LAPD
STATE OF THE DEPARTMENT

PLAN OF ACTION
FOR THE LOS ANGELES THAT IS
AND THE LOS ANGELES THAT COULD BE

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CHIEF OF POLICE

OCTOBER 28, 2004
October 28, 2004

Honorable Board of Police Commissioners
150 Los Angeles Street, Room 150
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Honorable Members:

I am writing to introduce LAPD, State of the Department: A Plan of Action for the Los Angeles That Is and the Los Angeles That Could Be. These documents strive to do two very different things and in so doing, they encapsulate the best thinking of the people inside our agency and many of the residents of our city with whom I have spoken during the past two years.

The first volume describes what we inside LAPD are doing and planning to do with what we have today to make Los Angeles as safe a city as possible. This volume explains how the police officers and detectives of the LAPD achieved a 21% drop in murder last year and through the first half 2004 two-year reductions of:

- 18.2% in murder
- 15.9% in violent crime
- 8.3% in total crime

The second volume describes what LAPD would do with significantly more resources to make every neighborhood a place where families can live, work, or play without fear of gangs, violence, drugs, or intimidation.

I have been a police officer nearly all my adult life. In the military, I was an MP.
After getting back from Vietnam, I joined the Boston Police Department. Since then I have led six police departments of varying size. While working for several years in the private sector, I learned that there was one piece of unfinished business in my career: I wanted to serve in one more department to help it redeem its full potential as the agent of making a city fit for all families, regardless of race, country of origin, economic status, or geographical location. And this would require, I have long known, making certain that officers perform their work in a constitutional manner that is free of corruption, bias and brutality.

Los Angeles seemed the best possible place to make this hope a reality. I was and am grateful to Mayor James Hahn for giving me the opportunity to help implement his vision of making this the safest big city in America.

Since joining the department two years ago today, I have been focused on one job: that of rebuilding (and in some places building for the first time) trust between the LAPD and the communities it is sworn to protect and serve, while at the same time rebuilding trust between officers and their department.

When I got here, the Police Commission, Mayor Hahn, and the City Council had given us the basic tools for succeeding. During difficult economic times, they had provided pay raises, an attractive work schedule, and more police officers. Dangerous attrition of uniform strength had been stopped. The agency’s inability to hire new officers had been resolved.

Yet two years ago, the symptoms of broken trust were still widespread, if not systemic.

The 1999 Rampart scandal had reopened old wounds, outside as well as inside the department. Police abuse of power in the Rampart Division had convinced many in the community that the LAPD had not learned from the Rodney King incident or from a history of achieving law and order through estrangement from the public and what was perceived by many as orchestrated propagation of fear.
The public response to the Rampart scandal, including imposition of a court-ordered Consent Decree specifying hundreds of procedural requirements throughout the organization, triggered intended and unintended reactions inside the LAPD. The disciplinary process came down heavily on many who had committed only minor infractions, while the investigative process for potentially major infractions was neither thorough nor credible.

Police alienation led to police inaction with respect to crime fighting. After 1999, arrests fell precipitously and crime rose dramatically. By the end of 2002, murder showed a three-year rise of 54%.

Our goal was construction of a police organization, effective against crime and potential terrorist attack, that conducted itself lawfully, constitutionally, and respectfully at all times. The watchwords of this process are accountability and transparency.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

As a reflection of the fact that the first responsibility of government in a democratic society is to preserve public safety, the first responsibility of the police department to the community is to do all in our power to reduce crime, fear, and disorder.

Dramatic crime reductions have been achieved in the last two years because police officers have become much more active in making appropriate arrests. In 2003, arrests for all offenses went up 10.9%. In the first half of this year, arrests increased another 8.4%; weapons arrests went up 20.1%. Response time to emergency calls has improved significantly.

The LA Compstat system has been retooled to use weekly crime meetings to discover patterns and devise better strategies to address emerging crime problems. Backlogs in warrants, case investigations, fingerprint searches, firearms examinations, and DNA analysis are being tracked and, where possible with our scarce resources,
reduced. The Compstat unit has also striven to deliver more timely, more accurate data to and from division commands, even though LAPD’s technology remains a system in need of radical repair. Some 57 separate operational systems containing more than 400 access databases remain fragmented and disconnected. Intensive command-based Compstats and police-executive mentors are being directed at Areas where crime problems require more attention.

Except in the area of technology, the LAPD is making substantial progress towards achieving compliance with the Consent Decree. Recent tests of these changes have emerged in a number of use-of-force cases, especially one involving the use of a flashlight by an officer following the pursuit of a fleeing car-theft suspect. We are now awaiting the results of parallel internal criminal and administrative investigations, with other investigations into the matter being conducted and/or monitored by the FBI, District Attorney, the Inspector General of the Police Commission, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff. I am determined that our investigation will be thorough — and transparent. Guided by the Consent Decree, we will do this right.

At the same time, we have reformed the disciplinary system to achieve consistency and fairness, to make certain that all public complaints are thoroughly investigated and adjudicated in a timely manner, to expand the number of targeted sting operations to ferret out serious misconduct and corruption, and to broaden training on police misconduct policies. In the process of building both trust and accountability among police officers, we are also saving time and money. Between 2002 and 2003, a 31% reduction in Board of Rights hearings has saved the city an estimated $3.69 million.

Better management can save money in other areas as well. As one example, City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo recently worked with LAPD to create a program that he believes will save the city $1.9 million in court-related police overtime cost in the first six months alone.
Just as important as accountability in operational and fiscal management, though, is winning the trust of the community. By attending many community meetings and reporting on all the activities summarized above, by developing additional Community Police Advisory Boards, by opening Compstat to the public and the media, and by utilizing more effectively our Senior Lead Officers, I have tried to impose a new standard of transparency on all of LAPD’s interactions with the residents we are working to serve and protect.

While I am pleased with the progress we have begun to make, I now know that when I took the oath as Chief two years ago I understood some — but not all — of the significant obstacles to achieving our goal of creating the trust necessary inside and outside LAPD to secure every Los Angeles neighborhood.

HISTORY

Excellent sources, such as Joe Dominick’s *To Protect and to Serve*, describe how the complex history of the LAPD had embedded certain cultural attributes in the organization.

Like most big city American police departments, the LAPD was conceived in sin and born in corruption. From the late 19th century largely through the middle third of the 20th, the LAPD was used by its civilian overseers and most of its internal bosses as an instrument of private gain and social control. Specialized units like the Vice Squad, the Intelligence Squad, the Gun Squad, and the Red Squad all delivered on one or both purposes. And like other American police departments during that period, the LAPD was segregated and racist in heart, mind, and action.

During its middle years, the LAPD became something dramatically different, the nation’s first and foremost professional policing organization. This was the LAPD those of us growing up in the 1960s, even in Boston, came to admire and even hero-worship.
Starting about the time of the police recruit class of 1940, the first to wear what would become the most famous badge in the world, the LAPD systematically transformed itself into a force dedicated to the ubiquitous imposition of law and order. Police union leader and then Chief of Police William H. Parker created a department governed by meticulously detailed rules and procedures, steeped in military discipline and tactics, and distanced from civilian oversight (which he considered interference). His swarming motorcycle officers, for example, engrained in the city’s pedestrian behavior jaywalking prohibitions still rigidly observed today, long after bike officers were consumed by duties elsewhere. As the Parker years unfolded, the LAPD showed that hard work and relentless application of innovative strategies and technology could secure results far beyond what much bigger East Coast police departments would even aspire to attain.

The success of the Parker model, developed in a city of rapidly expanding diversity and population within an immense geographical area, formed a bedrock sense of distinction within the agency. The LAPD, in many respects rightfully, regarded itself as the Marine Corps of American policing. Its integrity, training, practices, rapid mobility, and relatively small size all set it apart from every other police agency in America — but also from the community it served.

The Watts riots, the Rodney King incident, including the riots following the acquittal of officers charged in response, and the Rampart scandal each spotlighted flaws in the Parker design. But in all those cases, the LAPD was counseled to take more control, select recruits more carefully, perform better and more extensive training, impose more rules and regulations to obtain lawful and respectful behavior from its officers. In short, the department understood it was being told to apply more Parker remedy, not less.

What I have learned most starkly since becoming Chief is that the LAPD is far too small to carry out its mission in every neighborhood of the city. It has never been realistically and correctly sized to succeed in making and maintaining a safe city — everywhere — through lawful and respectful policing, in which officers know they
have sufficient numbers to safely handle any emergency, protect all residents, and protect each other while they do so. This reality has inexcusably jeopardized too many of our officers in too many situations. It has also created a style of policing that sometimes has created and reinforced fear rather than trust in all concerned. As a result, this community (acting in concert with our state and national governments) must make a major decision. Are we satisfied with continued incremental progress against crime and potential terrorist threats? Or will we make the investment necessary to secure every part of Los Angeles, and not just certain parts of it?

THE GANG PROBLEM

After the turbulence of the 1960s, the gang and drug problems in Los Angeles grew out of control, though they were largely confined to certain areas of the city. Today, there are 80,000 gang members in Los Angeles County, with a majority of them in the city.

While not all gang members are violent criminals, research has shown that gang membership intensifies and expands criminal behavior. As Fr. Greg Boyle has said, “There are no good gangs.”

Over half of the city’s murders are gang-related. Despite the best efforts of all available police, some Los Angeles neighborhoods are believed by residents to be essentially ruled by gangs. Law-abiding residents of these places report that they are afraid to walk their streets or be seen even talking with police. Intimidation keeps them from reporting crimes, and serving as witnesses in court or even as effective jurors. Police officers themselves come under attack in these places. Children become victims in several ways. Sometimes they are shot and killed. Frequently they feel compelled to carry guns and even join these gangs to protect themselves or to flee the misery of their lives. And there are instances of coercion that simply must not be allowed to continue in the United States of America, particularly in a city that bears the name Los Angeles, city of angels.
Recently, I was stunned to hear that one gang leader bragged that to compel a reluctant 15-year-old boy to join his gang, the boy was shown a videotape of eleven gang members (faces hidden from the camera) raping his 13-year-old sister. I was told he joined the next day, fearing that if he did not, the gang would kill her. In their impact on the communities they regard as their own turf, violent gang members are, in fact, domestic terrorists. And they always have the potential to export their criminal actions and even organizations to other areas of the city, county, and nation — and in fact they have been gaining momentum in doing so.

SECURING EVERY STREET, BLOCK, AND NEIGHBORHOOD IN LOS ANGELES

Work done in Los Angeles and other cities has demonstrated that we know how to address the gang problem: through prevention, intervention, and enforcement. Enforcement can be fully and effectively delivered by a properly managed and resourced police department. In 2003, the presence of an additional 83 officers in 77th Division resulted in a murder reduction of 57% there. Since we have moved some of those officers elsewhere this year we have experienced a murder increase of 42% in 77th as of October 14th.

Because of the complexity of overlapping and adjacent jurisdictional boundaries (88 cities in a county where 10 million people live within nearly 1,000 square miles), we must share information and coordinate actions among all the law enforcement entities in this region. Since the Sheriff polices half of these cities and all the unincorporated areas of the county and has built a technology backbone we can use, this regional approach can be done relatively easily, with an appropriate investment in technology.

A similar approach must be taken to deal with terrorist threats to our people and infrastructure, including the twin ports that handle half the nation's trade and are the busiest in the country. Public-tips and police-observation data can be assembled and matched against crime data with a relatively small investment in new technology. But we must have the funds to deploy such readily available technologies.
The larger matter is the question of the numbers of police the city needs to secure every part of the city. National crime-fighting experts who have had major success in other cities have recommended a minimum number of nearly 16,000 police officers, rapidly hired, trained, and deployed to quell the gang problem in LA. Apart from the issue of funding what would amount to a 76% buildup of police officers in the city, the problems of finding so many qualified new recruits, training them properly, and then supervising them adequately are, in my judgment, prohibitive. Instead, I am putting before the people of this region (as well as leaders in Sacramento and Washington) what I believe it will take to protect fully and well the national asset that is Los Angeles.

Quite simply, I believe we need 3,300 new officers to achieve a uniformed strength of 12,500 (500 fewer than the number in Chicago, with a land area less than half the size of LA’s and a population 23% smaller), combined with state-of-the-art technology to eliminate unnecessary paperwork, streamline arrest processing, and instantaneously deliver appropriate crime and counter-terror information to every level and individual in the police department.

Based on my experience as head of the police departments in Boston and New York (both successful in turning crime back to the levels of my childhood), I believe that number will secure a lasting 50% reduction in murder and violent crime from the still too-high levels we see today.

Gradual growth of police staffing strength can and will be monitored to see if staffing levels smaller than the ultimate goal achieve control of the gang problem in every neighborhood, protection of police officers in all places at all times (making possible cultural embrace within LAPD of the practice of community policing), and thorough and reliable counter-terror systems - in short, realization of Mayor Hahn’s vision of the safest big city in America.

Whatever decision is made by those in charge of every relevant level of government, my commitment and that of all the other police officers of the LAPD is to do all in our power to achieve continued reductions in crime.
As I wrote nearly a decade ago: "There are not many optimists in this country. I am an optimist. An organization is always reflective of its leader, and if there is no belief at the top echelons, there will be none below. I fully believe that with able police leadership, political will, well-trained cops, and community participation, we can take back America state by state, city by city, borough by borough, block by block. And we will win."

I believed that then, and I believe that now. The unfolding success of Los Angeles is confirming it once again.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police
LAPD PLAN OF ACTION

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LAPD PLAN OF ACTION
FOR THE LOS ANGELES THAT IS

Mandate for Change

The Los Angeles Police Department is an organization of deep complexities. It has been both praised and maligned in recent times, a period of extraordinary accomplishments by many police officers overshadowed by invidious actions by a few. LAPD’s legendary tactical prowess has burnished its shield to iconic glow. Yet this tactical preeminence has had a dark side that cast a cloud over the communities the LAPD is sworn to protect, giving rise to fear and distrust.

What explains this seeming duality? The answer lies in three truths about Los Angeles that set it apart from other large American cities.

• The people of Los Angeles have long identified more with their neighborhoods than with the City as a whole. Spread over a vast geography, grappling with rapid growth, and lacking a unifying infrastructure, the City’s neighborhoods became isolated from one another and xenophobic on issues beyond their boundaries, even those important to the metropolis as a whole. Public safety is a case in point. Historically, serious crime clustered in the inner city neighborhoods, leaving other neighborhoods relatively crime free. This led to a practice of crime containment, and with it, a reluctance to give the LAPD the proper resources it needed to effectively police the entire city.

• Gangs in Los Angeles have been endemic for years. But today, gangs are spreading into formerly safe neighborhoods, into the suburbs, into the region as a whole. The City is home to 416 gangs – about 45,000 gang members,1 80,000 countywide.2 Most are engaged in criminal enterprises and violent behaviors. They are urban terrorists. More than half the homicides committed each year in the City are gang-related. Make no mistake; this is not simply gang-on-gang violence. Since 2002, at least 449 of the City’s children below the age of fifteen were shooting victims.3 Gangs hold entire neighborhoods hostage to fear. “Gangbangers” too often violently target police
officers in brazen confrontation to protect their turf, and sometimes simply to earn their colors. They are emboldened by the fact that they face few more than 9,000 officers spread thinly over this vast city.

• The LAPD has long been understaffed and overmatched by the sheer expanse of its service area. Few other major American cities with high crime have fewer officers than Los Angeles in terms of ratio to both population and land area. Compared to America's other great cities: Los Angeles has one-half the number of police officers as New York per capita, and one-sixth the number of officers per square mile. Los Angeles has one-half the number of police officers as Chicago per capita, and one-third the number of officers per square mile.4

These realities forced an under-resourced LAPD to rely on rapid mobilization and assertive tactics to fight crime when reactive response to calls for service and random patrolling were not enough. And this operational strategy produced results. From 1994 to 1999, the LAPD achieved seven straight years of crime reduction at a rate that mirrored the nation-leading crime declines in New York City, a fact gone widely unrecognized.

But a blue line stretched too thin left officers uncertain how quickly back up would arrive, and so a policing style evolved that became overly aggressive in the eyes of many Angelinos, especially in minority communities. Police behavior that had arisen in this context has been called “good cop corruption,” which describes pursuit of justice through means both illegal and unconstitutional. The laudable end goal to achieve public safety in Los Angeles had become corrupted by the means to achieve it – fear.

This aberrant behavior by a few became known to the world with the Rodney King beating in 1992, and again with the 1999 Rampart scandal. A decade of public criticism and scrutiny culminated after Rampart in the imposition of a federal Consent Decree on June 15, 2001 for civil rights abuses. In the face of public outcry and demand for accountability, LAPD officers, in response to what they viewed as an oppressive and unfair disciplinary system under which a citizen complaint, even without merit, could jeopardize their chances for promotion or special assignment, virtually stopped proactive policing. As officers’ confidence in the Department’s leadership waned, morale hit rock bottom. Arrests plummeted, and crime incidence shot up.

“STRANGER POLICING, AS DEFINED BY THE NOTABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY GEORGE KELLING, RESULTS WHEN TOO FEW ARE ASKED TO DO TOO MUCH WITH TOO LITTLE FOR TOO LONG. STRANGER POLICING CREATES A DISCONNECTION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC UNDERMINING TRUST, PARTICULARLY IN MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS.”

– Chief William J. Bratton
• LAPD officers made 30% fewer arrests in 2002 than in 1999. Arrests for violent crimes alone dropped 51% during this period.\(^5\)

Between 1999 and 2002:

• Homicides increased each year – a three-year increase of 54%. In 2002, Los Angeles recorded the most homicides of any city in America, yielding a murder rate for the City greater than three times the national average.

• When violent crime in the rest of America declined 1%, and in New York, 19%, violent crime in America's second largest city increased 10%.

• Los Angeles, in 2002, had the 20th worst violent crime rate in the nation among the 239 cities in America with populations of 100,000 or more; and the 6th worst violent crime rate among the 25 largest cities.

• In fact, crime in Los Angeles rose significantly in every serious crime category.\(^6\)

To deal with a dispirited police force and the resulting slow down in police productivity and high attrition, the Police Commission and City leaders approved a change in work schedules that allowed officers to choose between two new and popular compressed schedules, a 3-day/12-hour schedule and a 4-day/10-hour schedule. The Police Commission also moved to examine the fairness and consistency of the Department’s disciplinary system. Officers in all ranks also received pay increases as part of a contract negotiated in 2000. Underpinning these steps was the stabilizing influence that interim Chief Martin Pomeroy played in leading the Department. Response to these actions was immediate. Officer morale in all ranks improved, halting high attrition and helping Department recruiting efforts. By the end of 2002, the rate of crime increase was slowing. The platform had been laid on which organizational turnaround could be staged.

This was the LAPD that greeted William J. Bratton as its new Chief of Police on October 28, 2002. This was the City that welcomed Chief Bratton with the hope, expressed by Mayor James K. Hahn, that Los Angeles would one day become the safest big city in America.

\[^{5}\] LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PLAN OF ACTION: BOOK I

\[^{6}\] “EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES WILL BE DONE TO MAKE LOS ANGELES A SAFER CITY.”

– Chief William J. Bratton
The challenges that lay ahead, however, were formidable.

Never has the LAPD been realistically and correctly sized to succeed in its mission of making every City neighborhood safe through lawful and respectful policing. Never has the LAPD been at a size that would assure officers they have sufficient numbers to handle any emergency and protect each other while they do. This was the reality in late 2002, and this remains the reality today. On taking command, Chief Bratton vowed to work assertively with the Mayor, the Police Commission, and the City Council to find ways to increase the Department's size. But he vowed also to do everything possible to make Los Angeles a safer city with the resources he had – and to do so within the very high standards of proper and lawful policing set by the Consent Decree.

Immediately, Chief Bratton set three priorities that would guide his administration:
1. Reduction of crime, disorder and fear.
2. Compliance with all mandates of the Consent Decree.
3. Prevention of terrorist attack, but preparedness should it occur.

To address these priorities, the Los Angeles Police Department has been restructured to more effectively and efficiently utilize limited resources. Proven crime-fighting processes and innovative crime reduction strategies and tactics have been implemented. A new bureau has been created to monitor and respond to terrorist activities. Accountability has been institutionalized. The disciplinary system has been reformed by the Chief and the Police Commission for fairness and consistency. Substantial progress toward compliance has been achieved with Consent Decree mandates. Use of force reporting and investigations have been reengineered in accordance with Consent Decree protocols. More minorities and women have been hired and promoted. Strong community/police partnerships have begun to be forged. Transparency and dialogue now define the relationship between police and community, a mark of unwavering commitment to community policing by the Chief, the Police Commission, the Mayor, and the Department as a whole.
Much more still needs to be done. That said, the men and women of the LAPD can be proud of their accomplishments over the last two years. Arrests are up significantly. Crime is down significantly. Response time to emergency calls has improved dramatically. Multi-million-dollar cost-saving efficiencies are continually being implemented. Gang-related crime is being addressed more comprehensively and effectively. Police officer confidence in the Department’s direction has improved. Police officer commitment is high. Trust is returning to the community. Turnaround is in the making.
**ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL**

During William Bratton’s first year as Chief, capitalizing on the pay increase and work schedule actions taken by the City before his arrival, he laid the groundwork for dramatic renewal of the LAPD.

Early in his tenure, Chief Bratton launched the Compstat method of problem solving and accountability that has produced historic crime declines in other American cities. In subsequent actions, he restructured and reorganized the Department and implemented strategic initiatives to turn the tide against crime that was threatening to wash over parts of the City that had been relatively crime-free.

Significant and measurable progress has been made over the last two years.

**CRIME HAS DECREASED AS ARRESTS HAVE INCREASED**

**CRIME DECLINES**

After crime increased in all crime categories from 1999 through 2002, crime decreased in all categories in 2003:

- Homicides declined 21.3% in 2003, a 75.2 percentage point shift compared to the three-year increase from 1999 to 2002. All violent crimes declined 5.6% in 2003, a 16.0 percentage point shift.

**LOS ANGELES ANNUAL CRIME TRENDS**

![Crime Trends Chart]

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% Change 1999-2002</th>
<th>% Change 2002-2003</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>53.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
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<td>-13.4</td>
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<td>Robbery</td>
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<td>Burglary</td>
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<td>Property Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Crime</td>
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In the First Half 2004, Crime continued to decline in all categories excepting homicide and forcible rape.

- Homicides increased by 12 in number from the First Half 2003 fed by an increase in gang-related homicides. Disturbingly, rapes increased by 81.7

- It is encouraging to note, however, that this year through October 19, there has been one fewer homicide than during the same period in 2003, a 0.24% decrease year to date.8

- When compared with First Half 2002, the full achievement of LAPD officers becomes most evident. Violent crime declined 15.9%. Property crime declined 5.5%. Total crime declined 8.3.9

**LOS ANGELES CRIME TRENDS**
**FIRST HALF 2002 - FIRST HALF 2004**

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<td>-18.2</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
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<td>-15.6</td>
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<td>-6.4</td>
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<td>-8.3</td>
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Source: LAPD Information Technology Division UCR data.
SHOOTINGS DECLINE

Shootings are a barometer of violence in Los Angeles.

Both in terms of shots fired and victims shot, shootings increased significantly in 2001, leveled off in 2002. In 2003, shots fired declined 17%, and victims shot declined 18%.10

In 2004 through the First Half, shots fired and victims shot were down again, 13% and 5% respectively, compared to the same period the previous year.11

One important contributor to these declines in shootings was the fact that arrests for illegal weapons increased 5.8% in 2003, and 20.1% in the First Half 2004.12
HOMICIDES AMONG MINORITIES AND YOUNG MEN, THE MOST VICTIMIZED GROUPS, DECLINE

Homicide rates in the African-American and Hispanic communities in Los Angeles have long been significantly higher than in the Caucasian community, as is true in most other large cities.

- From 2000 through 2002, the homicide rates for African-Americans and Hispanics increased.
- In 2003, with murders citywide down 21%, the homicide rate for African-Americans and Hispanics each declined although they were still significantly higher than the rate for Caucasians.

When the ages of homicide victims are considered, the differences in the rates between racial/ethnic groups become even more pronounced.

Among the most victimized group, men aged 18-24 years old, the homicide rate among African-Americans in 2003 was nearly four times that among Hispanics and nearly 19 times that among Caucasians. But this was a significant improvement over 2002 when the murder rate among African-Americans was nearly 27 times that among Caucasians.
GANG-RELATED CRIME DECLINES

In 2003, there was a significant reduction in gang-related crimes in LAPD’s South Bureau, and a modest reduction in the West Bureau. In 2004 though June, gang-related crimes were down in three of the four geographic bureaus for a 20% decline citywide. Compared to First Half 2002, gang-related crimes were down significantly in all four Bureaus for a 21% decline citywide.

GANG-RELATED CRIME 2002 - 2003 AND FIRST HALF 2002 - FIRST HALF 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau</th>
<th>% Change 2002-2003</th>
<th>% Change 1st Half 2002-2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Bureau</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>South Bureau</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
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<td>Valley Bureau</td>
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<td>West Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citywide</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-21.2</td>
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</table>

Source: LAPD CAL/GANG Case management System data as of July 8, 2004.

- Notwithstanding this encouraging development, gang-related homicides, which declined 26% in 2003, were up 21% during the period January through June 2004.13

ARRESTS INCREASE

In 2003 and in First Half 2004, arrests increased, driving the decrease in crime. Last year, arrests for all offenses (Part I and Part II) increased 10.9%.14 Violent crime arrests alone increased 5.2%, and weapons arrests for illegal possession increased 5.8%.15

In the First Half 2004, arrests for all offenses increased 8.4% (up 18.7% compared to First Half 2002). Weapons arrests increased 20.1%. The police deployed more strategically have made a difference. During the First Half 2004, NED (Narcotics Enforcement Detail) and GED (Gang Enforcement Detail), the Area proactive units tasked with targeting hot spots and specific crime problems, increased their arrests by 13.3% and 30.3% respectively.16 As of September 11 this year, year to date GED arrests in South Bureau are up 406.6% compared to 2002.17
OFFICER CONFIDENCE IS HIGH
OFFICER COMMITMENT IS HIGH

The men and women of the LAPD must be given credit for accomplishing this turnaround. They have become productive again in the fight against crime, responding to leadership that understood and supported their efforts. Their arrests record is a testament to this fact. In 2003, arrests were up 8.4% compared to 2002. In the First Half 2004, arrests were up 18.7% compared to the First Half 2002.18

Most officers express confidence in the direction the LAPD is heading and renewed commitment to the organization. In a Department-wide survey conducted in October 2003:

• 85% of officers responding agreed with the statement “I am confident the Chief of Police is leading us in the right direction,” compared to only 15% who felt this way in 1998.

• 85% agreed that “As an officer, I feel I play a key role in the overall mission of the LAPD.”

• 84% agreed that “I am willing to do whatever it takes to make the LAPD successful.”

• 83% agreed that “If I had to do it all over again, I would choose to be an LAPD officer.”

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**LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PLAN OF ACTION: BOOK I**
Today, the Department’s priority is to take back the streets of Los Angeles from the lawless, not by employing the kind of practices exposed by the Rampart scandal, but with practices that are lawful, that respect the law-abiding, and, not least, that secure the safety of all men and women who are asked to police these streets. The job of the LAPD, Chief Bratton has said, is “…to restore trust between the communities we serve and our officers, and between our officers and their own police department – and to do these at all times constitutionally, compassionately, and consistently in all neighborhoods of the City.”

To the first point, as a reflection of growing trust in the police, African-American ministers a few months ago convened to plead with their community to turn in those engaging in violence against the police, an event unprecedented in Los Angeles history. To the second point, the Department has worked to transform a discipline system that was seen by many as intrinsically unfair – too lenient in some areas and too harsh in others. And to the third point, the Chief’s commitment to full and timely implementation of the Consent Decree is evidence of these goals.

Work has been underway for two years to renew the LAPD, to shape it into an organization accountable for crime reduction, answerable to civilian oversight, and responsive to the diverse communities of Los Angeles that it serves. Although much has been accomplished, much more needs to be done. This Plan of Action – which charts progress made since the beginning of 2003, assesses the crime-fighting readiness of the LAPD, defines critical needs, and prescribes actions that will have measurable impact on high crime – lays out the blueprint for the work ahead.
PLAN OF ACTION

GUIDING PRIORITIES

The Los Angeles Police Department, to the fullest extent of its present resources, will direct all actions today and in the future to the achievement of three overarching priorities:

1 REDUCTION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE RAPIDLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY IN EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES.

2 COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATES OF THE CONSENT DECREE NOW AND GOING FORWARD BY INSTITUTIONALIZING BEST POLICING PRACTICES THAT ARE INNOVATIVE, LAWFUL, RESPECTFUL OF THE LAW-ABIDING, ANSWERABLE TO CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT, AND ACCOUNTABLE TO THE DIVERSE COMMUNITIES OF LOS ANGELES.

3 DETECTION, DISRUPTION, AND PREVENTION OF TERRORIST ACTS, AND READINESS TO RESPOND SWIFTLY AND FORCEFULLY IF NEEDED TO PROTECT LOS ANGELES – ITS INFRASTRUCTURE, ITS ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ASSETS, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, ITS PEOPLE.

The renewal of the LAPD now being shaped, defined by accomplishments in recent months and actions in this Plan that will guide the future course, will affirm that the LAPD can safely protect and serve the residents of the City of Los Angeles, and do so professionally, constitutionally, compassionately, and consistently.

The flexibility built into this Plan will enable officers to be innovative in fighting crime unencumbered by bureaucratic restraints that have for years handicapped crime-fighting efforts. At the same time, officers will be held accountable for their initiatives. The price of increased authority is and will remain increased responsibility.

The actions that have and will be taken will build on the strong institutional framework of a renewed Department and have been designed to restore the LAPD in a short time to its preeminent position among municipal law enforcement agencies in America.
REORGANIZATION

To position the LAPD to address more effectively its three guiding priorities, Chief Bratton quickly moved to restructure the Department.

COMMAND STAFF

Initially, to address widespread skepticism among LAPD officers that a new chief from outside the Department would be able to understand and effectively lead the premier West Coast police agency, and perhaps the nation’s proudest, Chief Bratton chose to build his command staff around three LAPD executives who had competed with him to head the Department. These executives were charged with devising a reorganization that would optimize use of limited internal resources to address the Chief’s three priorities. His command staff has subsequently assessed Department strengths and weaknesses, recommended new structures and systems, and is carrying forward many of those ideas, even in the face of the city government’s notorious bureaucracies and tight budget restraints.

To support his priorities and breaking with past practices, the Chief also reached outside the Department, bringing in two civilians and a chief from another department to run three areas critical to the new LAPD. These actions were taken not only to bring in individuals who were uniquely qualified for these jobs, but also to infuse outside perspective into an organization legendary for its parochialism and insularity.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Most important among structural changes made by the Chief, discussed in greater detail further on in this Plan, were the establishment of the:

- Office of Operations to have functional control of field enforcement and detective operations, creating a single line of command that has streamlined and redirected resources to proactively engage crime, fear of crime, and disorder in all the City’s communities;

- Special Operations Bureau to direct all special units, restructured from the former Operations Headquarters Bureau, to refocus highly skilled and trained officers on engaging violent crime throughout Los Angeles;
• Consent Decree Bureau, reporting directly to the Chief of Police, to ensure compliance with the Decree’s mandates which the Chief believes is critical to restoring the credibility of the Department and the support of all Los Angeles communities, as well as to the creation of innovative practices in all areas of the Department;

• Professional Standards Bureau, reporting directly to the Chief of Police, to consolidate all entities that review officer conduct, with the dedicated mission to improve investigation of all uses of force by officers, officer-involved shootings, all complaints against officers, and especially complaints on searches and seizures; and

• Critical Incident Management Bureau to develop a highly effective counter-terrorism capability in recognition that Los Angeles, as identified by the federal government, is one of the top three terror targets in America.

SUPPORT STAFF
To better position the Department in its fight against crime, the Chief also restructured some lines of authority.

• To improve communication into and out of the Office of the Chief of Police, the Deputy Chief of the Professional Standards Bureau also now serves as the Chief of Staff for the Chief of Police. In addition, the Public Information Office now reports directly to the Chief of Staff, as do the Community Relations Unit and Governmental Liaison Unit. This provides a centralized administrative center to ensure consistency in the collection and dissemination of information.

• Because of increased focus on improving the Department’s technological crime-fighting capabilities, the Information and Communications Services Bureau, headed by the Chief Information Officer, now reports to the Chief of Support Services. This new line of authority allows for immediate response to critical crime-fighting needs with the requisite technological priorities to support this mission.

Reflective of Chief Bratton’s management style, he believes that on-going change is essential, and that effective organizations are never satisfied with the status quo.

“As sweeping as these changes have been, there will be more to come.”

— Chief William J. Bratton
BRINGING OFFICERS BACK TO WORK

Nearly 1,300 LAPD officers were unavailable for work during a typical day in September, either because they were recovering from medical injuries, sick, on leave to care for newborns, serving in the military, or on vacation.

In addition, 631 officers are assigned to temporary light duty (177) or permanent light duty (454), usually because of medical restrictions. These officers play a vital role in LAPD investigative and support functions, but they are not available for field deployment.

The Department is making efforts to increase the number of officers available for field deployment by reducing the number of officers not qualifying for weapons use due to medical restrictions – 448 officers fit this category as of January 2004. At least 171 officers have begun qualifying as a result of Department efforts. In addition, the Department’s new Injury Reduction Task Force is working with other local police departments to develop strategies to prevent work-related injuries before they occur.
PRIORITY 1: REDUCTION OF CRIME

L.A. COMPSTAT

Shortly after Chief Bratton took leadership of the LAPD, he implemented the Compstat outcome management process that has proven highly successful in reducing crime in other major American cities. L.A. Compstat (which replaced the Department’s dysfunctional and ineffective FASTRAC system) is the mechanism that drives crime reduction by rapidly retrieving, mapping, and analyzing crime data, fostering problem solving with innovative strategies and tactics, and exacting accountability for productivity from all levels of the police organization.

L.A. Compstat is based upon four fundamental principles:

1  ACCURATE, TIMELY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATED TO ALL.
   To respond effectively to crime, officers at all levels of the LAPD are now provided the best accurate intelligence available on where particular types of crimes are occurring, when and how the crimes are being committed, and who the suspects are if known. The likelihood of an effective police response to crime increases proportionally as the accuracy of the crime intelligence shared by all increases.

2  RAPID DEPLOYMENT THAT IS SYNCHRONIZED AND FOCUSED.
   Personnel and other necessary resources are promptly deployed where crime has occurred. For a viable and coordinated response to a crime or quality of life problem, patrol personnel, detectives, and support personnel now bring their expertise and resources to bear in a synchronized effort.

3  EFFECTIVE TACTICS.
   Effective tactics based on analysis of accurate and timely crime intelligence are prudently designed to bring about crime reduction. In order to avoid simply displacing crime and quality of life offenses, and to bring about permanent change, these tactics are comprehensive, flexible, and adaptable to shifting crime trends identified and monitored.
An on-going process of rigorous follow-up and assessment is mandated to ensure that the desired results are actually being achieved. This evaluation component permits redeployment of resources to meet newly identified challenges once a problem has abated. It also permits assessment of the viability of particular tactics for developing future responses.

Simply put, L.A. Compstat uses computer crime-mapping and intensive anti-crime strategy meetings for developing and implementing new tactics, for coordinating patrol, detective, narcotics enforcement, and other special unit operations, and for exacting command accountability in addressing crime and disorder problems throughout the City.

- Although Compstat has been an effective tool in tracking and attacking crime problems, some LAPD Areas have not performed to the expectations of the Office of Operations. To address this issue, Compstat Plus has been created to more closely scrutinize these Areas and their crime-fighting strategies, and track their progress. It is an analysis tool, but as importantly, it is a mentoring tool to improve productivity. It is the goal of Compstat Plus to bring underachieving Areas up to the level of more productive peer commands in the crime reduction battle.

- To verify the accuracy of crime intelligence, an audit team is being established to identify suspect Compstat data, and to investigate reporting or computer system problems thought to produce errant information.

- To ensure that accurate and timely intelligence is available to all law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles region, the LAPD will soon begin routinely to invite to its weekly Compstat meetings representatives from the Los Angeles Unified School District Police, all police agencies from the surrounding Los Angeles communities including the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), and all federal law enforcement agencies operating in the City of Los Angeles – FBI, DEA, ATF, INS – as well as the Department of Homeland Security, to discuss crime trends in the City. This will help ultimately to create a first-of-its-kind multi-jurisdictional Compstat system that will be jointly funded by participating agencies thus maximizing the limited resources of all the County’s police forces.
L.A. Compstat goes beyond simple measures of police activity. Although statistics, maps, and strategy sessions are more visible aspects of L.A. Compstat, performance accountability is the driving force of this crime reduction process.

**ACCOUNTABILITY**

The outcome measure of progress at the LAPD today is proactive crime reduction, not simply reactive measurements of police activity, the historical gauge. The central focus for leadership is exacting accountability for crime reduction from Area Commanders.

Area Commanders today have the authority and duty to address crime and quality of life issues in the neighborhoods they serve, and they are held accountable for progress in their neighborhoods. At the weekly Compstat meetings, in addition to being questioned on all crime incidents, shootings, narcotics activity, gang activity, and calls for service in their Areas, Area Commanders are questioned on:

- deployment of patrol personnel by watch and by rank, including all discretionary units assigned to their commands, overtime usage and use of sick leave, and strategies for maximizing personnel effectiveness in response to crime trends;

- specific crime strategies and tactics for reducing the top two crimes by watch in their Area;

- deb briefings of suspects conducted by detectives in their Area, the capture and analysis of all pertinent information, and the dissemination of collected information to all relevant parties, including citizens’ groups when appropriate; and

- complaints by the public against police officers as well as risk management activities (lawsuits, uses of force, etc.).

Twice each week, the Office of Operations holds crime control meetings with its direct reports from the four geographic Bureaus, the Special Operations Bureau, and the Detective Bureau to share intelligence, devise strategies, and make decisions on redeploying resources to more effectively fight crime.
CRIME STRATEGIES, INITIATIVES, AND TACTICS

Strategies, initiatives and tactics have been implemented or are planned to increase crime-fighting effectiveness while streamlining work processes and improving operating efficiencies.

GANGS STRATEGY AND TACTICS

More than half of the homicides committed in Los Angeles are gang-related. Although gangs have been an endemic problem in Los Angeles for several generations, today, gang crime is spreading into communities previously thought safe, into the suburbs, and into the region as a whole. And some Los Angeles gangs are exporting their criminal activities to other cities in the nation. The measures of success of this strategy will be the elimination of a gang’s stranglehold on a neighborhood as evidenced by the reduction of violent crime in that neighborhood, and prevention of the expansion of gang activities to other communities.

- In March 2003, the LAPD launched a new citywide effort known as Gang Impact Teams (GIT) in each of the 18 Areas. These teams include gang specialists, detectives, and narcotics officers, who work closely together to address the confluence of guns, illegal drugs, and gang members that drive much of the violent crime in Los Angeles. The mission of these Teams is to reduce gang-related violent crime through a collaborative, focused, and coordinated approach to disrupt this violence whether directed toward rival gang members or law-abiding residents of the City. These GIT teams represent a long-term, sustained effort that applies the four fundamental principles of L.A. Compstat, with emphasis on leadership and accountability. This marshalling of resources includes nurturing community support to reach out to gang members and show them an alternative to their culture of crime and violence.

- To augment GIT initiatives, the LAPD conducted between November 26, 2002 and May 31, 2003 the Community Safety Operations Center (CSOC) in 31 reporting districts in four Areas: Southeast, Southwest, Newton, and 77th Street. CSOC is a short-term initiative designed to place intense focus on the violent gangs that dominate these Areas. Seeking to organize community support to address violent gang activities that have been particularly
difficult to suppress, CSOC is a collaborative effort among the Special Operations Bureau, Area commands, outside agencies (federal, state, and local), and community groups. CSOC has the ability to redeploy resources as needed guided by real-time crime intelligence. The resources brought to bear in 2003 were significant: four platoons of the Metropolitan Division (180 officers in all), 24 motorcycle officers, some federal assets, an undercover Buy Team, and an average of 45 Gang Enforcement Detail officers that were available on any given day to pursue CSOC initiatives as directed. Comparing the January 1 through May 28 2003 period to the same period in 2002, violent crime decreased an average of 31% where CSOC was implemented in the Southeast Division; 22% in the Newton Division; 29% in the Southwest Division; and 6% in the 77th Street Division.\(^{26}\)

- In response to a spike in violent crime in these areas at the beginning of this year, on March 28 the LAPD re-launched CSOC in five Areas: Newton, Hollenbeck, 77th, Southwest, and Southeast. Fewer resources are being used this time, due in large part to the fact that the Department has approximately 100 fewer personnel than it did at the time of the first CSOC initiative: one platoon from the Metropolitan Division (or about 25 people per day), 16 motorcycle officers, two squads of gang officers per day which amounts to about 16 officers, no Buy Team, and no federal assets. Violent crime decreased 8.4% in CSOC reporting districts between April and July 2004 compared to the same period in 2003. Through September 23, the unit has made 1,132 felony arrests, 880 misdemeanor arrests, and recovered 135 firearms.\(^{27}\)

- In order to respond preemptively to the threat posed to society by violent gangs, the LAPD will continue to work tirelessly with local, state and federal, law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, as well as with community groups, in order to develop the necessary tools to collect and share information on gangs, and devise tactics for prevention, intervention, and prosecution of criminal gang activities. Towards this end, in early 2004 the LAPD and the FBI hosted a national gang symposium in Los Angeles to formulate a response to gang crime using the full range of prevention, intervention, and prosecution tools. The LAPD was instrumental in organizing the San Fernando Valley Community Gang Summit in June 2004 where clergy leaders representing more than 800 congregations met to
devise a concerted response to gang violence that will enable young gang members to find safe havens within the faith community and alternatives to their violent lifestyles. The LAPD also participated in a national conference on gang violence held in Anaheim in July 2004 that provided tools and training to more than 1,300 gang investigators, and conceived and hosted the National Executive Session on Gangs, held also in July 2004, that met to share effective strategies to stem the rise of gang violence. Two additional National Executive Sessions, also funded by the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office, will be held in Los Angeles in 2005.

**DISTRICT POLICING PILOT PROGRAM**

Ten percent of the criminal population commits 50% of crime, a report for the National Institute of Justice has estimated. And these crimes repeatedly occur in the same geographic areas, estimated at 10% of a city. By strategically focusing on the interaction of high risk people, places and activities – arresting the repeat perpetrators of serious crimes in the high crime areas – the LAPD can deploy most effectively its limited resources to move the organization closer to the tipping point in its fight against crime citywide.

To pursue this strategy, Chief Bratton has implemented a new and innovative crime-fighting structure created by Assistant Chief George Gascón called District Policing, as a pilot program in three geographically dispersed LAPD Areas of the City – Hollywood, Rampart, and Harbor. Optimally structured and focused crime-fighting entities have been created within these Areas utilizing existing resources.

Since this Pilot Program was fully implemented in January 2004, its effect in reducing crime has been notable. In the pilot areas, Part I crime, the seven most serious felony crimes, was down 15.8% in the First Half 2004 from year ago compared to a 9.6% reduction in three control group Areas (Hollenbeck, Wilshire, and North Hollywood). Much of this success was in reduction of property crimes which were down 14.5% in the pilot Areas compared to 7.3% in the control Areas. While violent crime was down by the same degree in both pilot and control Areas (nearly 20%), arrests for violent crimes in the pilot Areas increased more than 9% compared to 4% in the control Areas, suggesting that the success of District Policing in reducing violent crime may yet be fully realized.
Focus group interviews indicate that District Policing’s emphasis on community-policing-style problem-oriented collaboration between Senior Lead Officers (SLOs) and Watch Commanders in the pilot Areas is working well. Specialized units are being directed more effectively and morale is high. Pilot Area Captains and District Lieutenants laud the system as one of the most effective ways to leverage Department resources in support of the LAPD’s primary crime reduction mission. One significant drawback to the pilot program that will need to be addressed, however, is a set of equity and Consent Decree-related concerns that, as a result of Lieutenants coming out from behind their desks to lead the fight against crime in the field, the Sergeants underneath them shoulder more administrative burden in pilot Area police stations than do sergeants elsewhere in the City. In addition, patrol crossover among districts is problematic. An order clarifying the role and responsibilities of the Senior Lead Officers is also being reviewed.

The District Policing Pilot program will be conducted through the end of 2004 at which point a full evaluation of its impact on crime will inform a decision on whether or not to expand this program citywide.29
VEHICLE INTERVENTION INITIATIVES

Building on the reduction in vehicle pursuits brought about by creating new policies and procedures, additional changes will soon be forthcoming to expand the use of vehicle intervention techniques, such as tire deflation devices (spike strips) and “PIT” (bumping) maneuvers, for use in pursuit tactics. Tire deflation devices, as well as vehicle barricades, are being tested at certain special events and have been approved by the City Council for use at Los Angeles International Airport as a pilot program.30

PUBLIC HOUSING SAFETY INITIATIVE

A memorandum of agreement with the City’s Housing Authority, authorizing officers to work overtime details in housing developments, at no cost to the Department, has been developed and approved by the Board of Police Commissioners and the City Council’s Public Safety Committee. This agreement, which will allow deployment of significant uniform resources to public housing to improve public safety, is scheduled for consideration by the Council’s Budget & Finance Committee at the time of this writing.31

HOMICIDE / ASSAULT INITIATIVE

Despite the 21.3% decline in homicides in 2003, the City’s homicide rate last year was still more than twice the national average.32 And as of October 19, 2004, homicide was the only Part I crime not to decrease significantly (-0.24%) compared to the comparable period last year, even while shootings were down 4%.33 The Homicide/Assault Initiative is developing effective tactics to swiftly, assertively, effectively, and lawfully investigate these crimes. The mission is not only to more effectively solve these violent crimes, but also to prevent them.

ILLEGAL GUNS INITIATIVE

The widespread availability of illegal guns, and the sense of impunity on the part of many people who carry them, is behind much of the violence in Los Angeles. The Illegal Guns Initiative is developing tactics that target and apprehend those involved in the distribution and sale of illegal guns, as well as reduce any sense of impunity among those who possess these illegal weapons – seizure of 388 firearms from one individual on September 17, 2004, illustrates the success of this strategy.34
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

The narcotics problem in Los Angeles is widespread and to significant degree, gang driven. To confront this dynamic, the Narcotics Division (ND) has developed a multi-pronged approach to narcotics enforcement. The ND Major Violators Section (MVS), in collaboration with federal and other law enforcement agencies, seizes large quantities of drugs ($121.2 million in 2004 through July, or 67% of the total street value seized by the Department) with relatively few arrests – 369 in 2004 through July. Frustratingly, such large seizures have done little to drive down street supply or drive up street drug prices in Los Angeles, perhaps because some, perhaps most, of these seized drugs were destined for other markets in the country. In view of this, the Narcotics Division also employs an undercover Buy Team to discourage would-be sellers by making street-level arrests – 776 in 2004 through July. Because these undercover operations produce compelling evidence, the narcotics charges that result produce a high rate of court convictions. The Narcotic Enforcement Details (NED) in the Area Gang Impact Teams (GIT) round out the strategy by responding to community complaints, making half as many arrests per officer as the Buy Team but seizing about 6.5 times as much drugs in street value.35

Given that narcotics commerce is at the root of many violent crimes as well as a deterioration of quality of life in many neighborhoods, the Narcotics Enforcement Initiative will be refined to more assertively suppress this illegal commerce. The centerpiece of this change will be new practices that ensure that MVS, the Buy Team, and NED work more closely together in coordinating activities and gathering and sharing intelligence. And, in view of the fact that patrol officers make 75% of all narcotics arrests,36 consideration will be given to providing all patrol officers narcotics enforcement training. The people of Los Angeles, especially those who live in drug-infested neighborhoods, have the need and the right to expect that the LAPD will always respond immediately to their reports of neighborhood drug activity.

YOUTH CRIME INITIATIVES

The work of the Juvenile Division focuses on child abuse and exploitation, juvenile narcotics enforcement, and training and evaluating other Department entities on juvenile-related policies and procedures. The Juvenile Division also supervises the Department’s magnet school and youth programs. Currently, 131 sworn personnel are authorized
and 105 officers are deployed. Recently, the Juvenile Division realigned its mission to focus on Part I crime reduction working directly with Area stations, specifically Area detectives, to target the most criminally active ten percent of juvenile suspects. The Juvenile Division is balancing this “ten percent” approach with the longer-term goal of steering first-time youth offenders away from a life of crime.37

- Juvenile Coordinators, established within Area detective units two years ago, comprise a critical link between Area patrol officers, who handle the majority of juvenile arrests, and expert knowledge within the Juvenile Division. This knowledge exchange is intermittent in practice, however, and will receive additional attention, so that patrol officers may keep abreast of the latest changes in juvenile policy and juvenile crime trends.

- Consideration is being given to working with Probation on a “soft-knock” program – knocking on the doors of juveniles who are on probation but not going to school, which is required.

- Consideration is also being given to implementing new practices that will improve collaboration between the Juvenile Division and the Area’s Gang Impact Teams (GITs) in sharing information on juveniles and coordinating enforcement actions to suppress juvenile criminal activities.

Juvenile Narcotics Section officers in plain clothes made 547 juvenile and 146 adult arrests through August 2004, an increase over last year of 67% and 38%, respectively. The School Investigation Buy Unit, which addresses drug selling in the Los Angeles Unified School District, made 107 arrests in Spring 2004.38

Through August this year, the Juvenile Division has maintained an 83% case clearance rate, with a goal of 85%, and an 89% criminal filing rate, exceeding its goal of 80%.39

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INITIATIVE
Child and spousal abuse accounts for more than a quarter of all violent crimes in the City. Abuse breeds more abuse and other violence. Children in households where domestic violence is common may turn to gangs as family substitutes. Abused children often grow up to
become abusers themselves. Adult victims often are trapped in a cycle of repeated abuse driven by intimidation, co-dependence, or lack of mobility. The Domestic Violence Initiative is developing tactics in conjunction with social service agencies for effective intervention, and for protection and support of victims, in domestic violence cases.

**SEX CRIMES INITIATIVE**

The heinous crimes of rape, forced sodomy, and sexual abuse of children, leave life-long mental scars on victims that often far exceed any physical harm done by these assaults. The Sex Crimes Initiative, propelled by a major reorganization of sex crime units and increased collaboration with rape crisis organizations such as the Santa Monica Rape Crisis Treatment Center, is developing tactics to enhance investigations of stranger and serial rapes, family sexual abuse, and other sex crimes capitalizing on recent developments in DNA analysis to identify sexual predators.

**CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**

The total Part I crime case clearance rate for the First Half 2004 was 27.5%, up from 24.2% for the same period in 2003. These rates compare to 21.1% of Part I crimes cleared for the full year 2001, 18.4% in 2002, and 23.5% in 2003. This increase in the clearance rate can be attributed to continuous improvement in detective operations citywide. Strategies and tactics, including the Compstat process, focus on debriefing arrestees, the expansion of detective-initiated arrests, an increase in number of search warrants, re-assignment and refocusing of detective resources, and the use of specialized units such as the Gang Impact Teams, have resulted in higher clearance rates in nearly all crime categories.

LAPD detectives must investigate every case assigned to them, even those thought to have low solvability potential, a fact that has produced a significant backlog in case clearances. At the end of May 2003, that backlog stood at 10,664 cases. As of the end of June 2004, the number had been cut by almost half to 5,589. This was achieved by the realignment of detective resources with the detective reorganization in June 2003 resulting in greater operational efficiencies, specific backlog task forces, improved communications with the City Attorney and District Attorney offices, and a renewed command emphasis on

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“WITH POLICE RESOURCES OVERTAXED, ITS DIFFICULT TO COMMIT DETECTIVES TO OLDER CASES. YET EACH UNSOLVED CASE GIVES LAWLESSNESS AND STREET JUSTICE FURTHER MOMENTUM, MAKING FRESH CASES HARDER TO CRACK. A LONG-TERM DECLINE IN HOMICIDES WILL REQUIRE MONEY AND SUSTAINED POLITICAL WILL.”

— Prof. Eric Monkkonen, UCLA

“Getting Away with Murder in South L.A.’s Killing Zone,” *L.A. Times*, January 1, 2004

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THE CRIMINAL CASE CLEARANCE RATE IS IMPROVING. THE CASE BACKLOG HAS BEEN CUT IN HALF.
the importance of a timely investigation of all cases with workable leads. The backlog volume remains significant, however, and could persist to some degree for some time at the present detective staffing level.41

CALLS FOR SERVICE

Dispatched calls for service (CFS) provide a good indicator of demand placed on police personnel and resources.42 With some success, the City is making efforts to reduce the percentage of calls that result in dispatches. In 2003, Mayor Hahn introduced a 3-1-1 information system, and calls to 9-1-1 that are not police-related are now being transferred to 3-1-1. Also, 9-1-1 operators today are spending more time with the caller to identify the true purpose of the call and to determine if dispatch is actually necessary. Weeding out those calls that do not require immediate police assistance both speeds up response times for true emergencies and frees more officer-time for proactive policing.

Calls necessitating a Code Three response, that is where there is an immediate or potential threat of loss of life, rose 17.1% between 1999 and 2003. In the first Half 2004, however, calls that require a Code Three response were down 20.6% from the comparable year ago period.

LAPD CALLS FOR SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total 9-1-1 Calls</th>
<th>Total Dispatched</th>
<th>% Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,712,560</td>
<td>842,317</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,854,149</td>
<td>887,985</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,792,721</td>
<td>970,597</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,813,143</td>
<td>890,835</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,854,448</td>
<td>864,904</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st H. 2004</td>
<td>887,281</td>
<td>421,067</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD
In May 2004, the Department revised its procedure for prioritizing emergency calls, eliminating the Code Two-High category that did not allow officers to utilize their lights and sirens in the course of their response. Many emergency calls formerly designated Code Two-High are now dispatched as Code Three, where lights and sirens can be used.

This policy change has led to a significant 33% drop in response time. By the end of the First Half 2004, response time to emergency calls for service averaged 6.6 minutes, surpassing the eight-minute goal set at the beginning of 2004.43

![LAPD CFS Priority Chart]

Source: LAPD
Code 3: an immediate or potential threat of the loss of life;
Code 2: emergency calls of an urgent nature but where loss of life is not being threatened;
Code 1: police response is required but not needed immediately (e.g. not life threatening or urgent).
FALSE BURGLAR ALARM CALLS

The LAPD must respond to every alarm call. The high number of false alarms drains and debilitates police resources.

Burglar alarm calls, although slowly decreasing as a percentage of total dispatched calls for service, still represent over 12% of all calls. More than 93% of these alarm calls are false alarms, a percentage that has remained relatively constant over recent years.44

The LAPD has estimated it spends $11.1 million annually responding to false alarms.45

In an attempt to deal with the false alarm problem, the Los Angeles Police Commission proposed to the City Council a Verified Response Alarm policy for the LAPD. This policy would require that “a burglar alarm be verified by private guard response, remote video electronic monitoring, or an eyewitness confirmation of potential criminal activity from the homeowner, business proprietor, or other responsible party.”46

The police would not respond to any address that had two or more
false alarms within a 12-month period without such verification. In late September 2004, the City Council unanimously approved an alternative policy that would fine homeowners and businesses $115 for the first false alarm with the fine increasing by $50 for each subsequent false alarm.47

**LAPD DEPLOYMENT**

With limited manpower and vehicular resources, the LAPD is struggling to maintain the delicate balance between deploying officers for reactive 9-1-1 response and deploying officers for proactive crime suppression.

**AREA DEPLOYMENT**

Bolstering enforcement strength at the Area level to increase greater police presence on the streets has long been one of the LAPD's primary goals.

- The creation of Gang Impact Teams (GIT) in 2003 has allowed nearly 400 officers to be redeployed within the 18 LAPD Areas for gang suppression duties.48

- The number of officers assigned to the Areas today represents nearly two-thirds of the total Department. But this total does not account for those officers on military leave, sick leave, or light duty status. When those officers are excluded from the deployment analysis, the percentage of total officers available for Area deployment drops to 54%.

- The LAPD has instituted “force multiplier” deployment days in which all officers and detectives assigned to administrative positions within the Offices of Support Services, Human Resources, and Operations now must work two days each deployment period in field operations to supplement patrol. These resources are flexibly deployed to Areas that display certain crime patterns or problems.

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**LAPD AREA DEPLOYMENT, SWORN PERSONNEL AS OF JUNE 26, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>3,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detectives</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIT</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick / IOD / loans / Military etc.</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Area Duties</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AREA DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>4,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ASSIGNED</td>
<td>5,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD Compstat Section.
• Because of understaffing, detectives do not work between 2:00 AM and 6:00 AM each day, although some are on call during these hours to respond to homicides and other serious incidents. The speed of response by detectives during these early morning hours, however, remains slow. To address this problem, the Detective Bureau is considering options that would provide for around-the-clock detective deployment.

NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT
Understaffing also handicaps narcotics enforcement. At the end of the First Half 2004, only 308 officers were assigned to the Narcotics Division, just 3% of LAPD budgeted strength, a lower percentage than in most other large city police departments which have more deployment flexibility because of much greater force strength relative to population and land area. Even more problematic, the LAPD has only one undercover Buy Team for the entire city, limiting the Department’s ability to visibly impact drug selling on the street and also “turn” sellers to inform on their suppliers. The LAPD would like to increase the number of Buy Teams for deployment as needed citywide, but the freeze on promotions has made finding adequately experienced supervision difficult. Despite these challenges, the LAPD increased narcotics arrests in 2003 by 57.2% over 2002. But narcotics enforcement remains primarily a patrol function because of the small size of the Narcotics Division; patrol officers make 75% of all narcotics arrests.49

WARRANTS ENFORCEMENT DEPLOYMENT
The backlog of outstanding felony fugitive warrants is increasing. As of August 31, the backlog stood at 18,040 of which 938 were warrants for homicide and attempted homicide.

At the end of April, the latest date for which backlog numbers can be compared to previous years, the overall backlog was approximately 49% greater than it was one year before, and 70% greater than in 2002. The number of outstanding homicide and attempted homicide warrants, however, was down 2.9% compared to 2003 and 3.8% compared to 2002.

There are about 86,000 more felony warrants in the Los Angeles County Warrant System.
In addition to felony warrants, the LAPD has about 500,000 misdemeanor warrants to clear but lacks the resources to pursue these wanted people except those whose involvement in more serious crimes is suspected.

Warrant service has received more attention under Chief Bratton, and officer activity has increased, but felony warrants are increasing faster than can be served by the current number of Section investigators.

Warrant service is shared by the Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS) and detectives (both centralized and Area-based). The primary burden, however, falls on FWS investigators who serve warrants for narcotics-related offenses, approximately 55% of all outstanding felony warrants currently.

The Fugitive Warrant Section (FWS) has 28 investigators citywide who serve warrants; this is an increase of ten investigators since this time last year, but only half the number from three years ago; some former FWS investigators currently work to comply with Consent Decree mandates.50

In 2003, the 800 Area detectives citywide, struggling to reduce high case backlogs as a priority, served only 100 warrants for homicide and an additional 459 felony arrest warrants of all other types, amounting to less than one warrant per detective annually. 51

Apprehension of wanted fugitives is an obvious way to quickly lower crime, yet higher demands on the utilization of scarce police resources means that assigning warrant service its due priority is not feasible without an increase in force size.

RE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS
Other deployment changes have been made to address operational priorities in the context of an understaffed Department.

• The Department is streamlining the manner in which incoming telephone calls for complaints, tips, media requests, and so on are managed after hours. The Department is considering redeploying to the field at least half of the sworn staff of the Command Post, a 24-hour communications hub (adjoining one of the City’s 9-1-1 call centers) that receives incoming information of an urgent nature. Representatives (PSRs), who work just outside this office and are trained to field 9-1-1 calls, would replace the sworn officers.52
• In response to the Consent Decree’s mandate that the LAPD deal more effectively in engagement with the mentally ill, 16 new positions have been created in both the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU), which tracks officer interactions with individuals who have mental disorders, and the System-wide Mental Assessment Response Team (SMART), the unit that handles mental evaluations in the field. MEU and SMART are now operational seven days a week for 20 hours each day. Because of this, the Department is better positioned to comply with provisions of the Consent Decree that require MEU notification when people believed to have mental illnesses are detained against their will. SMART teams, which consist of one police officer and one clinician from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, bring specialized expertise to better help the mentally ill. In addition, these Teams save time for front-line patrol officers estimated to be between 280 and 430 hours a month.53

• 14 of 20 positions within D.A.R.E. (the national Drug Abuse Resistance Education program) have been reassigned to the above mentioned SMART initiative. Studies cited by the U.S. Department of Justice have questioned the effectiveness of D.A.R.E. in reducing crime.

• The eight-position unit assigned to maintaining the Narcotics Information Network (NIN) was cut. The function of the Network, which safeguards undercover operations by eliminating police assignment conflicts that could expose an officer’s cover, is now handled by the Western State Information Network (WSIN), a project of the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LACRCIC, and also known as L.A. Clear), a resource on crime-fighting efforts for the region’s law enforcement agencies including the LAPD. In essence, this shift eliminates a system within the LAPD that was a direct duplication of the services provided by L.A. Clear.

SPECIALTY TRAINED LAPD UNITS INTERCEDE TO HELP PEOPLE STOPPED BY THE POLICE WHO ARE THOUGHT TO BE MENTALLY ILL.
SUPPORT SERVICES

Civilian vacancies also handicap the LAPD’s ability to optimize critical crime support services, especially in the areas of evidence collection, evidence identification, and records entry. The civilian staff has not been at full strength in more than eleven years. At the end of the First Half 2004, the LAPD had 555 vacant civilian positions of 3,583 authorized.\(^{54}\)

The LAPD has had difficulty hiring qualified people to staff these positions. Low salaries have been cited by some as a reason for high attrition and the inability to hire, although salaries are thought to be comparable to equivalent jobs in other local municipalities. Whatever the cause, the City’s hiring freeze in effect from October 2003 through August 2004 has exacerbated the problem. The result is that many essential functions normally handled by civilian personnel have to be performed by uniformed officers, at much higher cost, officers many of whom would otherwise be assigned to enforcement duties.

FINGERPRINT SEARCHES

Prints obtained from violent crimes in active cases have a target turn-around time of thirty days for examination; and because solving violent cases is a high priority, the Scientific Investigation Division (SID) is meeting this timeframe. Due primarily to staffing shortages, however, and in part to slow computer connection speeds that have recently been corrected, backlogs remain in a number of categories. Around 6,000 latent prints from cold cases of violent crimes prior to 1986, many of them unsolved homicides, have not been run through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (LAFIS). SID will enter any of these cold cases on a “request only” basis.

SID has a similar cold case backlog of 6,880 latent prints from property crimes for 2001 and 2002 which have not been entered into LAFIS. All of the 2003 property crimes, however, have been run through LAFIS. The 2004 backlog of cases at the end of June 2004 numbered 2,285 automated searches and 128 manual comparisons. Attention to the backlog is focusing on more recent crimes. The backlog from the oldest property crimes will be administratively cleared when these crimes reach the three-year statute of limitations.
There has been an increase in the automated search backlog of more than 800 latent prints to be entered into LAFIS in just the past three months. This backlog is mainly attributable to the implementation of a new technology that allows for the first time automated reading of palm prints, approximately 40% of all print lifts. Prints previously unreadable can now be read, increasing the backlog in the short term but solving more crimes in the long term.

• SID, currently, has open positions for four latent print specialists and two supervisors. To eliminate the current backlog, SID has requested additional positions to allow four technicians on the morning watch to focus solely on LAFIS examinations of already-lifted fingerprints.55

NARCOTICS ANALYSES
Narcotics analyses are not currently backlogged, due in part to effective coordination with the District Attorney’s office to streamline filing requirements. The crime lab averages about 370 cases each week, up from 250 last year.56

FIREARMS EXAMINATIONS
There was a backlog of firearms examinations numbering 2,113 as of June 30, 2004, as well as more than 1,700 images that have yet to be run through the NIBIN (National Integrated Ballistics Information Network) system.

A new program – “Walk-in Wednesday” – has helped reduce the Firearms Analysis Unit backlog. However, the success of the program and its emphasis at Compstat has increased the demand for service. Detectives make appointments with the Firearms Analysis Unit to personally deliver firearms and other evidence that they deem top priority. In most instances, these are gang-related cases and approximately half of them result in “hits” within the system. The program also relieves the Firearms Analysis Unit’s overhead cost of case prioritizing, evidence handling, and tracking the chain of custody to protect evidence integrity.

• Currently, one vacant Firearms Examiner and five vacant Criminalist positions contribute to the delays in processing firearms evidence. To meet current and emerging needs, the Firearms Analysis Unit has requested these positions and two additional Criminalists to be budgeted in FY2005/06.
• Compounding this problem, training new firearms examiners requires two years.57

DNA ANALYSES
As of June 30, 2004, there was a backlog of approximately 250 screen and profiling serology cases, with an additional 87 cold cases, mostly homicides. SID counts their backlog according to the number of cases specifically presented for analysis by detectives, although the total amount of DNA evidence that has been collected during the course of investigations may be greater. Analyzing evidence contained in every case containing possible body fluids would be cost prohibitive, and many cases can be closed without the need for DNA analysis.

With the City’s hiring freeze over, SID plans to outsource fewer backlogged cases after filling and training employees for the seven vacant Criminalist and four vacant Laboratory Technician positions.58

NEW REGIONAL CRIME LAB
A regional crime lab to be shared by the LAPD, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and Cal State / LA is currently under construction and is scheduled for completion by December 2006. This new crime lab is expected to relieve some congestion currently experienced in SID. Once the new facility is occupied and SID is fully staffed with trained analysts, the Criminalistics Laboratory will be in a position to effectively tackle the reduction of existing backlogs in the Serology/DNA and Firearms Analysis Units.59

RECORDS ENTRY
Scarce Department resources have produced a serious data entry backlog. Priority in handling records management is given to data mandated by law and the Consent Decree.

• Field Data Reports (FDRs), that collect data intended to identify signs of racial profiling, are required by the Consent Decree and are given data entry priority. FDRs are completed during motor vehicle and pedestrian stops, and describe the officer’s motivation for conducting the stop, and search if it occurs, along with the officer’s perception of the individual’s apparent ethnicity.
• Field Interview (FI) cards, on the other hand, that document all police/public contacts that do not result in an arrest or citation, and provide critical crime-fighting intelligence such as suspect and vehicle descriptions, are not required by law or Consent Decree and, therefore, do not receive data entry priority. As a result, there has been an enormous backlog in entry of FI data into the LAPD records system since the end of 2002.\textsuperscript{60} Only 3,641 Field Interviews for the full year 2003, and 4,848 for 2004 through the third week in July, have been entered into the system, compared to 77,695 Field Interviews for the full year 2002. This difference stems from the fact that only four records entry clerks have been handling the task of data entry, and are overwhelmed. The total FI card entry backlog of more than 281,000 cards would take them more than six years to eliminate.\textsuperscript{61} The difficulty the Department has had in the past in hiring civilian staff, the recent City hiring freeze, and the need to assign most records personnel now working at the Department to higher priority needs (such as entering the half million citations issued each year in addition to Consent Decree mandated data) have combined to make the Field Interview records backlog an intractable problem at this time.

One solution to this backlog going forward is Portable Officer Data Devices (PODDs). PODDs are designed to use technology as a “force multiplier” to reduce the burden of record entry. Officers in the field can enter information into a small hand-held device, which automatically populates relevant LAPD databases wirelessly, reducing the burden on records management personnel and the amount of lag time before investigators have access to information related to officer stops. Currently, 1,200 PODDs are available, more than half of these are in the field at any given time for use by patrol and traffic officers.

• PODDs, which went into use in June 2004, have had a significant impact on the FDR entry backlog. About 70,000 FDRs per month are currently entered into the Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop database, and the vast majority is entered with PODDs. As a result, FDRs are not currently backlogged, and the Department is saving between $200,000 and $300,000 per year in SCANTRON costs alone.\textsuperscript{62}
PODDs are also designed to handle Field Interview (FI) data. Once more PODDs are available, FI data entry on PODDs may become mandatory. If that were to occur, the Department would be able to quickly obtain the valuable crime-fighting intelligence from Field Interviews and avoid perpetuating the FI backlog. One potential problem with using PODDs to enter FI data, however, is that officers feel less able to observe their surroundings and a suspect they are interviewing while typing information into the PODD. The Department is reviewing the issue of the current FI backlog in order to determine its disposition. Influencing this discourse is the fact that Field Interview cards have a “shelf life,” after which the information they contain is unlikely to benefit investigators.

PODDs also have the capacity to process citations, but the law requires that individuals who are stopped by the police receive a printed receipt for their traffic ticket, and patrol cars are not currently equipped with printers.

DEPARTMENT MANUAL

The Department Manual is difficult to use, difficult to update, and below the standard of most manuals used by large city police departments. In short, it is not very user-friendly. In addition, it does not highlight critical policing tasks, such as use of force, or emphasize expectations of behavior based on the Department’s core values. Instead, it simply amasses thousands of rules, procedures, audits, and processes in a voluminous tome of more than 600 pages. The Department Manual needs to be thoroughly revised to eliminate the unnecessary, simplify the complex, stress the critical, and clarify expectations. But this may have to wait until additional staff can be hired. There are 21 people in the Planning and Research Division (PRD) assigned to the Herculean task of just updating the manual, three people short of authorized strength.
PRIORITY 2: COMPLIANCE WITH CONSENT DECREE

ACTION MANDATES

On June 15, 2001, the City of Los Angeles negotiated a voluntary agreement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to DOJ’s allegations accusing the LAPD of “engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests, and unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” Specifically, DOJ noted “serious deficiencies” in the training, supervision, investigations, and discipline of officers, and said the LAPD failed “to identify and respond to patterns of at-risk officer behavior.” The Police Commission and Chief Bratton have made reform of the LAPD in all these areas a top priority and have made substantial progress toward that goal.

According to DOJ, LAPD supervisors at times failed to direct, evaluate, or monitor officer performance in the field adequately. This failure in direct supervision created an environment where some officers engaged in misconduct with neither intervention nor detection by LAPD supervisors.

- The Consent Decree has become a central aspect of the LAPD’s comprehensive program to provide the maximum level of protection and service possible, and do so with the highest ethical standards. As noted by the Independent Monitor, however, problems achieving compliance with several action mandates continue to exist – most notably, investigations of Categorical Uses of Force, and TEAMS II, the risk management tracking system designed to capture all activity required by the Consent Decree. Overall, however, the Monitor and the Department remain optimistic that full compliance, with the exception of TEAMS II, will be achieved by the 2006 target date:

THE CONSENT DECREE CONSISTS OF 152 ACTION MANDATES FOR THE LAPD THAT MUST BE REALIZED BY JUNE 15, 2006.
“CLEARLY, IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT ENVISIONED BY THE CONSENT DECREE, A FIRM COMMITMENT AT THE TOP OF THE DEPARTMENT IS REQUIRED. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS FIRM COMMITMENT IS IN PLACE. THE CHALLENGE REMAINS TO IMBUE THAT COMMITMENT THROUGHOUT BOTH MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT AS A WHOLE. THE PROCESS IS ON-GOING AND CONSTANTLY EVOLVING, BUT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL ULTIMATELY BE SUCCESSFUL.”

— Report of the Independent Monitor for the Quarter ending June 30, 2004

• Compliance with the Consent Decree, it has been estimated, will cost the City of Los Angeles $34 million in amortized costs of required computer systems, such as TEAMS II, over the five-year implementation period, as well as additional personnel costs.66

Chief Bratton has often stated that one of his three highest priorities is timely and complete compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree.

• The Chief has established a separate Bureau (the Consent Decree Bureau, or CDB) solely dedicated to ensuring that the LAPD complies with the mandates of the Consent Decree under the leadership of Gerry Chaleff, a prominent criminal defense attorney, co-author of the Consent Decree, and former Police Commission President. Chief Chaleff, a civilian with a rank equivalent to the sworn rank of a Deputy Chief, reports directly to the Chief of Police.

• Prior to April 2003, the LAPD ran its officer-involved shooting, anti-corruption, and internal affairs investigations operations separately. In April 2003, the Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) was created and its size increased to 271 deployed sworn personnel, unifying all of these components, with a common purpose of preventing and investigating internal wrongdoing, under one command. As of this year, the restructured Bureau includes a new Force Investigation Division (45 filled positions as of September 3, 2004) with a redefined and dedicated mission to improve investigation of Officer Uses of Force and Officer-Involved Shootings. The LAPD accepts all public complaints of these types, as well as all others, and is conducting integrity tests of all Department units to ensure that complaints are actually being taken and investigated.

“TIMELY AND COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH ALL MANDATES OF THE CONSENT DECREE IS ONE OF MY THREE HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR THIS DEPARTMENT.”

— William J. Bratton
The LAPD is confident that the establishment of CDB and restructuring of PSB will positively influence crime-fighting efforts:

- A higher level of professionalism and greater productivity are resulting from monitoring police behavior to ensure that highest standards are maintained.

- High ethical standards and practices are being institutionalized as a result of proactive auditing of high-risk positions and activities to ensure compliance with state law.

- As a result of enhanced training for supervisors and managers, risk management issues are being identified and addressed long before they become problems.

Audits currently conducted by Consent Decree Bureau staff look, in an objective manner, for conduct that could indicate improper policing, the so called “Rampart triggers.” This information is then shared with the proactive elements of the Professional Standards Bureau for immediate review and field follow-up with integrity tests. It is anticipated that by July of 2006 when full compliance with the Consent Decree is achieved, these audit and inspection functions of the Consent Decree Bureau will be transferred to the expanded and comprehensive Professional Standards Bureau.

**COMPLIANCE PROGRESS**

Bureaus, Areas, and Divisions have substantial authority to choose and implement their own strategies to achieve Consent Decree compliance by June 2006, and are being trained and held accountable for those decisions through audits and at Compstat meetings.

- Mandatory meetings are being held with Consent Decree Bureau staff, Area and Bureau command staff, and the commanding officers of divisions and specialized units.

- Each Area now has its own Consent Decree Coordinator who has the authority to affect change within the Area in order to achieve Consent Decree compliance.
• The Consent Decree Bureau will continue to provide the Bureaus, Areas, and Divisions with the resources they need, including training and feedback on audit results. The Bureau will also issue Department notices explaining any compliance problems, reports to the Director of the Office of Operations and Bureau heads, and in Compstat meetings. Monthly training on compliance strategies will be given to Area command personnel and Consent Decree coordinators.

• The Consent Decree Bureau is implementing recommendations for changes in compliance strategies based on weekly inspections that the Civil Rights Integrity Division (CRID) and geographic Bureau Gang Coordinators (BGCs) are conducting.

• Emphasis on the Consent Decree within L.A. Compstat meetings is being increased each month, with additional compliance requirements included in discussions as Areas implement compliance-achieving procedures outlined elsewhere in this Plan. Special L.A. Compstat sessions are held specifically for the Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) and the Force Investigation Division (FID) to address these operational issues.

Through the use of command emphasis, training, tracking, and accountability, the Office of Operations has made emphatically clear that failure to achieve full compliance with the Consent Decree will not be tolerated. With this focus, deficient commands have been improved, and progress with all commands continues.

• A report card system has been implemented to grade Areas on compliance based on data derived from inspections and audits by the Civil Rights Integrity Division.

On June 15, 2004 the Department completed its third year under the Consent Decree. The Federal Monitor believes that as of June 30, 2004, the LAPD has complied with 94 of the Decree’s 152 provisions, and has yet to achieve compliance with 47 provisions. The Monitor has withheld decision on the remaining 11. Of those 47 provisions on which the Department is not yet in full compliance, 80% compliance or better has been achieved for 17. The Department’s assessment as of September 1, 2004, indicates compliance with 128 provisions, noncompliance with 22 provisions (although with 17 of those, 80% or better compliance had been achieved), and judgment withheld on two provisions.67
Chief Bratton has expressed confidence that the Department will be in substantial compliance with nearly all provisions of the Decree by June 15, 2006. The exceptions are provisions that relate to TEAMS II, the risk management program that helps identify employees with at-risk behaviors. Because of technological complications with TEAMS II beyond the control of the Department, TEAMS II is not expected to be fully functional until mid-2005, so meeting the Consent Decree requirement of two years of substantial compliance under TEAMS II by June 15, 2006 will not be possible.

**DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM**

**COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE**

In response to concerns that the LAPD was ignoring public complaints against police officers, the LAPD, at the direction of its former chief, Bernard Parks, developed a detailed process for investigating complaints of all types against officers and especially the use of force by police officers. The current process for handling complaints is exceptionally thorough, and each complaint is reviewed by three levels of the organization: the Area or Division level, the Bureau level, and ultimately by the Professional Standards Bureau. If the allegations in a complaint are “sustained” against an officer, a fourth level of review is added: the Chief of Police.68

All complaints alleging inappropriate officer behavior are accepted and can be received by any Department supervisor, either from the complainant directly in person, over the phone, or in any form of print, even if the complainant chooses to remain anonymous.

The number of complaints reported against LAPD officers more than doubled between 1997 and 1998, and grew by half again in 2000. By 2002, compared to 2000, the number of complaints against officers decreased by 45.3%.

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**LAPD OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ORDERED NOT TO DISCOURAGE ANY INDIVIDUAL FROM FILING A COMPLAINT ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE OFFICER BEHAVIOR. RANDOM STINGS ARE ROUTINELY CONDUCTED TO MAKE CERTAIN THEY ADHERE TO THIS POLICY.**
One reason for the decrease in complaints reported against officers in 2002 may be that officers had fewer interactions with the public, thus reducing the opportunities to generate complaints.

- Arrests of all types decreased 30.0% from 1999 through 2002.

- The reason for the drop in arrests and contacts appears to have arisen from work slowdowns based upon a combination of officers' lack of faith in the fairness of the disciplinary system and fear of the consequences of citizen’s complaints. As demonstrated by the Chief’s survey in October 2003:
  
  - 92.5% of officers agreed that “the threat of community complaints prevents LAPD officers from being proactive on the street.”
  
  - 89.3% agreed that “because of fear of being unfairly disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in doing their jobs.”
  
  - 76.7% agreed with the statement, “I am afraid that I will be punished for making an honest mistake.”

- When arrests and citations increased in 2003, the number of complaints reported against officers increased at a similar rate. Between the beginning of January and the end of June 2004, 3,009 complaints were filed against the police, an increase of 20.4% over First Half 2003. Of these, 2,392 came from outside the Department, and 617 came from within, increases of 22.3% and 13.4% respectively. These increases in complaints, while troubling, need to be viewed in the context of increased interactions between officers and the public. During the First Half 2004, LAPD officers made 75,219 arrests and issued 270,608 citations, up 8.4% and 18.1% respectively. In addition, there were tens of thousands of field interviews with the public that did not result in arrest or citation. Also contributing to the increase in complaint intake this year was the Stanley Miller flashlight-striking incident on June 23 (discussed further on in this document). Analysis shows that public complaints against the police often spike after well-publicized incidents of this nature.
The Chief of Police signs off on every act of discipline where a penalty is imposed. A unique aspect of the LAPD discipline process, however, is that the Chief is not the final arbiter of discipline for his officers. Any officer who does not accept the recommended punishment can opt for a Board of Rights hearing. In such instances, the Chief cannot increase the penalty meted out by the Board, although he may reduce the penalty at his discretion.

**INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE**

The average length of time Department-wide for investigating complaints against officers is nearing the five-month goal set by the Consent Decree. At the end of May 2003, 1,861 complaints had been open more than one year. The backlog was so serious that around 231 of these cases had exceeded the statute of limitations for processing the complaints, and officers involved in those cases could no longer be disciplined for any wrongdoing. These out-of-statute cases have been closed and a new tracking system implemented to prevent reoccurrence of this situation.

The number of complaints still open at the end of 2003 was less than half of what it was just three years prior, as the chart to the right demonstrates.

In the wake of the Rampart Scandal, the LAPD was forced to operate under an onerous and inefficient complaint investigation process. Every complaint, regardless of severity, was investigated in exactly the same way. The processes of investigating complaints and administering discipline were so cumbersome and unpredictable that many officers no longer had a clear idea of what behavior would or would not result in discipline.

Upon his appointment, Chief Bratton, working with the Police Commission, streamlined the procedure for investigating public complaints and administering discipline making it more uniform and fair.

- *All* public complaints have and will continue to be accepted, regardless of perceived merit, and appropriate discipline will be imposed if any officer has been found to refuse to take a complaint from a the public.
The Chief and the Police Commission revamped the burdensome complaint investigation process and enhanced operations, however, by restructuring and assigning additional personnel to the Department entity charged with investigating public complaints and officer misconduct. These changes, along with continuing reengineering of the procedures and paperwork involved in the investigative process itself, is producing quickly resolved, high-quality complaint investigations.

• The Professional Standards Bureau, under the creative and energetic leadership of Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, who was recruited from his former position as Irvine Chief of Police, has been created to include the Internal Affairs Group (IAG) and the Special Operations Division, with a consolidated surveillance process that will encompass ethics enforcement, internal surveillance, and electronic support.

• In the past, the LAPD was perceived to have failed to appropriately investigate all criminal acts committed by officers and thereafter submit the investigations to the District Attorney for possible prosecution. Indeed, past disputes between the LAPD and the various prosecutors were legend. In recognition of the highly complex legal nature of investigating police misconduct, PSB specifically structured IAG into two divisions: one to handle investigations of criminal conduct, and the other to handle investigations of administrative violations. This single move has tremendously strengthened the relationship between the LAPD Professional Standards Bureau and the various prosecutors. In practice, the IAG Classification Unit determines the nature of the investigation (criminal or administrative) and assigns the case to the appropriate division. The goal is to improve complaint classification, investigation, and adjudication. If the Classification Unit cannot decide what type of investigation is needed, the determination is made after a consultation with the District Attorney’s Office.

• Board of Rights hearings are the sole vehicle for removing officers from the Department. The Department has concluded that the Board of Rights process is best used efficiently when reserved for the most severe cases of officer misconduct – when seeking to remove an individual rather than trying to impose a penalty beyond the 22 days maximum suspension the Chief of Police may impose. With this philosophy in place, the total number of Board of Rights
hearings has steadily decreased, from 203 involving sworn personnel in 1999 to 95 in 2003, a 53.2% drop. The cost savings of this policy is substantial: a 30.5% reduction in total cases between 2002 and 2003 saved the city an estimated $3.69 million. The number of officers choosing to utilize the Board of Rights process has decreased 46% during this same period. Officers on the whole have become more accepting of recommended discipline imposed by the Department.

• The Police Department and the Police Commission initiated the Alternate Complaint Resolution (ACR) mediation process in 2003 to bring complaints of a minor nature not involving serious officer misconduct to a speedy resolution, thereby freeing up time for more serious complaint and disciplinary investigations. In cases where officers readily admit to having made a mistake, the Chief of Police may choose to reward their decisions to take responsibility for their actions by reducing the severity of the discipline. Eighty-two settlements have been made since November 2003, and more officers facing discipline appear willing to enter into settlements with the Department. These settlements provide absolute closure to the discipline process – both the officer involved and the Department are precluded from bringing future proceedings.

UNCOVERING POLICE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT
Prior to the Consent Decree, the LAPD lacked proactive anti-corruption initiatives. To remedy this problem, the Ethic Enforcement Section (EES) was created in 2001 as a requirement of the Consent Decree. EES, responsible for the integrity audits, has increased its operational tempo dramatically with more detailed planning, proactive targeting, and intelligence gathering. EES conducts one type of administrative integrity audit, or sting, and two types of criminal integrity audits.

Administrative integrity audits are directed primarily at the question of whether officers are appropriately taking citizen complaints. This is a key "check" on whether complaint incidence is accurately measured and tracked.

The criminal integrity audits comprise both random and targeted efforts. Random stings are conducted to ensure that officers are not engaged in illegal misconduct; specifically many of these tests are designed around problems found as a result of the Rampart Corruption Probe.
These pro-active measures ensure that such illegal behavior does not repeat itself. Targeted stings, sometimes in partnership with the FBI, ferret out corruption when malfeasance is suspected. These audit-specific officers have come to the Department’s attention in a myriad of ways – supervisor tip, anonymous call, paper audit, etc.

A principal early warning tool to signal police corruption and other misconduct will be the implementation of the TEAMS II system, as required by the Consent Decree, the key element of which is the Risk Management Information System (RMIS). Implementation of the TEAMS II system has been delayed because of the complexities of integrating stand-alone LAPD databases and instituting the necessary security requirements, a consequence of the Department’s outdated technology.

To enhance investigations of police corruption, the Department has forged closer ties with the District Attorney, the United States Attorney, and the FBI’s Public Corruption Section.

USE OF FORCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The public’s perception of the LAPD has been shaped in part by the Rodney King videotape and news accounts of the Rampart scandal, incidents where LAPD officers were seen to have employed excessive force. Indeed, public concern about the LAPD often centers on the issue of force: whether officers use lethal and non-lethal force in accordance not only with what is allowed by law, but with the restraint that a democratic society expects of its police. There are provisions at the heart of the Consent Decree to reform the ways in which the Department uses force, investigates its use, and disciplines officers who use inappropriate force.

The first challenge for the Department is to fashion strict but sensible rules to control use of force and to make them consistent with the harsh realities of the dangers on the street – there are often daily needs to use force. The second challenge is to strike an appropriate balance
between the need for thorough force investigations and the competing time-intensive demands of proactive crime fighting.

Today, the LAPD employs rigorous use of force (UOF) policies addressing 22 different subjects. Officers receive training in 29 separate courses regarding use of force. All supervisors have completed training in conducting use of force investigations.

**USE OF FORCE POLICY**
Sections 835(a) and 196 of the California Penal Code, along with individual case law, govern when and how police officers may use force. Department policies and unwritten administrative philosophy further affect LAPD’s approach to uses of force in practice. For example, Department policy on shooting at moving vehicles has long stated that officers should refrain from doing so unless they feel that their lives are in immediate peril. In light of controversial use of force earlier this year in which a suspect backing his car toward officers was shot and killed, the Department will more carefully scrutinize such cases and is contemplating a more restrictive policy that would require officers to carry out or consider a prescribed list of alternatives prior to using deadly force against a suspect in a vehicle who is threatening their lives.

Also, the Department seeks to provide officers with technology and training that allow them to minimize injury to suspects. The Department increased the number of TASERs available in the field from 322 deployed prior to 2001 to 752 today, enough that usually every Area patrol car deployed at any given time may be equipped with a TASER. Following the Stanley Miller incident, the Department has decided to replace the current metal SL-20 flashlight with a shorter and lighter nonmetallic flashlight.

**USE OF FORCE REPORTING PROCESS**
Investigations of use of force by police officers are exceptionally time-consuming. Supervisors must interview all witnesses to the alleged use of force, including both civilian and sworn eyewitnesses, and complete lengthy reports detailing the investigation. Because these investigations, although necessary and important, divert scarce manpower from crime-fighting duties, efforts are being made to streamline the process. Moreover, the California Police Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBR) complicates the matter in which involved sworn officers can be questioned about using force.
• The Office of Operations, in conjunction with the Office of Human Resources, has revised the guidelines for reporting and procedures for investigating non-categorical use of force (that is, force not threatening life), processes estimated to have taken previously 12 hours to complete in each case. The new process classifies non-categorical use of force (NCUOF) incidents in two levels. Investigation for the less-serious NCUOF incidents have been streamlined while remaining thorough and fair. The time-savings estimated for these changes will result in the annual full-time equivalent of 13 supervisors. These revisions ensure that sergeants spend more time in the field supervising operations.

Upon completion of training of all supervisors in the new procedures, the Department will seek the assistance of an outside expert to develop a comprehensive integrated order on use of force, including all related training material and post-force reporting and evaluation.

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS PROCESS

In August and September of 2003, the Consent Decree Monitor identified a series of flaws in officer involved shooting investigations. The Department quickly picked up these cases and conducted detailed reviews of these investigations.

Upon being briefed on this issue, Chief Bratton directed that a thorough overhaul of the existing investigative protocols take place. After extensive interactive work with the various stakeholders (the Police Protective League, District Attorney, City Attorney, etc.) a new protocol resulted in the creation of the Force Investigation Division (FID) on August 22, 2004. As part of the Professional Standards Bureau, FID places under one chain of command both criminal and administrative use of force investigations in a bifurcated system that separates the evidence obtained through an administrative investigation, where an officer could be compelled to give information, from a criminal investigation in which compelled evidence is inadmissible in court. Previously, FID’s function was shared by Internal Affairs (IA), the Criminal Incident Investigation Division (CIID), and the Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD), each issuing reports that sometimes had discrepancies or inconsistencies among them because of the different chains of command. This new investigative protocol has been praised by outside commentators such as Merrick Bobb, a monitor for the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, as one of the most progressive and intelligent in the
country. The operating philosophy of FID is a mixture of pragmatic realism—in the near future, the unit will no longer respond to either animal shootings or accidental, non-tactical discharges—and detailed, comprehensive investigative protocols. Past holes in the investigation process have been plugged; one example is that officers are immediately sequestered after a categorical use of force incident, which is mandated by the Consent Decree.

**USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATION IN PRACTICE**

On June 23, 2004, an LAPD officer was videotaped striking a suspected car thief, a 36-year-old African-American man, Stanley Miller, 11 times with a flashlight after some observers concluded that the suspect had surrendered. In comments regarding this incident, Chief Bratton has said, “At face value, it is disturbing. Although we will not rush to judgment.” The Chief went on to say that there are many questions, but these would be answered through protocols established by the Consent Decree. The Chief of Police and the Police Commission are investigating this case as a Categorical Use of Force. Parallel internal administrative and criminal investigations, both designed to protect the constitutional rights of the suspect, as well as the police officers involved, are being undertaken. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department has announced that it will conduct a simultaneous and independent investigation of the incident in relation to the involvement of its deputies. The process also allows the Office of the Inspector General to do the same. The LAPD is working in cooperation with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In response to this incident, Chief Bratton has ordered commanders to upgrade any borderline non-categorical use of force cases to categorical (involving blows to the head or other serious injury), thus requiring more immediate and thorough investigation.

― Chief William J. Bratton
USE OF FORCE REVIEW AND ADJUDICATION

The Force Investigation Division (FID) now prepares a comprehensive presentation that can be adapted and updated for use at the Use of Force (UOF) Review Board briefing. This will ensure a presentation that is comprehensive and that meets consistent standards from one incident to the next.

In the past, the first briefing/examination of the case was at the UOF board. The divisional captain was allowed to make the determination as to whether the officer returned to work or not. Under Chief Bratton, the results of the preliminary investigation must be presented to him and members of his top command staff within five days of the incident. Chief Bratton or the acting chief then makes the decision as to whether an officer should be returned to full duty or restricted duty. Recognizing the key role that the Inspector General’s Office plays, FID provides the same briefing independent of the Chief’s briefing to the IG’s staff at their office.

Changes to use of force policy and reporting, investigation, and adjudication processes are numerous. Amendments to Department procedures are being coordinated through the Chief of Staff’s office in order to keep various Department entities on the same page.81

COMMUNITY POLICING

A principal goal of the Consent Decree is to achieve greater transparency and dialogue between the Department and its stakeholders – the many diverse communities which the police serve. And much progress has been achieved by the LAPD over the past two years in its commitment to community policing. In an action designed to make the Department more transparent and to involve communities in crime fighting, L.A. Compstat meetings have often been opened to the public and the press; and these meetings have been taken into the neighborhoods. The LAPD further reached out to the City’s communities through development of additional Community-Police Advisory Boards (C-PABs), one example being the new Mental Health Community Police Advisory Board. In addition, the Chief has stressed the importance of Neighborhood Councils, and Department members regularly attend local C-PAB, Neighborhood Council, and Town Hall
meetings to outline the Police Commission’s and Chief’s agenda and seek feedback in open forum. The Chief and Police Commission have also directed that Community Policing tenets be covered in recruit and in-service training classes.

• African-American ministers and other activists, as mentioned previously, have called on their congregations and communities to protest violence directed at police officers, and to no longer withhold information from the police about crimes being committed in their neighborhoods.82

• The Los Angeles Urban League President, John Mack, and the Los Angeles Brotherhood Crusade President, Danny Bakewell, have both lauded the LAPD’s community outreach. President Mack has stated, “There has clearly been a major turning point in the relationship with the LAPD and the African American community...”83

The news media has also recognized the fruit of LAPD’s outreach to its stakeholders.

• The Los Angeles Sentinel, during Black History Month in 2004, published several articles on new partnerships being formed between African-American community groups and the LAPD.

• The Spanish language Channel 34, in partnership with the LAPD, runs occasional programs on police topics of importance or interest to the Hispanic community.

The Department still has a good deal of work ahead. Vehicle stop data indicate that when a driver is stopped and an officer makes a decision to search, Hispanics and African Americans who are stopped and not arrested are more likely to be searched than similarly situated whites, Asians and other ethnic groups.84 A consultant has been hired by the City as part of the Consent Decree to explore the degree to which these searches are racially motivated, if at all.

By building on the trust of those it is sworn to protect and serve, and with their help, the LAPD can continue to move closer to making Los Angeles the safest big city in America.
CREATING COMMUNITY-POLICE PARTNERSHIPS

A key principle of community policing that has helped communities restore order and reclaim public spaces is problem solving through public/police collaboration. For crime control and prevention measures to be successful, they must be driven by both an understanding of the nature of the crime problem, and collaboration between police and community partners to develop a comprehensive strategy that reduces and prevents crime, fear, and disorder.

Importantly, LAPD officers believe strongly that partnership with the public is essential. Responding to the Chief’s department-wide survey last October,

- 98.0% think “the community should share the responsibility for making the streets safer.”

Other cities have had success in applying community policing principles to crime control. At the same time, law enforcement, social service and treatment providers, and faith-based representatives are challenged to develop new ways of offering their services, and new links of accountability and cooperation.

THE LOS ANGELES SAFER CITY INITIATIVE

The Los Angeles Safer City Initiative, sponsored by Mayor Hahn and endorsed by the Police Commission, the members of the City Council, and Chief Bratton, is a collaborative problem-solving process among the LAPD, other government agencies, and community organizations to suppress crime and violence in high crime areas of the City. The program in each neighborhood is tactically fluid, subject to amendment as feedback is received from stakeholders about the best courses of action given local community dynamics.

Implementation of this program is underway or planned for 2004 in five sections of the City:

- Hollywood Boulevard, where a focus on prostitution enforcement has seen a 545% increase in prostitution arrests. Overall violent crime in Hollywood is down 16% and property crime is down 14% this year. Gang-related crimes are down 28%.86
• The Baldwin Village community in Southwest Los Angeles, where enforcement tactics include: 1) a LAPD Safer City Unit to restore order; 2) proactive enforcement of probation and parole compliance; and 3) proactive enforcement of quality of life conditions and prosecution of quality of life crimes. Gang and gun enforcement focuses on the most violent gang members. Also, nuisances are abated by evicting tenants from apartments for chronic narcotics activities and other criminal offenses. After establishment of the Baldwin Village program in June 2004, only one homicide was reported there that month compared with three in June 2003. Also during June 2004, robberies were down 17%, and aggravated assaults were down 9%. While placing an additional 14 officers and two supervisors in the three reporting districts that make up Baldwin Village effectively reduced crime, such a strategy can only be used sparingly: with 1,009 reporting districts in the City, responding to crime in such a manner citywide would require at least 5,381 additional personnel (but, of course, not all districts have high crime).

• The “Skid Row” section of downtown Los Angeles, a center for violent crime, drug sales, prostitution, and poor public health, places the children and homeless there at high risk for victimization. Safer City Initiative projects have yet to be implemented, but general policing has led to a perceived reduction in the number of illegal homeless encampments.

• The Panorama City area in the San Fernando Valley, where Safer City Initiatives are still in the planning process.

• MacArthur Park and the surrounding Alvarado Corridor, a part of the City that has historically been a hotbed for drug dealing, prostitution, and gang violence. A focused response to the problem since September 2003 leveraged bike patrols, foot beats, gang injunctions, undercover narcotics officers, Gang Impact Teams, mounted officers, and federal resources, with the goals of reducing homicides by 20% and Part I crimes by 5%, reducing fear, and revitalizing the community. Perhaps the most effective tactic of this program was a series of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras installed in key locations around the park. Overall crime in MacArthur Park had declined 45% by July 2004. Although some critics have charged that the cameras are simply displacing crime, in fact they were responsible for 150 arrests by July 2004.

“SINCE [CHIEF BRATTON] HAS BEEN HERE, I HAVE SEEN A GREAT DIFFERENCE IN THE ATTITUDES OF POLICE OFFICERS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNITY.”

— Bishop Charles Blake, Senior Pastor, West Los Angeles Church
DIVERSITY

The LAPD has worked to maintain its commitment to diversity and its Affirmative Action goals. Chief Bratton, working within budget limitations and promotion freezes, has promoted a woman and a Latino to Assistant Chief, an African-American and a Latino to Deputy Chief, and a woman and an Asian to the rank of Captain.

And since a department that seeks to be open to the community it serves should reflect the demographics of that community, the Chief has worked with the Mayor and the Police Commission to ensure that a renewed emphasis has been placed on hiring and promoting minorities and women.

- In FY 2003/2004, 26% of the 280 appointments to the Police Academy were women. Among all appointments, 43% were Hispanic, 11% were Asian, and 9% were African Americans.91

- In FY 2003/2004, 53% of the officers promoted or assigned to coveted positions were African-American, Hispanic, or Asian. And 28% were women, some of whom are included in the minority percentage.92
PRIORITY 3: READINESS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS

STRUCTURE AND MISSION

A world-class counter terrorism capability is the third of Chief Bratton’s three highest priorities for the LAPD. To that end, a new Critical Incident Management Bureau (CIMB) was created within the LAPD, headed by John Miller, former Deputy Police Commissioner of the NYPD, terrorism expert, and former network news investigative journalist – and although funding to increase force strength to staff its positions was not approved by the City Council due to fiscal constraints, officers have been reassigned by the Chief to this new Bureau. CIMB’s dedicated mission is to monitor and develop response to specific and potential threats to the City of Los Angeles.

PREPAREDNESS

- The CIMB has identified hundreds of high threat locations within the City, with the Port of Los Angeles and Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) being among the 45 locations of highest risk. Indeed, LAX is rated the top potential terrorist target in the state.\(^93\) In fact, the City of Los Angeles contains 85% of California’s high threat locations.

- CIMB recently coordinated the application for and distribution of $18.7 million in federal Homeland Security grants to provide technology, equipment, overtime for intelligence gathering, and training for LAPD officers. Officer training includes 16 hours for terrorism awareness and force protection training, and 16 hours of critical incident management training for supervisors. Manpower and funding shortages have handicapped execution of this program – the Training Division has only eight instructors hired through CIMB on an overtime basis to train the 9,200-officer LAPD, and only eight hours of terrorism awareness training have been provided to date, with no reimbursement.\(^94\)

- CIMB is conducting an analysis of the 31 LAPD facilities including the Area stations and LAPD headquarters at Parker Center.\(^95\) The Bureau is also evaluating evacuation plans for the LAPD jails in case of terrorist attack or natural disaster, as well as collaborating with the U.S.
Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency to better recognize and reduce the threat of terrorism to individual stations.

- Another issue facing CIMB with its limited staff is that the specialized training for new CIMB officers can take up to two years. This training includes highly specific and complex subject matter such as identifying and handling hazardous materials, and defusing explosives of diverse types.

Also impacting LAPD resources:

- Major annual events such as the Academy Awards and the Los Angeles Marathon – which were once treated as “routine” traffic concerns – now require lengthy security analysis and planning because of their high profile, and hence their potential as terrorist targets.

- All threats, regardless of how far in advance they are made, and all suspicious persons must be investigated to ensure that no incidents occur.

- Suspicious packages left unattended require LAPD bomb squad response and disposal. In 2003, the Bomb Squad responded to 1,237 calls. This averages more than three call-outs each day. 25% of these calls involved actual explosives.96

The costs to the LAPD for securing the City of Los Angeles are great. Every time the U.S. Department of Homeland Security raises the alert level from Yellow to Orange, the extra costs of mobilizing Department resources are approximately $400,000 per week.97 During Orange Alerts, LAPD officers must respond to over 600 high-profile target sites and conduct investigations, regardless of whether specific threats have been made.

- The costs to the City and nation should a terrorist attack occur are impossible to quantify in advance, but as a reference point, when the Port of Los Angeles was shut down for ten days due to a labor dispute, the estimated cost to the national economy was $20 billion, or $2 billion per day.98 And the events of September 11th, 2001 cost the City of New York $17.68 billion.99
• “A radioactive dirty bomb detonated at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach could cause a $34 billion loss to the nation's economy, according to researchers at a two-day symposium that focused on the economic impact of terrorism.” reported the Los Angeles Times on August 22, 2004.100

INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE
The LAPD is the major partner with the FBI in the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and has either originated or participated in every major terrorism investigation in the Los Angeles region. Surveillance personnel and investigators also regularly assist LAPD Area detectives on major cases.

Detectives, assigned to the JTTF and to the Department of Homeland Security Operations Center, give Los Angeles instant access to the latest intelligence and threat information including classified data that many other local law enforcement agencies do not have access to.

COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRESS
The proliferation of threats against the United States, and in particular against Los Angeles, underscores urgent needs related to terrorism prevention and response. The primary need is to establish an efficient system within the Los Angeles Police Department whereby incident-related information is received, analyzed, investigated, and disseminated accurately and as rapidly as possible. It is critical that every level of government work vigorously and relentlessly to establish compatible functions to process this information.

The successful management of past disasters has shown that timely and accurate intelligence in the hands of experienced planning and operations personnel creates a synergy enabling effective critical incident detection, prevention, and response. The new Critical Incident Management Bureau is designed to facilitate this information flow and eliminate intelligence failures.

• In October 2002, the LAPD established the Terrorist Threat Assessment Center (TTAC) as a clearinghouse for terrorist-related information received from the public via the 877-A-THREAT hotline. The LAPD is merging TTAC into a Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC). The JRIC will combine and coordinate the efforts of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies for the purpose of creating
a central point for the intake and analysis of incident-related information for the Los Angeles region.  

- In order to improve the LAPD’s ability to respond to and effectively manage critical incidents within the City of Los Angeles, the CIMB will continue to work collaboratively with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to implement Operation Archangel, a program intended to identify and protect crucial City infrastructure. Conceived by the LAPD and funded by the Department of Homeland Security, Operation Archangel will provide a real-time “test bed” opportunity for the concepts and initiatives undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security which are outlined in its National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.

Overall information support for CIMB and Archangel will cost approximately $15 million but will provide a vital security advantage for this second largest city in America and one of the nation’s primary terrorist targets. External funding sources will need to be secured.  

- Archangel would combine the functionality of a wide array of currently existing databases, and among other capabilities would provide alerts, geospatial analysis, emergency operations management, and an evaluation of threats to critical infrastructure.

- More than 600 infrastructure locations protected under the Critical Incident Management System would be specifically incorporated into the automatic geocoding used for crime analysis.

- Integration of LAPD technology with other City systems, such as utilities and fire databases, would not only enable rapid response to imminent terrorist activities, but would benefit police, fire, and EMS personnel on a daily basis by providing them with critical information about the City’s infrastructure as they respond to radio calls.
RESOURCING THE LAPD

BUDGET

The LAPD's budget for FY 2004/2005 stands at $1.03 billion, up from $985.0 million in FY 2003/2004. The $44.1 million increase is primarily due to annual cost of living allowance increases, the addition of 30 sworn officers to budgeted strength approved this year by the City Council, and to allow for the opening of the Department's 19th Area station in the San Fernando Valley.

• 96% of the budget goes directly to salaries and benefits, including overtime. Only 4%, or $46.3 million in FY 2004/2005, can be used for other expenses.

• Vehicle procurement and maintenance is one of the largest non-personnel line items in the LAPD budget. The FY 2005 budget will allow for the replacement of 250 black and white vehicles and 80 to 103 motorcycles depending on the make and model.

• The FY 2004/2005 budget also allocates $1,480,000 for technology improvements and computer life cycle replacement. This equipment will be funded through Asset Forfeiture.

FORCE STRENGTH

The LAPD is authorized by the Los Angeles City Council to have 10,213 officers, but it has never been budgeted to hire to that limit. The LAPD is currently funded for a year-end total of 9,241 sworn positions. Actual strength, however, fluctuates somewhat as attrition and hiring overlap one another.

Because of fiscal constraints, the Mayor and City Council have been unable to increase the size of the LAPD to the level needed to meet all of the increased demands faced by the Department. This cap on budgeted force strength in the face of these increased needs is a continuing concern for both City leaders and police administrators. Today, the LAPD must not only address crime in the City, but also compliance with Consent
Decree mandates and homeland security with essentially the same personnel resources as before.

- Because a sufficient number of positions requested by the Chief to adequately staff the CIMB, and Consent Decree-mandated positions within the Professional Standards Bureau, the Audit Division, and elsewhere were not funded by the City Council, the Chief, using his discretion to allocate personnel as he sees fit, has loaned officers and civilians from other Units throughout the Department to staff these critical functions.

- The Department has also faced significant operational constraints this year caused by a hard freeze on promotions. With the establishment of the hiring freeze in September 2003, all hiring and promotions except for those in patrol and Consent Decree positions were prohibited. Then the patrol promotions were frozen in December. The negative impact of a policy that has not allowed the Chief of Police to manage promotions within budget cannot be overstated. It impacts on morale, operational effectiveness, risk mitigation, and Consent Decree mandates. For example, not a single Lieutenant promotion and only 70 Detective promotions were made since mid-2003, compared to an average of 29 Lieutenant and 162 Detective promotions each year on average between 1995 and 2003.

- In early October 2004, after extensive negotiations between the Department and the City Council, an additional 184 promotions were approved and will be phased in during the remainder of Fiscal Year 2004-2005. The $1,519,294 cost will be covered from the City’s general fund.107

- In early October of 2004, the City Council also approved the allocation of approximately $340,000 from the City’s general fund to cover 48 new officer positions for the North Valley Station, scheduled to open in First Quarter of 2005. This action also provided position authority for 13 new supervisory positions required at the North Valley Station. The remaining authorities came from those reassigned from Transit Division, D.A.R.E. and Recruitment and Employment Division.108
• The 30 additional officers that will be hired for citywide deployment under the FY 2004/2005 budget will also help in staffing the new North Valley Area station.\textsuperscript{109} The remaining patrol force will be reassigned from other neighboring divisions as the boundaries of the North Valley Station are determined.\textsuperscript{110}

**FISCAL REALITY**

The City of Los Angeles faces substantial budgetary restrictions today, including several hundred million dollars in lost revenue from the elimination of the City's Vehicle License Fee increase and the state's appropriation of more city property taxes.

Not long ago the City secured a $20.8 million grant from the federal government to share the cost of hiring 278 additional police officers over the next three years, provided the City contribute $41.4 million to the total cost. But again, due to anticipated City budget shortfalls, it appears unlikely that the City will be able to take advantage of this grant for at least two years.\textsuperscript{111}

If the county voters approve the half-cent on the dollar sales tax increase on goods and services measure on the November ballot, this would fund a 1,260-officer build-up in LAPD force size.\textsuperscript{112}
COST AND TIME-SAVINGS ACTIONS

To utilize personnel most effectively, several actions are now being taken to save officers’ time. In addition to those referenced elsewhere in this Plan, are the following efforts:

COURT OVERTIME REDUCTION PILOT PROGRAM

A pilot program jointly designed by the Department and City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo to reduce officers’ court overtime was initiated in May 2004 in the downtown courts. Preliminary results have shown a marked improvement in reducing the number of officers being placed on-call or subpoenaed for court. In October, City Attorney Delgadillo reported to the Department that the program resulted in a savings of $1.9 million in its first six months. This pilot program will continue to be monitored and an evaluation will be developed to assess the potential impact on court overtime reduction citywide.

REVISION OF TRAFFIC COLLISION REPORTING PROCEDURES

Streamlined traffic collision reporting procedures to expedite investigations by traffic and field officers were implemented in May 2004. A methodology is under development to identify the impact of this reengineering effort in terms of cost savings efficiencies and overall results.

REDUCTION IN PAPERWORK BY PATROL

Officers in the field spend approximately three to four hours each day in a twelve-hour shift completing necessary paperwork. Examination of patrol-related forms is currently underway to determine which are essential and which should be modified or possibly eliminated.

TECHNOLOGY

Police departments across America are becoming ever more reliant on modern technology which offers some of the most effective tools today for fighting crime. At the LAPD, however, scarce funding for technology enhancements has necessitated an ad hoc, stovepipe approach to upgrading and modernizing infrastructure. Such an environment can be perilous because it not only deprives the Department of the problem-solving potential that new technology
offers, but it creates inefficiencies and barriers to data portability and integration that severely handicap crime enforcement and counter-terrorism efforts.

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Based on interviews and evaluations conducted by independent technology consultants, the current LAPD technology infrastructure has significant weaknesses.

There has been no “enterprise” plan or process.
• Without a strategic plan and a set of firm standards for technology, new systems have often been built as “stand-alone” systems to address singular tactical needs. Retrieving and analyzing data from the resulting montage of databases is far more difficult and time-consuming than if the data architecture were planned and integrated.

The existing infrastructure is inadequate.
• Many databases and other systems are at or have exceeded their life expectancy, and old technologies are no longer supported. As a result, response times by police officers may degrade, and tactics, deployment and follow-up may be hindered.

LAPD systems are not “user-friendly.”
• Officers, detectives, and their supervisors spend too much time searching 57 separate LAPD databases and reading manual reports. This practice either discourages use of the databases or leaves little time to derive meaning from crime patterns and officer behavior indicators.

Interoperability is limited; “stovepiping” of data is rampant.
• The historical approach to data entry, coupled with understaffing in records management from unfilled personnel vacancies, have created data entry errors and backlogs that lead to inaccurate or incomplete crime analysis.

Technology and practices are not secure.
• The increasing reach and sophistication of cyber-attacks today outmatch current citywide systems for detecting and preventing them. Of particular concern, LAPD databases are almost completely unprotected from attacks from within the system. And disaster
recovery is inadequate. As LAPD personnel rely more upon the integrity of Department databases in order to fight crime, network security must become a high priority.115

TECHNOLOGY VISION

Acting on the premise that planned, sustainable change is preferable to crisis management, the LAPD is developing a plan for modernizing and consolidating its antiquated technological systems. This plan will set standards and identify funding sources for a multi-year upgrade program. Underpinning this endeavor is a long-term vision that defines a framework for the technology infrastructure and building block approach. This vision lays a foundation for the technological improvements needed most urgently today, and then builds upon that foundation as funds and new technologies become available.

• Patrol officers responding to a call for service would have at their disposal all relevant Department information, including the history of calls and crime trends pertinent to that location, suspect, and vehicle and weapon descriptions if relevant. Officers would also be able to query databases and write and submit electronic reports from their vehicles or remotely using wireless technology, increasing their time in the field.

• Detectives beginning new cases would be able to access lists of people on parole or probation reported to be near the scene of a crime at the time it occurred. They would also be able to access information on similar crimes by modus operandi, vehicle and weapon descriptions, and so forth to quickly develop leads. Such a system is possible with compatible, linked databases, and software that would automatically query them using the established best practices of veteran LAPD detectives.

• With Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and other cellular technology, detectives and plainclothes officers would be able to monitor police radio frequencies and search Department databases, a degree of accessibility only patrol officers now enjoy with radios and Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs). These wireless devices will be easy to carry and conceal, providing detectives with increased mobility and flexibility.
• Whether in their office or car, supervisors and watch commanders would be able to approve online crime and arrest reports, track crime trends, manage officer deployment in real time, and view the performance of an officer to spot trends suggesting risks.

• Units responding to a tactical situation would gain an advantage from detailed information about the layout and potential hazards of the location, as well as recommended incident command post sites. Using wireless technology, officers would have access to video feeds from fixed or remote locations. With the same technology, headquarters personnel could send updates about emergent crime patterns and trends to officers in the field, or could also transmit video feed related to major incidents anywhere in the City. Officers responding to a bank robbery in progress, for example, could obtain tactical information from live camera feeds inside the bank.116

In short, catching 21st Century criminals requires 21st Century tools.

Crime analysis and other tools associated with crime reduction constitute the most fundamental technology priority for the LAPD. The independent analysis has not only validated the need for technology integration inside the LAPD, it also has identified substantial potential savings if this is done.

• A system integrating databases of all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the County and region would greatly benefit the City by providing comprehensive crime intelligence and, when appropriate, allow rapid and coordinated response to crime problems and terrorist threats.

**STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLAN**

In response to pressing technological needs, a Strategic Technology Plan will be developed by newly appointed Chief Information Officer Ron Wilkerson under the direction of Assistant Chief Sharon Papa, that makes the vision presented above a reality.

The Strategic Technology Plan will lay out a multi-year program that takes the following steps:
Immediate
• Develop Information Technology standards and architecture design that reduce the current number of databases to a fewer number that are compatible, easily backed up, and written in languages known for their longevity.

After setting standards and architecture, and conditional on funding, the Department will implement the following changes, each a building block towards achievement of its vision.

Short-term
• Fix those databases closest to crashing by rehabilitating or upgrading legacy systems.

Mid-term
• Obtain a Records Management System (RMS) that will consolidate the 22 records databases into one and include additional analytical tools.

• Implement a much-needed records application that allows for an officer to electronically submit field reports into the upgraded Consolidated Crime and Arrest Database (CCAD).

• Migrate information from current databases, bit by bit as funds become available, into a new infrastructure of fewer, compatible, relational databases.

• Integrate these systems with other City and State agencies to gain powerful analytical capabilities to support crime reduction and counter-terrorism efforts.

Long-term
• Develop a strategy for building upon the above foundation that best supports the information and operations needs of the Department as it moves into the future.

Integrating LAPD databases would cost an estimated $10 million.\textsuperscript{117} If the City also replaces its outdated systems, the City could save at least $15 million annually in maintenance costs for the old systems alone.\textsuperscript{118}
COMPSTAT TECHNOLOGY
Improved crime-fighting and counter-terrorism tools are the LAPD's top priority for technology along with data integration, and Compstat software is the vehicle to deliver such tools.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE NATION, NEW COMPSTAT TECHNOLOGY WILL ALLOW A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL COMPSTAT APPROACH TO INTEGRATE CRIME INFORMATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM INFORMATION COLLECTED, ANALYZED, AND USED BY THE LAPD TO REDUCE CRIME IN THE REGION AND TO PREVENT TERRORISM INCIDENTS IN WHAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS ONE OF THE TOP THREE TERROR TARGETS IN THE NATION.

In 1999, the City of Los Angeles was awarded a grant under the U.S. Department of Justice COPS MORE 1998 Program to develop a command accountability system. This system will analyze and respond to crime problems with strategic and tactical guidance by embedding the knowledge and expertise of the nation’s most renowned crime fighters.

L.A. Compstat technology will be designed by an outside contractor working under contract with the City of Los Angeles and directed by the LAPD. It will not only address Los Angeles’ specific crime reduction and counter-terrorism needs, but it will include a new automated community policing problem solving component as a strategic crime management tool.

L.A. Compstat technology will provide an enhanced Compstat accountability system that

- improves the Department’s ability to provide officers in the field with all relevant crime data in a more timely manner; automatically geocode spatial data where possible, and automate the input of crime locations;

- takes the current Compstat to the next generation by helping to develop successful crime strategies for street-level officers.
In the short term, line officers will be able to use these new capabilities to develop targeted crime strategies on their beats based on national best practices in crime-fighting and community policing, the expertise of LAPD executive officers, and local conditions and laws. In the long term, officers will automatically receive data while in the field via mobile devices.

**INVESTIGATIONS TECHNOLOGY**
The Department will explore development of a system that will allow detectives to conduct more efficient database queries to speed their work.

- This system would save an estimated 360,000 investigative hours annually, which equates to the equivalent of 173 full-time officers or $17 million annually.¹¹⁹

- Integration of an investigative link analysis tool to analyze data in the new database architecture could save detectives additional time and increase case clearances by identifying leads detectives have not previously considered.

**COMPUTER-AIDED DISPATCH**
The LAPD is in the process of upgrading Computer-Aided Dispatch software that will outfit black-and-white police vehicles with a Mobile Data Computer (MDC) system that offers improved interface and allows faster access to data. This system should be operative by the final weeks of 2004. The current MDC system is using a Windows 1995-based technology.¹²⁰

**CRITICAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY**
Critically important today are technology enhancements to confront and respond effectively to the looming threat of international terrorism. Today, analysts must gather information from multiple, archaic databases through a labor-intensive process requiring multiple queries. In order to provide a high quality and range of emergency services, the Los Angeles region needs a system for automated intelligence sharing and real time interagency data access. The LAPD necessarily requires an information technology capability that supports critical incident preparedness, response, and recovery if it is to provide detection of terrorist threats, a shield against terrorist attacks, and life-saving response should an attack occur.
INTER-DEPARTMENT NETWORK TECHNOLOGY
The Department is exploring the possibility of establishing a wireless network with other City departments. Such a network would serve as a foundation for the interdepartmental information exchange needed to realize the Department’s technology vision.

PAPERLESS SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY
The LAPD produces a mountain of paperwork to capture the necessary and critical information for crime-fighting purposes, to document compliance with the Consent Decree, and to satisfy requirements of the various other mandates under which it operates. In 2002, the latest year for which paperwork has been completed, the Records and Information Division (R&I) received 1,049,632 police documents from throughout the Department.121

The drafting, completion, review, re-drafting, final review, and auditing of paper within the Department, while necessary, is a strain on resources. While recognizing the need to keep track of important information, the LAPD will streamline this work by shifting to electronic processes where and when possible. This will be enormously beneficial to the LAPD in terms of both time/cost efficiencies and operational effectiveness.

With a Paperless System

- the need for data entry clerks would be greatly reduced;
- every officer would be able to populate multiple databases by entering data once from the field using a wireless device.

FACILITIES

NEW AND REPLACED
One bright spot on the LAPD’s fiscal horizon is that under the direction of Chief Sharon Papa, the Department’s $600 million need for a strong facilities infrastructure to support the emerging technological requirements of the Department is being addressed. The new North Valley Station is now being completed and is scheduled to open in early 2005. In addition, extensive other new and replacement construction is underway.
• Funded through 2002 Proposition Q – Citywide Public Safety Bond Program, two additional new LAPD station facilities (Valley Station and Mid-City Station), three station replacements (Hollenbeck, Rampart, and West Valley), one replacement station and jail (Harbor), and two new Bomb Squad facilities (Downtown and North Valley) are at various stages of design or pre-construction. Work on the West Valley station was 75% completed as of September 2004, and is expected to be completed in spring 2005. Completion dates for the other seven facilities range from late in 2006 to early in 2008. The total cost of construction for these eight LAPD facilities, including satellite vehicle maintenance facilities, parking structures or lots, and in some cases, demolition and land acquisition, is budgeted at $226,639,000.122

RENOVATIONS
Renovations of twelve existing LAPD facilities including the Los Angeles Police Academy, funded also by Proposition Q, is currently planned or underway, and is scheduled to be completed by early 2008. The budgeted cost for this work is $45.1 million. Parker Center is not included among these twelve.123

PARKER CENTER
Parker Center is a 1950s-era building that was damaged by the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. The building also does not comply with current Fire/Life safety requirements, and extensive age and use are causing corrosion and deterioration of its heating/ventilation/cooling system. In addition, the building is too small to accommodate current needs of the LAPD, not to mention projected growth. There has long been agreement that the LAPD needs new headquarters.

• In July 2004, the City Council approved construction of a new LAPD headquarters at a location on the south side of City Hall at a cost of $300 million. Completion will take an estimated five years. 124

• In late May 2004, the Public Safety Bond oversight Committee (PSBOC) requested its Project Management Team (PMT) to re-examine Parker Center and determine the scope of work to upgrade the building on a temporary basis until the new permanent facility is available. The three primary issues with respect to the building's current condition are structural/seismic integrity, Fire/life safety systems, and the HVAC
system (Heating, Ventilation and Cooling). For the purpose of a temporary fix, the PMT focused on the last two items only. Based on cost estimates, the PMT has recommended 24/7 Fire Watch services, as defined in the Fire Code, and basic repair and cleaning of the existing HVAC system. This option would not require floor closures. These renovations would take ten months to complete at a cost of approximately $7.8 million, although this preliminary cost estimate may be revised by the Bureau of Engineering before City Council review.125

FUNDING URGENT NEEDS

GRANTS DEVELOPMENT
The LAPD has sought and obtained significant federal and state grant funding through block grant and formula-based programs, as well as large amounts of federal and state discretionary funding through competitive grant programs. The Department is seeking grant funding, moreover, from non-traditional government and private sources.

A Department Grants Agenda Committee was convened in 2003 to determine current funding needs. Today, the LAPD Grants Unit, working closely with the Mayor’s Criminal Justice Planning Office (CJPO), has started the process of developing a Grants Agenda Strategic Plan to identify, research and write grant proposals for important LAPD needs not covered by the Department’s budget.

• The Grants Agenda will be completed and then updated on a bi-annual basis for use as an internal planning document to help redirect and reinvigorate the LAPD Grants program. It will also serve as an external marketing tool and introduction to the Department’s funding goals.

• The LAPD Grants Unit, in conjunction with detailed staff from the CJPO, will enhance their networking skills in order to identify potential resources for seeking new funding proactively through unsolicited concept papers and proposals.

LOS ANGELES POLICE FOUNDATION
Budget constraints handicap LAPD’s operations in a number of ways. Among these is often the inability to conduct important programs and procure needed equipment without outside help. In recognition of
this, the Los Angeles Police Foundation was formed in 1998 to secure donations from the private sector to fund “urgently needed programs and equipment” not covered in the LAPD’s budget.

Since 2001, the Police Foundation has funded over 40 LAPD projects. Among these are: procurement of trauma shooting kits for every officer (which have already saved one officer’s life); digital cameras for every Area stationhouse and the Metropolitan Division to assist officers in capturing and documenting critical evidence; scanners and color printers for L.A. Compstat to assist in the preparation and dissemination of timely, essential crime data; surveillance equipment; search and rescue equipment; tactical body armor; portable radios and radio cell phones; and equipment for the Underwater Dive Unit for cargo ship inspections in the Port of Los Angeles. Police Foundation grants to date have totaled $2,902,000.

Understanding that unbudgeted LAPD needs and opportunities are growing in number and complexity as the Department repositions operations to confront gang violence and terrorist threats, the Police Foundation has set a $2,500,000 fundraising goal for 2004.

The generosity of those business and philanthropic organizations and private individuals in supporting the LAPD through the Police Foundation has made an important contribution to LAPD’s progress in fighting crime, enhancing officer safety, and protecting the City from terrorists.

**SALES TAX INCREASE BALLOT MEASURE**

In late June 2004, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors agreed to work with local cities to draft a ballot measure that would raise the County sales tax to hire and support additional police officers and sheriff deputies. In July, this measure was approved by the Supervisors for placement on the November ballot. If this measure is approved by the required two-thirds of voters, it will increase the County sales tax to 8.75%, or one-half cent on the dollar, and generate a projected $500 million a year to fund the hiring of about 5,000 additional officers and deputies countywide. This would translate to more overtime, equipment, laborsaving technology, and 1,260 additional officers for the LAPD, an increase in force strength to 10,501. The prospective utilization of these additional officers, and the operating benefits that
will accrue to LAPD from this increase, are set forth in Book 2: LAPD Plan of Action for the Los Angeles that Could Be.

CONSTRAINTS ON REALIZING PRIORITIES

As a result of having too few officers, the LAPD had been forced to rely on rapid mobilization and assertive tactics to respond to violent crime. Forty years ago, these methods became the hallmark of the LAPD. Today, the world has radically changed, and with it, the demands placed on the LAPD. Tactical prowess and assertive tactics are no longer adequate.

Today, the LAPD must confront the dangers of spreading gang violence and terrorist threats, and do so while complying with the 152 action mandates of the Consent Decree. It is implementing new strategies and innovative deployment. It is doing everything it can with the resources it has. But it is constrained on several fronts from realizing optimum benefits from its actions. Primary among these constraints, as detailed in this document, are insufficient force strength and inadequate technology. As a result, essential crime-fighting units are understaffed and under-resourced. The investigative case backlog is high. Crime analysis backlogs are high. Thousands of warrants go unserved. Counter-terror resources are stretched thin. Technology is archaic, ad hoc, and understaffed.

If the people of Los Angeles truly want to take back the streets of their City for the law-abiding, if they seriously expect that their City will be prepared to deal with terrorist attack or natural disaster, then Angelinos need to recognize the fact that their first line of defense, the Los Angeles Police Department, has always been and continues to be severely under-resourced. The men and women of the LAPD are among the most professional law enforcement agents in the world. They need to be given proper support in human and material resources to do their jobs effectively and safely. The high standards of the LAPD coupled with under-resourcing have led to the mantra among officers that “the LAPD can do anything, it just cannot do everything.” There is truth in this expression, a truth the people of Los Angeles need to recognize in shaping their expectations of the police.
Before his appointment as Chief of Police, and continuing to this day, William Bratton has repeatedly acknowledged that the great challenge facing the LAPD is the need to accomplish more today with fewer resources than in the past. And, with the Police Commission to which he reports, he is committed to doing this. But he also has been outspoken on LAPD’s need for more police officers and new technology if Los Angeles is to become the safest big city in America. He understands, however, the fiscal reality. While the Chief will continue to work assertively to find new and innovative ways to finance Department needs, he, the Police Commission, and the 12,000 men and women they lead are striving to do everything possible with the limited resources they now have.

LAPD’s progress on renewal over the last 24 months, and the crime reduction successes that have ensued, speak for the Department’s record, commitment, and capabilities. But Chief Bratton has also warned that “additional significant, permanent, and citywide reductions in crime in the City of Los Angeles will be increasingly harder to achieve without the infusion of more resources.” “We can do it,” Chief Bratton has said, “make Los Angeles the safest large city in America, if we are given sufficient resources to do it.” It is a choice that the people of Los Angeles will need to make.
ENDNOTES

2 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, August 2004.
3 This figure for juvenile shooting victims is a low estimate, as it excludes those victims whose ages were not known.
5 LAPD Information Technology Division. “Crime and Arrest Weekly Statistics” for the weeks ending 12/31/99, 12/31/00, 12/31/01, 12/31/02.
8 LAPD Department Command Post, October 19, 2004.
9 LAPD ITD, UCR numbers for 1H2003 and 1H2004.
12 Ibid.
14 Arrests made in 2003 have not yet been compiled into a format compatible with the statistical digests from previous years.
18 Ibid.
20 LAPD Medical Liaison Office, September 24, 2004. Because the number of officers reporting sick fluctuates, this figure reflects an average for the first three weeks in September. In addition, the number of officers reported as sick is artificially high and the number of officers reported as injured on duty is artificially low. The LAPD Payroll Office initially records officers reporting injured on duty (IOD) status as sick, for insurance reasons, until they receive a doctor’s note verifying the officer’s IOD status. (Source: LAPD Medical Liaison Office, September 24, 2004).
22 LAPD Fiscal Operations Division, Payroll Section, September 24, 2004. These figures reflect an average number of officers suspended, relieved, or on vacation for eight hours or more for the September pay period beginning on September 5th and ending on September 18th. The number of officers on vacation fluctuates greatly from day to day and from season to season. An average of 529 people were on vacation during the work week after Labor Day, for example, while the average dropped to 413 during the following week. Fewer people normally working on weekends, so fewer people take vacation time on weekends, lowering the figure used in this narrative to 359.
23 Ibid.
24 LAPD Professional Standards Bureau, Ethics Section, October 1, 2004. After the Department
issued a letter informing employees that not qualifying with a weapon may impact their job assignment or promotion opportunities in January 2004, 136 officers began qualifying in April. 184 of the remaining 312 people had temporary medical restrictions that either expired or did not meet the criteria for qualification, and follow-up letters were sent out in July. 36 of those 184 individuals have since begun qualifying, bringing the total to 171 officers who will have qualified. It is unknown how many of the officers who qualify will then be available for full field deployment.

25 LAPD Detective Support Division, Gang Unit, October 2004.
27 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
34 LAPD
Numbers for the street value of drugs seized tend to be skewed by major busts. The fact that NED officers seize 6.5 times as much street value as undercover buy officers is based on five months of information, with April eliminated from the data set because of a particularly large seizure that skewed the numbers significantly.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid
39 Ibid.
40 LAPD Information Technology Division, LAPD Statistical Digests for 2001, 2002 and 2003 to compare full-year case clearance rates; LAPD Investigative Analysis Section, “Detectives Activity Summaries” for 2003 and 2004 to compare 1H 2003 and 1H 2004 case clearance rates. (Obtained from LAPD Investigative Analysis Section). The Detectives Activity Summary contains only preliminary data, however, and the statistical digests contain slightly more accurate clearance rates.
41 LAPD Detective Bureau, July 2004.
42 Dispatched calls for service are those 9-1-1 calls that result in a police officer being sent to the location of the call. Since every 9-1-1 call does not result in an officer being sent, the yearly total of dispatched calls is less than the total volume of calls received by 9-1-1. Also excluded here are dispatches where an officer is taken out of service for administrative reasons.
43 LAPD Information Technology Division.
45 Ibid.
50 Warrant backlog and staffing numbers in this heading are from LAPD Fugitive Warrants Section, July 2004.
51 LAPD Investigative Analysis Section, July 2004.
52 "PM Watch Consolidation Project.” LAPD Communications Division presentation, August 2004.
53 Consent Decree Mental Illness Project, LAPD Detective Bureau, October 1, 2004. In particular,
a team of two police officers normally requires two to three hours to detain an individual with a possible mental illness in accordance with section 5150 of the Welfare and Institutions code, while a SMART team (with one officer) requires two hours. Each call therefore saves three to four patrol hours. In August, SMART units handled 277 calls, 122 more than in May and 80 more than in April, for a savings of between 280 and 427 hours of patrol time. Savings are calculated based on the increase in SMART calls rather than the decrease in patrol calls because an estimated 34% of patrol calls for 5150 stops went unreported to the Mental Evaluation Unit prior to the July extension of MEU hours, making direct comparisons on the patrol side problematic.

54 LAPD Civilian Employment Section, July 2004.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 LAPD Information Technology Division, August 2004.
61 Office of the Chief Information Officer, LAPD, September 2004.
62 LAPD Planning and Research Division, October 1, 2004.
63 Ibid.
66 LAPD TEAMS II Development Bureau, April 2004.
67 LAPD Consent Decree Bureau, October 2004.
68 In addition, there are two levels of external review: the Monitors as part of the Consent Decree and the Office of the Inspector General.
69 LAPD ITD, “Crime and Arrest Weekly Statistics” for 12/31/99, 12/31/00, 12/31/01, and 12/31/02.
70 LAPD Professional Standards Bureau, September 2004.
71 LAPD Information Technology Division, August 2004.
72 LAPD Professional Standards Bureau, October 6, 2004. A complaint must be open for a year before exceeding the statute of limitations governing complaint investigations, although for a number of reasons some open cases may be “tolled,” allowing them to stay open longer and still be processed normally. Because a direct query of the number of open cases that are out of statute is not possible with the current complaint database architecture, two numbers are used here to measure the seriousness of the complaint backlog in May 2003: first, the number of cases open for more than a year as of May 31st (1,061). Second, the number of still-open “un-tolled” cases that were initiated prior to May 31st, 2002 plus the number of cases open for more than a year on May 31st, 2003 that have since been closed and are shown to be out of statute (231). Neither of these numbers necessarily reflect the number of cases out of statute at the end of May 2003, but they are good indicators of the severity of the complaint backlog.
74 LAPD Professional Standards Bureau, Advocate Section, October 1, 2004.
75 LAPD Professional Standards Bureau, “Board of Rights: Chief’s Point of View.”
76 LAPD Training Division, Tactics Training Unit, October 1, 2004.
78 LAPD Tactics Training Unit, October 1, 2004.
79 In very simple terms, the POBR provides that an officer has the right to representation anytime he/she is asked a question in which the answer could result in punitive action against them, an administrative protection against self-incrimination. The trend has been to
push an expansion of this right to virtually every situation.

80 In particular, categorical uses of force include accidental or intentional uses of deadly force, incidents that result in deaths or hospitalization, head strikes with an impact weapon, dog bites, animal shootings, and investigations on behalf of a non-Department entity (2002 LAPD Department Manual, section 3/794.10). Non-categorical uses of force include all other reportable uses of force, including TASERS and chemical spray (2002 LAPD Department Manual, section 4/425.05).

82 LAPD Community Relations Office, April 2004.
83 Ibid.
85 In Boston, Operation Ceasefire has received national attention for its creative multi-agency approach, bringing together the Boston Police Department, Boston-area African-American clergy, and researchers at Harvard University, that crafted an innovative set of tactics that essentially ended gang violence in Boston for a two-year period. In Newark, New Jersey, the Greater Newark Safer Cities Initiative has increased the accountability of law enforcement agencies to the local community, putting them in closer contact with law-abiding residents, community leaders, and neighborhood organizations to plan and implement activities.
86 LAPD Compstat unit, October 21, 2004.
88 LAPD Compstat unit, September 2004.
89 Kelling and Wagers, “Los Angeles Safer City Initiative Progress Report.”
92 Ibid.
95 Increasing security for Parker Center is a contentious issue as the LAPD will be vacating the building for a new one in a few years.
97 LAPD Fiscal Operations Division, October 13, 2004. Costs vary depending on the nature of the threat creating the orange alert level. $400,000 per week is accurate given a threat to LAX airport.
101 Communications Division, “PM Watch.”
103 LAPD TEAMS II Development Bureau, April 2004.
104 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
115 LAPD TEAMS II Development Bureau, April 2004.
116 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 LAPD, Office of the Chief Information Officer, September 2004.
121 Records & Information does not receive traffic citation books, Sergeant logs, Daily Field Activity Reports, or Field Interview Cards.
123 Ibid.
125 Proposition Q Program Oversight Committee, June 2004 Progress Report.
LAPD PLAN OF ACTION

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FOR THE LOS ANGELES THAT COULD BE
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AWAKENING TO THE PROMISE

Although people here, when asked where they live, identify more with their neighborhoods – Brentwood or South Los Angeles or the Valley and so on – it is the City as a political unity that will shape the future of every one of its neighborhoods and, in so doing, the life of every resident. As the City of Los Angeles fares, so does each of its people, regardless of race, country of origin, economic status, or home location.

Today, there is no issue before Los Angeles, and therefore before every resident regardless of community, of greater importance than public safety. Despite significant reductions in crime in 2003, Los Angeles still had one of the highest violent crime rates in America last year, ranking 24th among the 244 cities reporting to the FBI.\(^1\) Also, Los Angeles today is one of the top three cities in America targeted by terrorists, an emphatic warning by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.\(^2\) Every person who has a stake in the future of Los Angeles (and that is everyone who lives, works, invests, or visits here) needs to understand and accept the fact that public safety is an essential condition for cities to flourish – and to realize that the corollary is equally true. Without public safety, cities languish and decline.

It is the intent of this *Book II: LAPD Plan of Action for the Los Angeles that Could Be* to awaken the people of Los Angeles, as a single polity, to appreciate the very real threats of violent crime and international terror, understand what the Los Angeles Police Department needs in resources to protect them proactively from these threats, recognize the certain gain from delivering these resources, and embrace the imperative that this be done quickly.

- Needed are more police officers to take back the streets for the law-abiding and secure sustained low levels of crime in every City neighborhood.
• Needed is 21st Century technology that will deliver greater policing effectiveness in the fight against 21st Century crime and terrorism.

• Needed is for the whole community to come together to support their police with the resources they need to drain the swamps of gangs that are sucking young people by the thousands into lives of crime, destruction, and death – and once and for all excise this cancer on the civic body.

The LAPD is one of the few cultural artifacts that confer common identity on the enormous and complex place that is Los Angeles. Its badge is a world-recognized cultural icon of the City. But this badge can be much more than that. It can be the shield behind and around which a new city is born. A city where children no longer have to step around drug dealers and gang lookouts to go to school. A city where no young person thinks he has to carry a gun to be safe or feel important. A city where all live as one community without fear and for the common good. A city where businesses prosper, people have good-paying jobs, and the tax base grows. The men and women of the LAPD are among the most professional law enforcement agents in the world. Given the support they need in human and material resources, they can deliver on this vision: Los Angeles can be the safest big city in America, as Mayor James K. Hahn aspires. And it will be, if its people have the will and resolve.

FACING UP TO THE THREAT

Los Angeles has made important strides in recent years. But that progress could quickly unravel with a crippling one-two punch from gang violence and terrorist attack. These are serious threats, a combination unique to Los Angeles. And Angelinos ignore them at their peril.

GANG VIOLENCE IS A CANCER ON THE CITY

Too many of the City’s residents live under the shadow of gang violence, held hostage in their neighborhoods like prisoners of war. Too many are consumed daily by the fear that a stray bullet might end their lives. Police officers enter gang-infested neighborhoods at great risk, sometimes targeted by assault rifles with laser sights.
There are 416 known gangs with about 45,000 gang members active in Los Angeles today, many engaged in criminal activities. Countywide, there are about 80,000 gang members, “gang-bangers” who let no municipal boundary restrict their marauding. Despite the crime declines in 2003 and First Half 2004, the City is still gripped by deadly violence, much of it gang precipitated.

• The City of Los Angeles averages more than one homicide and six people shot each day.

• There have been 3,444 gang-related killings from January 1993 through August 2004.

• In 2003, 50.3% of the 514 homicides in Los Angeles were gang-related.

• In First Half 2004, gang-related homicides in the City increased 21.4%. Through October 9 this year, 58% of homicides were gang-related.

Residents of South Los Angeles, Pacoima, Boyle Heights, Echo Park and other gang-infested neighborhoods live in constant fear for their lives. Mothers place children in bathtubs to shield them from the crossfire.

• In October 2004, a 68-year old grandfather taking his grandchildren out for a morning walk, and another innocent bystander, were caught in crossfire between warring gangs in South Los Angeles.

• In April this year, a 4-year old girl in a car seat was critically injured in South Los Angeles after she was struck in the head by a stray bullet from a drive-by shooting. A pedestrian was also injured.

• In July this year, a 6-year old girl exiting a 7-Eleven where she had gone for ice cream, was shot in the head by a man with a rifle in the parking lot. “She just closed her eyes and fell to the ground,” her uncle, who was accompanying her said.

And the sanctuary that homes provide is no longer inviolate.

• Last December, a stray bullet in South Los Angeles killed Laudelina Salazar Garcia, 39, while she was decorating her Christmas tree. The two gunmen were firing back at a drive-by shooter.

“OH GOD. EVERY TIME I HEAR OF SOMETHING HAPPENING, I’M ON THE PHONE ASKING, ‘IS MY BOY ALL RIGHT? IS MY BOY ALL RIGHT?’”

“Getting Away with Murder in South L.A.’s Killing Zone” – L.A. Times, January 1, 2004

“TIRED OF ALL THE VIOLENCE EVEN A MOTHER’S TEARS AND PLEAS CAN’T STOP, WHEN THE POWER OF THE GANG IS STRONGER THAN ONE MOTHER’S LOVE.”

Earlier this year, a gunman shot into the front door of a home, striking a six-year-old girl and her ten-year-old brother inside.\(^{14}\)

Gangs target young people with few options and pull them into the violent nexus of guns and drugs. Too many of the City’s youth have lost their lives to entrenched gang culture, whether it is because they have embraced the ethos of gang violence, or because they have struggled to avoid it.

- Since 2002, at least 1,563 of the City’s youth were shooting victims; 449 of these were children below the age of fifteen.\(^ {15}\)

- In several instances, young men have been killed specifically because they have refused to join a gang.\(^ {16}\)

- The Grape Street Crips, to compel a reluctant 15-year old boy to join their gang, showed him a videotape of eleven gang members raping his 13-year old sister. He joined the next day fearing, if he did not, the gang would kill her. As one gang member said, “kids have no choice but to belong.”\(^ {17}\)

- On October 9th, 2004 a fourteen-year-old boy riding his bicycle was killed in South Los Angeles, shot repeatedly as he begged for mercy. The murder appeared to be gang-related, though the boy had nothing to do with gangs. The boy was “hunted” and shot down like a deer, said Detective Rudy Lemos of the 77th Street Area station. “There’s a turf war going on in the neighborhood. Some people decided to do what they call ‘work.’ Hunt someone down. Just to let their rivals know they’re still around.”\(^ {18,19}\)

Paralyzed with fear of gang retribution, law-abiding residents in gang-dominated neighborhoods will not cooperate with the police. Witnesses to gang-related homicides will not testify in court, despite a standing offer of $25,000 for information leading to a murder conviction. This silence, in effect, enslaves these people to gang tyranny.
Gangs have been characterized as a cancer – a tumor on the civic corpus. Like a cancer left unchecked, the urban terror of Los Angeles gangs – and it is domestic terrorism – is spreading to parts of the City once thought safe, penetrating into the suburbs and even rural areas at an alarming rate.20

New gangs first engage in property crimes, studies show, and then move on to violent crimes including homicides as they grow in size and notoriety.21 And this is not simply a case of gang-on-gang violence.

- On September 9, 2003, three Taft High School students were shot by gang members in a drive-by shooting near the school’s campus; the victims were waiting for the bus.22

- On April 3, 2004, a University of Southern California student was shot multiple times and killed at an intersection less than a quarter of a mile away from his downtown apartment.23

- On May 25, 2004, a sailor on leave from duty in the Persian Gulf visited a nightclub not knowing that it was a gang hangout. As the sailor was leaving, a gunman walked up and fired at least 30 shots killing him. LAPD Detective Rudy Lemos of the 77th Street Area station, who was on the scene, commented to the Los Angeles Times that the victim “was probably safer in the Middle East than he was here.”24

No Los Angeles resident is safe as long as gang violence continues unabated. But too many in “safe” neighborhoods close their eyes to the threat mistakenly believing it is a gang-on-gang problem that can be contained to certain sections of the City. But residents of City areas once considered havens from violence are being attacked in increasing numbers as gangs and other violent criminals expand their territory of criminal operations.

- The San Fernando Valley is thought to be safer than South Los Angeles and other sections where gangs cluster; yet in September 2003, the Devonshire Area in the Northwest part of the Valley recorded more homicides that month than any other of the 18 LAPD geographic Areas.25
• Even though the number of shooting victims citywide fell 18% in 2003 compared to 2002, the number of victims shot in the San Fernando Valley increased 2% during that time period. Although there were several clusters of shootings, the shooting locations were spread throughout the Valley.26

• Gang crime in the Pacoima area increased 37% between October 2001 and March 2004. Gang-related crime in Panorama City increased 33% during the same period.27

Homicides and shootings are the most egregious of violent crimes, but robberies are committed more often, and for the victims can be very frightening. Robbery is commonly perceived as “street-level” crime. But even more invasive than being robbed on the street is being robbed while in your own home.

Home-invasion robberies increased 4% in 2003 over the previous year.28

• At a national conference on gang crime held in Los Angeles in January 2004, representatives from twelve major police departments throughout the country agreed that an increase in home invasions, particularly committed by Asian gangs, constitutes a significant trend in gang violence today.

**GANGS ARE TARGETING THE POLICE**

Too often, LAPD officers monitoring gang activity have been met with hails of bullets. Many of these shooting incidents have been unprovoked. Often, gangs make no distinction between police and gang rivals in protecting their turf.

• In 2003, 87 LAPD officers were shot at in 40 separate incidents throughout the City. This was an increase of 29% citywide. Twelve of these shooting incidents were from high-powered rifles using 7.62mm cartridges, ammunition typically associated with AK-47s and similar illegal weapons. In total, 144 gunshots were fired at LAPD officers in 2003.29

• In First Half 2004, 36 LAPD officers were shot at in 16 separate incidents throughout the City. This was a 6% increase citywide compared to First Half 2003, but an 80% increase in South Bureau alone due to a flare-up of violence at the beginning of the year.30
• Earlier this year, 30 year-old Police Officer Ricardo Lizarraga was shot and killed by an active gang member, the first LAPD officer to be shot and killed in the line of duty since 1998.

The most vicious gang members not only prey upon law-abiding residents, they target LAPD officers charged with protecting these residents because of who they are and what they represent.

• On December 4, 2003, a man using an assault rifle equipped with a laser sight fired into the hood of an LAPD police car with two officers inside disabling the vehicle with one shot. This frightening new tactic eliminates a tactical safety maneuver for officers, trained to drive away if under fire, and places them in a deadly situation. Had the assailant’s weapon not jammed, the officers might not be alive today. No suspects have been apprehended in this case.31

• California Highway Patrol Officer Thomas J. Steiner was gunned down at random in late April 2004 apparently by a teenage boy to impress a street gang.32

Too few in number and lacking technological tools to give them an edge, LAPD officers are highly vulnerable targets of gang violence. The people of Los Angeles have good reason to worry about the safety of these men and women they depend on to protect them.

FEAR AND PUBLIC RESPONSE

Indeed, some Angelinos are concerned about crime. In 2002, a Los Angeles Times poll found that 24% of City residents felt unsafe in their neighborhoods; 20% felt less safe than five years before.33

Many residents who can afford it have resorted to gated communities, private security details, and home alarm systems.

According to The Economist, and cited by the National Center for Policy Analysis, the ratio of security guards to police officers in California was four to one in 1997, the latest year for which statistics are available. (Numbers are not tallied for the City but the ratio is likely to be at least the same and probably higher.)34

“AS LONG AS IT’S NOT A MIDDLE CLASS PROBLEM, NO ONE WILL CARE. IT’S STILL A CRIME-FREE CITY… FOR RESPECTABLE PEOPLE.”

— Dudley in LA Confidential

“…AN ATTACK ON AN OFFICER IS AN ATTACK ON ALL OF US.”

— William Lockyear
California Attorney General
In 1997, $90 billion dollars was spent on private security nationwide, compared to only $40 billion dollars on police. That relationship is no doubt the same in Los Angeles given its size, high crime incidence, and low number of police officers relative to most other large cities.\textsuperscript{35}

Residents of “The Crown,” a community of townhouses in Burbank, are seeking to gate off their community to provide increased security, despite protests from groups representing the hundreds of bikers and joggers who travel through Canyonback Road each week to get to 20,000 acres of public parkland on the other side. This is just one example of residents outside but near the City’s boundaries being adversely affected by the spread of crime.\textsuperscript{36}

It is ironic that many people seem more willing to invest in private security patrols and systems that do nothing to deal proactively with the crime problem, than to invest in their police who do. Every resident of Los Angeles, not just those who cannot afford private security, should expect, demand, and support the LAPD’s need for the resources required, both human and material, to effectively protect every City neighborhood.

THE THREAT OF TERRORIST ATTACK PERSISTS

Los Angeles is the world’s entertainment capital. It is a great commercial hub supplying much of the West with goods and services. The conjoined ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, through which move half the nation’s trade, are the busiest in the nation. As an iconic world city and America’s second largest, Los Angeles is in the crosshairs of international terrorism and a major security concern. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has stated that a future terrorist attack of possible 9/11 magnitude or greater is all but certain. And chillingly, Homeland Security has identified Los Angeles as one of the nation’s top three terror targets.

- An Al-Qaeda operative was arrested at the Canadian border in December 1999 as he tried to bring explosives into the country to bomb Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on the millennium New Year’s Eve.\textsuperscript{37}
• Federal authorities in May 2002 revealed a possible plot by terrorists to attack the World Cruise Center and the Vincent Thomas Bridge in the Port of Los Angeles.\(^\text{38}\)

• Air Flights from Paris to LAX were canceled at Christmas 2003 because of “no show” passengers who were under close federal scrutiny for possible terrorist plots.\(^\text{39}\)

• Al-Qaeda's operations chief, captured by the U.S., told interrogators that the group had planned an attack on the Library Tower in Los Angeles on the heels of the 9/11 terror strikes. The attack was aborted mainly because the decisive U.S. response to 9/11 disrupted the organization's plans to proceed. “We talked about hitting California as it was America's richest state, and bin Laden had talked about economic targets,” he said.\(^\text{40}\)

• On July 29, 2004, the FBI issued a warning for Los Angeles and other parts of the Southwest about possible terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda based on an analysis of intelligence.\(^\text{41}\)

Los Angeles is among the cities in America at highest risk of terrorist attack.\(^\text{42}\) LAX, the world's fifth-busiest airport, is considered California's number one terrorist target.\(^\text{43}\) These facts argue strongly for the resources the LAPD needs to prevent and disrupt terrorist acts, and if ever called upon, to swiftly and forcefully respond to terrorist attack.

The stakes for the people of this city, as well as for the LAPD, are high.
ASKING TOO MUCH FROM TOO FEW FOR TOO LONG

UNDER-STAFFED AND OVER-STRETCHED

Policing the City of Los Angeles has always been a stretching exercise. The LAPD has never had more than 10,000 officers to police nearly 470 square miles with a population over 3.8 million, a ratio of officers per capita and per square mile that is far lower than in most other large American cities.

Over the last fifty years, the number of LAPD officers per 1,000 residents has never exceeded 2.5, the present ratio, which is only marginally higher than in 1950 when crime was much lower.44

By comparison, America’s other largest cities – New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, have twice the number of officers per capita. And Los Angeles has far fewer officers per capita than many smaller cities with high crime such as Washington D.C., Baltimore, St. Louis, and Detroit.45

When compared by land area, Los Angeles also ranks behind all of these cities in officers per square mile.

OFFICER RATIOS TO POPULATION AND LAND AREA
SELECTED CITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Per 1,000 Pop.</th>
<th>Per Sq. Mi.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>39,779</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>128.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>14,075</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington D.C.</td>
<td>3,604</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>9,241</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Officer totals from Labor Relations Information Systems, Officer Wage and Benefit Survey, 2002 except for L.A which is current budgeted strength; City land area from World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2000; Population from 2002 U.S. Census estimates.
Boston offers another eye-opening comparison.

- The City of Boston is approximately 48 miles square with a population of nearly 600,000. Its police department deploys about 160 police cars per watch per day. The City of Los Angeles is 469.3 miles square with a population of 3.8 million. The LAPD deploys a similar number of police cars per watch citywide as does Boston,

- but all four LAPD geographic bureaus are larger than Boston both in land area and population;

- the Valley Bureau alone is over four and one-half times larger than Boston in land area; and three of the Valley Bureau's Areas are each larger in land area than Boston.

Perhaps most telling is this comparison. Los Angeles is equal in land area to all of the cities combined in the table at the left, including the borough of Manhattan. But L.A. has fewer than half the police officers of all of these cities combined.

When placed on a map, this point is compellingly made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND AREA AND POLICE FORCE SIZE SELECTED CITIES</th>
<th>Square Miles</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan, NYC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>452</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,165</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>9,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While most other cities have benefited from declines in violent crime since 1999, violent crime in Los Angeles increased 10.4% between 1999 and 2002, as the table of selected cities below shows.

Exacerbating this problem:

- Nearly 1,300 LAPD officers were unavailable for work on a typical day in September 2004, either recovering from medical injuries, sick, on leave to care for newborns, on military leave, relieved from duty, or on vacation.48

- The LAPD is authorized to have 3,580 civilian employees, yet the City has budgeted the LAPD to end FY04/05 with only 83% (or 2,981) of these positions, a situation analogous to sworn personnel.49 Because of this, the LAPD has had to fill many of these critical support functions with sworn officers removing many from enforcement duties.

- Budgetary constraints and uncertainties limit the amount of overtime available and limit the promotions that can be made, reducing the operational and motivational flexibility of the Department.
THE REVOLVING DOOR OF JUSTICE

Adding to the demands placed on a resource-strapped LAPD, and frustrating the Department’s progress in reducing crime, has been the return of convicted criminals to the street before completion of their jail sentences.

- In the past year, Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca, forced by steep budget cuts to close county jails, has been releasing prisoners at a rate of up to 400 to 500 a day. Some of these offenders have served as little as 10% of their sentence. As of late spring, more than 47,000 had been released early.

- An LAPD audit completed April 1, 2004 found that at least 73 inmates released since the beginning of the year had been rearrested within weeks, some within days, on charges as serious as kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon.

- Manuel Castenado Banos, released after serving only a third of his 12-month sentence for felony domestic abuse, brutally beat and killed his girlfriend, Mary Cortez.

The LAPD is in the process of teaming up with the Sheriff’s Department and prosecutors to identify inmates with the highest potential for committing new offenses. The more serious offenders are being “red flagged” to prevent their early release. Although this will help, it will not solve the problem.

FIGHTING CRIMES LIKE FIRES

The LAPD is struggling to hold off an inferno of criminal activity. As soon as the Department puts out one fire by mustering its scarce resources to respond to a flash point of violent crime, the violence jumps to a new location. Enforcement strength is oftentimes stretched too thin to provide an effective and consistent deterrent to crimes developing. The LAPD does not have the manpower to erect a firewall to keep the conflagration from spreading. The core issue here is a Los Angeles culture that asks the police to do too much with too little.
The outcome is a police department that behaves like a fire department, constantly moving from one problem to the next without ensuring that the initial conditions that led to the problem are addressed. It is a dynamic that allows the more clever criminals to prosper.

Some have posited that the crime reductions in 2003 and First Half 2004 were results of the Department “picking the low-hanging fruit.” Chief Bratton has warned that “additional significant, permanent, and citywide reductions in crime in the City of Los Angeles will be increasingly harder to achieve without the infusion of more resources.”

The LAPD currently works at full capacity and has produced the crime reduction successes of recent months. If the necessary resources are made available, as outlined in this Plan, further and dramatic reduction in crime will be realized. Los Angeles can become the safest big city in America. Every Los Angeles neighborhood can be safe. Without additional resources, a crime-reduction momentum will be difficult to sustain. Whether the public understands this or not is unclear. What is clear is that, in the past, the socioeconomic and cultural divisions within the City have prevented residents coming together to demand that the LAPD be given the proper support to mount a truly effective response to crime citywide and terrorist threats.

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“THE PROBLEM IN THE STREETS IS THAT YOU HAVE ONE PATROL CAR GO THROUGH A NEIGHBORHOOD, AND WHEN A GANG MEMBER WATCHES IT GO PAST, HE KNOWS THAT ANOTHER CAR WON’T BE ALONG FOR ANOTHER TWENTY MINUTES, AND SO HE GOES AND COMMITS A CRIME.”

— Deputy Chief Gerry Chaleff
LAPD Consent Decree Bureau
Former President, Los Angeles Police Commission

“I’M A NIGHTMARE WALKIN’, PSYCHOPATH TALKIN’
KING OF MY JUNGLE, JUST A GANGSTER STALKIN’
LIVIN’ LIFE LIKE A FIRECRACKER, QUICK IS MY FUSE
VENDETTAS OF DEATH BACK THE COLORS I CHOOSE
RED OR BLUE, CUZ OR BLOOD, IT JUST DON’T MATTER
SUCKER, DIVE FOR YOUR LIFE WHEN MY SHOTGUN SCATTERS…”

– Rap lyric from Colors
A CHOICE BEFORE THE PEOPLE

Los Angeles is a city of second chances, a city of individualism and aspiration. It is a city where millions have come from many states and foreign lands to rediscover and reinvent themselves. It is a city defined by individual activity, not common effort. This dynamic has “fueled... an anti-urban ideal,” quoting William Fulton from his book, *The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles*. The result is a patchwork of communities whose identities are centered on the idea that they are “not Los Angeles.”

Again in Mr. Fulton’s words, Los Angeles today is a “huge metropolis in self-denial about what it is.”

“...THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS THAT ONCE CHARACTERIZED THE INNER CITY ALONE NOW AFFLICT ALL COMMUNITIES AND, TO A LESSER BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT EFFECT, ALL NEIGHBORHOODS...CRIME MAY RISE OR FALL DEPENDING ON THE YEAR OR THE PLACE, BUT IT STRIKES IN CITIES, IN SUBURBS, EVEN IN SMALL TOWNS WHERE, ACCORDING TO CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, IT HAS NO BUSINESS GOING. IN LOS ANGELES TODAY...THE CONTAINMENT POLICY HAS FAILED. THERE ARE NO SUBURBS HERE. THERE IS ONLY A MIRROR REFLECTING THE PATHOLOGY OF OUR SOCIETY INTO EVERY COMMUNITY.”

– The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles

Indeed, there are no longer “cocoon suburbs” (as Fulton says) in fact, only in mind. And that reality means that Los Angeles needs to evolve attitudinally from a collection of disparate communities to a place that has common identity and common aspirations if it is to realize its full potential as a world-class city.

The fate of every community is tied inextricably to the fate of the greater community. This fact is not more self-evident than in the matters of protection from crime and terrorist threats. Given this, certain actualities must be faced:

- Los Angeles has too few police by every objective measure. This has allowed entrenchment of gangs and the violence they propagate, exerting a phenomenal negative impact on the City. In effect, it has spawned an arms race between the lawless and the police. There is very much an urban war in our midst. Do the people of Los Angeles...
want a City where the police may need to carry machine guns to secure people’s safety? This cannot be where we really want to go.

• LAPD technology is antiquated, ad hoc, not integrated, and not secure. There is no connectivity that allows coordinated response to regional threats. This leaves our protectors, the police, deprived of timely intelligence in their contest with criminals and puts them at greater risk. This leaves the City’s people and assets highly vulnerable to catastrophic terrorist attack. Do the people of Los Angeles expect protection from 21st century threats with 20th century technology? This cannot be what we truly think.

The LAPD can continue with present resources to do what it has been doing, putting out crime flare-ups. In the past year and a half, it has shown that it can be a more assertive force while acting lawfully and in collaboration with the communities it serves. But with current manpower and technology, it is not reasonable to expect the Department to extinguish the spread of gang tyranny, or provide expanded counter-terrorism protection for this city.

Or, the people of Los Angeles can unite as one city and empower the LAPD to become what it needs to be, a properly staffed and resourced force, not only to protect people’s lives, but also to secure the people’s investments in housing, infrastructure, and commercial, civic, and cultural assets.

And these investments are great:

• Housing in Los Angeles County in 2003 appreciated a remarkable 21.6% with nearly every neighborhood benefiting from a significant one-year increase.53

• Over $2 billion has been invested since 1999 in seven major civic and cultural real estate projects Downtown visible in such buildings as Staples Center, The Walt Disney Concert Hall, and the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Angels.54
• About $2.2 billion in new development is planned for Downtown in the Grand Avenue Project regional center of offices, housing, a hotel, and retail; and in the Anschutz Entertainment Group’s Convention Center Hotel, specialty retail, and housing adjacent to Staples Center.55

• Twenty-six major Downtown building transactions in 2002 and 2003 totaling over $3 billion demonstrate one of the healthiest commercial real estate markets in the nation.56

• Between new and adaptive reuse construction, over 6,000 new residential units have been built or are being built Downtown since 1999 representing a major housing boom reclaiming the City’s center.57

• The Metro Gold Line light rail first phase connecting cities from Los Angeles to Pasadena was completed in July 2003 at a cost of $793 million; construction of the Foothill extension to Montclair now planned could begin as early as 2006.58

• Over $235 billion in trade flowed through the L.A. Customs district in 2003 making it the largest international trade center in the U.S.59

• The Los Angeles-Long Beach conjoined port ranks first in the nation in terms of cargo tonnage and containers handled.60

• In 2003, 22.7 million people visited Los Angeles overnight spending $11.3 billion.61

These investments – and many more could be listed – are the signs of rebirth. They signal, in the words of Chief Bratton, “a golden opportunity in the Golden State.” But the prize of urban renaissance is far from assured if the City remains known as much for gang violence as for its films and stars. If Los Angeles is to reach the tipping point beyond which positive momentum becomes irreversible, it must act, not as a collection of communities, but as one community with common aspirations and unified determination to protect its wealth, interests, and millions of people who can drive this city to uninterrupted record prosperity and cultural bloom.
TAKING BACK THE STREETS OF LOS ANGELES

Continuing significant and permanent crime reduction progress with existing resources cannot be promised. Critical enforcement units such as gangs and narcotics are understaffed. The investigative case backlog is high. Crime analysis backlogs are high. Thousands of warrants go unserved. Counter-terror readiness is under-resourced. Technology is archaic and improvements ad hoc. Today, the world has radically changed, and with it, the demands and responsibilities placed on the LAPD. Tactical prowess alone is no longer adequate to meet emerging threats.

THE NEED TO EXPAND LAPD FORCE SIZE

The argument for expansion is compelling. The largest cities in our nation with low ratios of officers per capita, with one exception, have experienced increases in violent crime in recent years. The largest cities with proper ratios have experienced significant reductions in crime during the same period. Although not a strict correlation because of other variables (more effective policing by LAPD is one example), the relationship between force strength and crime incidence cannot be ignored.

<p>| TEN LARGEST U.S. CITIES RATIOS OF OFFICERS TO POPULATION COMPARED TO VIOLENT CRIME TRENDS |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002 Population</th>
<th>Officers per 1,000 People</th>
<th>% Change in Violent Crime 1999-2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>8,084,693</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>2,938,299</td>
<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, PA</td>
<td>1,524,226</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, CA</td>
<td>1,268,346</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix, AZ</td>
<td>1,404,938</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>1,241,481</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>3,830,561</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, TX</td>
<td>2,040,583</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas, NV</td>
<td>1,153,546</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio, TX</td>
<td>1,195,592</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1U.S. Census estimates.  
2Ratios based on force size from Labor Relations Information Service, Police Officer Wage and Benefit Survey, 2002, except San Diego, courtesy of the SDPD, and Los Angeles which is current LAPD budgeted strength. 
3FBI, Crime in the United States, totals do not include rape.
There is recent evidence from Los Angeles itself that increased force strength, when strategically deployed and relentlessly focused, drives down crime significantly.

- In late November 2002, LAPD implemented a crime suppression initiative in the City’s most violent 31 reporting districts which fall within four Police Areas; 224 additional officers were assigned to this initiative. By May 28, 2003, when the initiative ended, violent crime had declined in each. On average: in the Southeast Area’s four districts, -31%; in the Newton Area’s nine districts, -22%, in the Southwest Area’s 13 districts, -29%; in the 77th Street Area’s five districts, -6%. Of particular note, homicides in the 77th Street Area declined 57% during this initiative.

**12,500 LAPD OFFICERS ARE NEEDED IN TOTAL IF LOS ANGELES IS TO BE THE SAFEST BIG CITY IN AMERICA**

Needed are more police officers dedicated exclusively to suppression of criminal gang activity to free gang-infested neighborhoods, ensure “safe” neighborhoods are truly safe, and protect the City’s youth who are its future.

Needed are more officers to better staff narcotics enforcement and warrants enforcement, police activities offering great promise for rapid and dramatic reduction in violent crime.

Needed are more officers to ensure that every criminal case is quickly investigated and properly disposed so that career criminals are removed and kept off the streets.

Needed are more officers dedicated to stopping the trade and possession of illegal weapons to stem shootings of the innocent.

Needed are more officers to better staff the patrol function in order to put more police officers on the street for the proactive work of crime suppression, and to shorten response time to emergency 9-1-1 calls.

Needed are more officers to staff the three new Area stations now in construction or planning, so officers will not need to be transferred from other critical assignments for that purpose.
Needed are more Senior Lead Officers to engage with community groups to make certain that the primary community-policing tenet of problem solving through public/police collaboration becomes an institutionalized LAPD practice.

Needed are more officers to ensure that Los Angeles has an around-the-clock world-class counter-terrorism capability to respond to terrorist threats and simultaneous attacks on its people and assets.

Needed to take back the streets of Los Angeles is an increase in LAPD force size from the present budgeted strength of 9,241 officers to 12,500 officers.

Even with an expansion in force size to 12,500, a 35% increase over present budgeted strength, Los Angeles would still trail most other large cities significantly on ratios of officers to population and land area.

But the LAPD is not just any police department. Its inherent strengths that underpin its reputation as tactically the best police agency in America cannot be discounted. This is the LAPD, after all, that achieved seven straight years of dramatic crime reduction in the 1990s doing far more with far less than many other large city police department in the nation. Unsurpassed professionalism coupled with a long history of budget constraints has fostered maximum utilization of available resources and innovation in crime-fighting deployment and strategies. This operational productivity is again evident in the 2003 crime declines, declines that have continued through First Half 2004. But, as Chief Bratton has warned, additional and significant reductions in crime will be increasingly difficult to achieve without more resources. With a force size of 12,500 officers, even though force size ratios to population and land area would remain well below those of most other large cities with declining crime, the LAPD can and will deliver sustainable low levels of crime in every Los Angeles neighborhood.

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**OFFICER RATIOS TO POPULATION AND LAND AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Officers per 1,000 People</th>
<th>Officers per Sq. Mi.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Los Angeles with an LAPD force size of 12,500 officers</strong></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>128.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Officer totals from Labor Relations Information Systems, Officer Wage and Benefit Survey, 2002; City land area from World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2000; City population from U.S. Census estimates.
AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN FORCE BUILD-UP NOW

On the November ballot this year, voters will consider a measure to increase the sales tax on goods and services purchased in Los Angeles County by a half-cent on the dollar. Passage of this measure, requiring approval by two-thirds of the County’s voters, would generate about $560 million a year for public safety needs countywide. Benefiting from passage would be the District Attorney, the Public Defender, County jails, a new regional communications system, Sheriff’s patrols in unincorporated areas, and police departments in 88 cities in the County (40 of which contract with the Sheriff’s Department for police services). A primary beneficiary would be the Los Angeles Police Department. LAPD would receive about 29% of these new tax revenues, $160 million annually beginning March 2005. Use of these revenues would be restricted to hiring and support of additional officers.64

It is projected that these funds would allow the LAPD to hire 1,260 additional officers. This would increase force size to 10,501, an increase of 14% over present budgeted strength. In addition to compensation for the additional officers, the costs of Department infrastructure changes to attract and support the new hires – recruitment, training, overtime, technology and equipment, facilities, vehicles, and 128 new civilian positions – would be covered.65

- The cost of this sales tax increase for each City resident would be between 11 and 18 cents a day, estimates the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Passage of this measure could help secure the dividend of economic prosperity experienced in other cities that would ensue from sustained low levels of crime and effective deterrence of terrorist activity.

If the sales tax increase is approved by County voters in November, the 1,260 additional officers it would fund would be deployed principally to the 18 present and 3 new geographic Areas:

750 to Area Stations – additional officers to each of the 18 present Areas, and to staff enforcement and support positions in the new North Valley Station scheduled to open in spring 2005, and later to the new Valley and Mid-City Stations, with the exact number in each Area to be determined by service demand and crime incidence – this would allow Area Captains to provide
better patrol service for each Basic Car Area, allow Area officers at all ranks to be more proactive in preventing and solving crime problems in their neighborhoods, and enhance officer safety; the benefits would be increased police presence on the street and improved response time to calls for service.

228 to Gang Enforcement to suppress criminal gang activities begetting much of the violence now occurring in Los Angeles – deployed to LAPD Area commands based on gang-related crime incidence.

168 additional Senior Lead Officers, doubling their number and reinforcing the LAPD’s commitment to community policing, a critically acclaimed resource.

64 to Narcotics Enforcement to allow additional Buy Teams to support gang suppression initiatives.

And because of the high urgency of enhancing counter-terrorism preparedness,

50 to increase staffing of the Critical Incident Management Bureau to improve LAPD’s capability to quickly and effectively respond to terrorist threats and simultaneous attacks, as well as natural disasters.

In addition, passage of the sales tax increase would allow the Department to hire 128 civilian personnel who would be assigned primarily to those civilian positions now staffed by sworn officers, freeing these officers to return to enforcement duties.

If the sales tax measure is approved, First Assistant Chief James McDonnell, Director of the Office of Human Resources, will develop a plan for accelerating the recruitment and training processes, without lowering present high standards, that will allow this 1,260 officer build-up to be achieved in four years.
MEETING HIGHEST STANDARDS IN THE BUILD-UP
Mindful of the warnings of the Christopher Commission in response to the Rodney King Incident and the LAPD Board of Inquiry into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident, recruitment background checks, and the training and supervision of new recruits resulting from this build-up, would be comprehensive and rigorous.

- The background check of every police candidate would continue to be thorough and uncompromising to ensure that recruits entering the Academy are of high caliber.
- A new model for Academy training and field training and supervision would be created to introduce new officers to crime-fighting duties under close supervision of experienced officers working in field enforcement teams.
- A strict supervisory ratio would be maintained as force strength grows.
- Recruitment efforts to attract minority and female candidates would be expanded to ensure that the Department as a whole continues to reflect the diverse population of Los Angeles.

PHASED INCREASES IN FORCE BUILD-UP
If the sales tax measure is approved by County voters this November, crime reduction trends will be closely tracked against LAPD growth to 10,500 officers over four years. If acceleration in the rate of crime decline is not sufficient, or if officers are still stretched too thin to be safe enough, to achieve the goal of making Los Angeles the safest big city in America, Chief Bratton will work assiduously with Mayor Hahn and the Los Angeles City Council to find ways to finance a further expansion in phases until the 12,500-officer LAPD recommended in this Plan is achieved.

A LAPD force size of 12,500 sworn officers would allow, in addition to the deployment of the 1,260 additional officers the sales tax increase would fund detailed above, the deployment of:
1,000 officers to Citywide Mobile Anti-Crime Task Forces – deployed as crime conditions and Department priorities dictate, for:

**Gang Enforcement** – this would further augment initiatives to suppress criminal gang activities, deployed to LAPD Area commands based on gang-related crime incidence, and all dedicated to new programs such as gang prevention, gang intervention, and gang member rehabilitation.

**Narcotics Interdiction** – this would allow detectives to make cases against street sellers through relentless buy-and-bust tactics (there is only one Buy Team working the entire City today); to make cases against mid- and upper-level drug dealers, including gang enterprises, by infiltrating the distribution system; to allow for on-going training in surveillance without reducing officer presence on the street; and to enable the LAPD to increase its commitments to local, regional and federal task forces working to eradicate illegal drug commerce.

**Criminal Investigations** – this would eliminate the large case backlog detectives are now facing, improve arrest and case clearance rates, and expand focus on property crimes.

**Warrant Service** – this would greatly improve investigation and apprehension of wanted fugitives now numbering over 18,000.

**Firearms Enforcement** – this would allow a more dedicated focus on sellers and buyers of illegal weapons, as well as better collaboration with gang detectives and narcotics detectives to identify and eliminate the nexus between gangs, drugs, and guns.

949 to Area Assignments – additional officers to each of the 18 present Areas and the soon to open North Valley Area, and to properly staff the new Valley and Mid-City Stations now in the planning stage, with the exact number in each Area to be determined by service demand and crime incidence – this would allow Area Captains to provide comprehensive patrol service for each Basic Car Area, allow all officers at all ranks to be proactive in preventing and solving crime problems in their neighborhoods, and further bolster officer safety.
to fully staff the Critical Incident Management Bureau at a proper level – this would allow around the clock capability to ensure that the LAPD can quickly and effectively respond to terrorist threats and simultaneous attacks, as well as to natural disasters; to seek out and investigate all threats of any manner to the people of Los Angeles; to cultivate confidential informants for advance notice of terrorist activities; and to train all LAPD personnel thoroughly on response to the most likely critical incident scenarios.

A build-up to 12,500 police officers would not only deploy more enforcement strength to ensure that every City neighborhood safe, it would also build upon efficiencies in operations being achieved today through wider supervision, better collaboration among units, and streamlined processes.

A comprehensive workload and needs analysis will be developed to determine the specific deployment allocation of additional officers over the multi-year build-up to recommended force strength.

With or without passage of the sales tax increase this year, a significant increase in LAPD force size is needed if LAPD is to deliver on the goal of making and keeping Los Angeles the safest big city in America.

THE NEED FOR 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGY TO FIGHT 21ST CENTURY CRIME

21st Century threats demand 21st Century tools for effective response. The LAPD will identify and secure funding for technology essential for successful conduct of its mission as defined by Chief Bratton’s three overarching priorities set forth in Book I of this Plan. Urgently needed is “enterprise” technology that updates and integrates LAPD databases and systems. Critically needed is integration of criminal justice information systems regionally. Strategically needed are the technological tools of modern crime-fighting. These technology needs are described fully in LAPD Plan of Action: Book 1.

The cost of bringing the LAPD into the 21st Century technologically is an investment that will likely seem high when reliable estimates are obtained based on detailed specifications and competitive bids.
But as with increased force size, it will be a small price for significant crime reduction, protection from terrorist threats, and greatly enhanced officer safety. And in fact, the estimated savings new technology would yield should more than offset its procurement cost.

**COST SAVINGS FROM NEW TECHNOLOGY**

Updated and integrated technological systems in place in other large urban police departments have produced substantial savings, both in terms of actual money as the consolidated systems require less maintenance, and freeing the time of police officers to concentrate on enforcement duties.

The estimate of the savings of systems consolidation, most urgently needed, is $19 million annually in labor/data entry, or the equivalent of 193 full-time officers based on a similar system implemented in Chicago.66

When the anticipated benefits of an estimated $50 million investment in a paperless system and new investigative tools for detectives are included, estimated savings would be an additional $67 million for a total of $86 million annually.67

- Timesavings from a paperless system would reduce the amount of time officers spend completing reports from 33% to 10%, LAPD estimates, and equate to hiring an additional 500 full-time officers a year, or $50 million saved.68

- Timesavings for detectives would equate to an additional 360,000 hours per year, the equivalent of hiring 173 full-time officers, or $17 million saved.69

The above figures do not take into account savings from *Operation Archangel*, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security-funded technology that would allow rapid and coordinated police/fire/EMS response in the event of terrorist attack or natural disaster. This pioneering technology offers no precedent on which a reliable savings estimate can be based. But given the magnitude of loss in such emergencies, savings in property, not to mention lives, would be substantial.

**ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST SAVINGS PROPOSED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Near Term</th>
<th>Longer Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems Consolidation</td>
<td>$19 million</td>
<td>$19 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paperless System</td>
<td></td>
<td>$50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative tools for detectives</td>
<td></td>
<td>$17 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>$19 million</td>
<td>$86 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPD

---

*COST SAVINGS FROM NEW TECHNOLOGY SHOULD GREATLY OFFSET ITS PROCUREMENT COSTS.*
Infrastructure consolidation and delivery of new systems for detectives would require approximately one year to implement following Department approval and the securing of funding for the projects, while the paperless system, *Operation Archangel*, and the development of a regional information system would require on-going multi-year funding sources.

Funding for procurement of new technology will be sought primarily through federal and other grants.

The time has come to remove the technology handicap that has greatly impeded LAPD productivity and placed at unnecessary risk the safety of both police officers and the people of Los Angeles.

**THE COST FOR A SAFE LOS ANGELES**

What is the total cost of an expanded force and new technology as recommended here? What would it cost City taxpayers initially? And annually thereafter? How much of these costs could be funded by government and foundation grants? These questions cannot now be answered with exactness at this time. The variables are many. A detailed plan will be developed that projects or determines:

- The practical number of additional officers that can be hired each year until recommended force strength is achieved.

- The number of officers now employed that would need to be promoted to supervisory positions.

- The cost of expanding training facilities and instruction.

- The cost of new station facilities, vehicles, and equipment to support the additional officers hired.

- A precise cost for each technology component based on detailed specifications and vendor bids.

- The timing for a phased introduction of the suite of technology components.
• The maintenance cost savings resulting from new technology.

• The identification of grants opportunities and foundation interest to fund each of these new technology components.

Whatever the costs that will be more precisely projected in the near future, the needs for additional officers and new technology are urgent if the City is not only to maintain its economic and cultural position today, but also flourish as it moves forward in the 21st Century. And the people of Los Angeles should not forget the significant economic growth other cities have experienced from dramatic reductions in crime. And dramatic crime reductions will be the outcome of an expanded and technologically equipped LAPD.

ECONOMICS OF CRIME REDUCTION

While the pool of research examining the direct relationship between crime and a city’s economy is shallow, research that does exist finds that the public cost of urban violent crime is indeed substantial. A reduction in violent crime, such as last year’s decrease of 6%, and this year’s 14% decrease through October 9, can result in hundreds of millions of dollars in savings ultimately benefiting the taxpayer.\(^70\), \(^71\)

• In 2002, Part I crimes in the City of Los Angeles cost an estimated $4.2 billion in private and taxpayer expense.\(^72\)

• The 4.2% decrease in Part I crime in 2003 produced savings of more than $639 million.\(^73\)

• But Part I crime still had enormous cost for private and public sectors of the City combined: in First Half of 2004, more than $1.5 billion.\(^74\)

• Shooting-related injuries represent a sizeable portion of this economic cost in terms of treatment, both directly and indirectly borne by the residents of Los Angeles.\(^75\)

– The Los Angeles County Department of Health’s Injury and Violence Protection Program estimated that the average cost in 2002 of treating a non-fatal gunshot victim at L.A. County
hospitals was $65,031 per victim, not including physician fees, ambulance services, ongoing therapy, etc. This amounts to a cost of more than $157.6 million.

– The study also noted that 59% of victims were covered by tax-funded Medicaid, meaning that their hospital bills were almost entirely paid with taxpayer dollars. For these victims, the average cost of treatment was $79,000.

– The estimated taxpayer burden of treating shooting victims in Los Angeles in 2003, based on these calculations, was more than $113.0 million.

### MONETARY IMPACT OF GUNSHOT INJURIES, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg. hospital cost per victim</td>
<td>$65,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.A. gunshot victims x 2,424</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs</strong></td>
<td>$157,635,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. hospital cost per victim for 59% on Medicare or Medicaid</td>
<td>$79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated number of victims x 1,430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost to taxpayers</strong></td>
<td>$112,970,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WE’VE PROVEN THAT REDUCING CRIME AND IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE – BESIDES BEING THE RIGHT THINGS TO DO – ARE ALSO THE KEYS TO STIMULATING NEW YORK CITY’S ECONOMY.”**

— Rudolph W. Giuliani, Speech, October 23, 1997

**REDUCTION IN CRIME FOSTERS ECONOMIC VITALITY**

One exploratory position paper examining the relationship between national unemployment figures and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports data suggests a strong positive correlation between unemployment levels and both violent crime and property crime. Another study shows that “although crime rates are found to be significantly determined by both the wages and unemployment rates of less educated males... a sustained long-term decrease in crime rates will depend on whether the wages of less skilled men continue to improve.”

• The reduction in crime in high-crime neighborhoods will foster economic vitality in these neighborhoods creating job opportunities. The higher employment rate and better wages that result will help sustain lower crime levels and contribute to the economy through growth in neighborhood commerce. A higher employment rate and a growing economy will contribute to an expanded tax base.

The reductions in crime in 2003 may be one reason why last year’s real estate boom, in which housing prices citywide appreciated on average an astonishing 21.6% in one year, benefited virtually every neighborhood of the City regardless of crime incidence. Other cities that have reduced crime dramatically and lastingly have seen rapid economic rebounds.

• In New Orleans in 2002, six years after the introduction of Compstat, the highly successful crime analysis and accountability process now employed by the LAPD, violent crime had declined 59%. Over this period, the average residential home value increased 46%,
residential construction increased 22%, commercial construction increased 207%, and property tax revenues increased 19%.

- In New York City in 2002, nine years after the introduction of Compstat, violent crime had declined 58%. Over this period, the number of private sector jobs increased by 430,000, home ownership increased by over 10%, total visitor spending increased 65%, the total number of overnight visitors increased 54%, and population, after years of slow decline, grew to over 8 million people for the first time in the city’s history.

While these are just two examples of a successful turnaround, they point to the benefits of lower crime that can accrue to a city. Increasing the safety and security of all residents will make Los Angeles a more attractive place to live, to work, and to visit, ultimately driving economic growth.

THE PEOPLE OF LOS ANGELES MUST DECIDE

It will be argued that the costs of increasing the Department’s size to 10,500 officers, and perhaps eventually to 12,500 officers, and acquiring 21st century technology are too high; that any new investment in the LAPD should be balanced with investment in other resource-strapped components of the criminal justice equation – intervention, prosecution, incarceration, probation, rehabilitation. But if public safety is the public mandate, then this is a sophistic argument. To limit the level of police enforcement needed to protect the people and assets of Los Angeles because the courts and jails and other institutions have needs would be a case of the tail wagging the dog. A properly resourced LAPD will be a deterrent to criminal activity thereby ultimately producing fewer demands on the other criminal justice agencies. And if the sales tax increase is approved in November, other criminal justice agencies will also benefit from these new revenues.

The residents of Los Angeles need to think seriously about the choice before them. The LAPD can continue with present resources to make incremental progress against high crime, but it will not be able to suppress...
fully gang tyranny or provide as strong a shield against terrorist threat that the exposure of Los Angeles as a primary target demands. Or, with resolve and the will, Angelinos can empower their police with the support needed to prevail over criminal and terrorist violence.

THE PEACE DIVIDEND FROM DRAMATIC CRIME REDUCTION

The cost of increasing the size of the LAPD eventually to 12,500 officers, the number we believe is needed to achieve and sustain low levels of crime in every Los Angeles neighborhood, would be a modest investment for each City resident in consideration of the enormous peace dividend that would accrue paid out to all in greater public safety, improved quality of life, and dynamic economic growth.

The people of Los Angeles must decide whether or not this investment in the Los Angeles Police Department is reasonable for securing one of the world’s great cities that happens to be their city, their home, and their future.
“THIS IS THE CITY. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.

465 SQUARE MILES OF CONSTANTLY INTERFACING HUMANITY…

REPRESENTING EVERY RACE, COLOR, CREED AND PERSUASION, THAT GOD, NO MATTER HOW HE IS WORSHIPPED, CHOSE IN HIS INFINITE WISDOM TO DEPOSIT HERE IN THE CULTURAL NEXUS OF THE PACIFIC RIM.

ALMOST FOUR MILLION PEOPLE WORK AND PLAY HERE. AND LIKE ANY OTHER PLACE ANYWHERE, THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE IT AND THOSE WHO WANT IT. THOSE WHO HAVE IT, ENJOY IT, NO MATTER HOW THEY GOT IT. THOSE WHO WANT IT CAN GET IT BY ATTEMPTING TO BETTER THEMSELVES IN A SYMPATHETIC COMMUNITY POPULATED BY DECENT CITIZENS CHEERING THEM ON. OR THEY CAN TRY TO TAKE IT THE EASY WAY. BECAUSE EVEN IN THE CITY OF ANGELS, FROM TIME TO TIME, SOME HALOS SLIP. THAT'S WHERE I COME IN, DOING MY JOB TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY ON A DAILY BASIS. I WORK HERE. I CARRY A BADGE.”

– Joe Friday in Dragnet
ENDNOTES

4 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, August 2004.
15 LAPD Information Technology Division, July 2004. This figure for juvenile shooting victims is a low estimate, as all victims of unknown age were excluded.
16 Leovy, Jill. “Slain Youth was not Allowed to be Neutral!” *Los Angeles Times*, October 3, 2003: B1.
17 Constance L. Rice, Co-Director, Advancement Project - Los Angeles. Interview with former Grape Street Crips gang member, that included viewing of the referenced video tape. September 2004.
21 Ibid.
29 LAPD Robbery-Homicide Division, September 2004. This figure is an approximation, as in 
several cases when multiple shots were fired, the officers involved could only approximate 
the number of shots they heard, and bullet casings were not always recovered.
30 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
 Retrieved October 19, 2004 from 
 Retrieved 8/12/04 from 
41 Krikorian, Greg and Andrew Blankstein. “FBI Warns Police of Possible Terror Attack.” 
46 Boston Police Department, November 2003.
47 Sources for population and area data in “Land Area and Police Force Size” table: The World 
48 For a comprehensive breakdown of these numbers, see Book I of the LAPD Plan of Action. 
Sources: LAPD Medical Liaison Office, LAPD Fiscal Operations Division, and LAPD Personnel 
Records Division, September 2004.
50 Guccione, Jean, Richard Winton, and Anna Gorman. ‘Jail Inmates Freed Early to Save 
51 “Accessory to Murder: The Justice System Failed Mary Cortez.” Los Angeles Daily News, April 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
54 “Facts and Figures.” Los Angeles Downtown Center Business Improvement District. 
55 Los Angeles Grand Avenue Committee. Retrieved May 3, 2004 from 
57 Ibid.
63 LAPD 77th Street Crime Analysis Division, October 14, 2004.
65 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
71 To calculate cost of crime figures for the following three bullets, cost estimates per victimization by Part I crime from the NIJ report were multiplied by the totals for each type of Part I crime in Los Angeles in 2002 and 2003, taken from the FBI Preliminary Uniform Crime Report for 2003. As the NIJ cost estimates are in 1993 dollars, the cost estimates were then adjusted to reflect 1H 2004 consumer buying power in Los Angeles, using Consumer Price Index conversions without seasonal adjustments (Source: U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, “1993 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for the U.S. City Average for All Items, 1982-84=100” and “2004 Consumer Price Index for the Los Angeles MSA for All Items, 1982-84=100.” Retrieved 9/21/04 from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm). These are estimates only and are likely to be low, as the NIJ researchers included attempted Part I crimes, such as attempted robbery, into the average cost of a Part I crime victimization. Attempted crimes tend to carry a lower cost to society and the victim than successful crimes.
72 Miller et al, “Victim Costs.”
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Los Angeles County Department of Health Injury and Violence Prevention Program, January 2004. The hospitals under study include L.A. County/USC Medical Center and Olive View Medical Center, located within the City of Los Angeles. Shooting victim numbers for 2002 are from LAPD Information Technology Division, January 2004.
79 DataQuick, “Southland Sales Surge.”
THE PRODUCTION COST OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS GRACIOUSLY DONATED BY THE

Los Angeles Police Foundation