city an estimated $3.69 million. The number of officers choosing to utilize the Board of Rights process has decreased 46% during this same period. Officers on the whole have become more accepting of recommended discipline imposed by the Department.

• The Police Department and the Police Commission initiated the Alternate Complaint Resolution (ACR) mediation process in 2003 to bring complaints of a minor nature not involving serious officer misconduct to a speedy resolution, thereby freeing up time for more serious complaint and disciplinary investigations. In cases where officers readily admit to having made a mistake, the Chief of Police may choose to reward their decisions to take responsibility for their actions by reducing the severity of the discipline. Eighty-two settlements have been made since November 2003, and more officers facing discipline appear willing to enter into settlements with the Department. These settlements provide absolute closure to the discipline process – both the officer involved and the Department are precluded from bringing future proceedings.

UNCOVERING POLICE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT
Prior to the Consent Decree, the LAPD lacked proactive anti-corruption initiatives. To remedy this problem, the Ethic Enforcement Section (EES) was created in 2001 as a requirement of the Consent Decree. EES, responsible for the integrity audits, has increased its operational tempo dramatically with more detailed planning, proactive targeting, and intelligence gathering. EES conducts one type of administrative integrity audit, or sting, and two types of criminal integrity audits.

Administrative integrity audits are directed primarily at the question of whether officers are appropriately taking citizen complaints. This is a key "check" on whether complaint incidence is accurately measured and tracked.

The criminal integrity audits comprise both random and targeted efforts. Random stings are conducted to ensure that officers are not engaged in illegal misconduct; specifically many of these tests are designed around problems found as a result of the Rampart Corruption Probe.
These pro-active measures ensure that such illegal behavior does not repeat itself. Targeted stings, sometimes in partnership with the FBI, ferret out corruption when malfeasance is suspected. These audit-specific officers have come to the Department’s attention in a myriad of ways – supervisor tip, anonymous call, paper audit, etc.

A principal early warning tool to signal police corruption and other misconduct will be the implementation of the TEAMS II system, as required by the Consent Decree, the key element of which is the Risk Management Information System (RMIS). Implementation of the TEAMS II system has been delayed because of the complexities of integrating stand-alone LAPD databases and instituting the necessary security requirements, a consequence of the Department’s outdated technology.

To enhance investigations of police corruption, the Department has forged closer ties with the District Attorney, the United States Attorney, and the FBI’s Public Corruption Section.

**Use of Force Policies and Procedures**

The public’s perception of the LAPD has been shaped in part by the Rodney King videotape and news accounts of the Rampart scandal, incidents where LAPD officers were seen to have employed excessive force. Indeed, public concern about the LAPD often centers on the issue of force: whether officers use lethal and non-lethal force in accordance not only with what is allowed by law, but with the restraint that a democratic society expects of its police. There are provisions at the heart of the Consent Decree to reform the ways in which the Department uses force, investigates its use, and disciplines officers who use inappropriate force.

The first challenge for the Department is to fashion strict but sensible rules to control use of force and to make them consistent with the harsh realities of the dangers on the street – there are often daily needs to use force. The second challenge is to strike an appropriate balance...
between the need for thorough force investigations and the competing time-intensive demands of proactive crime fighting.

Today, the LAPD employs rigorous use of force (UOF) policies addressing 22 different subjects. Officers receive training in 29 separate courses regarding use of force. All supervisors have completed training in conducting use of force investigations.

**USE OF FORCE POLICY**

Sections 835(a) and 196 of the California Penal Code, along with individual case law, govern when and how police officers may use force. Department policies and unwritten administrative philosophy further affect LAPD’s approach to uses of force in practice. For example, Department policy on shooting at moving vehicles has long stated that officers should refrain from doing so unless they feel that their lives are in immediate peril.\(^76\) In light of controversial use of force earlier this year in which a suspect backing his car toward officers was shot and killed, the Department will more carefully scrutinize such cases and is contemplating a more restrictive policy that would require officers to carry out or consider a prescribed list of alternatives prior to using deadly force against a suspect in a vehicle who is threatening their lives.\(^77\)

Also, the Department seeks to provide officers with technology and training that allow them to minimize injury to suspects. The Department increased the number of TASERs available in the field from 322 deployed prior to 2001 to 752 today, enough that usually every Area patrol car deployed at any given time may be equipped with a TASER. Following the Stanley Miller incident, the Department has decided to replace the current metal SL-20 flashlight with a shorter and lighter nonmetallic flashlight.\(^78\)

**USE OF FORCE REPORTING PROCESS**

Investigations of use of force by police officers are exceptionally time-consuming. Supervisors must interview all witnesses to the alleged use of force, including both civilian and sworn eyewitnesses, and complete lengthy reports detailing the investigation. Because these investigations, although necessary and important, divert scarce manpower from crime-fighting duties, efforts are being made to streamline the process. Moreover, the California Police Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBR) complicates the matter in which involved sworn officers can be questioned about using force.\(^79\)
The Office of Operations, in conjunction with the Office of Human Resources, has revised the guidelines for reporting and procedures for investigating non-categorical use of force (that is, force not threatening life), processes estimated to have taken previously 12 hours to complete in each case. The new process classifies non-categorical use of force (NCUOF) incidents in two levels. Investigation for the less-serious NCUOF incidents have been streamlined while remaining thorough and fair. The time-savings estimated for these changes will result in the annual full-time equivalent of 13 supervisors. These revisions ensure that sergeants spend more time in the field supervising operations.

Upon completion of training of all supervisors in the new procedures, the Department will seek the assistance of an outside expert to develop a comprehensive integrated order on use of force, including all related training material and post-force reporting and evaluation.

**USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS PROCESS**

In August and September of 2003, the Consent Decree Monitor identified a series of flaws in officer involved shooting investigations. The Department quickly picked up these cases and conducted detailed reviews of these investigations.

Upon being briefed on this issue, Chief Bratton directed that a thorough overhaul of the existing investigative protocols take place. After extensive interactive work with the various stakeholders (the Police Protective League, District Attorney, City Attorney, etc.) a new protocol resulted in the creation of the Force Investigation Division (FID) on August 22, 2004. As part of the Professional Standards Bureau, FID places under one chain of command both criminal and administrative use of force investigations in a bifurcated system that separates the evidence obtained through an administrative investigation, where an officer could be compelled to give information, from a criminal investigation in which compelled evidence is inadmissible in court. Previously, FID's function was shared by Internal Affairs (IA), the Criminal Incident Investigation Division (CIID), and the Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD), each issuing reports that sometimes had discrepancies or inconsistencies among them because of the different chains of command.

This new investigative protocol has been praised by outside commentators such as Merrick Bobb, a monitor for the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, as one of the most progressive and intelligent in the...
country. The operating philosophy of FID is a mixture of pragmatic realism—in the near future, the unit will no longer respond to either animal shootings or accidental, non-tactical discharges – and detailed, comprehensive investigative protocols. Past holes in the investigation process have been plugged; one example is that officers are immediately sequestered after a categorical use of force incident, which is mandated by the Consent Decree.

**USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATION IN PRACTICE**

On June 23, 2004, an LAPD officer was videotaped striking a suspected car thief, a 36-year-old African-American man, Stanley Miller, 11 times with a flashlight after some observers concluded that the suspect had surrendered. In comments regarding this incident, Chief Bratton has said, “At face value, it is disturbing. Although we will not rush to judgment.” The Chief went on to say that there are many questions, but these would be answered through protocols established by the Consent Decree. The Chief of Police and the Police Commission are investigating this case as a Categorical Use of Force. Parallel internal administrative and criminal investigations, both designed to protect the constitutional rights of the suspect, as well as the police officers involved, are being undertaken. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department has announced that it will conduct a simultaneous and independent investigation of the incident in relation to the involvement of its deputies. The process also allows the Office of the Inspector General to do the same. The LAPD is working in cooperation with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In response to this incident, Chief Bratton has ordered commanders to upgrade any borderline non-categorical use of force cases to categorical (involving blows to the head or other serious injury), thus requiring more immediate and thorough investigation.

“OUR RESPONSIBILITY NOW IS TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION, AND THIS INVESTIGATION WILL BE QUICK, THOROUGH, AND TRANSPARENT... GUIDED BY THE CONSENT DECREE, WE’RE GOING TO DO THIS RIGHT.”

— Chief William J. Bratton
USE OF FORCE REVIEW AND ADJUDICATION

The Force Investigation Division (FID) now prepares a comprehensive presentation that can be adapted and updated for use at the Use of Force (UOF) Review Board briefing. This will ensure a presentation that is comprehensive and that meets consistent standards from one incident to the next.

In the past, the first briefing/examination of the case was at the UOF board. The divisional captain was allowed to make the determination as to whether the officer returned to work or not. Under Chief Bratton, the results of the preliminary investigation must be presented to him and members of his top command staff within five days of the incident. Chief Bratton or the acting chief then makes the decision as to whether an officer should be returned to full duty or restricted duty. Recognizing the key role that the Inspector General’s Office plays, FID provides the same briefing independent of the Chief’s briefing to the IG’s staff at their office.

Changes to use of force policy and reporting, investigation, and adjudication processes are numerous. Amendments to Department procedures are being coordinated through the Chief of Staff’s office in order to keep various Department entities on the same page.81

COMMUNITY POLICING

A principal goal of the Consent Decree is to achieve greater transparency and dialogue between the Department and its stakeholders – the many diverse communities which the police serve. And much progress has been achieved by the LAPD over the past two years in its commitment to community policing. In an action designed to make the Department more transparent and to involve communities in crime fighting, L.A. Compstat meetings have often been opened to the public and the press; and these meetings have been taken into the neighborhoods. The LAPD further reached out to the City’s communities through development of additional Community-Police Advisory Boards (C-PABs), one example being the new Mental Health Community Police Advisory Board. In addition, the Chief has stressed the importance of Neighborhood Councils, and Department members regularly attend local C-PAB, Neighborhood Council, and Town Hall meetings.81

“…TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE, [MINORITY COMMUNITIES] HAD TO BE THE DIFFERENCE … I CONSIDER THIS A WATERSHED MOMENT IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO REBUILD TRUST AND STRENGTHEN OUR DEPARTMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES OF LOS ANGELES.”

— Chief William J. Bratton
meetings to outline the Police Commission’s and Chief’s agenda and seek feedback in open forum. The Chief and Police Commission have also directed that Community Policing tenets be covered in recruit and in-service training classes.

- African-American ministers and other activists, as mentioned previously, have called on their congregations and communities to protest violence directed at police officers, and to no longer withhold information from the police about crimes being committed in their neighborhoods.82

- The Los Angeles Urban League President, John Mack, and the Los Angeles Brotherhood Crusade President, Danny Bakewell, have both lauded the LAPD’s community outreach. President Mack has stated, “There has clearly been a major turning point in the relationship with the LAPD and the African American community…”83

The news media has also recognized the fruit of LAPD’s outreach to its stakeholders.

- The Los Angeles Sentinel, during Black History Month in 2004, published several articles on new partnerships being formed between African-American community groups and the LAPD.

- The Spanish language Channel 34, in partnership with the LAPD, runs occasional programs on police topics of importance or interest to the Hispanic community.

The Department still has a good deal of work ahead. Vehicle stop data indicate that when a driver is stopped and an officer makes a decision to search, Hispanics and African Americans who are stopped and not arrested are more likely to be searched than similarly situated whites, Asians and other ethnic groups.84 A consultant has been hired by the City as part of the Consent Decree to explore the degree to which these searches are racially motivated, if at all.

By building on the trust of those it is sworn to protect and serve, and with their help, the LAPD can continue to move closer to making Los Angeles the safest big city in America.
CREATING COMMUNITY-POLICE PARTNERSHIPS

A key principle of community policing that has helped communities restore order and reclaim public spaces is problem solving through public/police collaboration. For crime control and prevention measures to be successful, they must be driven by both an understanding of the nature of the crime problem, and collaboration between police and community partners to develop a comprehensive strategy that reduces and prevents crime, fear, and disorder.

Importantly, LAPD officers believe strongly that partnership with the public is essential. Responding to the Chief’s department-wide survey last October,

- 98.0% think “the community should share the responsibility for making the streets safer.”

Other cities have had success in applying community policing principles to crime control. At the same time, law enforcement, social service and treatment providers, and faith-based representatives are challenged to develop new ways of offering their services, and new links of accountability and cooperation.

THE LOS ANGELES SAFER CITY INITIATIVE

The Los Angeles Safer City Initiative, sponsored by Mayor Hahn and endorsed by the Police Commission, the members of the City Council, and Chief Bratton, is a collaborative problem-solving process among the LAPD, other government agencies, and community organizations to suppress crime and violence in high crime areas of the City. The program in each neighborhood is tactically fluid, subject to amendment as feedback is received from stakeholders about the best courses of action given local community dynamics.

Implementation of this program is underway or planned for 2004 in five sections of the City:

- Hollywood Boulevard, where a focus on prostitution enforcement has seen a 545% increase in prostitution arrests. Overall violent crime in Hollywood is down 16% and property crime is down 14% this year. Gang-related crimes are down 28%.86
• The Baldwin Village community in Southwest Los Angeles, where enforcement tactics include: 1) a LAPD Safer City Unit to restore order; 2) proactive enforcement of probation and parole compliance; and 3) proactive enforcement of quality of life conditions and prosecution of quality of life crimes. Gang and gun enforcement focuses on the most violent gang members. Also, nuisances are abated by evicting tenants from apartments for chronic narcotics activities and other criminal offenses. After establishment of the Baldwin Village program in June 2004, only one homicide was reported there that month compared with three in June 2003. Also during June 2004, robberies were down 17%, and aggravated assaults were down 9%. While placing an additional 14 officers and two supervisors in the three reporting districts that make up Baldwin Village effectively reduced crime, such a strategy can only be used sparingly: with 1,009 reporting districts in the City, responding to crime in such a manner citywide would require at least 5,381 additional personnel (but, of course, not all districts have high crime).

• The “Skid Row” section of downtown Los Angeles, a center for violent crime, drug sales, prostitution, and poor public health, places the children and homeless there at high risk for victimization. Safer City Initiative projects have yet to be implemented, but general policing has led to a perceived reduction in the number of illegal homeless encampments.

• The Panorama City area in the San Fernando Valley, where Safer City Initiatives are still in the planning process.

• MacArthur Park and the surrounding Alvarado Corridor, a part of the City that has historically been a hotbed for drug dealing, prostitution, and gang violence. A focused response to the problem since September 2003 leveraged bike patrols, foot beats, gang injunctions, undercover narcotics officers, Gang Impact Teams, mounted officers, and federal resources, with the goals of reducing homicides by 20% and Part I crimes by 5%, reducing fear, and revitalizing the community. Perhaps the most effective tactic of this program was a series of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras installed in key locations around the park. Overall crime in MacArthur Park had declined 45% by July 2004. Although some critics have charged that the cameras are simply displacing crime, in fact they were responsible for 150 arrests by July 2004.
DIVERSITY

The LAPD has worked to maintain its commitment to diversity and its Affirmative Action goals. Chief Bratton, working within budget limitations and promotion freezes, has promoted a woman and a Latino to Assistant Chief, an African-American and a Latino to Deputy Chief, and a woman and an Asian to the rank of Captain.

And since a department that seeks to be open to the community it serves should reflect the demographics of that community, the Chief has worked with the Mayor and the Police Commission to ensure that a renewed emphasis has been placed on hiring and promoting minorities and women.

• In FY 2003/2004, 26% of the 280 appointments to the Police Academy were women. Among all appointments, 43% were Hispanic, 11% were Asian, and 9% were African Americans.91

• In FY 2003/2004, 53% of the officers promoted or assigned to coveted positions were African-American, Hispanic, or Asian. And 28% were women, some of whom are included in the minority percentage.92